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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses upon the operation of plant-level industrial relations in Germany, 
and the role of the works council in particular, and does so by observing the way in 
which occupational health and safety, an issue upon which the works councils enjoy a 
right of co-determination in managerial decision-making, is addressed in the 
workplace. Case studies were carried out in seven companies in the metal-working 
industry, and the findings presented are based upon the results of a questionnaire 
survey amongst the employees and the works councillors, structured interviews with 
the employers and the health and safety personnel, and the observation of meetings of 
the prevalent health and safety-related fora. 
The information gleaned from the seven case-study companies revealed that there was 
a clear preference for cooperation over confrontation in the health and safety arena, 
with the legislative provisions, the dislike of third-party intervention, the inherent 
conflict between safety and profit, the apathy of the employees, and the inability of 
either the employers or the works councillors to address such issues alone, influential 
in this regard. Whilst variables such as company size, union density, and the direct 
involvement of the chairman of the works council were found to exert no significant 
influence upon the efficacy of the health and safety structures, the availability of 
financial resources and the commitment of management to an improvement in working 
conditions were identified as being of vital importance. 
The thesis concludes by suggesting that the works councils were not operating as 
representative bodies of the workforce at plant level, but instead, were mediating 
between the demands made by their electorate and the capabilities of the company 
within which they operate. The legislative provisions, it is argued, are instrumental in 
encouraging the works councillors to adopt this intermediary or cooperative stance. 
111 
"While the murderer in the high street is almost certain to face years of 
incarceration, killers in the boardroom walk free. " (Moore 1991: 28) 
0 Naim Salter 1996 
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CHAPTER ONE - PLANT-LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND 
THE ISSUE OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY: A 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Industrial relations studies the relationship between employer and employee in paid 
employment: the ways in which employees are rewarded, motivated, trained and 
disciplined, together with the influence on these processes of the major institutions 
involved, namely managements, trade unions and the state. (Edwards 1995: 3) 
This thesis concerns itself with the dynamics of this relationship between the employers 
and their employees at plant level' in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). By 
examining the way in which the issue of occupational health and safety is addressed in 
seven companies in the metal-working industry, it attempts to draw conclusions about, 
and provide an explanation for, the nature of this relationship in practice. 
In pursuit of this goal, this introductory chapter begins by providing the reader with an 
overview of the particular nature of German industrial relations. This is followed by an 
introduction to the works council (Betriebsrat): a statutory body, which if elected by the 
workforce in companies with upwards of five employees, negotiates with the employer on 
behalf of its electorate. The penultimate section examines the significance of the issue of 
occupational health and safety as an analytical tool, and the chapter closes with a brief 
description of the layout of the thesis as a whole. 
I The terms `plant level' and `micro level' are employed, and refer to the situation in the 
workplace, as opposed to `sectoral level', where the industrial unions and the employers' associations are 
operational. 
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1.2 German Industrial Relations: The Nature of the Model 
With reference to three of its most striking characteristics -a high degree of juridification, 
or legal regulation, a dual system of interest representation, and a comparatively low 
propensity for industrial conflict - this section examines the wider framework within which 
plant-level industrial relations operate in Germany. By adopting a historical perspective, it 
attempts to provide an explanation for these characteristics. 
As Gospel and Palmer (1993: 31) have indicated: 
An understanding of industrial relations requires some knowledge of political and 
economic history to understand the context within which industrial relations has 
developed, it also requires some knowledge of business and labour history in order 
to understand the origins and development of the main institutions of employers 
and employees. It also requires some understanding of politics and labour law so 
as to be able to understand how government action and legislation affects the 
actions of the parties and determines employment rules. 
1.2.1 A High Degree of Juridification 
Müller-Jentsch (1995: 15) has described the state as "the third actor on the industrial 
relations stage" (author's translation) in Germany, 2 and explains that it has regularly 
intervened to define not only the rights and duties, but also the limits of acceptable 
behaviour of the industrial relations actors. The result, he continues, is a "dense network 
of predominantly procedural rules, and restrictions placed on industrial action. " (Müller- 
Jentsch 1995: 15, author's translation) 
This situation is in stark contrast to the early stages of industrialisation during the 1850s 
when the relative absence of labour law enabled the entrepreneurs to exploit their 
2 The other two being the owners of capital and labour, and their respective representative bodies. 
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employees, who as a result of the expansion of the industrial centres at that time, 3 were 
only just beginning to organise themselves (Weitbrecht and Berger 1985: 484). 4 However, 
following German unification under Prussian domination in 1871,3 the juridification of 
German industrial relations -a process which has been described as a "steering 
mechanism" (Simitis 1984: 74, author's translation) - began in earnest. 
One of the earliest interventions by the newly unified German state in the industrial 
relations arena came in the form of the Socialism Law (Sozialistengesetz), which was 
introduced by Bismarck in 1878, in his capacity as Chancellor. This legislation served to 
prohibit all socialist union activity over a twelve-year period, and Bismarck justified this 
action by linking two assassination attempts on Kaiser Wilhelm I to the embryonic Social 
Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). It is generally 
accepted that Bismarck's actions were those of a man who feared the power of the labour 
movement, which according to Fürstenberg (1993: 177), had its origins in the failed 
revolution of 1848.6 The Socialism Law, it has been suggested, was introduced in an 
attempt to attract the working classes away from the ever increasing influence of this 
movement (Zwingmann #3 8)7. 
Before relinquishing his post in 1890, Bismarck left an indelible mark on the industrial 
relations arena when he introduced the world's first social security system. 8 Bismarck's 
legislation came in three parts and served to provide employees with financial support in 
the event of an accident, illness or old-age. Sandwiched between a compulsory Sickness 
Insurance Scheme (Krankenversicherung) of 1883, and an Infirmity Insurance Law 
3 10 per cent of the population were employed in factories by 1873, compared with a figure of just 
4 per cent in 1850 (Fulbrook 1994: 123). 
Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Workers Association (der Allgemeine Deutsche 
Arbeiterverein, ADA ') was the first workers' party. It was founded in 1863. Six years later, August Bebel 
and Wilhelm Liebknecht launched the Social Democratic Labour Party (die Sozialdemokratische 
Arbeiterpartei). These two merged in 1875 to form the Social Democratic Party (die Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, SPD) (Weitbrecht and Berger 1985; Fulbrook 1994). 
5 Before 1871 Germany consisted of numerous sovereign states which were held together in a loose 
confederation. Prussia and Austria dominated. 
6 The revolutionaries had demanded both national unity and social and political reforms at this 
time. 
This is a reference to Interview #38 conducted during a field trip to Germany (see Appendix 1). 
8 Social security has been described as the "central topic" in the late nineteenth century health and 
safety arena (Parmeggiani 1982: 271). 
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(Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung) of 1889, was the Accident Insurance Act 
(Unfallversicherung) of 1884.9 Introduced to alleviate the effects of industrialisation on 
the working classes, the social insurance legislation was demonstrative of the welfare 
aspect of Dahrendorf s description of late nineteenth century Germany as an "authoritarian 
welfare state" (Williams 1984: 131). 
As Fulbrook (1994: 134) has indicated: 
The welfare measures were not purely the result of machiavellian considerations or 
bread-and-circuses policies on the part of Bismarck. The depression which had 
started in the 1870s led to very real material distress, and growing disparities 
between rich and poor, which gave cause for concern to many members of German 
society in addition to Socialists. 
However, it is not inconceivable that this legislation was similar to the Socialism Law in 
the sense that its main aim was to attract the working classes away from the labour 
movement, which had continued to gain support, albeit unofficially, during the `Anti- 
Socialist' period. 10 In essence, "while suppressing the political activities of the working 
class with one hand, Bismarck appeared to be buying them off through welfare provisions 
with the other" (Fulbrook 1994: 134). 
State intervention continued throughout `Wilhelmine Germany', " and both in preparation 
for, and during the First World War, governments agreed to recognise the legitimacy of 
the unions as workforce representatives in an attempt to encourage cooperation rather 
than confrontation at a particularly sensitive time (Fulbrook 1994: 156-157). The 
introduction of the Auxiliary Service Act (Gesetz über den `Vaterländischen Hilfsdienst ) 
of 1916, which was designed to ensure the smooth running of the war economy 
(Weitbrecht and Berger 1985: 492), provided for the recognition of the unions and the 
formation of plant-level workers' committees (betriebliche Arbeiter- und 
9 This legislation was to be administered jointly by representatives of the employers and the 
employees, and was an attempt to bridge the gap between the two sides (Weitbrecht and Berger 1985: 
488). 
10 This refers to the period 1878-1890 when the Socialism Law was in force. 
II This refers to the period 1871-1918. 
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Angestelltenausschüsse), the latter enjoying consultative responsibilities in companies with 
upwards of 50 employees (Koch 1978: 13). 
This enforced cooperation between the employers and the unions continued after the 
cessation of hostilities in 1918 as the enormity of the challenge facing the defeated nation 
became apparent. This cooperative approach was institutionalised in November 1918 in 
the form of the Central Labour Community (Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft der industriellen 
und gewerblichen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer Deutschlands, ZAG), an arrangement 
which served to reaffirm union recognition and the acceptance of both collective 
agreements and the aforementioned workers' committees (Weitbrecht and Berger 1985: 
494). The juridification of industrial relations continued during the parliamentary Weimar 
Republic, which came into being in 1919.12 
Initial interventions were enshrined in the Weimar Constitution of 1919, and included the 
principles of freedom of association, union influence on wages and working conditions, 
the recognition and binding nature of free collective agreements, and the formation of 
workers' committees. The following year saw the introduction of the Works Council Law 
(Betriebsrätegesetz), which has been described as being the "breakthrough to the modem 
day idea of a Works Constitution" (Halbach et al. 1989: 298, author's translation). The 
Works Council Law provided for the election of works councils as representative bodies 
of the workforce in companies with upwards of 20 employees. These representative 
bodies were based upon the workers' committees of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, but unlike their predecessors, which had enjoyed only consultative 
responsibilities, the works councils of 1920 were compulsory, and were granted rights of 
participation at plant level. 
12 As Fulbrook (1994: 155) explains, the Weimar Republic "was born out of turmoil and defeat, 
under near civil-war conditions; it was hampered by a harsh peace settlement, and an unstable economy; it 
was consistently subjected to attacks from both left and right, as large numbers of Germans rejected 
democracy as a form of government; and little over 14 years after its inception, the Weimar Republic was 
ended when Adolf Hitler, as a constitutionally appointed chancellor, inaugurated one of the worst regimes 
known in human history. " 
14 
The suggestion that'the Works Council Law of 1920 was introduced as a reward for the 
employees in recognition of their contribution to the war effort is a little shallow. A more 
viable explanation is provided by Crouch (1993: 126), who indicated that the Communist 
Revolution of 1917 in Russia had raised awareness of the need to involve rather than to 
alienate the working classes. Further explanations make reference to the Council 
Movement (Rätebewegung) of workers and soldiers which was born out of the naval 
mutiny at Wilhelmshaven in 1918.13 Dahrendorf (1965: 195), for example, suggested that 
the Works Council Law was the Council Movement's reward for their part in bringing 
down the old regime. Kotthoff (1985: 66), meanwhile, claimed that the introduction of 
this law was in fact a defensive measure by the state, the employers and the unions against 
the revolutionary Council Movement. The unions, he explained, were granted supremacy 
at plant level, and the inclusion of an `absolute peace obligation' in the Works Council 
Law, which served to prohibit strike action, reduced the potential power and influence of 
the Council Movement (Kotthoff 1985: 66). 
The tradition of statutory intervention in the industrial relations arena was upheld 
throughout the period of National Socialism. Hitler disbanded the unions in May 1933, 
and with his Ordinance of National Labour (Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit), 
placed the employers in charge of plant-level industrial relations in January 1934. 
Statutory intervention has also been a permanent feature of post 1949 industrial relations 
in the FRG. The principles of freedom of association, free collective bargaining14 and the 
binding nature of collective agreements, enshrined in the constitution of the Weimar 
Republic, reappeared in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and the Collective Bargaining Law 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz, TVG) respectively in 1949. 
13 The mutiny served as the catalyst for the chain of events which led to the fall of the Second 
German Empire in November 1918, and to the leader of the SPD, Friedrich Ebert, assuming the position 
of imperial Chancellor. 
14 Free collective bargaining is the process whereby employers' associations and industrial unions 
conclude collective agreements, without statutory intervention, to regulate quantitative issues such as 
wages and working conditions (see Subsection 1.2.2). 
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Works councils re-emerged even earlier than this when, in 1946, the Allied Control 
Council Law No. 22 came into force. This legislation was implemented in different ways by 
the regional governments, and it was not until 1952, when the Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, WCA 1952) came onto the statute book to regulate industrial 
relations in private companies with between 5 and 2000 employees, that a unified 
approach to employee participation, or co-determination's (Mitbestimmung) in managerial 
decision-making at plant level, was adopted. The WCA 1952 was based on the Works 
Council Law of 1920 and provided for the election of a works council at plant level as a 
representative body for all employees in their dealings with their employers. 
Ideas of economic democracy, which had been discussed by Naphtali (1977) towards the 
end of the 1920s, came to fruition in 1951 when the Montan Co-Determination Law 
(Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz) was passed. This legislation, which is still in force today, 
has its origins in an informal agreement known as the `Dinkelbach Model', which provided 
for co-determination in the iron, coal and steel industries in the British zone of occupation 
as of 1947 (Lorenz 1995: 58). 16 
This informal agreement was challenged in 1948 when, with the division of Germany 
beginning to take shape, the Western Allies introduced legislation which required that the 
heavy industries be dismantled. This was never realised, and by May 1950, the intention 
was to reorganise the iron, coal and steel industries in an attempt to reduce the 
concentration of power and the potential for war. Such a reorganisation would not have 
incorporated the principles of co-determination enshrined in the `Dinkelbach Model'. In 
response, the unions threatened strike action. 
Faced with the possibility of industrial action in such key industries during the crucial 
period of reconstruction, the Federal Government decided to legalise the `Dinkelbach 
Model' in the form of the Montan Law. As with its predecessor, the Montan Law 
15 Co-determination is the process whereby employees participate in the running of companies. This 
participation takes the form of involvement either on the works council or on the supervisory board of 
joint-stock companies (see Subsection 1.2.2). 
16 The unions had been campaigning for the introduction of co-determination for some time 
(Hirsch-Weber 1959: 87). 
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provided for parity co-determination" on the supervisory board, and a protected position 
for the labour director" on the management board of joint-stock companies'9 in the iron, 
coal and steel industries. 20 Meanwhile, the WCA 1952 provided the employees with just 
one third of seats on the supervisory boards. 
The WCA 1952 was updated 20 years later, and the Works Constitution Act of 1972 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, WCA 1972), which retained many of the principles of 1952 
and 1920, now dominates plant-level industrial relations in the FRG. The WCA 1972 
continues to grant the works councils rights of participation in managerial decision- 
making, varying from simple rights of information, which require the employers to inform 
the works councils of their plans in advance, through rights of consultation, whereby the 
ideas of the works councils are to be heard but must not necessarily be observed, to actual 
rights of co-determination, which prevent the employers from acting without at first 
gaining the approval of the works councils. As Marsden (1995: 6) explains, "Workplace 
representation has given employees powerful channels for shared control on many work- 
related issues. " Lane (1989: 226), meanwhile, has indicated that these rights of 
participation enjoyed by the works councils could not have been attained without state 
intervention, a view which is shared by Müller-Jentsch (1995: 14). 
Of further significance in this regard was the passing of the Co-Determination Law 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz) in 1976, which served to extend the principle of parity co- 
determination on the supervisory board beyond the Montan industries to joint-stock 
companies with upwards of 2000 employees. However, this legislation required that the 
employees' representatives on the supervisory board comprise at least one `leading white- 
17 Parity co-determination describes the situation in joint-stock companies whereby the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) comprises equal numbers of representatives of the employers and the employees. The 
employees are also represented by a labour director on the management board (Vorstand). 
is This protected position for the labour director ensures that this individual cannot be removed 
from the management board against the wishes of the employees' representatives on the supervisory 
board. 
19 Streeck (1984a: 41) made reference to the two-tier structure of joint-stock companies with the 
supervisory board developing company policy and the management board, which is elected by the former, 
concerned with the day-to-day running of the company. 
20 See also Hirsch-Weber (1959). 
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collar employee'. 21 With such individuals more than likely to identify with the employer, 
there is little more than numerical parity on these supervisory boards in practice. 
Furthermore, the labour director on the management board is not granted a protected 
position by this legislation. 
Add the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung, GewO) of 1869, the Reich Insurance Code 
(Reichsversicherungsordnung, RVO) of 1911, the Works Safety Law 
(Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz) of 197422 (see Chapter Five), and labour law in general to this 
list of legislative interventions, 23 and a picture emerges of a highly juridified model of 
industrial relations. The situation in Germany stands in marked contrast to the principle of 
self-regulation or voluntarism, which until recently, has been the preferred mode of 
operation in Great Britain. 
As Williams (1984: 117) has indicated, "the German [industrial relations] system has 
developed largely on the basis of legislation and judicial interpretation of this legislation", 
and in attempting to explain the German approach to industrial relations, Williams (1984: 
132) suggests that the high degree of statutory intervention is a result of: 
... the effects of centuries of national, social, political and economic 
disunity which 
were eventually overcome by the establishment of the German empire under 
absolute Prussian control in 1871. The Prussian government encapsulated feudal 
political and social values, promoting absolute rule of the state and employers. 
Whilst the introduction of the Socialism Law and the passing of the Social Insurance 
legislation would support Williams' claim, the intervention of two World Wars in the 
twentieth century raises the question of how significant the influence of the Prussian state 
of the late nineteenth century can be for an explanation of the continued high degree of 
21 The German industrial relations terminology differentiates between blue-collar employees 
(Arbeiter), white-collar employees (Angestellte), and leading white-collar employees (leitende 
Angestellte). Lane (1989: 227) uses the term "employee of managerial status" to refer to the leading 
white-collar employees. 
22 The Works Safety Law came onto the statute book on December 15th 1973. §13(1), §14, §21 and 
§23(1) came into force on December 16th 1973. The legislation was eventually implemented in its entirety 
on December Ist 1974 (Kliesch et al. 1978: 53-54). 
23 All of these laws are of significance in the health and safety arena. 
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juridification of industrial relations since 1945. Crouch (1993) goes some way to 
providing an answer in his examination of state traditions by suggesting that, when faced 
with a choice, a country is more likely to retain a strategy with which it is familiar than to 
experiment with unknown and unaccustomed ideas (Crouch 1993: 349). 24 He explains: 
These arguments... testify to the power of continuity and help explain.. . the 
persistence of a recognisable German approach to organised interests despite the 
violent overthrow of three regimes and a major westward shift of geographical 
location of the German state during the course of the century. (Crouch 1993: 349) 
Williams' explanation of the significance of the Prussian tradition becomes more credible 
when considered in conjunction with Crouch's idea of continuity. Of equal importance in 
this respect is the idea raised by Unterseher (1972), who suggested that there was a 
"tradition of social conservatism" in Germany, which had led to an acceptance of state 
intervention in the industrial relations arena (Williams 1984: 120). In other words, the 
Germans accept, and indeed have come to rely upon, the statutory rules and regulations. 
This subsection demonstrates that the German state has continued to exercise control over 
industrial relations by intervening with legislation when signs of weakness have become 
apparent. The Works Council Law of 1920, introduced in order to prevent the alienation 
of the working classes, and the Montan Co-determination Law, introduced to avoid strike 
action during the period of reconstruction, 25 are just two examples of the fine tuning 
which highlight the juridification of industrial relations. 
24 The continuing applicability of the nineteenth century health and safety-related legislation (see 
Chapter Five), and the re-emergence of ideas from the Weimar Constitution after 1945, in the form of the 
TVG 1949 and the WCA 1952, support this theory of the power of continuity. 
25 See also Hirsch-Weber (1959). 
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1.2.2 The Dual System of Interest Representation 
Jacobi et al. (1992: 218) described the dual system of interest representation as the most 
important of four principles upon which the German model of industrial relations is 
based. 26 The dual system describes the arrangement whereby individual employers, or their 
associations, and industrial unions negotiate collective agreements to regulate quantitative 
issues - wages and working conditions - at sectoral level, and individual employers and 
works councils negotiate qualitative27 company specific accords to implement, and 
occasionally to supplement, these collective agreements. As Lane (1989: 203) explains, 
"There is a dual system of worker representation in Germany with competences and 
powers clearly divided between the unions and the works council. " 
This arrangement can be best explained if one imagines 16 strips of paper, joined at the 
top, each of which has a perforated horizontal line running through it. The 16 strips of 
paper represent the 16 branches of industry which correspond to the 16 unitary - 
politically and ideologically neutral - industrial unions, which were created in response to 
the ideological and political divisions of the pre-1933 union movement that had facilitated 
Hitler's rise to power. The upper portion of each strip of paper - above the perforated line 
- corresponds to the situation at sectoral level within each branch of industry. It is at this 
level that the relevant industrial union - IG Metall in the metal-working industry - 
negotiates with the corresponding employers' association - Gesamtmetall in the metal- 
working industry (see Figure 1.1). Their interaction is subject to the TVG 1949, which, as 
mentioned previously, enables them to conclude collective agreements to regulate wages 
and working conditions in their respective branches of industry. 
26 The other three principles referred to were the "extensive juridification", the "degree to which the 
institutions of collective representation encompass their constituencies", and the "relative centralisation of 
collective bargaining and the coordinated policies of the bargaining parties at sectoral level' (Jacobi et al. 
1992: 219). 
27 Streeck (1981: 152) includes issues such as the hours of work, safety rules and regulations, 
employment security, and job classification amongst these qualitative matters. 
20 
Figure 1.1: The Dual System - Strips of Paper: The Metal-Working Industry 
SECTORAL LEVEL 
----------- 
PLANT LEVEL 
IG METALL f-i GESAMTMETALL 
Collective Agreements 
-------------------- 
Company #1 Company #2 Company #3 
WC 41E WCf-º E WC`-ºE 
111 
Plant Agreements Plant Agreements Plant Agreements 
The lower portion of each strip of paper - below the perforated line - represents the 
situation at plant level, which remains the focus for this thesis. This lower portion is 
divided into thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of thinner strips, each representing 
an individual company. The WCA 1972 regulates industrial relations within the individual 
companies and provides for the election of a works council (WC) to represent the interests 
of all blue and the white collar employees in their dealings with their employers (E). The 
WCA 1972 also grants the works councils rights of participation in managerial decision- 
making, ranging from simple rights of information to actual rights of co-determination. As 
Jacobi et al. (1992: 243) explain however, "the potential for works council intervention in 
managerial decision-making decreases the more closely it [the issue] impinges on business 
policy", and as Section 1.3 explains, the right of co-determination is reserved for the 
regulation of social28 and personne129 issues. 
28 The social issues are enshrined in §§87-89 WCA 1972 and include questions of working time, 
health and safety and holiday arrangements. 
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The dual system of interest representation is indeed one of the most notable features of the 
German model of industrial relations and first came into being during the Weimar 
Republic. Following the creation of the ZAG in 1918, and the passing of the Works 
Council Law in 1920, the unions' sphere of influence was considered to be at sectoral 
level, with the works councils operating on behalf of the employees in the workplace. 
Fulbrook (1994: 170) explains that the "Works Council Law laid the foundation of the 
German tradition of co-determination", but despite early post-war agreements on wages, 
working conditions and the length of the working day (Fulbrook 1994: 170), both this 
legislation and the ZAG began to flounder in the early 1920s as Germany struggled to 
meet its reparations payments. 
The dual system of interest representation re-emerged after the formation of the FRG in 
1949 and bore a striking resemblance to the Weimar arrangements, adding further weight 
to Crouch's idea of the "power of continuity" (Crouch 1993: 349). Whilst the passing of 
the TVG in April 1949 enabled the industrial unions and the employers, or their 
associations, to conclude collective agreements at sectoral level, the works councils, 
which had been re-introduced into the workplace by the Western Allies in 1946, were 
enjoying rights of participation in managerial decision-making far in advance of those 
enjoyed even today (Kittner 1994: 598). 
The dual system was not cemented until 1952 however, when the WCA came onto the 
statute book (see Subsection 1.2.1). As of this date, the industrial unions and the 
employers' associations concluded collective agreements to regulate quantitative issues in 
collective bargaining at sectoral level, and the works councils and the individual employers 
negotiated plant agreements of a qualitative nature via co-determination in the workplace. 
29 The personnel issues are enshrined in §§92-105 WCA 1972 and include the distribution of 
questionnaires. 
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Under the Allied Control Council Law No. 22 there had, in §7, been a provision for 
cooperation and interaction between the works councils and the unions, 3° but the WCA 
1952 served to drive a wedge between the employees' representative bodies by effectively 
excluding the industrial unions from plant-level industrial relations. In essence, the 
aforementioned 16 strips of paper had been torn along the perforated line, thus creating a 
clear distinction between the two levels. 
The passing of the Works Constitution Act on July 1 st 1952 was described by Lorenz 
(1995: 59) as a "significant defeat" for the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) and the industrial unions, given that the latter were largely 
ignored by this legislation. 31 Koopmann (1981: 32) quotes Triesch who suggested that the 
"WCA 1952 was the `Basic Law' of partnership and cooperation at plant level, and could 
be celebrated throughout the world by all those opposed to the unions" (author's 
translation). 
According to Schmidt and Trinczek (1991: 169), this trend had been set much earlier, with 
the workers' committees of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries designed to 
encourage workforce integration at the expense of the unions. Hyman (1989: 203) claimed 
that both the Works Council Law of 1920 and the WCA 1952 were designed to "displace 
potentially insurrectionary organs by the safe machinery of employee representation 
formally detached from the trade unions and denied the right to mobilise opposition to the 
employer. " 
Kotthoff (1985: 66) suggested that the industrial unions were initially not too concerned 
about their effective exclusion from plant-level industrial relations by the WCA 1952, as 
they were more concerned with quantitative issues during the early post-war period. 
30 The works councils performed a number of tasks on behalf of the unions in the early post-war 
period, but as the size of the workforce increased, it became apparent that the works councillors were 
unable to devote sufficient time to union issues. In response, IG Metall appointed employees as so-called 
trustees (Vertrauensmdnner) within the companies to supplement the activities of the works councils 
(Koopmann 1981: 28). 
" The WCA 1952 was passed in the Bundestag by 195 votes to 140 with just 7 abstentions 
(Koopman 1981: 33). 
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Nevertheless, in the face of falling membership, 32 and in an attempt to make use of the 
rights afforded the works councils in the WCA 1952, the industrial unions soon sought to 
gain a foothold at plant level. Just four months after the WCA 1952 came onto the statute 
book, IG Metall called upon its members in all companies to establish bodies of union 
stewards (Vertrauensleutekörper) as a counterweight to the works councils (Koopmann 
1981: 34). 
The resulting antagonism between the union stewards (Vertrauensleute) and the works 
councils continued throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, with the former trying to gain 
control of the plant-level representative bodies on behalf of IG Metall. According to 
Jacobi et al. (1992: 245), "the rivalry between Vertrauensleute [union stewards] and 
Betriebsräte [works councils] ended in victory for the works councillors .... 
Today 
Vertrauensleute are expected to support rather than control the works councils' 
activities. "33 
In 1972, the WCA was revised. The WCA 1972 built upon the principles of its 
predecessor by extending the rights of co-determination enjoyed by the works councils. 
More significantly however, the WCA 1972 recognised plant-level reality by bridging the 
theoretical gap between the works councils and the industrial unions. The perforations 
across the 16 strips of paper were effectively restored with the following provisions: 
" §2(2) granted the industrial union rights of access to the companies; 
"§ 14(5) allowed the industrial union to propose candidates for election to the works 
councils; 
" §74(3) stated that works councillors were not to be restricted in their union activities. 
One continues to make reference to a dual system of interest representation in German 
industrial relations, with employers' associations and industrial unions addressing mainly 
32 IG Metall represented just 37.7 per cent of metal-working employees in 1963, compared with a 
figure of 56.2 per cent in 1952 (Lorenz 1995: 60). 
33 See also Kotthoff (1994). The evidence from the case-study companies also supports the validity 
of this statement (see Chapter Eight). 
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quantitative issues in collective bargaining at sectoral level, and the works councils and 
employers regulating mainly qualitative matters via co-determination at the micro level. In 
practice however, the two levels are functionally merged, with over 80 per cent of works 
councillors affiliated to an industrial union (see Table 1.1 for a portrayal of the situation in 
the metal-working industry), and with many of these individuals representing the latter 
during the collective bargaining negotiations at sectoral level. The works councils, 
meanwhile, depend upon the industrial unions for advice. In return, they seek to recruit 
new members for the unions, and ensure that the employees will support both the valid 
collective agreements and proposed strike action in pursuit of an improved bargaining 
arrangement (Schmidt and Trinczek 1991: 180; Jacobi et al. 1992: 243). Essentially, the 
works councils are a link between the workforce and the industrial union. As Lane (1989: 
239) has indicated, the WCA 1972 and the process of co-determination have provided the 
industrial unions with a "Trojan horse" within the individual companies. 
Table 1.1: 1994 Works Council Election Results - Metal-Working Industry 
* The Five New Federal States came into being following reunification in 1990. 
Source: IG Metall, 1995d. 
Whilst the value of the dual system of interest representation in Germany is recognised 
today, this has not always been the case. "During the 1960s and early 1970s academic 
socialists and union activists condemned the German industrial relations system for stifling 
industrial militancy and suppressing class conflict" (Jacobi et al. 1992: 219). 
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However, as Jacobi et al. (1992: 220) explain: 
This controversy has now died down as a result of the defeats suffered by unions in 
neighbouring countries during the 1980s. Economic crisis and the strategies of 
conservative governments, and the resulting decline elsewhere in union 
membership and bargaining power, have made the advantages of the German dual 
system self-evident. It is now almost universally agreed that the system allows 
flexible adjustment to change, without weakening the representational strength of 
unions. 
1.2.3 The Low Propensity for Industrial Action 
As Table 1.2 demonstrates, Germany, comparatively speaking, has had one of the lowest 
levels of industrial conflict in terms of working days lost over recent years. In fact, the low 
propensity for industrial action has been a feature of industrial relations in Germany since 
1949, and amongst the numerous explanations for this characteristic, Lane (1989: 214) 
suggests that a "combination of a clearly differentiated dual system of interest 
representation with a comprehensive legalisation of industrial relations has served both to 
keep the level of conflict low and to resolve disputes quickly when they arise. " 
Streeck (1981: 153) also recognises the importance of the dual system for the stability of 
industrial relations in Germany, in the sense that the absence of the industrial unions from 
the workplace has had a "positive effect on economic performance" at this level. 
Consequently, the bargaining power of the industrial unions during wage negotiations at 
sectoral level has increased, thus reducing the potential for strike action over such issues. 
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Table 1.2: Working Days Lost (000's) through Strikes34 and Lockouts35 
* Figures exclude agriculture and public administration. 
** 1993 figure relates to strikes and lockouts in the FRG after reunification. 
Source: ILO, 1995. 
Kotthoff (1985), meanwhile, refers to studies by Blume (1964) and Voigt (1962) to 
support his theory that the low propensity for industrial action in German industry can be 
explained in terms of the contribution made by the works council. He suggests that the 
"integrative and cooperative" (Kotthoff 1985: 69, author's translation) stance adopted by 
these bodies, has resulted in peaceful industrial relations at plant level. 
Whilst recognising the validity of these arguments, the contention of this thesis is that the 
juridification of the German model of industrial relations has also been important in this 
regard. 36 On the one hand, a labour court ruling in relation to the TVG 1949, restricts the 
34 The ILO (1995: 945) quotes the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, held 
in Geneva in 1993, which defined a strike as "a temporary work stoppage effected by one or more groups 
of workers with a view to enforcing or realising demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other 
workers in their demands or grievances. " 
's The ILO (1995: 945) quotes the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, held 
in Geneva in 1993, which defined a lockout as "a total or partial temporary closure of one or more places 
of employment, or the hindering of the normal work activities of employees, by one or more employers 
with a view to enforcing or resisting demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other employers in 
their demands or grievances. " 
36 See also Miickenberger (1975); Erd (1978). 
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ease with which disagreements between the respective representatives of the employers 
and the employees can deteriorate into industrial conflict at sectoral level. On the other, 
the WCA 1972 prohibits the instigation of industrial action in the workplace with its 
`absolute peace obligation'. 
As far as the former is concerned, an industrial union can call a strike only if the period of 
validity of a collective agreement has expired, if negotiations concerning the conclusion of 
a new agreement break down, if arbitration then fails to reconcile the differences between 
the bargaining parties, and finally, if more than 75 per cent of employees declare 
themselves to be in favour of such action in a strike ballot. This process is demonstrated 
by the `seesaws' in Figure 1.2. 
A ball placed on the `existing agreement' seesaw will roll to the left of the fulcrum during 
the period of validity of a collective agreement, but to the right of the fulcrum and down 
onto the `negotiations' seesaw once this period of validity expires. Should the employers' 
association and the industrial union succeed in reaching an agreement at this second level, 
the ball will roll left. A breakdown of negotiations however, causes the seesaw to pivot to 
the right, sending the ball through the second check and down onto the third level. A pivot 
to the left at stage three represents the successful intervention of an arbitrator and the 
conclusion of a new agreement, but should the arbitrator fail to reconcile the differences 
between the social partners, 37 the ball rolls to the right and the industrial union is then just 
a strike ballot away from being able to instigate industrial action. A strike can only be 
averted at this fourth and final level if fewer than 75 per cent of union members support 
such action. If this is the case the ball rolls to the left of the fulcrum and negotiations 
between the employers' association and the industrial union are re-started. Should the 
ballot indicate a willingness to strike however, the `strike ballot' seesaw pivots to the right 
and strike action begins. Sooner or later the social partners return to the negotiating table 
in an attempt to resolve their differences. 
" The social partners are the employers' association and the industrial union for a particular 
branch of industry. 
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Figure 1.2: The Checks and Balances in Collective Bargaining 
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As for the legislative influence on the situation at plant level, where the employers and the 
works councils are permitted to conclude plant agreements, an `absolute peace 
obligation', enshrined in §74(2) WCA 1972, prevents either side from instigating industrial 
action at any time. 38 In the event of the works council and the employer failing to reach an 
agreement in relation to company-specific measures, §76 WCA 1972 provides for the 
creation of a plant-level arbitration committee to act as a "conflict resolution mechanism" 
(Weiss 1992: 134), the costs of which are borne by the employer. 39 
38 Johannson (1977: 56) regarded the `absolute peace obligation' as a means by which to nullify the 
oppositionary tendencies of the works councils in favour of greater cooperation at plant level. 
39 The plant-level arbitration committee consists of equal numbers of representatives of the 
employer and the works council, and a neutral chairperson who is acceptable to both sides. 
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Whilst the works councils are unable to resort to strike action, Lane (1989: 203) and 
Lorenz (1995: 58) have indicated that, by refusing to cooperate whenever they do enjoy a 
right of co-determination in managerial decision-making, they can force the employers to 
make significant sacrifices. 40 As Weltz (1976: 114-115) has indicated, the plant-level 
arrangements represent "a style of industrial relations based on a system of sanctions and 
gratification by means of which both sides can exert pressure on the good conduct of the 
other side... good conduct is the advantage offered and the price paid by both sides. "a' 
Both the peace obligation, which operates at sectoral level during the period of validity of 
a collective agreement, and the `absolute peace obligation' at plant level, which is 
enshrined in the WCA 1972, came into being during the Weimar Republic, as did one 
further legislative explanation for this low propensity for industrial action at plant level. 
The Works Council Law of 1920 required the employees' representative body to support 
the employer in promoting the welfare of the company, as well as representing the 
interests of the employees. 42 This dual function, or social partnership ethos, was recreated 
in the WCA 1952, and is now enshrined in §2(1) WCA 1972, which states that the works 
councils should cooperate with the employers and the relevant industrial union "in a spirit 
of mutual trust for the good of the employees and of the establishment" (Jacobi et al. 
1992: 242). 
Of further significance as far as the low propensity for industrial action in German industry 
is concerned, is the fact that the early post-war period was characterised by a collective 
desire to rebuild industry and the economy. Until the 1960s the `economic miracle' 
(Wirtschaftswunder) resulted in rising wages and little cause for industrial conflict, and as 
the boom years drew to a close, there was a period of tripartite concertation (Konzertierte 
Aktion) between the government, the industrial unions and the employers' associations. In 
40 Streeck (1981: 159) suggests that works councils regularly threaten to use their veto on overtime 
to force the employers to negotiate with them on issues where they do not enjoy a right of co- 
determination. 
41 Marsden (1995: 6) argues that the regulation of the contentious quantitative issues in collective 
bargaining at sectoral level reduces the need to trade rights and exert pressure at plant level. 
42 According to Williams (1988: 37), the early works councils ignored this idea of cooperation, 
preferring to operate as pure representatives of workforce interests. 
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an attempt to stabilise both prices and income distribution (Jacobi et al. 1992: 239), the 
industrial unions were encouraged to show wage restraint in return for "an expansion of 
the welfare state and greater influence within the political process" (Jacobi et al. 1992: 
239). This corporatist approach43 to industrial relations helped to maintain industrial peace 
during a potentially difficult period, but the period of concertation eventually collapsed in 
1977 when the industrial unions pulled out in protest at the failure of the other contracting 
parties to deliver their part of the bargain. Nevertheless, the continuous upward trend in 
the German `social market' economy has served to keep industrial conflict to a minimum. 
The importance of industrial unionism should also be emphasised, as this arrangement 
serves to ensure that strike action would be expensive for the employers if either collective 
bargaining or arbitration failed to reconcile the differences between the employers' 
associations and the industrial unions (Lane 1989: 215). With the majority of all unionised 
employees in any one company affiliated to the same industrial union, strike action in any 
one industry is likely to have a more crippling effect than in Great Britain where the unions 
are occupationally based. "' 
Whilst the `absolute peace obligation' is the principle guarantor of harmony at plant level, 
there are other factors which help to explain the preference for cooperative industrial 
relations in the workplace. Fürstenberg (1993: 189) emphasises the importance of co- 
determination, which he describes as "a form of conflict management [which provides] for 
the discussion of major issues and problems for the workforce before final decisions are 
taken. " Simitis (1984: 98) shares this view and suggests that the `absolute peace 
obligation' was the price that the works councillors had to pay in exchange for their rights 
of co-determination in managerial decision-making. There is also a clear dislike of third- 
party intervention in plant-level industrial relations, with the costs of arbitration an 
unnecessary and an unwelcome expense for the employers. 45 
43 The corporatist approach to industrial relations is discussed in Section 2.6. 
44 See also Jacobi et al. (1992); Miiller-Jentsch (1995). 
45 If arbitration fails to reconcile the differences, the matter goes before a regional labour court 
which is made up of representatives of both the employers and the industrial unions, and a judge 
(Williams 1988: 28). The labour court's decision is final, and is binding upon the plant-level actors. 
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Finally, this thesis contends that the low level of industrial conflict in Germany can, in part, 
be explained by the disastrous consequences of disunity in modern German political and 
social history. The cooperative approach to industrial relations has been greatly influenced 
by the upheavals of this period, with labour having been involved in wartime planning and 
in periods of reconstruction on two occasions during the twentieth century alone. This is a 
sentiment shared by Lorenz (1995: 58) who stated that: 
... one cannot 
help being struck by the evolution from a situation of almost 
internecine conflict in Weimar to one of relative industrial peace after World War 
Two. This evolution in attitudes and behaviour is often presented as a response to 
the tragic events of the interwar period, to a new pragmatism and moderation on 
the part of both unions and employers born of their conviction that the overt 
conflicts of the Weimar Republic contributed to the rise of the Nazi dictatorship. 
Historical predispositions should therefore not be underestimated when attempting to 
explain such characteristics. The decision by certain employers not to recognise the unions 
during the latter stages of the Weimar Republic, and the subsequent cessation of collective 
bargaining, helped to create the instability which Hitler was able to exploit to his 
advantage. Furthermore, many works councils began to ignore the `absolute peace 
obligation' in the Works Council Law towards the end of the 1920s. The consequences of 
such actions are well documented, and such events serve as a warning to those 
contemporary industrial relations actors who would wish to `rock the boat'. The benefits 
of peaceful industrial relations, which include a successful economy, could not be clearer. 
1.2.4 Summary 
Marsden (1995: 5) summarises the post-war history of the German model of industrial 
relations as follows: 
Fifty years ago, the Nazi dictatorship was overthrown, and workers, their unions, 
and their employers were again free to reconstruct a system of industrial relations. 
At the time, the Allies offered advice, and much more, based on their respective 
models. Today, of these four models, the Soviet one has collapsed, and US unions 
now bargain for a fraction of the workers they represented in the late 1940s. In 
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Britain, less than half of the workforce is now covered by collective agreements, 
and in France, although coverage of agreements remains high, it is widely argued 
that this is so because employers find them relatively unconstraining. Today, it is 
the `German model' which attracts admirers from many parts of the industrialised 
world keen to learn the secrets of relatively peaceful industrial relations, 
cooperative and flexible working practices, a highly effective vocational training 
system, and a powerful system of employee voice. 
The West German model of industrial relations exceeded all expectations over a forty-year 
period from 1949, but the transplantation of the West German "legal, institutional and 
organisational framework of industrial relations" (Jacobi et al. 1992: 225) to the territory 
of the former East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR), 46 which was realised 
via the Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag) of October 3rd 1990, and which was 
testimony to the high regard in which this model was held throughout the world, will 
provide it with its sternest test to date. As Jacobi et al. (1992: 265) explain: 
... the 
demands arising from German unification have put the established system 
under considerable stress. It is true that the transfer of institutions and the 
extension of organizational domains from the West to the East proceeded with less 
friction than expected. But industrial relations practice cannot be so easily 
transferred; it requires a long learning process. The handling of industrial disputes 
(in terms of the development of case law and conflict management) demands 
experience and skills which were rarely able to develop under the authoritarian 
communist regime. 
These fears appear to have materialised in practice: 
The transfer of the West German industrial relations institutions to the former East 
Germany has not led to the development of a comparable dual system of industrial 
relations there. Instead, there is a process of institutionalisation that is specific to 
former East Germany that reinforces a system of workplace oriented industrial 
relations (Verbetrieblichung) ... 
This can be explained by the crisis of transition, 
especially the economic difficulties of east German firms, and by the revival of 
enterprise oriented models of industrial relations from the past in the East. (Mense- 
Petermann 1996: 65) 
46 The aforementioned co-determination legislation and the health and safety-related Works Safety 
Law (see Section 5.6) were implemented with one or two temporary amendments, but both the TVG 1949 
and the WCA 1972 were introduced in their existing form. 
33 
1.3 Plant-Level Industrial Relations: The Role of the Works Council 
The previous section has traced the development of the Works Constitution 
(Betriebsverfassung) in Germany, and has highlighted both the relationship between the 
industrial unions and the works councils, and the contribution made by the most recent 
version of this legislation, the WCA 1972, to the maintenance of industrial peace at plant 
level. The aim here is to explain, in detail, the legally defined role of the works council. 
[The works council is a participative institution], the theoretical function of which 
is to promote labour-management cooperation with the goal of increasing the size 
of the economic pie, and to foster forward-looking behaviour on the part of the 
workers. (Addison et al. 1995: 29) 
The WCA 1972 is the rule book of plant-level industrial relations and regulates the 
relationship between the owners of capital and labour at the workplace. §1 provides for 
the election of a works council in companies with at least five employees aged 18 years or 
over, 47 and according to §2(1), this body is required to cooperate with the employer for 
the good of both the employees and the company. §8(1) states that only those employees 
who have been with the company for six months or more, and who have passed their 
eighteenth birthday, are entitled to stand for election to this body. 
The size of the works council is dependent upon the size of the company, and §9 details 
these arrangements in tabulated form. 48 The election of a works council now takes place 
every four years (§ 13), having been held once every three years prior to an amendment to 
the WCA 1972 in 1988. Once elected, the members of the works council are required, 
under §26(1), to select both a chairman and a deputy chairman, and in companies with 
upwards of 300 employees, §38 provides for a certain number of works councillors to be 
47 The election of a works council is not compulsory, but should take place if the employees so 
desire. 
48 Only 1 works councillor is to be elected in companies with between 5 and 20 employees, 9 works 
councillors constitute this forum in companies with between 301 and 600 employees, and a works council 
in a company with between 1001 and 2000 employees has a membership of 15. 
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released from their normal duties so that they may concentrate on fulfilling the 
requirements of this and other legislative provisions. 49 
The WCA 1972 permits the works councils to hold a meeting of its members (§30), and to 
arrange consultation periods during normal working hours (§39(1)), although the time and 
place of the latter are to be agreed upon in advance with the employer. In addition, §43(1) 
requires the works councils to hold a works assembly once every three months, during 
which they are obliged to report on their activities to the workforce. 
Section Four of the WCA 1972 comprises §§74-113 and includes details of the general 
duties required of the works councils and the rights of participation which these bodies 
enjoy in managerial decision-making. §74(1) states that the works council should meet 
with the employer at least once every month, and should negotiate "with a serious desire 
to reach agreement" (Jacobi et al. 1992: 242). §74(2) prohibits the instigation of industrial 
action by either the employer or the works council. §76(1) provides for the formation of 
the plant-level arbitration committee, on which, according to §76(2), the employees and 
the employer are represented in equal numbers together with a neutral chairperson. Should 
this committee fail to resolve differences of opinion, the decision of a regional labour court 
becomes legally binding. §77(2) enables the works council and the employer to conclude 
plant agreements to regulate workplace specific matters, although §77(3) prohibits such 
agreements from regulating issues addressed in collective bargaining, unless the collective 
agreements permit such action. 
As far as the general duties of the works councils are concerned, §80(1) requires these 
bodies to: 
" observe that the laws, ordinances, safety regulations, collective labor 
agreements, and works agreements made in the interest of the employees are 
carried out; 
49 In companies employing between 300 and 600 employees, 1 works councillor is to be released, 
and in those companies with between 3001 and 4000 employees, 5 works councillors are free to 
concentrate upon works council work. 
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" apply to the employer for measures that serve the interests of the works and the 
staff; 
" receive suggestions by employees and the youth representation and, if they 
appear warranted, to confer with the employer to have the matter settled; the 
works council will inform the employees concerned of the progress and result of 
deliberations; 
" to further the integration of the invalids and other people who need special 
protection; 
" to prepare and carry out the election of the youth representation and to 
cooperate closely in furthering the interests of the juvenile employees; the 
works council can ask the youth representation to make suggestions and put 
forth its point of view; 
" to further the employment of older employees in the works; 
" to further the integration of foreign employees in the works and strengthen a 
loyal understanding between them and the German employees. (Peltzer 1972: 
171-173) 
The works councils' rights of participation in managerial decision-making are qualified by 
§2(1) and §74(2). The former requires the employer and the works council to work 
together for the benefit of both the employees and the company within which they are 
operational, whilst the latter prohibits either the employer or the works council from 
instigating industrial action. The weakest of these rights, those of information and 
consultation, are granted in relation to financial matters, whilst the strongest, those of co- 
determination, relate mainly to social, but also to personnel issues. In the latter case the 
employer is unable to take a decision without first seeking the consent of the works 
council, but when the works council enjoys only rights to information or of consultation, 
the employer is not obliged to respect the wishes of this body. 
§87(1) details the social issues on which the works councils enjoy a right of co- 
determination. SO These are as follows: 
" questions of order in the works and the conduct of employees therein; 
" beginning and ending of daily working time and recesses as well as the 
allocation of the working hours to the week days (including Saturdays); 
" temporary shortening or extension of the usual working hours at the works; 
" time, place and manner of payment of wages and salaries; 
50 This right of co-determination only comes into effect if these social issues have not been 
addressed either in legislation or by a collective agreement. 
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" establishment of general principles governing vacations and the scheduling 
thereof as well as fixing periods of vacation for individual employees, if no 
agreement can be reached between the employer and the employees concerned; 
" introduction and application of technical apparatus serving to check the conduct 
or the efficiency of employees; 
" regulations concerning the prevention of industrial accidents and occupational 
illnesses, and the protection of health within the scope of the legal provisions or 
the safety regulations; 
" form, arrangement and administration of social welfare services that are limited 
to the operations of the works, the plant or the concern; 
" allocation and termination of housing which is rented to the employees on the 
basis of the employment relationship as well as the general fixing of conditions 
for use; 
" questions pertaining to the wage framework, especially the setting up of 
principles of remuneration and the institution and application of new methods of 
remuneration as well as their alteration; 
" fixing of piece-work pay and premiums and comparable performance-based 
remuneration including the financial factor; 
" principles concerning the suggestion procedure. (Peltzer 1972: 185-187) 
As Section 4.2 demonstrates, the works council has been the subject of numerous research 
initiatives, and descriptions of its role in practice do vary. Halbach et al. (1991: 317) 
regard the works councils as the representatives of the employees in the workplace. Hall 
et al. (1992: 237) refer to Kotthoff's claim that the works councils are more than just 
bodies of interest representation, and are instead, "social integrators" of the workforce. 
Müller-Jentsch (1995: 14) is also reluctant to categorise these bodies as "pure 
representatives" (author's translation) of the employees, and regards the works councils as 
"intermediaries" (author's translation) at plant level. 51 
A challenge for both the Works Constitution and its statutory bodies of interest 
representation came in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Works councils soon started 
to appear in the GDR, and these early experiments with the West German councils were 
monitored closely by a number of researchers at the `Economic and Social Research 
Institute' (Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialforschung Chemnitz e. V.., WISOC) in 
Chemnitz. 
s' The author's appraisal of the role performed by the works council in practice is presented in 
Subsection 8.10.1. 
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These dramatic events enabled the East German employees to elect representative bodies 
democratically at plant level for the first time in over 40 years (Ermischer and Preusche 
1992: 3). Kreißig and Schreiber (1990: 3) have indicated that the elections of the first 
works councils were often instigated by the employers, the employees, or the former 
communist-style plant-level representative bodies (Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitungen). As 
Kreißig et at. (1990: 4) explained, there appeared to be a widespread belief that any idea 
coming from the West was worth adopting. Consequently, works councils were readily 
accepted in the GDR, and the almost instantaneous rejection of the plant-level institutions 
of the communist regime resulted in a power vacuum in many workplaces (Ermischer and 
Preusche 1992: 5). The works councils were therefore presented with an ideal 
opportunity. As was the case during the period of occupation in 1945-1949, the 
embryonic works councils in the GDR were able to establish rights of participation in 
managerial decision-making far in advance of their established counterparts in the West 
(Ennischer and Preusche 1992: 5). With no legal basis for works council activity (Kreißig 
et al. 1990: 10), the majority of rights were secured with relatively little opposition and 
were enshrined in plant agreements. Following the collapse of the old regime, many senior 
positions in the majority of companies had been vacated, and they were filled by those 
who were both willing and able to stand for election. As the new hierarchy owed their 
elevated position to the workforce, the power relationship at plant level was therefore 
somewhat different to the situation in the FRG (Ermischer and Preusche 1992: 6). 
The implementation of the `Economic and Currency Union' (Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion) in July 1990 however, resulted in the adoption of the WCA 1972 in the 
GDR. This put an end to the plethora of informal plant agreements which had given 
several works councils far reaching rights of participation, and with this development, the 
initial optimism which had accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall slowly began to 
evaporate. Redundancies followed, and were initially accepted by many works councils as 
little more than a temporary set-back. Western investment, it was hoped, would help to 
refloat the economy (Kreißig et al. 1990: 6). By the end of 1990 however, general feelings 
within society were being reflected within industry, and it was evident that these initial 
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redundancies would soon be followed by more severe cut-backs. Employees in the West 
were beginning to feel threatened by the reservoir of cheap labour that was now available 
in the East, and the help and advice that many East German firms had initially received 
from companies based in West Germany was no longer forthcoming (Ermischer and 
Preusche 1992: 13). 
Although the embryonic works councils in the GDR were able to redefine the role of this 
statutory body temporarily, by securing themselves far-reaching rights of co- 
determination, many of the privatised companies that survived the early `post-wall' period 
soon settled into a more recognisable pattern of industrial relations, with the employers 
controlling activities at plant level to a greater extent than initially had been the case. 
Essentially, a more traditional power relationship began to take shape (Ermischer and 
Preusche 1992: 21). 
1.4 Occupational Health and Safety: An Analytical Tool 
Having highlighted both the development and the particular nature of the German model 
of industrial relations, and having summarised the legally prescribed role of the works 
council, the thesis now introduces the issue of occupational health and safety into the 
equation. This issue will be used as an analytical tool in this thesis to identify the operation 
of plant-level industrial relations and the role of the works council in particular. 
The issue of occupational health and safety has been selected to demonstrate the operation 
of plant-level industrial relations in Germany both for economic and for legal reasons. On 
the one hand, the occurrence of occupational accidents and the outbreak of industrial 
illness and disease cost the German economy somewhere in the region of DM 100 billion 
annually (Lißner 1995: 80). On the other, and perhaps most significantly, the WCA 1972 
grants the works councils a right of co-determination - the strongest of its rights of 
participation in managerial decision-making - in questions of a health and safety-related 
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nature, and thus enables an examination of the operation of these statutory bodies at the 
limit of their capabilities. 
Whilst the legal aspects of health and safety, and the rights and duties of the individual 
actors and agencies in particular, are considered in detail in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, 
this section clarifies the particular nature of the subject matter, and highlights the extent of 
the problem facing the aforementioned personnel in their attempts to improve health and 
safety at plant level in the German metal-working industry. 
1.4.1 Aspects of Occupational Health and Safety Defined 
This thesis makes frequent use of the term `occupational health and safety', but it is 
worthwhile to point out at this juncture that the author's interest lies with the technical 
rather than the medical aspect of this discipline, and in particular, with the occurrence and 
the prevention of occupational accidents. 52 
The majority of figures quoted throughout this thesis refer to `reportable occupational 
accidents', which describe those accidents that occur both at work and either on the way 
to, or back from, the workplace, and which result in more than three days absence. S3 Such 
accidents are reported to the professional associations with which all employers are 
obliged to register their companies. The employers are required to insure their employees, 
and therefore pay an accident insurance premium to these bodies. 54 In return, the 
professional association provides the employees with compensation and rehabilitation in 
52 Occupational accidents were preferred as a measure of performance of the health and safety 
activities of the case-study companies, as they are generally considered to be more accurate than those 
relating to illness and disease (Kittner 1994: 365). For example, whilst reportable occupational accidents 
are usually registered with a professional association (Berufsgenossenschaft) within three days to one 
week of their occurrence (see Chapter Six), it can take several years for the effects of exposure to harmful 
substances to become apparent, and to be included in the official statistics. 
53 The term 'occupational accident' is also used, and includes all accidents at work and either on 
the way to, or back from, the workplace, irrespective of whether the employee requires time off work 
S' Unlike sickness, unemployment and old age insurance contributions, which are split equally 
between the employers and those insured, the employers are required to pay the entire accident insurance 
premium on behalf of all their employees. 
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the event of a reportable occupational accident, or the outbreak of an occupational illness 
(see Subsection 6.2.2). 
Reference is also made to accident rates, and these figures are important in so far as they 
enabled a comparison to be made between the seven companies where case studies were 
carried out. The accident rate refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents 
per 1000 employees and is calculated in the following way: 
Number of reportable occupational accidents 
Size of workforce 
X 1000 
Whilst the German occupational health and safety structures are held in high regard 
throughout the world, and the system within which they operate is considered by many to 
have been the model upon which recent European developments were based, problems 
still remain. For example, every 21 seconds an employee is involved in an occupational 
accident in Germany (Maschmann 1995: 146). In 1993, the 36.3 million employees 
suffered approximately 2.2 million occupational accidents, 1.9 million of which resulted in 
over three days absence from the workplace (BMA 1994: 3-7). Once every four hours, an 
employee dies as a result of the effects of an occupational accident (Maschmann 1995: 
146), and in 1993, there were over 2800 fatalities (BMA 1994: 3). Only 34 per cent of 
employees remain in full-time employment until the age of 65 (Lißner 1995: 80), with one 
in three of these employees forced to seek early retirement on health grounds (BAU 1988: 
5). Of concern in this respect is that by the year 2030, it is estimated that between 30-40 
per cent of the German population will be aged over 50, compared with a figure of just 25 
per cent in recent years (Wilisch 1993: 97). 53 Each year, the equivalent of some 108 000 
working years are lost as a result of occupational accidents in Germany (Thiehoff 1994: 
85). Thiehoff (1994: 85) suggests that if one were also to take into consideration the days 
lost as a result of illness, the figure would be as high as 1.7 million working years. Lißner 
(1995: 80) has indicated that these absences cost the German economy somewhere in the 
ss Figures published in 1992 suggested that over 30 per cent of employees in what were then the 12 
member states of the European Union considered their health to be at risk and feared for their safety at 
their place of work (Bailey 1994: 9). 
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region of DM 90 billion per annum when one takes both the direct and the indirect costs 
of absenteeism into account. 56 
Table 1.3: Accidents and Illness in the German Metal-Working Industry 
* Absolute figure. 
Source: HVBG, 1995. 
Of greater significance for this thesis is the fact that, in 1994, the 3.8 million employees in 
the German metal-working industry'7 suffered almost 300 000 reportable occupational 
accidents, and reported some 15 891 suspected cases of occupational disease to the 
professional associations (HVBG 1995). Table 1.3 highlights the development of the 
occupational health and safety statistics in the German metal-working industry as of 1960, 
and demonstrates that the absolute number of reportable occupational accidents has been 
falling steadily ever since, as has the accident rate (see Section 5.6). In contrast, the 
suspected cases of occupational disease have shown a negative trend as the professional 
56 Brody et al. (1990: 94) have described indirect costs as those which are not insured and which 
are borne by the employer. Heinrich (1959), meanwhile, referred to an iceberg to describe the relationship 
between direct and indirect costs. He considered the former to be just the tip of the iceberg, above the 
waterline, and suggested that the uninsured or invisible costs were as much as four times higher. 
Although the iceberg analogy has come in for much criticism, Laufer (1987: 305) explained that 
Heinrich's ratio is still widely used. 
s' For a detailed explanation of why the metal-working industry was selected as the focus for this 
study, see Section 3.2. 
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associations have added more ailments to their list of recognised illnesses and diseases. Of 
particular significance has been the inclusion of musculo-skeletal disorders, " as well as the 
provision for the recognition of occupational diseases which were recognised in the former 
GDR, providing the illness was contracted before January 1992 (HVBG 1995: 6). 
Whilst occupational accidents and diseases most obviously affect the employees and their 
dependants in terms of pain, suffering, reduced income, and even invalidity and death, 
these occurrences are also of detriment to the companies in which the workers are 
employed. Research carried out by Schneider (1984) on behalf of the Federal Institute for 
Occupational Health and Safety (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, BA U) for example, 
calculated the cost of each day's absence as a result of an occupational accident in the 
metal-working industry to be, on average, DM 1004.59 This included the costs associated 
with a disturbed production run, damage to the machinery, the failure to meet deadlines, 
the need to hire and to train replacement labour, an increased accident insurance 
premium, 6° continued payment of remuneration (Lohnfortzahlung), and a poor 
reputation. 61 
Accidents increase the cost of production (Siller and Schliephacke 1989: 9), and whilst 
larger companies can carry the odd absentee without too much difFiculty, 62 such a scenario 
can threaten the existence of the many smaller companies, which, as Table 1.4 
demonstrates, predominate in the German metal-working industry. The benefits of good 
58 Wood (1995: 6) explains that musculo-skeletal disorders include "a wide variety of sprains and 
over-use, affecting the body's muscles and joints. The back, neck shoulders and upper limbs are 
particularly at risk" 59 A telephone conversation with Dr Hermann Schneider in April 1996 revealed that early 
indications from a follow-up study to the 1984 research initiative calculated the cost of each day's absence 
as a result of an occupational accident in the metal-working industry to be, on average, in the region of 
DM 1100. Given that this figure was little more than an estimate at the time the thesis was submitted, the 
aforementioned figure of DM 1004 is preferred. 
60 The insurance premium payable to the professional association can be annually adjusted as it is 
partly based on the number of occupational accidents which have occurred in the company over a twelve- 
month period (see Subsection 6.2.2). 
61 As Siller (1989a: 30) has commented, occupational accidents are also detrimental to a company's 
reputation, a factor which is of vital importance in the current economic climate. 
62 Oi (1974: 688) identified a negative correlation between company size and accident rates. 
Reasons why the larger companies had better accident records included the aforementioned ability to carry 
absentees, their low labour turnover rates, their ability to substitute capital for labour where necessary, and 
the probability of there being a higher percentage of white-collar employees. 
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health and safety on the other hand can include reduced absenteeism, increased efficiency, 
and improved industrial relations at plant level (Stranks 1994a: 7). As Tegtmeier (1991: 9) 
has argued, the maintenance of the productive capacity, the motivation, the creativity, and 
the health of the workforce, is a sound piece of investment. 
Table 1.4: Distribution of Companies by Size - Metal-Working Industry 1994 
Source: HVBG, 1995. 
Employers have traditionally been reluctant to pay much attention to health and safety. As 
Chapter Five explains, there were few effective mechanisms in place during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries with which to force the employers to give health and safety 
issues any consideration, and whilst this deficiency has long since been addressed in the 
form of legislation, including the provision for plant-level co-determination on questions 
of a health and safety-related nature, and the introduction of agents of enforcement, there 
is little incentive for the employers to do more than the minimum required under this 
legislation. 63 As Buchholz (1994b: 68) has explained, the relationship between investments 
and improvements in health and safety is not linear, with employers needing to invest 
heavily before they see any return. 
The statistics demonstrate that the occurrence of occupational accidents and the outbreak 
of occupational disease are detrimental to the employees, to the companies in which they 
are employed, and to the economy as a whole. In response, governments throughout the 
63 Maximum fines of DM 20 000 can be imposed on employers found to have contravened the 
health and safety regulations intentionally. 
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world have passed legislation and have introduced actors and agencies in an attempt to 
prevent such occurrences. The German response is considered in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven, and its efficacy tested in Chapter Eight. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
In realising its objectives, the remainder of this thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter Two assesses the merits of the various theoretical approaches to industrial 
relations, and presents a theoretical framework for the study which follows. 
The third chapter highlights the research methodology, and explains the reasons behind the 
selection of both the metal-working industry as the area of investigation and a case-study 
approach for the data collection. It also provides the reader with an insight into how the 
case-study companies were chosen and contacted, and summarises the techniques which 
were adopted in order to uncover the required information. 
Chapter Four, the literature review, begins by evaluating a number of research initiatives 
which have concerned themselves with the role of the works council. There then follows 
an assessment of a number of studies which have examined the occupational health and 
safety structures in German industry, and the chapter closes with a review of general 
health and safety-related investigations. 
The purpose of Chapter Five is to trace the development of health and safety awareness in 
German industry from the early nineteenth century to the present day, in order to identify 
the extent to which the past events have influenced the present-day health and safety 
structures. The chapter itself is divided into five sections, each of which concerns itself 
with a specific time interval. The first examines Germany's period of transition from a 
confederation of independent agrarian states to a unified industrial nation, whilst the 
second explores the epoch 1878-1933, arguably one of the most significant periods as far 
as health and safety issues were concerned. There then follows a brief insight into the 12 
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years of National Socialism, and Hitler's influence upon the health and safety arena. The 
penultimate section looks at the early post-war period when little was done in this regard, 
but which, nevertheless, was of immense importance. The historical journey draws to a 
close with an assessment of the period 1961-1995. 
The activities of both the macro- and the plant-level health and safety-related actors and 
agencies are addressed in Chapters Six and Seven respectively. Divided into three sections 
- legislators, enforcers and educators - Chapter Six highlights the actors and agencies 
involved, and identifies the extent of this involvement in these three disciplines. Chapter 
Seven, meanwhile, explains the intended roles of the plant-level actors, as laid down in the 
relevant legislative provisions. 
Before drawing any empirical or theoretical conclusions about the operation of plant-level 
industrial relations in practice, the penultimate chapter reveals the findings of the empirical 
research. Taking each case-study company in turn, the findings are presented in five 
similar sections, in order to facilitate the drawing of comparisons between the different 
companies. Following a general introduction, the sections highlight the actors involved 
and the nature of their involvement, reveal how information is communicated throughout 
the companies, as well as seeking to identify a nucleus of health and safety activity in each 
case, and examine the way in which health and safety measures are developed, monitored 
and implemented at plant level. Finally, the chapter closes with an overall assessment of 
the plant-level health and safety structures, and offers one or two generalisations from the 
findings uncovered. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THEORETICAL DISCUSSION: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF 
PLANT-LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE GERMAN 
METAL-WORKING INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
Having sketched the pattern of plant-level industrial relations on a historical basis, and the 
role of the works council in particular, the aim in this chapter is to discuss the significance 
of various frames of reference for an understanding of the particular nature of plant-level 
industrial relations in Germany. Beginning with an evaluation of the unitary approach, 
each section summarises the principles and assesses the validity of a different frame of 
reference. The chapter then concludes by presenting an explanatory framework, the 
validity of which will be tested by the findings from the questionnaire survey conducted in 
seven companies in the German metal-working industry (see Chapter Three). 
2.2 Unitary Approach 
The unitary frame of reference portrays a desirable arrangement at plant level, with on the 
one hand, industrial conflict prohibited, and on the other, much weight attached to the 
principle of a communality of interest between the industrial relations actors. The unitary 
theorists regard individual companies as being "analogous to a team" (Fox 1966: 2), with 
the employer, not unlike the manager of the team, the only "source of authority" and the 
single "focus of loyalty" (Fox 1966: 3) at plant level. They reject the idea of employee 
involvement in managerial decision-making, with unions, which are deemed to present a 
challenge to managerial authority (Fox 1966: 11), regarded as an unnecessary and an 
unwanted obstacle in pursuit of a cooperative arrangement. Consequently, there is no 
place for collective bargaining in the unitary frame of reference. As Salamon (1992: 31) 
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explained, the unitary theorists regard the industrial organisation as "an integrated group 
of people with a single authority/loyalty structure and a set of common values, interests 
and objectives shared by all members of the organisation. " 
In assessing the significance of the unitary approach for an understanding of German 
plant-level industrial relations, one can begin by rejecting the suggestion that, in German 
companies there is a single "focus of authority" (Fox 1966: 3), with the employer the 
legitimate and accepted decision-maker (Salamon 1992; 31), and the employees unable to 
interfere in this process (Batstone 1988: 11; Farnham and Pimlott 1995: 45) in any way 
whatsoever. The thesis contends that this is an inaccurate portrayal of plant-level industrial 
relations. Whilst the balance of power undoubtedly remains with the employer at the micro 
level, the provision in the WCA 1972 for the election of a works council, which enjoys 
rights of participation in managerial decision-making, ensures that authority is shared by 
the employer and the works council, whenever the latter enjoys the right of co- 
determination. Furthermore, the existence of a works council at plant level, as the elected 
representative body of the blue and white-collar employees, invalidates the idea of there 
being a single "focus of loyalty" (Fox 1966: 3) in the workplace. 
Those who subscribe to the unitary frame of reference see no place for the unions in plant- 
level industrial relations. They regard their presence as an "intrusion" (Fox 1966: 11), as 
the union, it is suggested, "competes illegitimately for control over, and the loyalty of, the 
employees" (Fox 1966: 11). The validity of this aspect of the unitary approach must also 
be rejected, as the unions, under the WCA 1972, are granted rights of access to the 
individual companies, without being permitted to negotiate at this level. Prior to 1972 
however, the unions were legally prohibited from entering the workplace by the WCA 
1952. Nevertheless, union members were elected onto the works councils as of this date, 
and when the Works Constitution was re-defined in 1972, the legislators decided to 
recognise the situation at plant level. 
Whilst it is easy both to be critical of the unitary approach and to dismiss it as inapplicable 
for an understanding of the particular nature of plant-level industrial relations in Germany, 
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Edwards (1995: 11) has indicated that whilst "a unitary view does not describe 
organisational reality, there are features of it which any serious analysis of industrial 
relations has to recognise. " 
For example, at the centre of the unitary frame of reference is the rejection of the 
legitimacy of conflict, which is regarded as being "unnecessary and exceptional" (Salamon 
1992: 31), and "morally indefensible" (Fox 1966: 12). Fox (1966: 12) explained that 
conflict was: 
... either 
(a) merely frictional, e. g. due to incompatible personalities or `things go 
wrong', or (b) caused by faulty `communications', e. g. `misunderstanding' about 
aims or methods, or (c) the result of stupidity in the form of failure to grasp the 
communality of interest, or (d) the work of agitators inciting the supine majority 
who would otherwise be content. 
The illegitimacy of conflict, in the sense of strike action or a lockout, is of significance in 
this context as the WCA 1972 contains an `absolute peace obligation', thus prohibiting the 
instigation of industrial action from within the workplace. However, the inevitability of 
disagreements arising between the employer and the works council is recognised, with the 
WCA 1972 providing for both the formation and the intervention of a plant-level 
arbitration committee, and failing this, for disagreements to be settled by the binding 
decision of a labour court. The absence of conflict lends credence to the unitary frame of 
reference, although it is worth emphasising that this absence is to be explained by its 
prohibition rather than by any concerted effort on the part of the employers and the works 
councils. 
The unitary theorists also emphasise the idea of a harmony of interest in the workplace as 
part of their "professional football team" (Fox 1966: 2) analogy. Whilst the single source 
of authority and single focus of loyalty aspects of this analogy have been rejected, the 
suggestion that there is a harmony of interest is of greater relevance. For instance, §2(1) 
WCA 1972 obliges the employer and the works council to cooperate on behalf of the 
employees and the company, the idea being that all concerned stand to prosper if the 
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company is successful. As Batstone (1988: 11) has indicated, "a communality of interest 
exists, for the wages of the worker depend upon the profitability of the plant. " 
Finally, the unitary frame of reference rejects the existence of ` oppositionary groups or 
factions" (Fox 1966: 3) in the workplace, an idea which, to a limited extent, portrays the 
situation at the micro level in German industry. Whilst the works councils are the elected 
representatives of the employees, and negotiate with the employers on behalf of their 
constituents, they are bound by the requirement in §2(1) WCA 1972 to work with, rather 
than against, the employers. In essence, the WCA 1972 ensures that they are partners 
rather than opponents at plant level. 
2.3 Pluralist Approach 
The proponents of the pluralist frame of reference recognise the existence of rival sources 
of authority and loyalty in the workplace, and in doing so recognise the potential for, if not 
the inevitability of, industrial conflict (Fox 1966: 4; Salamon 1992: 34). The pluralists also 
recognise the need to manage the differences of opinion which inevitably emerge between 
the divergent interest groups. They therefore accept, and indeed welcome, the unions in 
their capacity as regulators of such disputes via collective bargaining. The pattern which 
emerges is one of negotiations taking place between representatives of the divergent 
interest groups, with deals and compromises often resulting. 
Whilst many of the pluralist ideas are of relevance to an understanding of plant-level 
industrial relations in Germany, there are fundamental weaknesses in the argument. For 
example, the unions are not the "legitimate representatives of employee interests" 
(Farnham and Pimlott 1995: 48), and collective bargaining is not the "preferred method of 
negotiation" (Clegg 1976: 96) in the workplace. Instead, as the early part of this chapter 
demonstrated, it is the works councils rather than the unions which negotiate on behalf of 
the employees at this level, and they do so via co-determination and a series of weaker 
rights of participation in managerial decision-making rather than in collective bargaining. 
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One final point of contention surrounds the suggestion that there is a balance of power 
between the owners of capital and labour (Batstone 1988: 13). Whilst the WCA 1972 
does grant the works councils rights of co-determination in managerial decision-making, it 
does not do so on all issues (see Section 1.3), thus ensuring that the employers remain in 
control at the workplace. 
The relevant aspects of the pluralist frame of reference, meanwhile, include the acceptance 
of the existence of rival sources of authority and loyalty (Fox 1966: 4) in the workplace. 
One could argue that the works councils are the manifestation of this rivalry. Furthermore, 
the pluralists are sceptical of the unitary idea of a communality of interest at plant level, 
but do accept that there is a grey area where the interests of the employers and their 
employees overlap (Fox 1966: 4), albeit in the long term. The contention of this thesis is 
that this grey area does exist, and is a reflection of the interest that all concerned have in 
the survival of the company within which they are employed. 
The pluralist analogy put forward by Fox (1966: 2) in describing the industrial 
organisation as a "miniature democratic state composed of sectional groups with divergent 
interests over which the government tries to maintain some kind of dynamic equilibrium" 
is also of relevance. This highlights perfectly the relationship between the employer and 
the works council under the controlling influence of the statutory WCA 1972 at plant 
level. 
Finally, unlike the unitary theorists, the pluralists recognise the inevitability of conflict in 
the workplace and realise that mechanisms need to be established to ensure that it is 
contained. Whilst conflict in the sense of industrial action is prohibited by the `absolute 
peace obligation' in the WCA 1972, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that differences 
of opinion do occur at plant level. 
Finally, Farnham and Pimlott (1995: 49) differentiate between "hard" and "soft" pluralism. 
The former they associate with conflicts and collective bargaining, the latter with 
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disagreements and joint consultation. Whilst the pattern of `hard' pluralism must be 
rejected for reasons already elucidated, `soft' pluralism is more applicable given both the 
nature of the disagreements and the preferred method for their resolution within the 
workplace. 
2.4 Marxist Approach 
The cornerstone of Marxist analysis is the identification of the class relationship 
between capital and labour as the major determinant of social relations, the major 
explanation of why social actors behave the way they do or why particular 
institutions exist. (Crouch 1982: 28-29) 
A Marxist approach to industrial relations, as developed by later Marxist writers64 rather 
than by Marx himself (Farnham and Pimlott 1995: 53), stresses the irreconcilable conflict 
of interest between the owners of capital and labour, and as the quotation suggests, the 
disputes within industry, as with those within society, are to be explained in terms of class 
conflict. 
Given the existence of the `absolute peace obligation' at plant level, and both the provision 
for the formation of the plant-level arbitration committee and the intervention of the 
labour court if disagreements cannot be resolved internally, one can reject the idea that 
there is an irreconcilable conflict of interest at plant level, and that the disagreements 
which arise are the result of class divisions. Instead, the argument of this thesis is that 
many of the divisions which do exist at plant level are occupationally based rather than 
determined by class, as the WCA 1972 provides for only one rival source of authority, the 
works council, to represent the interests of all the blue and the white-collar employees, but 
not those of the "employees of managerial status" (Lane 1989: 227). 
Whilst the Marxist approach is clearly of little relevance for an understanding of the 
operation of plant-level industrial relations in the late twentieth century, one can argue that 
64 See also Hyman (1975). 
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this particular frame of reference was instrumental during the formative years of 
industrialisation in Germany. For example, the threat of class conflict encouraged the 
formation of the early workers' committees, and ultimately, the provision for works 
councils under the Works Council Law of 1920. It has been suggested that these fora, the 
forerunners to the works councils which were introduced after 1945, were created in an 
attempt to bind the employees to the companies within which they were employed 
(Schmidt and Trinczek 1991: 169), to prevent the rise of insurrectionaries (Hyman 1989: 
203), and to avoid a repeat of the Russian Revolution on German soil (Crouch 1993: 
126). The thesis contends, therefore, that the current pattern of plant-level industrial 
relations in Germany has its origins in attempts to prevent the rise of class conflict, which 
was, and continues to be, contained by works councils which integrate the divergent 
interests of the employees. 
2.5 Social Action Approach 
Whilst Dunlop (1958) sought to explain the behaviour of the industrial relations actors in 
terms of the legal or the structural constraints within which they operate with his systems 
theory, the social action theorists argue that the behaviour of these individuals can be 
explained by their responses to the situations with which they are faced. For example, 
Silverman (1970) suggested that the unions and the employers come together because, 
"for a while at least, their differing ends may be served by the same means" (Farnham and 
Pimlott 1995: 49). 
This is an unlikely portrayal of plant-level reality, as firstly, it is the works council and not 
the industrial union which operates at this level on behalf of the employees, 65 and 
secondly, the employers and the works councils come together as their interaction is 
required under the terms of the WCA 1972, rather than it being a voluntary process. In 
fact, given the importance of the WCA 1972 in Germany, one argument is that the social 
65 This is not to say that the industrial unions do not have a presence at plant level. On the one 
hand, as Table 1.1 indicates, the majority of works councillors are unionised. On the other, the industrial 
unions are usually represented by union stewards (see Section 7.8). 
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action approach is of little relevance to an understanding of plant-level industrial relations, 
as the behaviour of the individual actors is, to such a large extent, pre-determined by the 
requirements of this legislation and not by their individual responses to particular 
situations. 
Finally, the social action theorists also subscribe to the validity of collective bargaining as 
the desired method of conflict resolution (Schienstock 1982: 174), an idea which sits 
uneasily in the German context, as co-determination is the recognised process at plant 
level. 
2.6 Corporatist Approach 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and supports. (Schmitter 1979: 13) 
In defining corporatism in this way, Schmitter has, albeit unintentionally, provided a 
detailed description of the German model of industrial relations. The idea that the 
representative bodies are `noncompetitive', `hierarchically ordered', `functionally 
differentiated' and `granted a deliberate representational monopoly' explains the particular 
nature of the dual system of interest representation, with the employers' associations and 
the industrial unions operating under the TVG 1949 and concentrating on quantitative 
issues in collective bargaining at sectoral level, whilst the WCA 1972 oversees the 
interaction of the individual employers and works councils in the workplace, where more 
qualitative issues are addressed. This dual system is, as Schmitter suggested, a statutory 
creation, with the rights and duties enjoyed by these representative bodies enshrined in 
labour legislation. In return, whilst the actors at sectoral level are restricted in their ability 
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to resort to industrial action, with the prohibition of political strikes a further constraint, 
an `absolute peace obligation' operates in the workplace. 
The relevance of Schmitter's definition was also recognised by Streeck (1981: 156): 
The German system of industrial relations corresponds in its basic features to 
Schmitter's structural definition of `corporatism' as an institutional mechanism of 
interest representation. The number of organised units representing separate 
interest constituencies is `limited' in Germany, unlike that in `pluralist' systems - 
with the result that units are broad and internally heterogeneous - and there is little 
if any `competition' between organisations appealing to identical constituencies. 
Furthermore, the `type or scope' of the interests represented by and within 
different interest-political actors - such as works councils and trade unions - are 
not `self-determined', but to a considerable extent, regulated by legislation; the 
result is a high degree of `functional differentiation'. Compulsory membership - 
another characteristic of corporatist systems as defined by Schmitter - exists in the 
statutory representation system at the plant level and is extended latently and 
informally into parts of the voluntary system. Moreover, arenas of interest politics 
are hierarchically ordered, with workplace bargaining being subordinate to 
industry-wide bargaining, and the latter being subject to regulation by law. Finally, 
there are a number of (latent) mechanisms of state `licensing' of interest 
associations. One of them is the works councils system which favours broad-based 
industrial unions over sectional unions and supports them in their attempts to gain 
a `representational monopoly within their respective categories'. 
The corporatist frame of reference therefore presupposes a central role for the state and a 
preference for cooperation over confrontation in the industrial relations arena, both of 
which are in evidence in Germany. On the one hand, the state `holds the ring' in industrial 
relations. 66 Its central role manifests itself in the high degree of juridification of both the 
employment relationship in general, as shown in Chapter One, and the health and safety 
arena in particular, as explained in Chapter Five. As Crouch and Dore (1990: 13) have 
indicated, "Germans... have an extensive state which shares its role with those organised 
interests that it accepts as co-operating with it, and excludes from participation those that 
it does not accept. " On the other hand, the desire to "replace conflict and competition with 
66 The state 'holds the ring' in the sense that whilst statutory legislation dominates the industrial 
relations arena, the state does not involve itself directly on a daily basis. At sectoral level, the employers' 
associations and the industrial unions are free to negotiate collective agreements under the auspices of the 
TVG 1949. At plant level, the individual employers and the works councils operate under the influence of 
the WCA 1972. 
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consensus and cooperation in the furtherance of the common good" (Dabscheck 1989: 
147) was demonstrated by the period of tripartite concertation between the government, 
the employers' associations and the unions, which began in the late 1960s, and by §2(1) 
WCA 1972, with its requirement of the employer and the works council to cooperate for 
the good of the employees and for the company within which they operate. In the words 
of Crouch and Dore (1990: 5), "Corporatist arrangements are designed 
for... situations... where the collective good does require a restraint, an exercise of 
discipline, which private benefit calculations would not themselves produce. 2167 
As Crouch (1982: 40) has indicated however, the existence of "a purely corporatist 
arrangement... whereby a peace obligation and a disciplinary role are undertaken in 
exchange for no concessions" is rarely in evidence in an industrial society. The German 
example is no exception, and the concessions are enforced by the WCA 1972, which 
grants the works councils rights of participation in managerial decision-making in return 
for their commitment to industrial peace. 
2.7 Explanatory Framework 
Whilst the corporatist approach comes close, no single frame of reference is capable on its 
own of explaining the particular nature of plant-level industrial relations in Germany. 
Instead, several theoretical approaches offer ideas which are of relevance to an 
understanding of the prevalent arrangements. The unitary approach is applicable in the 
sense that it stresses the illegitimacy of conflict, the existence of a harmony of interest, and 
the absence of oppositionary groups in the industrial organisation. The pluralist acceptance 
of the inevitability of conflict, albeit in the form of disagreements, and the need to establish 
a conflict resolution mechanism, is relevant, as is the recognition of the existence of rival 
sources of authority and loyalty in the workplace. The social action approach and the 
Marxist analysis are of less significance, but the importance of class conflict for an 
67 This was the case in the late nineteenth century when Bismarck introduced his social security 
legislation. 
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explanation of the evolution of the existing plant-level arrangements should not be 
ignored. 
The processes and structures which characterise plant-level industrial relations in 
Germany, are, to a large extent, the product of statutory legislation, and of the WCA 1972 
in particular. Its provisions have prohibited industrial conflict, have imposed the idea of a 
harmony of interest, and have prevented the appearance of oppositionary groups. At the 
same time however, the WCA 1972 has sanctioned the formation of a rival source of 
authority and loyalty for the employers at plant level, in the form of a representative body 
which enjoys rights of participation in managerial decision-making. 
With the employers and their employees cooperating under the auspices of the statutory 
WCA 1972, and the emphasis on both industrial peace and the furtherance of the common 
good, the contention of this thesis is that plant-level industrial relations in Germany 
demonstrate corporatist, or more accurately, micro-corporatist traits. 
As Jacobi et al. (1992: 262-263) have indicated, "micro-corporatist arrangements or 
productivity coalitions have gained in importance in the 1980s. Relatively stable alliances 
have developed at establishment level between works councils and management which 
further the complementary interests of both sides. " 
This trend is continuing in the 1990s. Whilst corporatist arrangements may well be in 
decline at sectoral level, with union membership falling, as unemployment reaches its 
highest level since the end of the Weimar Republic, and employers' associations 
representing the interests of fewer employers, they continue to flourish at plant level. 
Here, an ever-increasing number of issues are being addressed by employers and works 
councils under the auspices of the WCA 1972. Consequently, there is talk of a 
decentralisation of industrial relations in Germany (Kotthoff 1994: 34), and as Keller 
(1993: 59) explains, this trend is accelerated by processes such as the introduction of new 
technology, which needs to be tailored to the conditions prevailing in individual 
workplaces. 
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The argument of this thesis, therefore, is that plant-level industrial relations in Germany 
are characterised by a pattern of Mate-induced cooperation. The inducements are 
enshrined in the WCA 1972. They include guaranteed industrial peace for the employers 
on the one hand and rights of participation in managerial decision-making for the works 
councils on the other. 
With reference to the way in which the issue of occupational health and safety is addressed 
in seven case-study companies in the German metal-working industry, this thesis will 
therefore demonstrate that corporatism is alive and well at the micro level. As Crouch and 
Dore (1990: 22-24) have suggested: 
Answers to three questions are needed to determine whether an institution is a 
corporatist arrangement.... First, an institution must make use of representatives of 
the interests whose behaviour is involved.... Second, for an institution to be 
corporatist it must have the power to constrain and sanction, either through its 
own resources or by effectively co-opting those of its constituent representative 
bodies.... Finally, to speak of corporatism we need some notion of orientation to a 
public interest. 
This definition will be utilised to demonstrate that corporatist arrangements prevail at 
plant level in German industry. 
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CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Divided into three subsequent sections, this chapter explains the thinking behind the choice 
of both the metal-working industry as the focus of the study, and the case-study approach 
as the preferred method of investigation. It also details the process of selection of the 
case-study companies, and highlights the way in which the empirical evidence was both 
collected and interpreted. 
3.2 Formulating the Approach 
The original intention of this industrial relations research initiative was to identify 
explanations for the way in which occupational health and safety issues are addressed at 
plant level in Germany and Great Britain. The research continued in this vein for much of 
the first 12 months, before the conclusion - was reached that the complexity of the 
legislative and organisational arrangements in Germany deserved greater attention than 
could have been guaranteed within a cross-national comparative framework. It was 
therefore decided to concentrate on the situation in Germany, and the metal-working 
industry was selected as the area of study for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, with the exception of commerce and administration, the metal-working industry 
was the largest employer in Germany in 1992,68 with over 4.2 million employees (HVBG 
1993: 12). Secondly, IG Metall, the metal workers' union, was, and still is, the largest 
industrial union, not only in Germany but also the world. Within Germany itself, IG Metall 
is therefore the most influential of the 16 industrial unions, and usually sets a precedent for 
the other 15 in the annual round of wage bargaining. Thirdly, this branch of industry has 
68 The 1992 figures are quoted as these were the most recent at the time the decision was taken to 
concentrate on the metal-working industry. 
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traditionally had one of the worst occupational accident rates (see Table 3.1). Finally, it 
was envisaged that established contacts between the University of Surrey and IG Metall 
would facilitate the realisation of the field work, which is described in detail below. 
Table 3.1: Full-Time Employment and Accident Rates 199269 
A full-time employee was deemed to work 1620 hours in 1992. 
** For a definition of commuting accidents, see Section 5.3. 
Source: HVBG, 1993. 
69 The 1992 figures are quoted as these were the most recent at the time the decision was taken to 
concentrate on the metal-working industry. 
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Having selected the metal-working industry as the focus for the empirical research, the 
next task was to decide upon the approach best suited to collating the information 
required. A review of previous research initiatives, many of which are referred to in the 
following chapter, revealed a variety of research methods, with postal surveys (Pröll and 
Sczesny 1991) and case studies (Diekershoff 1979; Kühn 1982) most frequently cited. The 
idea of a postal survey was rejected, both for reasons of cost and for the lack of 
information it would yield. Given that there was an interest in developing a profile of a 
number of companies, the case-study approach was preferred. It was decided that a series 
of similar profiles would enable the author to compare and contrast the health and safety 
structures in companies of varying size, a factor which is particularly important when one 
considers that the occupational health and safety legislation affects different sized 
companies in different ways (see Section 7.5). 
Having decided upon a case-study approach, a number of methods of data elicitation were 
considered. The original intention was to produce questionnaires for the employers, the 
works councillors and the employees, which would be distributed in all of the chosen 
companies. However, a pilot study served to highlight several weaknesses in this 
approach. 
The pilot study was carried out at Zulu AG, 7° a producer of fork-lift trucks in northern 
Germany, during the second of four field trips to Germany. The first of these four visits 
lasted two weeks, and the time was spent establishing contacts with IG Metall, and both 
identifying and researching primary sources of information. During the second visit, which 
lasted three weeks, 50 questionnaires were distributed to management, works councillors 
and employees at Zulu AG, with a total of 23 being returned. The pilot study identified 
weaknesses in the formulation of a number of questions, and whilst these inadequacies 
were easily rectified with the assistance of a native speaker, " the most significant finding 
70 The name of this and the final seven case-study companies have been changed. 
71 Copies of the final questionnaires are to be found in Appendices 2-4. 
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was the unsuitability of the questionnaire approach as far as senior managers and the 
works councillors were concerned. 
It was evident that the information provided by these individuals in a questionnaire survey 
represented only a minute fraction of what could have been generated in a single 
interview. With this in mind, a series of structured interviews were drawn up to be carried 
out with senior management, those members of the works council dealing specifically with 
health and safety, and the health and safety experts. 
The interviews were divided into three sections. In the first, the interviewees were asked 
to evaluate the prevalent organisational structures, highlighting the advantages and 
disadvantages of these arrangements for addressing the question of health and safety. They 
were then presented with a series of questions designed to identify the profile which health 
and safety issues enjoyed within their company. The interview concluded with an 
evaluation of the plant-level interrelationships. 
It was therefore decided to combine a questionnaire survey, which has the advantage of 
being a simple, cost-effective and well-understood method of data elicitation, a series of 
structured interviews, which enable the respondents greater freedom to express 
themselves, and observations of plant-level reality, in order to develop, a profile of the 
case-study companies. 
3.3 The Search for the Case-Study Companies 
Contact with the case-study companies was established in a variety of ways, with initial 
attempts to identify suitable workplaces, made during a short field trip to Germany in 
January 1995. Several union secretaries were interviewed at the offices of IG Metall in 
Hamburg, Hanover, Dortmund, Stuttgart and Frankfurt am Main, and in each location the 
union secretary was asked to recommend as many companies as possible. 
62 
Within four weeks, five companies had expressed an initial interest in participating in the 
survey. In addition, the works council at Zulu AG had indicated that it would be prepared 
to participate. Of these six, only two, Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH and Echo AG, 
were among the final list of seven case-study companies. Two of the four employers who 
declined to participate did so on the grounds that their employees had only recently 
completed a series of similar surveys. The third, Zulu AG, raised an objection to the 
wording of the re-drafted questionnaires. 72 
The one remaining candidate, Delta AG, was itself unsuitable for the survey, given that it 
was a holding company for a number of manufacturing operations, rather than a 
manufacturing plant itself. Nevertheless, the labour director, who displayed a keen interest 
in the survey, suggested that contact be established with one of the companies under the 
control of Delta AG. The company in question, Beta GmbH, agreed to support this 
undertaking. 
The other four companies were contacted following the author's arrival in Germany in 
March 1995 to carry out the field work. The first was identified during an initial visit to 
Echo AG, one of the largest private sector employers in Germany. The chairman of the 
health and safety sub-committee of the works council suggested that his counterpart at 
another branch of Echo AG would be interested. Permission to carry out the survey at this 
second location was duly granted. 73 Contact with the remaining three companies, Foxtrot 
GmbH, Tango-Roger Steel AG and Gamma Transportation Technology GmbH was 
established by letter, following a search for suitable participants in a business directory. 
72 The personnel manager informed the author that although union stewards were active in the 
company, they were not officially recognised. Access would only have been granted had the word 
'Vertrauensleute' been removed from all questionnaires. As they had already been printed, and as the 
author was interested in the contribution made by these individuals, the personnel manager's offer was 
rejected. The chairman of the works council at Zulu AG, who had previously pledged his support, was 
subsequently unavailable for comment. 
73 The first branch is referred to as Echo AG - 'Branch A', and the second as Echo AG - 'Branch 
B'. 
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3.4 Field Work 
The field work was carried out over a three-month period in the Spring of 1995. In each 
company the survey was executed in a similar fashion, with several visits made to all seven 
companies over the three-month period. The questionnaires were distributed by, and 
returned to, the works council following an initial visit, "' and were collected on returning 
to the companies to conduct the structured interviews (see Table 3.2). There were a total 
of 46 interviews in the seven companies (see Appendix 1), each lasting between one and 
three hours. With one exception - Interview #86 - all interviewees agreed to the use of a 
dictaphone to record the discussion, the details of which were then transcribed the same 
evening. 
Table 3.2: Questionnaire Survey Response Rates 
An explanation for the differences in the response rate is offered in Section 9.3. 
74 During the initial discussions in each company, the author requested that the relevant 
questionnaires be distributed to all employees. Whilst all works councillors received a copy of their 
particular questionnaire in each company, the distribution of workforce and line management 
questionnaires was often limited to particular sections of the companies at the request of either the 
employer or the works council. 
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In each company, the author gathered yet more information by making general 
observations, whilst accompanying a member of the works council on a tour of the 
workplace. In addition, at Gamma Transportation Technology GmbH and at Tango-Roger 
Steel AG, meetings of the prevalent health and safety committees were attended. Finally, a 
check list of general information was compiled on each company, and a copy of the 
accident statistics, and both the minutes and reports of the various health and safety 
committee meetings were also acquired. 
The information gleaned from the questionnaire surveys was analysed using the `Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences' (SPSS), and whilst the data presented in Chapter Eight is 
mainly a comparison of frequencies, correlations were also applied in the final analysis. 
In compiling this thesis an extensive review of industrial relations and health and safety- 
related literature has been carried out both here and in Germany, with previous empirical 
research initiatives providing the central focus. There was also a review of official 
occupational health and safety statistics which are produced annually by both the Federal 
Government and the professional associations. Finally, a series of unstructured interviews, 
which were designed to generate a wealth of general information, were conducted with 
academics, government officials, union secretaries, health and safety inspectors and 
members of the professional associations (see Appendix 1). 75 
75 For an assessment of the research methodology adopted, see Section 9.3. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE WORKS COUNCIL AND THE ISSUE OF 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY: A REVIEW OF 
RELATED RESEARCH INITIATIVES 
4.1 Introduction 
This fourth chapter is divided into three main sections. The first provides an assessment of 
a number of studies concerned with the operation of the works council. There then follows 
an evaluation of the major empirical research initiatives which have examined the 
occupational health and safety structures in German industry. The third reviews a number 
of general health and safety-related studies. 
4.2 Empirical Research Review: The Works Council 
In 1964, Blume published the findings of his study of the operation of the WCA 1952. He 
was particularly interested in identifying both the way in which the works councils coped 
with the dual function of representing the interests of the employees, whilst not 
endangering the survival of the company, and the reception afforded the works councils by 
the individual employers. To this end, Blume observed the performance of the works 
council in 491 companies, each of which employed upwards of 200 employees. The 
companies were spread across six branches of industry, and the findings were based on the 
results of a questionnaire survey and a series of unstructured interviews. 
Blume (1964: 209) found that many employers were opposed to the provisions of the 
WCA 1952, and that this law was violated with greater frequency as the size of the 
companies decreased. These violations included the election of insufficient works 
councillors, and the infrequency with which works assemblies were convened. As far as 
the social partnership ethos was concerned, there was evidence to suggest that a 
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cooperative relationship between the works council and the employer was the dominant 
pattern (Blume 1964: 143). 
Whilst both the subject matter and the findings of his survey are outdated, Blume's work 
remains a study of great importance as it was one of the first of its kind. The width of the 
sample is to be applauded, as is the decision to examine the situation in eight Federal 
States. Consequently, Blume was able to account for any regional disparities that may 
have remained from the days of the Allied Control Council Law No. 22. 
In a survey of seven companies with between 400 and 15 000 employees across a variety 
of industries, Weltz (1976) examined the way in which both new work processes and new 
technologies were introduced at plant level. Of particular interest was the way in which 
conflicts associated with such changes were resolved within the workplace. All seven 
companies had successfully introduced new technologies just prior to the survey, and 
Weitz found that potential misunderstandings in this respect between the works councils 
and the employers had been avoided, as the former were kept in regular contact with 
technological developments (Weitz 1976: 65). 76 
Weitz (1976: 114) concluded that a process of "cooperative conflict resolution" was 
operational at plant level, with the employer and the chairman of the works council often 
addressing potential points of conflict without recourse to the WCA 1972. He suggested 
that this preference for cooperation was a result of. 
" the collective desire to rebuild the economy after the Second World War; 
" the recognition that the relationship between the works council and the employer was 
an on-going association; 
" the call for cooperation in §2(1) WCA 1972; 
" the recognition that rationalisation measures were necessary so long as the negative 
consequences of such changes for the employees could be minimised. 
76 In 1968, IG Metall and Gesamtmetall signed a Rationalisation Protection Agreement which 
served to ensure that employers would inform works councils in advance of any rationalisation measures. 
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Confrontation was the exception rather than the rule in the seven companies, and Weltz 
(1976: 130) suggested that the relationship between the employers and the works councils 
was "a tightrope walk between confrontation and cooperation. " 
On a similar technological note, Altmann (1992a) examined the problems facing the 
works councils in a number of metal-working companies, as they attempted to come to 
terms with the implementation of new technologies. He discovered that the works 
councillors were underqualified and overstretched in their attempts to negate the harmful 
effects of these new technologies upon the workforce. According to Altmann (1992a: 
398), the existing legislation was unable to cope with the problems raised by the new 
technologies, with the WCA 1972 failing to give the works councils sufficient power to 
influence such developments. For example, the works council enjoyed a right of co- 
determination concerning the introduction of new technologies only if it could prove that 
the scientific findings relating to work design had been violated (Altmann 1992a: 398). ' 
In the late 1970s, Kotthoff (1981) surveyed 63 companies of varying size across a number 
of industrial sectors. His intention was to identify the prevalent organisational structures, 
with the employees' representative body at plant level providing the central focus. 
Kotthoff identified six `types' of works council: 78 
" The "ignored works council" (author's translation) was to be found in the smallest 
companies, where the employers enjoyed a close, personal relationship with the 
employees. These close links ensured that the latter had little need for a representative 
body, and although they had been elected, they were of little significance in practice; 
" Kotthoffs "isolated works council" (author's translation) was to be found mainly in 
those companies employing between 200 and 600 employees. The employers regularly 
ignored both the labour law provisions and the collective agreements, and although the 
77 This right is enshrined in §91 WCA 1972 and is closely linked to §90 WCA 1972. 
78 Only 30 per cent of Kotthoff's works councils were found to be as cooperative as those that Weltz 
(1976) had identified (Kotthoff 1985: 72-73). 
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works councils were permitted to realise some of their duties, a lack of trust and open 
aggression characterised the relationship between the social partners; 
" The "works council as an organ of management" (author's translation) represented 
Kotthoffs third and final example of a deficient form of interest representation at plant 
level. These works councils were operational, but were found to be carrying out tasks 
on behalf of the employers; 
" As for the effective bodies of interest representation, Kotthoff initially identified the 
"co-operative works council as a countervailing power" (author's translation). 
These works councils were regularly involved in company planning, with their chairmen 
enjoying a position of trust in the workplace. In essence, these works councils 
represented the employees' interests, but were often accused by the latter of taking a 
management-oriented stance; 
" The "works council which is respected by management, but which is committed 
to representing the interests of the employees" (author's translation), was Kotthoff's 
fifth example. Conflict between these works councils and the employers was always a 
possibility as the former were committed to realising the interests of the workforce; 
" His final type of works council, the strongest form of interest representation, was also 
respected by the employers, but found itself in limbo between the workforce and 
management. These works councils had also established close links with the industrial 
unions. 
Approximately two thirds of the 63 companies had one of the deficient forms of interest 
representation, 79 and Kotthoff (1981: 30) attributed this finding to the employers' 
rejection of the WCA 1972, on the grounds that the extended rights of participation in 
79 The deficient forms of interest representation were the first three types of works councils he 
identified. 
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managerial decision-making, enjoyed by the works councils under this legislation, was 
likely to make plant-level industrial relations expensive. 80 
Kotthoff concluded that the degree of influence that the works councils were permitted to 
exert at plant level was dependent upon the following variables: 
" the stance adopted by the employers; 
" company size; 
" form of ownership; 
" union density. 
The author recognises that Kotthofi's study is a seminal work in German industrial 
relations, but suggests that, as no two works councils are identical, the idea of subdividing 
these bodies of interest representation is misleading. The contention is that there could be 
greater similarities between the `types' than there actually are within them. 
Having highlighted the plant-level structures in 63 workplaces in his 1981 study, Kotthof 
(1994) returned to the same companies in the late 1980s in order to identify, and account 
for, any changes in the forms of interest representation. 81 In particular, Kotthoff wanted to 
establish whether any of the deficient works councils had evolved into effective 
representative bodies. He was therefore concerning himself with the dynamics of plant- 
level industrial relations. 
Kotthoff (1994: 29) reached the conclusion that only one third of the companies had a 
deficient form of interest representation in the late 1980s, compared with a figure of 
approximately 66 per cent in 1975. He suggested that this development could be partly 
explained by the employers' realisation that the provisions for works council participation 
in managerial decision-making had not imposed the financial burden that had initially been 
feared (Kotthoff 1994: 30-31). The works councils were also found to be realistic in their 
80 For a discussion of the cost of the WCA 1972, see Niedenhoff 1994. 
81 Fifty-five of these companies were still operational in the late 1980s. 
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demands, appearing to appreciate the need to consider the company's financial position 
during negotiations with the employer (Kotthoff 1994: 42). Furthermore, they recognised 
that modernisation was a necessary development if the company was to remain 
competitive, and if jobs were to be saved (Kotthoff 1994: 42). The period during which 
the new technologies had been introduced had therefore seen the works councils 
perfecting a damage limitation exercise (Kotthoff 1994: 43). 
In seeking to explain the transition from an inefficient to an effective form of interest 
representation, Kotthoff suggested that change was brought about by: 
"a group of employees standing for election to the works council in order to initiate 
change; 
"a new employee with experience of an effective works council; 
" an individual with a strong personality; 
" desire for change on both sides. 
In the mid 1970s, Kluge et at. (1981) visited eight provincial companies across four 
branches of industry. Each employed between 200 and 2500 employees. By observing 
plant-level behaviour, and carrying out a series of interviews over a period of several 
weeks, Kluge et al. were interested in identifying the way in which the employees' 
interests were being represented in the eight workplaces. 
Their findings identified the chairman of the works council as a key player in plant-level 
industrial relations, with the relationship between these individuals and the employers 
deemed to be of crucial importance. Unlike Kotthoff (1981), the authors were unable to 
identify a positive correlation between union density and the efficacy of the works council, 
and suggested instead that the presence of an industriai union at plant level actually had a 
detrimental effect upon the relationship between the employers and the works councils 
(Kluge et al. 1981: 59). 
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In 1985, Birke et al. published the findings of a study which examined the role played by 
the works council during the introduction of measures designed to humanise the 
workplace. They found that these bodies tended to concentrate on addressing individual 
deficiencies, such as accident prevention and noise abatement, rather than developing an 
overall strategy to improve the working conditions as a whole. They also identified a 
preference amongst the works councillors for addressing quantitative rather than 
qualitative measures. 
A study of the causes of conflict and the means for its resolution in German industry took 
Williams (1984) to 10 companies of varying size in the metal-working industry. Her focus 
on the relationship between the employers and the works councils in both a series of 
interviews and a questionnaire survey revealed a general acceptance of the WCA 1972 and 
its provisions, although the extent of this acceptance appeared to be influenced by 
company size, managerial attitudes and the nature of ownership. 
As far as company size was concerned, Williams (1984: 94) found that the WCA 1972 
was very much a ceiling of rights in the smaller establishments, but little more than a basic 
floor of rights in the larger companies. She also suggested that the WCA 1972 had the 
potential both to cause and to prevent conflict at plant level, with the rights of 
participation enjoyed by the works councils in managerial decision-making the decisive 
factors (Williams 1984: 94). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, Kotthoff and Reindl (1990) carried out a series of 
interviews in 52 companies, each employing fewer than 500 employees, in order to shed 
some light on the social structure of these smaller organisations. Spread across four 
branches of industry, and located in six Federal States, the 52 companies, 30 of which had 
a works council, were independent family-owned operations. 
Whilst not the focus of their research, Kotthoff and Reindl did refer to the works council 
in their findings. They suggested that the performance of this body was dependent upon: 
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" the influence of the prevalent regional culture; 
9 the personality of the chairman of the works council; 
" the influence exerted by the employer. 
The combination of these three variables, it was argued, had a major bearing upon the 
nature and the performance of the works councils (Kotthoff and Reindl 1990: 349). 
Finally, Kotthoff and Reindi (1990: 350) warned against expecting too much of the works 
councils in these smaller companies. They were in no position to establish elaborate 
networks of interest representation, and were described as "reactive bodies" (Kotthoff and 
Reindl 1990: 350, author's translation) which were heavily influenced by the requirement 
in §2(1) WCA 1972 to consider the interests of the company as well as those of their 
electorate (Kotthoff and Reindl 1990: 352). 
In an attempt to highlight the structures and the operation of plant-level industrial 
relations, and the micro-level influence of the industrial union, IG Metall, Streeck (1984a; 
1984b) carried out a study of the car giant Volkswagen. 
Despite the legal demarcation, Streeck (1984a: 141) identified close links between the 
bodies of interest representation - the works council and the industrial union - at 
Volkswagen, and suggested that IG Metall was dictating to the works council which, in 
turn, was exerting a controlling influence upon the union stewards. The situation at 
Volkswagen highlighted the extent to which the industrial unions can exploit the WCA 
1972, and therefore influence plant-level industrial relations as a whole. 
Streeck also discovered that the works council was able to use the WCA 1972 to cause 
management numerous problems. For example, it was found to be trading its stronger 
rights of participation in managerial decision-making for concessions by management on 
issues where its influence was more restricted (Streeck 1984a: 65). Streeck therefore 
concluded that management had an interest in establishing a good working relationship 
with the works council. 
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Rosenbaum (1982) displayed an interest in determining the efficacy of labour law 
regulations in plant-level industrial relations. He aimed to identify: 
" whether the works councils fulfilled the social partnership ethos or merely worked on 
behalf of the employees; 
" whether aspects of labour law had improved the bargaining position of the employees 
and their representatives in their dealings with their employers. 
The main conclusion reached by Rosenbaum (1982: 404) was that informal norms 
dominated plant-level industrial relations. He suggested that labour law was ineffective in 
small and medium-sized companies, as the works councillors were underqualified and 
isolated from the industrial unions. They therefore lacked the necessary know-how to 
enforce the legislation. As far as the WCA 1972 was concerned, he found that this law 
served as a point of reference for the plant-level actors. Its provisions, he continued, were 
mainly used as bargaining tools to manage the works councils' relationship with 
management (Rosenbaum 1982: 413). 
Rosenbaum also described how the works councils used their rights of participation in the 
area of health and safety to gain benefits for their members elsewhere. The works councils 
apparently tolerated certain violations of the health and safety legislation, but demanded 
concessions from the employer in return. He further found that management was able to 
ignore the works councils' rights to co-determination in the area of overtime. This was 
possible, even if the works councils threatened to `work to rule' on health and safety 
issues, as management knew that the employees were always prepared to sacrifice health 
and safety for the financial rewards linked to overtime (Rosenbaum 1980: 415). 
The research initiatives that have been assessed in this section have aimed to elucidate the 
activities of the works council in relation to a number of factors. There have been attempts 
to identify different types of works council (Kotthoff 1981), to evaluate the performance 
of the works councils in the industrial provinces (Kluge et al. 1981), to explain the 
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particular situation in union-dominated plants (Streeck 1984a/1984b), to describe the role 
of the works council in resolving conflicts (Weitz 1976; Williams 1984), to consider the 
effect of labour law on the performance of this body (Rosenbaum 1982), and to examine 
the way in which the works councils are affected by the new technologies (Altmann 
1992a). The various research initiatives suggest that the following variables influence the 
performance of the works council at plant level: 
" Company size (Blume 1964; Kotthoff 1981; Williams 1984); 
" The nature of ownership (Kotthoff 1981; Williams 1984); 
" Management attitudes (Kotthoff 1981; Kluge et al. 1981; Williams 1984); 
" Union density (Kotthoff 1981; Kluge et at. 1981); 
" Geographical location (Kluge et at. 1981). 
4.3 Empirical Research Review: Health and Safety in German Industry 
One of the most comprehensive studies of the occupational health and safety structures in 
Germany was commissioned by the Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs and 
carried out by the BAU in the late 1970s. Published in five volumes in 1980, the study 
concerned itself with the macro-level health and safety structures, and both the legislative 
process and the existing legislative provisions, all of which were to be evaluated by the 
labour inspectors and the health and safety-related actors at plant level. The study 
investigated claims that there were overlaps in the legislation, that the statutory labour 
inspectors and the technical inspectors of the professional associations were performing 
similar functions, that the statutory labour inspectors were more concerned with 
environmental issues, and that certain employees were not covered by the existing 
legislative provisions (Deppe et al. 1980: 21). The entire undertaking was a "stock-taking" 
exercise (Büntgen et al. 1980a: 720, author's translation), with the central task being that 
r 
of identifying whether the prevalent structures met the needs of the employees. 
75 
To achieve these aims, questionnaires were sent out to all statutory labour and technical 
inspectors, 82 and supplementary interviews were carried out with both the inspectors and a 
number of plant-level health and safety experts. Finally, in order to evaluate the efficacy of 
these arrangements from a micro-level perspective, case studies were made of 51 
companies. 
The findings revealed that both inspectorates were understaffed and were therefore 
hampered in their attempts to make regular visits to the companies. 83 The shortages were 
found to be most severe in the Statutory Labour Inspectorates (Gewerbeaufsichtsämter), 
and it was here that the inspectors were also found to be spending a great deal of their 
time completing administrative tasks (Büntgen et al. 1980b: 1083-1084) and addressing 
environmental issues. 84 
The statutory inspectors considered themselves to be advisors rather than inspectors 
(Büntgen et al. 1980a: 721), but the plant-level actors appeared to know very little about 
the activities of either this or the technical inspectorate, with most respondents regarding 
the statutory body as an environmental watchdog (Büntgen et al. 1980b: 1080). There was 
a lack of cooperation between the two inspectorates, despite the introduction in 1977 of a 
General Ordinance for the Cooperation of the Professional Associations and the Statutory 
Labour Inspectorates (Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift über das Zusammenwirken der 
Träger der Unfallversicherung und der Gewerbeaufsichtsbehörden), which had been 
designed to address this deficiency. There was also a suggestion that the inspectors tended 
to concentrate their efforts on larger companies. 
The research also highlighted the legislative complexity in the health and safety arena and 
identified more than 100 different domestic and international bodies issuing legislation 
(Deppe et al. 1980: 378). Consequently, there were a number of legislative overlaps, and 
82 Approximately 52 per cent of all statutory labour inspectors and as many as 73.4 per cent of all 
technical inspectors participated (Mertens 1980: 177). 
93 Whilst the majority of works councillors and health and safety personnel interviewed expressed a 
wish for more frequent visits, their employers disagreed (Biintgen et al. 1980b: 1082). 
84 BUntgen et al. (1980a: 720) indicated that they devoted as much as 40 per cent of their time to 
environmental issues. 
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when asked, many works councillors and employers were apparently unfamiliar with the 
complex network of provisions. Whilst the employers bemoaned this complexity, the 
employees' representatives stressed the importance of these provisions for an 
improvement in health and safety at plant level (Büntgen et al. 1980b: 1081). 
On the whole, the study was critical of the inspection and enforcement arrangements, and 
the plethora of rules and regulations was regarded as incomprehensible (Büntgen et al. 
1980b: 1081). The health and safety structures were also criticised for not having kept 
pace with technological change, and it was suggested that both the legislative and the 
enforcement arrangements were in need of modernisation if they were to contribute 
effectively to an improvement in working conditions (Büntgen et al. 1980b: 1104). 
In 1984, the results of a research initiative, carried out in Germany over a five-week 
period, were published by the International Labour Office (ILO). Similar studies had 
been carried out by the ILO in a number of industrialised countries, and were intended to 
identify the way in which health and safety legislation was enforced by the labour 
inspectorates in the various countries. One of the aims of the entire programme was to 
encourage the state and the social partners to give health and safety issues greater 
consideration, and to this end the research was carried out by a representative from each 
of the three groups. They visited a number of companies across a variety of industrial 
branches and interviewed both statutory labour and technical inspectors, as well as 
representatives of both the industrial unions and the employers' associations. 
As with the BAU study, the researchers identified a complex legislative framework, with 
the statutory and the autonomous provisions addressing similar issues. They also referred 
to the "excessive quantity and detail of the legislative provisions" (JLO 1984: 15), 
although they found no evidence of a desire to re-organise the legislative process. 
As for the inspectorates, the tripartite body8S uncovered a lack of cooperation between the 
statutory labour and the technical inspectors (IIA 1984: 76), and whilst it was not 
95 The body comprised representatives of the state and the social partners. 
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opposed to the inspectors preference to advise rather than to prosecute, the researchers 
did suggest that there should have been more frequent prosecutions to ensure that the 
threat of punitive measures was taken seriously by the employers (ILO 1984: 60). 86 
Further deficiencies uncovered included the inapplicability of the Works Safety Law to 
large sections of the working population employed in smaller companies (ILO 1984: 73), 
and the opportunity for employers to delegate health and safety responsibilities to lower 
levels of the management chain, thus relegating the importance of such issues at plant level 
(ILO 1984: 74). Furthermore, both employers and works councillors suggested that the 
costs of many health and safety measures were unrealistically high in relation to the 
improvements that they could be expected to produce. Investments were therefore 
discouraged (ILO 1984: 25). The ILO praised the idea of self-administration in the 
professional associations however, describing the arrangement as "an important piece of 
democracy and a way of achieving cooperation between the social partners" (ILO 1984: 
7). It commended the time and effort spent on health and safety issues by a wide range of 
actors, and was particularly impressed with the training facilities, the range of educational 
courses and the quality of the information handouts (ILO 1984: 124). 
The subsequent recommendations made by the ILO representatives included the call for a 
simplification of the legislative arrangements and provisions, the need both for greater 
cooperation between the two inspectorates and for a revision of inspection arrangements, 
with the latter including the suggestion that there should be more unplanned visits (ILO 
1984: 127-129). 87 In essence, the ILO study uncovered few, if any, new findings, and 
there were many similarities between this initiative and the research carried out by the 
BAU in the late 1970s. Many of the recommendations made by the latter had apparently 
86 This problem is still in evidence today. Of the 26 000 safety deficiencies uncovered by the 
Statutory Labour Inspectorates in 1993, fewer than one in three resulted in an administrative fine (BMA 
1994: 73). 
$' The obvious disadvantage of a pre-planned visit is that the plant-level actors have advanced 
warning, and can therefore ensure that the rules and regulations are being observed at the time of the visit. 
Findings from the qualitative interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that the technical inspectors 
prefer to give advanced warning as they need to ensure that the works councillors and the health and 
safety personnel will be on site at the time of the visit, in order to assist them with their inspection (Frener 
#46; Buchner #51). 
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not been acted upon, and a comparison of the findings from the two research initiatives 
suggests that the health and safety structures had changed little between 1980 and 1984. 
Whilst the two previous studies were concerned with the health and structures as a whole, 
and the macro-level arrangements in particular, a number of initiatives have concentrated 
upon the arrangements at plant level. One such undertaking was carried out by Hauß, 
Kühn and Rosenbrock in the period 1978-1979, and examined the contribution to an 
improvement in working conditions made by the employees, their representative bodies, 
and the health and safety personnel. Their study attempted to identify the extent to which 
the legislative developments of the 1970s had affected plant-level health and safety. 
The information was gathered in a variety of different ways, but essentially involved an 
initial review of secondary sources, followed by a questionnaire survey, group discussions, 
and a series of interviews at a union training centre. These interviews were carried out 
with a wide spectrum of plant-level health and safety actors, as well as a number of 
representatives from the professional associations, the industrial unions and the employers' 
associations. A total of 1400 people, employed in 380 different companies, and affiliated 
to a variety of unions, were either interviewed or completed a questionnaire. 
The findings revealed that the employees, who had difficulty in identifying potential 
sources of danger in the workplace, were given little opportunity to influence 
developments in the health and safety arena (Kühn 1982: 82). The employees who were 
perceived to be exposed to the greatest danger were found to be most concerned about an 
improvement in their working conditions, and 62 per cent indicated that they would be 
prepared to accept less pay in return for safer working conditions (Hauß et al. 1980b: 
575), compared with an overall figure of just 37 per cent (HauB et al. 1980a: 14). The 
employees were found to rely heavily upon the works councils to represent their interests 
in the health and safety arena (Hauß et al. 1980a: 10), and when asked who had dealt with 
their health and safety-related problems on the last occasion, 35 per cent referred to either 
the works council or the union stewards. 52 per cent also suggested that they would 
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approach their representative body if such problems arose in the future (Hauß et al. 1980a: 
17). 
The works councils were found to have a more significant role to play in the area of health 
and safety as the size of the company decreased, with health and safety personnel the 
dominant actors in the larger companies (Kühn 1982: 135). 88 For example, in companies 
with fewer than 100 employees, the works council was named as the source of health and 
safety-related information in 32.9 per cent of cases, compared with a figure of just 5.9 per 
cent in companies employing upwards of 1000. Where they were active, the works 
councillors were criticised for concentrating upon the removal of individual problems, 
rather than attempting to develop an overall strategy for a general improvement in 
working conditions (Kühn 1982: 172). 
The interviews revealed that health and safety issues appeared to be addressed by the 
works councils in one of three ways. The first involved just one works councillor dealing 
with such questions, whilst the second saw new and inexperienced works councillors 
required both to concern themselves with health and safety and to represent this body on 
the statutory industrial health and safety committee. In the third case, health and safety 
issues were addressed by a small but competent committee of works councillors (Kühn 
1982: 95). 
The works councils were regarded as part-time assistants to the health and safety 
personnel (Kühn 1982: 137), as the former often lacked both the time and the knowledge 
to deal with such issues alone (Kühn 1982: 172). However, the contribution made by the 
works council was also seen to increase as the working conditions deteriorated (Kühn 
1982: 138). Furthermore, those works councils which were able to rely upon the support 
of a conflict-oriented workforce, and both an established and active network of union 
stewards, were deemed to be more effective in pushing for improvements in health and 
safety (Kühn 1982: 173). The interviews also suggested that it was not an uncommon 
88 The works councillors were more active in the smaller workplaces as these companies were not 
obliged to appoint full-time health and safety experts. 
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occurrence to find works councillors simultaneously performing the duties of safety 
representatives, and even those of health and safety experts, on a part-time basis (Kühn 
1982: 94). The former arrangement was found to be most prevalent in larger companies in 
the metal-working industry (Kühn 1982: 93). 
Of the 380 companies represented, those with an established and active body of union 
stewards, which concerned itself with health and safety, were found to call on the 
inspectors with greater frequency. The authors accounted for this by suggesting that the 
union stewards in such companies were more likely to bring deficiencies to the attention of 
the works councils (Kühn 1982: 166), who would then invoke their right to call in the 
inspectors if such problems could not be resolved internally. 
As far as the health and safety personnel were concerned, they were found to be absent 
from many of the small and medium-sized companies (Hauß et al. 1980a: 18). It was 
suggested that the larger companies were more likely to comply with the requirements of 
the Works Safety Law as a result of pressure applied by the works councils (Hauß et al. 
1980a: 21). Part-time health and safety personnel, who were mainly to be found in smaller 
companies, were criticised for being both management-oriented and under-qualified (Hauß 
et al. 1980a: 19), and it was suggested that given both their social standing and 
educational background, many health and safety experts and works doctors were more 
inclined to side with the employers (Hauß et al. 1980a: 8). There was also evidence that 
one third of eligible companies had failed to establish an industrial health and safety 
committee, with this forum convened less frequently than the required four times annually 
in 28 per cent of companies where it did exist (Hauß et al. 1980b: 578). Kühn (1982: 146) 
also identified a positive relationship between the frequency of meetings of the industrial 
health and safety committee and the conclusion of health and safety-related plant 
agreements. 
The study concluded that there appeared to be a positive correlation between the level of 
health and safety and union activity on the one hand (Kühn 1982: 14), and the influence of 
the works council on the other (Hauß et al. 1980b: 573). In addition, the labour market 
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situation, the structure of the workforce, and the degree of interest shown by the 
employees for such issues, were considered to be influential in determining the profile of 
health and safety at plant level. The authors did not consider the branch of industry to be a 
factor of any significance, and the size of the company was seen to be little more than 
slightly influential (Hauß et al. 1980a: 4), this despite constant comparisons between the 
situation in the small and medium-sized companies and that in larger organisations. Finally, 
they discovered that those actors concerned with health and safety devoted most of their 
time to questions of accident prevention and employee behaviour (Hauß et al. 1980b: 
572). 
A study by Diekershoff, carried out on behalf of the BAU, and published in 1979, was 
designed to analyse the efficacy of safety representatives at plant level. The aim was to 
identify whether they actually made a contribution to an improvement in health and safety, 
and accident prevention in particular, within the individual companies. Diekershoff looked 
at the situation in eight large companies, as he was of the opinion that the presence of full- 
time health and safety experts would bring the best out of the safety representatives. He 
carried out a series of structured interviews with health and safety experts, and with those 
works councillors who addressed health and safety questions, and conducted 
approximately 400 unstructured interviews with safety representatives, as well as almost 
300 short discussions with their supervisors. 
The survey revealed that the safety representatives spent most of their time trying to 
encourage the employees to observe the health and safety regulations, rather than seeking 
to identify safety deficiencies (Diekershoff 1979: vi). There was also evidence to suggest 
that the safety representatives were rarely informed about the potential sources of danger 
in their areas of responsibility (Diekershoff 1979: v). However, Diekershoff did discover 
that, in many cases, the safety representatives were given time off from their normal duties 
in order to attend to health and safety matters, but concluded that their supervisors had 
only released them because they considered that the safety representatives would relieve 
them of their own responsibilities in this respect (Diekershoff 1979: 180). Diekershoff also 
found that many safety representatives were simultaneously union stewards, and that it 
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was not uncommon for union work to be given a higher priority (Diekershoff 1979: v). 
Furthermore, contrary to recommendations made by the professional associations, 
approximately 40 per cent of the safety representatives interviewed were also line 
managers (Diekershoff 1979: 33). 
Diekershoff concluded by suggesting that the safety representatives should be given the 
opportunity to exert a greater influence upon plant-level health and safety. He suggested 
that they had more to offer in this regard than many of those involved in the decision- 
making process, as they themselves were exposed to, and were consequently aware of, the 
prevalent dangers (Diekershoff 1979: 181). Failing this, he recommended that the duties 
performed by the safety representatives be assumed by either the works council or the 
health and safety experts (Diekershoff 1979: viii), as their involvement in the industrial 
health and safety committee for example, would ensure that the information from the 
shop-floor would be taken into consideration. 
In 1982, the findings of a study by Brötz et al., which examined the problems facing the 
works councils in their attempts to improve working conditions at plant level, were 
published. The survey had been carried out in the period 1978-1980 and involved case 
studies of 49 companies from eight branches of industry. Each of the companies employed 
between 20 and 800 employees. 
The authors found that the works councils were unable to realise their duties in many of 
the companies, as they lacked the necessary information, the knowledge, and the time to 
do so (Brötz et al. 1982: 297). They suggested that the works councils relied upon the 
advice of the industrial unions and the assistance of the union stewards (Brötz et al. 1982: 
299), and that the works councils' contribution to an improvement in health and safety 
was therefore at its best in those companies where the union density was highest (Brötz et 
al. 1982: 297). Furthermore, the works councils' task was apparently much easier in those 
companies where the employer was committed to improving the working conditions, but 
the authors discovered that the latter was reluctant to do so unless there was evidence that 
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such measures would reduce the potential for conflict at plant level, and most importantly, 
would lead to an increase in productivity (Brötz et al. 1982: 298). 
As with Hauß, Kühn and Rosenbrock before them, Brötz et al. discovered that the 
employees were given little opportunity to exert an influence upon their working 
conditions, but suggested that these individuals were in fact reluctant to involve 
themselves in the health and safety arena for one of two reasons. Either they feared 
reprisals from their employer for suggesting health and safety measures which may well 
have been needed, but which would have proved costly to implement, or they recognised 
the financial benefits associated with risk-taking, and were therefore prepared to work in 
hazardous conditions (Brötz et al. 1982: 300). 89 There was also evidence to suggest that 
some employees had either become accustomed to the hazardous working conditions, or 
were simply unaware of the prevalent dangers at their work stations (Brötz et al. 1982: 
300). Finally, the authors recommended that the employees be given the opportunity to 
influence developments in the health and safety arena, and suggested that the works 
councillors in small and medium-sized companies, where releases from normal duties were 
not so widespread, be given more time to realise their health and safety-related duties, as 
laid down in the various legislative provisions (Brötz et al. 1982: 303). 
As part of a wider project under the supervision of the Social Research Centre 
(Sozialforschungsstelle) in Dortmund, and financed by the Federal Government's `Work 
and Technology' (Arbeit und Technik, AuT) programme, Pröll and Sczesny (1991) 
carried out a written survey of health and safety experts in 1990, in order to identify the 
role performed by these individuals in practice. They were interested in their duties, their 
relationships with other plant-level actors, and the extent of their participation in both the 
health and safety committees and the other discussion groups in the workplace. 
Approximately 1100 health and safety experts from a variety of industrial branches 
participated in the survey, and although they had no idea if any of these individuals was 
89 It is commonplace for employees to receive extra payments if they are prepared to work in 
hazardous conditions. The level of this payment is usually negotiated by the works council. The employees 
welcome the extra remuneration whilst the employers are saved from having to invest in what could prove 
to be costly safety measures. 
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employed in the same company, Pröll and Sczesny were aware that almost 80 per cent 
were employed in companies with upwards of 500 employees. 
The findings revealed that the majority of health and safety experts devoted much of their 
time to accident prevention and to addressing questions of a technical nature (Pröll and 
Sczesny, 1991: 61). They were also found to cooperate most frequently with either the 
health and safety representatives on the works council, or the chairman of this 
representative body (Pröll and Sczesny, 1991: 38). As for the health and safety 
committees at plant level, almost 50 per cent of those surveyed indicated that the company 
in which they were employed had established at least one health and safety-related forum, 
and approximately 75 per cent reported that their industrial health and safety committee 
met on four occasions each year (Pröll and Sczesny 1991: 60). This forum was held in 
high regard by the overwhelming majority of health and safety experts, and was praised 
both for improving the flow of information at plant level and for enabling the works 
council and the health and safety personnel to pressurise the employer into taking such 
issues seriously (Pröll and Sczesny, 1991: 64). 
With the support of the Social Research Centre, Fromm et al. (1995) carried out research 
in the period 1992-1994 into the role of the works council in preventive health and safety 
at plant level. A series of case studies, which included a period of observation followed by 
discussions with the works councillors, enabled the researchers to uncover the following 
information. 
They found that health and safety issues were increasingly addressed in a very bureaucratic 
fashion as the size of the companies increased, with the works councillors forced to spend 
much of their time in a series of committees and other forms of group discussion (Fromm 
et al. 1995: 123). The advantages of such arrangements were that the works councillors 
were able to put their ideas to the employer on a regular basis and were thus always 
involved in the decision-making process (Fromm et al. 1995: 124). The authors also drew 
attention to the dilemma facing the health and safety representatives on the works council. 
Those who were not released from their normal duties were found to be most 
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knowledgeable, as they themselves were exposed to the dangers in the workplace. 
However, as they were not released, they had little time in which to address the 
deficiencies which they themselves had identified (Fromm et al. 1995: 124). 
Finally, they found that the works councils and the other plant-level health and safety 
actors were more concerned with addressing individual deficiencies than with tackling the 
health and safety question as a whole. They suggested that a more effective policy for all 
concerned would be one which saw health and safety issues being taken into account when 
new production processes were being introduced, rather than when deficiencies became 
apparent (Fromm et al. 1995: 127). 
Fromm et at. (1995: 129) concluded that the works councils had a difficult task in 
addressing health and safety as this topic was often an issue of only minor importance at 
plant level (Fromm et al. 1995: 129). 
In an attempt to identify the roles performed by both the health and safety experts and the 
works councils, Thon-Jacobi (1989) observed the activities of these individuals over a 
two-week period in three different branches of industry. He observed the health and safety 
representatives on the works council in the mining industry, and the health and safety 
experts in both a steel and a chemical plant. His decision to concentrate on large 
companies was influenced by the fact that the representatives on these works councils 
were more likely to be released from their normal duties, and it was probable that the 
health and safety experts would be employed in this capacity on a full-time basis. To 
supplement his observations, Thon-Jacobi carried out a number of discussions with a 
variety of other actors in the three companies. 
His research led him to the conclusion that both the works councillors and the health and 
safety experts concentrated most of their efforts on accident prevention (Thon-Jacobi 
1989: 167). However, he, like others before him, found that the works councillors had 
insufficient time at their disposal and were under-qualified to deal with such issues (Thon- 
Jacobi 1989: 173). The works councillors were therefore reliant upon the assistance of the 
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health and safety actors at plant level, and he suggested that the safety representatives, 
many of whom were simultaneously union stewards, had most contact with the works 
councillors in this respect (Thon-Jacobi 1989: 171). Thon-Jacobi concluded that the 
activities of both the works councillors and the health and safety experts were fairly similar 
in practice (Thon-Jacobi 1989: 179). 
Whilst there have been many other studies which have concerned themselves with the 
occupational health and safety structures at plant level, the author regards those reviewed 
above as having been the most significant. However, this section concludes by briefly 
highlighting the findings from a handful of other research initiatives. 
Schulz (1987a; 1987b) carried out a written survey amongst approximately 1000 health 
and safety experts across four branches of industry in the mid-1980s, in an attempt to 
identify their role in practice. All of the health and safety experts were employed in 
companies with upwards of 100 employees, and he discovered that only 37.6 per cent of 
those who replied were employed as health and safety experts on a full-time basis (Schulz 
1987a: 573). Of those who were employed on a part-time basis, 29 were simultaneously 
members of a works council, and 57 were senior managers (Schulz 1987b: 669). The 
health and safety experts were also found to be devoting the majority of their time to 
questions of accident and fire prevention, and the removal of hazardous substances 
(Schulz 1987b: 670). 
Meyer-Falcke and Postler (1993) concerned themselves with the health and safety 
structures in companies with fewer than 200 employees, as part of a wider project carried 
out by the Ministry for Labour, Health and Social Affairs (Ministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales, MAGS) in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) in 1992. They 
surveyed 3616 companies in the region, covering a wide range of activities in the process. 
They found that almost half the companies surveyed had no health and safety institution of 
any description, whilst almost one in three had one such institution, but no works council 
(Meyer-Falcke and Postler 1993: 38-39). 
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A survey carried out by the IMU Institute in Nuremberg was designed to identify the 
extent of the plant-level actors' knowledge of hazardous substances. It was conducted in 
57 companies in the metal-working industry in and around Nuremberg. Not only did they 
discover that many of the employees and the works councillors knew little about such 
dangers, they also found that the latter were prepared to allow employers to issue 
protective clothing and equipment, rather than insist upon the complete removal of such 
hazards (IG Metall 1995a: 4). 
In 1990, Windhoff-Heritier et al. published the findings of a survey which had examined 
plant-level health and safety structures in nine companies with between 120 and 1900 
employees, all of which were situated in NRW. They found that the health and safety 
experts spent much of their time addressing administrative or organisational questions, 
leaving them little opportunity to attend training courses, to advise the employees, or to 
participate in safety tours and inspections (Windhoff-Heritier et al. 1990: 127). They 
reached the conclusion that the safety representatives had a key role to play in the health 
and safety arena, and that such issues enjoyed a higher profile on those works councils 
where some of the members were simultaneously safety representatives (Windhoff Heritier 
et al. 1990: 129). Furthermore, suggestion schemes were found to be central to the plant- 
level health and safety structures, but there was evidence to indicate that those suggestions 
which were rejected by the decision-making bodies were done so on cost grounds 
(Windhoff-Heritier et al. 1990: 125). 90 
Finally, Arnold and Satzer (1986a) reviewed a number of empirical works which were 
carried out by various union bodies. Two are of interest here. The first, a DGB study in 
1979, examined the aftermath of the implementation of the Works Safety Law. A survey 
of 44 works councils in Tübingen revealed that many of the works doctors (see Section 
7.5) appointed after 1974 were already past retirement age, and one in four works 
councillors were unaware of whether these medical representatives were fulfilling the 
requirements of the Works Safety Law. The second also focused upon the implementation 
90 The following section reviews a number of studies which have concerned themselves with this 
apparent conflict between safety and profit. 
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of this legislation. It was carried out by IG Metall in 1977. A questionnaire survey 
amongst 13 8 works councillors revealed that some employers had failed to appoint health 
and safety experts and medical representatives. Furthermore, safety representatives, which 
an amendment to the RVO had provided for in 1963 (see Section 7.6), were also absent 
from a number of workplaces. Only 50 per cent of all companies were reported to have 
created an industrial health and safety committee, with few, if any, meetings of those 
involved in addressing health and safety issues taking place in the remaining plants (Arnold 
and Satzer 1986a: 159). 
The German health and safety-related research initiatives reviewed above have concerned 
themselves with a variety of issues. There have been attempts to identify the macro-level 
health and safety structures (Büntgen et al. 1980b; Mertens 1980), to evaluate the efficacy 
of the inspection and enforcement arrangements (ILO 1984), and to assess the 
contribution made by the various plant-level actors to an improvement in working 
conditions (Diekershoff 1979; Hauß et al. 1980a/1980b; Brötz et al. 1982; Kühn 1982; 
Thon-Jacobi 1989; Pröll and Sczesny 1991; Fromm et al. 1995). 
At the macro level, the authors criticised the lack of cooperation between the 
inspectorates (Büntgen et al. 1980; ILO 1984), the legislative complexity (Deppe et al. 
1980; ILO 1984), and the shortage of agents of enforcement of this legislation (Mertens 
1980). On a more positive note, the idea of self-administration in the professional 
associations was praised (ILO 1984). 
Meanwhile, at plant level, the researchers were critical of the absence of employee 
involvement in the health and safety arena (Brötz et al. 1982; Kühn 1982), the 
concentration on individual issues such as accident prevention (Thon-Jacobi 1989; Pröll 
and Sczesny 1991), and the apparent inability of the works councillors to address health 
and safety issues (Brötz et al. 1982; Thon-Jacobi 1989). Finally, of most concern was the 
frequency with which the legislative provisions were violated at plant level (Hauß et al. 
1980b; Kühn 1982). 
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4.4 Empirical Research Review: General Health and Safety 
A study by McKelvey in 1973 identified an interesting relationship between financial 
disincentives and employee behaviour (Peters 1991: 59). Under laboratory conditions, 
employees were required to operate machinery under different payment systems. Those on 
piece-rate pay were more productive than employees on an hourly wage, but the former 
were also found to have more accidents. The frequency of accidents decreased however, 
following the imposition of a five minute no-work penalty for every unsafe act. This 
penalty prevented them from producing, and therefore from earning. McKelvey reached 
the conclusion that economic penalties were needed if performance-related pay was not to 
have a detrimental effect upon safety. 91 
In their 1972 publication, Hale and Hale concluded that there was an inherent conflict 
between safety and production. They referred to Schlag-Rey et al. (1961) who had 
suggested that the majority of employees that they had surveyed, had considered the safety 
regulations to increase the degree of difficulty of their work (Hale and Hale 1972: 58). 92 
According to Schlag-Rey et at. (1961), the employees were more concerned with pay than 
with safety, as occupational accidents were only infrequent occurrences (Hale and Hale 
1972: 58). As Hale and Hale (1972: 59) have stated: 
Some safety measures directly affect the speed of work and hence remuneration. 
Some safety regulations impose lengthy methods of work. Workers are expected 
to welcome the increase in safety as full compensation for the loss of pay, which is 
surely unreasonable. 
Hale and Hale also refer to studies which have examined the influence of employee 
involvement on health and safety at plant level. Fugal (1950) found no significant 
relationship between employee involvement in safety discussions and improved safety 
91 Bacow (1980: 9) found that employees on piece-rate pay would oppose safety rules and 
regulations which impaired productivity to a greater extent than those on an hourly wage. 
92 A similar question was posed in the workforce questionnaire distributed in the seven case-study 
companies. The responses are portrayed in Appendix 5. 
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performances, whereas Cesa-Bianchi (1967) concluded that such involvement was indeed 
beneficial in this regard (Hale and Hale 1972: 72). 
A comparison between two motor vehicle assembly plants, one in France and the other in 
Great Britain, led Grunberg (1983) to the conclusion that there was a conflict between 
safety and production, but that where labour was both strong and well-organised, it was 
more able to resist demands for an increase in productivity. The result was a lower 
accident rate (Grunberg 1983: 631). 
Moore (1991) referred to research which had been conducted by the Statistical Services 
Unit of the Health and Safety Executive in Great Britain. The suggestion here was that the 
workforce in companies with fewer than 50 employees was 20 per cent more likely than 
their counterparts in larger plants to be involved in a serious occupational accident (Moore 
1991: 7). Moore made reference to Tye (1989) who had suggested that one of the reasons 
for this was that the employers in the smaller companies were under little pressure to put 
safety before profit as they were less likely to receive a visit from the health and safety 
inspectors (Moore 1991: 8). 
Cronin (1971) carried out a survey into accident causation in several factories belonging 
to the same company in the late 1960s. The conclusion he reached was that variables such 
as factory size, the nature of the operation, and the demographics of the workforce had 
little, if any effect upon the accident rates in the individual factories (Cronin 1971: 103). 
There was also little evidence to suggest that the degree to which the employees observed 
the health and safety legislation had any effect upon the level of occupational accidents 
(Cronin 1971: 106). Instead, Cronin offered an explanation which had been postulated by 
Revans in 1958. Survey results led Revans to conclude that the morale of the employees 
had a significant effect upon the accident rate, and that this variable also influenced the 
extent to which plant-level communication took place between the various actors. The 
suggestion was that an absence of communication could result in the occurrence of 
occupational accidents (Cronin 1972: 106). 
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In 1971, Powell et al. published the findings from an evaluation of over 2000 occupational 
accidents, which had occurred in just four workplaces over a two-year period. They 
identified a degree of apathy amongst the workforce towards health and safety issues 
(Powell et al. 1971: 5). Similar findings were produced by the Robens Committee which, 
between May 1970 and June 1972, sought to identify weaknesses in the health and safety 
system in Great Britain. The Committee criticised the complex network of rules and 
regulations, the manpower shortages in the inspectorates, and a lack of relevant statistical 
information (Robens 1972), and concluded that the large volume of legislation had had the 
effect of convincing the workforce that its health and safety had been taken care of. In 
short, the employees had become apathetic, and this was considered to be the major cause 
of occupational accidents. Many of the recommendations made by the Robens Committee 
were included in the `Health and Safety at Work etc. Act' which was implemented in 
Great Britain in 1974. 
Nichols and Armstrong (1973), who were extremely critical of many of the findings of 
the Robens Committee, and the suggestion that apathy was to blame for the majority of 
occupational accidents in particular, agreed with the Committee's assessment of the role 
performed by the foremen at plant level. Both recognised the importance of these 
individuals in relation to safety, as it was they who were responsible to the employers for 
preventing accidents and maintaining production (Nichols and Armstrong 1973: 28). They 
suggested that, faced with this dilemma, foremen would not insist upon safe behaviour if 
unsafe acts maintained production levels and did not result in occupational accidents 
(Nichols and Armstrong 1973: 29). 
Finally, the participation of both workplace unions and works councils in health and safety 
management in the private and the public sector in Great Britain and Germany provided 
the focus for research carried out by Olsen (1993) in the early 1990s. Case studies were 
carried out in one private and one public sector workplace in each country, and involved a 
questionnaire survey, interviews and the observation of plant-level reality. 
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Olsen identified the attitudes displayed by the employers to be significant in determining 
the importance attached to health and safety in the workplace, and also concluded that 
these issues suffered, as they were deemed not to be as important as the quantitative 
demands, such as pay. There was also evidence to suggest that the individual works 
councils had difficulty in representing the diverse interests of the employees, with the 
financial conflict of interest between protecting jobs and promoting health and safety 
proving particularly problematic. Finally, Olsen's findings revealed a clear preference 
amongst the works councils to settle points of contention internally with the employers. 
4.5 Summary 
The main findings to emerge from the works council-related research initiatives included 
the identification of a preference for cooperation, and the avoidance of conflict, in the 
relationship between these representative bodies and the employers (Blume 1964; Weltz 
1976). 
As far as the Works Constitution is concerned, there was evidence to suggest that this 
legislation was not always observed in practice. Violations of its provisions were found to 
be more widespread in smaller workplaces (Blume 1964), and it was considered to be little 
more than a basic floor of rights in larger companies (Williams 1984). There were also 
suggestions that workplace industrial relations were governed by informal norms, rather 
than by the statutory legislation, with the works councils also trading their rights of 
participation for gains in other areas on a regular basis (Rosenbaum 1982; Streeck 
1984a/1984b). 
The performance of the works councils was found to be influenced by a number of 
variables, with union density cited most frequently (Kotthoff 1981; Kluge et al. 1981; 
Streeck 1984a/1984b). Streeck (1984a/1984b) identified a unionisation of the works 
councils, and Kluge et al. (1981) suggested that the presence of an industrial union at 
plant level had a detrimental effect upon the relationship between the works council and 
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the employer. Finally, the works council chairperson was identified more than once as the 
key individual on these representative bodies (Kluge et al. 1981; Kotthoff and Reindl 
1990), and the overall conclusion which can be drawn is that the works councils are far 
from being homogenous bodies of interest representation. 
The empirical investigations which concerned themselves with the health and safety arena, 
have produced a wealth of information. The ILO (1984) and the five-volume BAU study, 
published in 1980, uncovered severe shortages in the statutory labour and the technical 
inspectorates at the macro level, with both a lack of cooperation between these bodies and 
the legislative complexity identified as further weaknesses in the system of safety 
regulation. 
Several studies focused on the situation at plant level, and the success enjoyed in the 
health and safety arena was found to be dependent n variables such as company size 
(Moore 1991), workforce morale (Cronin 1971) and the attitudes displayed by the 
employers (Brötz et al. 1982; Olsen 1993). As far as the latter is concerned, it was 
suggested that those employers who could be convinced of the financial benefits 
associated with an improvement in safety, were more likely to intervene (Brötz et al. 
1982). However, senior managers were found to be delegating their health and safety 
responsibilities further down the management chain (ILO 1984), with line managers, who 
were regarded as key individuals in this respect (Nichols and Armstrong 1973), taking 
over on their behalf. 
It was generally recognised that the works councils lacked both the time and the necessary 
expertise to address health and safety issues (Kühn 1982; Brötz et al. 1982; Thon-Jacobi 
1989; Altmann 1992a), although these bodies were found to be more involved in smaller 
workplaces (Kühn 1982), and to be more effective in the more densely-unionised 
companies (Kühn 1982; Brötz et at. 1982). 
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As a result of their educational background, the health and safety experts were criticised 
for being management-oriented. They were also found to be more effective in the larger 
workplaces (Hauß et al. 1980a). 
Safety representatives were identified as performing dual functions at plant level, and 
whilst some combined this role with that of a line manager, many were simultaneously 
union stewards (Diekershoff 1979). 
The industrial health and safety committee was identified as the key institution in the 
workplace (Pröll and Sczesny 1991), but certain studies found that this forum was 
convened less frequently than required by the Works Safety Law (Hauß et al. 1980b; Pröll 
and Sczesny 1991). 
As far as the employees were concerned, the consensus was that these individuals were 
given little opportunity to influence developments in the health and safety arena (Kühn 
1982; Brötz et al. 1982). The employees, it was suggested, have become accustomed to 
working in unsatisfactory conditions, resulting in a certain degree of apathy towards health 
and safety (Powell et al. 1971; Brötz et al. 1982). 
Finally, a criticism levelled at all plant-level actors concerned their reluctance to address 
health and safety issues as a whole, preferring instead to concentrate on individual 
measures such as accident prevention (Hauß et al. 1980a/1980b; Kühn 1982; Schutz 
1987a/1987b; Thon-Jacobi 1989; Pröll and Sczesny 1991; Fromm et al. 1995). In essence, 
health and safety was not a priority issue at plant level. 
Many of the studies reviewed reach similar conclusions about the nature and, in particular, 
the deficiencies of both plant level industrial relations and the way in which health and 
safety issues are addressed. Without pre-empting the empirical research too much, it 
suffices to say that many of these characteristics were in evidence in the seven case-study 
companies (see Chapter Eight). 
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH AND 
SAFETY AWARENESS IN GERMANY 
5.1 Introduction 
Within the highly juridified German industrial relations system, there is a plethora of 
legislation designed to protect the health and safety of the working population. Although 
there are only two sources of relevant primary legislation at the macro level, with the state 
issuing laws and ordinances as public labour law on the one hand, and the self- 
administrating professional associations producing accident-prevention regulations as 
social insurance legislation on the other, this is supplemented by a complex web of 
secondary legislation, some of which is agreed upon within the individual companies. IG 
Metall (1990a: 25) has estimated that both the Federal Government and the individual 
Federal States have produced over 40 health and safety-related laws and ordinances since 
1949, whilst the professional associations have been responsible for almost 3000 accident- 
prevention regulations. Whilst this legislative complexity is advantageous, in the sense that 
it enables the individual actors to highlight both their rights and duties in moments of 
discord, it does on occasion, discourage even the most determined reader. Many actors, 
including the employees, are therefore unaware of their rights embedded in this legislation. 
The smallest companies suffer most in this regard (Schlummer #32), as until recently, they 
have not been required to appoint health and safety personnel (see Section 7.5). In defence 
of this high degree of juridification however, it has been suggested that the legislation is 
required by the individual actors who prefer to know what they can and cannot do (Salani 
#10). 
To facilitate an understanding of the 
, 
way in which occupational health and safety issues 
are addressed at plant level in the German metal-working industry, this chapter traces the 
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historical evolution of health and safety awareness in Germany93 from the early nineteenth 
century to the present day, focusing in particular upon the development of the large 
volume of health and safety-related legislation. Beginning in 1828, Section 5.2 covers a 
period of 50 years and highlights the initial moves to address the issue of occupational 
health and safety before, during, and after the onset of industrialisation. The second period 
runs from 1878 until the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933, and assesses the influence 
on health and safety of both the rise of the German labour movement and the First World 
War, as well as examining the inter-war period. There then follows a brief insight into the 
12 years of Nazi dictatorship, which initially saw positive developments in the health and 
safety arena. Section 5.5 addresses both the period of occupation until 1949 and the 
embryonic years of the emerging West German state, whilst the penultimate section covers 
the period 1961-1995 during which time there has been intense legislative activity. Finally, 
whilst each section closes with a brief summary of the significant developments of the 
period, the chapter concludes by summarising the significance of these legislative 
developments for an explanation of the way in which occupational health and safety issues 
are addressed at plant level. 
5.2 1828-1878: The Embryonic Years 
Contemporary German health and safety legislation has its origins in the Prussian labour 
regulations of the early nineteenth century, which were initially concerned with the 
protection of the weaker groups in society and with questions of working time. 94 In 1802, 
legislation was passed in England to regulate the widespread exploitation of child labour, 
and by the late 1820s this issue was also causing concern in Germany. 
Germany became an industrialised nation much later than many of its European neighbours 
and was still very much an agrarian society when the aforementioned legislation was 
93 Before unification in 1871, Germany was little more than a loose confederation of states. The 
Prussian and Austrian states dominated the so-called `German Confederation'. To avoid confusion, the 
generic neric term `Germany', as opposed to 'German Confederation', is preferred. 
As Oppolzer (1994: 41) has indicated, the extent to which hazardous working conditions affect 
the employees' health and safety depends upon the length of time they spend at the workplace. 
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passed in England at the turn of the nineteenth century. The mining industry was well 
established in Germany by this time however, and given their size, children had been 
employed for some time in the appalling conditions prevailing in the mines. 
Towards the end of the 1820s there was an increasing amount of concern surrounding the 
future security of Prussia, after an official report had drawn attention to the physical 
unsuitability of many of the new recruits called up to join the Prussian army. Having spent 
much of their young lives in the mines, these individuals were of little use as a defensive 
force. A law was subsequently passed in 1839 which set the minimum working age at nine 
years both in mining, which remained at the forefront of industry throughout the 
nineteenth century, and in the ever increasing number of factories. Furthermore, for those 
aged between 9 and 16 years, the working day was not to exceed 10 hours Mlles and 
Reuhl 1985: 344). 
It was around 1850 that Germany started to experience the first stages of industrialisation, 
and as the demand for labour grew, there was an increasing awareness of the need to 
protect the health and safety of the working population. This process of industrialisation 
had been facilitated by the expansion of the rail network, the creation of a customs' 
union9S in the 1830s, and a population increase. With the exception of the 1839 regulation 
however, there was an absence of labour legislation with which to keep the employers in 
check, and the working conditions were therefore far from satisfactory during this initial 
phase of industrial activity. For example, it was not uncommon for men, women and 
children to toil for anything between 12 and 18 hours each day, very often in appalling 
conditions. Out of necessity, many were also forced to sleep on the factory floor. 
The child labour legislation of 1839 had been largely unsuccessful, and many children 
continued to work long hours, either to supplement the family income, or to support 
parents incapacitated by the atrocious working conditions. The failure of this initial 
statutory provision can be attributed to the absence of any authority to ensure its 
95 The customs union, which provided for the free movement of goods, was established under 
Prussian control in 1834. All German states, with the exception of Austria, participated. 
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implementation, but this deficiency was addressed in 1853 when the Factory Inspectors 
Law (Fabrikinspektorengesetz) came onto the statute book. 96 
By the 1860s it was the working conditions in the mines which were once again causing 
concern. An, amendment to the Mining Law in 1865 assigned responsibility for safety to 
the mine owners, who traditionally had shown little or no interest in such measures. On 
their authority, shifts were regularly extended in a bid to increase productivity, with 
workers receiving bonus payments if they used less wood for roof supports in the mine 
shafts. 
In the increasing number of factories meanwhile, it soon became evident that dangers were 
associated with the new machinery. By industrialising later than many of its European 
neighbours, Germany had acquired the latest equipment, thus enabling her to re-gain much 
of the lost ground on many of her rivals in a relatively short period of time. However, the 
workers were expected to make use of the latest machinery with little or no thought given 
either to training or to safety provisions. 
Protection was needed and was eventually provided in the form of the Industrial Code 
(Gewerbeordnung für den Norddeutschen Bund) in 1869. This law obliged the employers 
to design their workplaces in such a way so as to protect the health and safety of their 
employees, and held the former responsible if the employees came to any harm. In the 
event of an occupational accident however, the law laid the onus on the employees to 
prove that their employer had been at fault (IG Metall 1990b: 16). The significance behind 
the introduction of the Industrial Code was the suggestion that the state had a role to play 
in the field of occupational health and safety, and it was a signal to the employers that the 
welfare of their employees was very much their responsibility. 
The Industrial Code was introduced at a time when the working classes were starting to 
organise themselves. The first groups had appeared during the 1860s (see Subsection 
1.2.1), and Crouch (1993: 68) suggested that both the employers and the employees were 
96 With the passing of this legislation, the Statutory Labour Inspectorate was born. 
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well organised by the end of the 1870s. German unity under Prussian control was 
eventually realised in 1871, and the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung, GewO) was 
subsequently adopted by the German Empire, of which Otto von Bismarck became 
Chancellor. 
Whilst Germany was still experiencing the effects of industrialisation at the end of this 
fifty-year period, the recently unified nation was on the verge of becoming a major 
industrial power. It had become clear during this period however, that the employers 
could not be relied upon to provide adequate protection for the labour which they 
employed, and the rudimentary measures provided for in the Factory Inspectors Law were 
an early recognition of the need for external enforcement. Finally, by recognising the 
relationship between working time on the one hand, and the health and physical fitness of 
the workers on the other, the child labour legislation had set an important precedent, 
despite having been introduced for military as opposed to humanitarian reasons. 
5.3 1878-1933: Anti-Socialism to Anti-Semitism 
In 1878, following two assassination attempts on Kaiser Wilhelm I, Bismarck introduced 
the Socialism Law (see Subsection 1.2.1). This attempt to prohibit all socialist union 
activity failed during its initial two-year period of validity, and was extended in September 
1880 for a further four years. Bismarck explored alternative methods of deterring the 
workers from supporting the labour movement, and the issue of health and safety provided 
him with an opportunity. 
Bismarck made his major contribution to the health and safety arena during the 1880s with 
the introduction of the world's first social security system. His legislation came in three 
parts: 
" Compulsory Sickness Insurance Scheme of 1883; 
" Accident Insurance Act of 1884. 
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" Infirmity Insurance Law of 1889; 
To help administer this legislation, trade courts and arbitration tribunals were established, 
and the Organisation of Professional Associations (Verband der deutschen 
Berufsgenossenschaften) was founded in 1887 to oversee the implementation of the 
Accident Insurance Act in particular. The professional associations were administrated 
autonomously by representatives of capital and labour, and were required to supervise the 
accident insurance system which the legislation of 1884 had created. They were also 
entrusted with handling insurance claims from injured workers, as well as actively 
promoting accident prevention within the individual companies (HVBG 1989: 9). 
The Socialism Law was extended for further periods in 1884,1886, and for a final two- 
year period in 1888. This final extension followed the death of Wilhelm I in March 1888, 
and it was his successor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, who initiated a second phase of social 
legislation, which culminated in an amendment being made to the GewO in 1891.97 Whilst 
this amendment included provisions concerning working time, the most significant 
development was the inclusion of § 120a. Still in force today, it reads as follows: 
§120a Workplace Safety 
(1) Owners are bound to arrange and maintain work-rooms, appliances, machinery 
and tools and to regulate the working in such a way as to protect the workers 
from dangers to life and health so far as the nature of the business allows. 
(author's italics) 
(2) In particular, attention must be paid to the provision of sufficient light, ample 
air space and ventilation and to the removal of dust arising from the work, of 
vapours and gases thereby developed and of refuse incidental to it. 
(3) Similarly, those arrangements must be provided which are necessary for the 
protection of workers against dangerous contact with machinery or parts of 
machinery, or against other dangers lying in the nature of the workplace and 
particularly against the dangers which might arise from fire. (Shadwell 1909) 
The insertion of §120a in the GewO in 1891 was significant, in so far as it represented a 
clear indication of the responsibility which the employers had for the health and safety of 
their employees. This was also the first legislative provision to address the question of 
97 Bismarck's resignation was accepted by Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890. 
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health and safety without discriminating in terms of age or sex, as had been the case with 
the working-time legislation. However, the decision to anchor these requirements in the 
GewO limited their applicability to industrial companies (Häckert et al. 1994: 19), and the 
requirement to protect the employees' health and safety `so far as the nature of the 
business allows', introduced a financial loophole for the employers. 
Despite these developments there was little sign of any improvement at plant level, with 
women and children continuing to work long hours in appalling conditions. Towards the 
end of the nineteenth century for example, accidents were a daily occurrence in the mines, 
and the safety inspectorate in the mining industry had proved itself to be largely inefficient. 
There was a distinct shortage of qualified safety inspectors as the number of pits and the 
size of the workforce continued to increase, and as each inspector had many mines to 
cover, the time spent in each pit was greatly reduced. The inspectors struggled both to 
keep an eye on the dangers and to oversee the implementation of the health and safety 
regulations, and it often took major disasters to force the state to intervene. 
For example, following the Carolinenglück explosion near Bochum in 1898, in which 116 
miners were killed, the Prussian Trade Minister tried unsuccessfully to implement 
legislation which would have provided for the recruitment of workers to the position of 
assistant inspectors. As the number of mining-related deaths continued to rise in the 
following years however, there were a number of experiments with this method, many of 
which were successful, as the employees trusted their representatives. It took a further 
explosion in 1908, in which 348 people were killed, to convince the government that a 
radical change in the system of safety inspection was necessary. Legislation soon followed 
and provided for both an advisory workers committee and a number of safety officers 
(Sicherheitsmänner). Together with a state official, these safety officers were required to 
inspect their section of the mine every fortnight to ensure that all the necessary safety 
measures were being observed. 
The next significant development saw the introduction of the Reich Insurance Code 
(Reichsversicherungsordnung, RVO) in 1911. The RVO served to unify the social 
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insurance legislation of the 1880s (Weiss 1992: 24) and was concerned in the main, with 
accident prevention. It assigned responsibilities for such activities to the professional 
associations, which, to reiterate, had been created in 1887 to supervise the Accident 
Insurance Act. §708 RVO enabled the professional associations to issue accident- 
prevention regulations, which required the employers to take specified measures to 
prevent occupational accidents in the workplace. 
By 1914, the state had long since come to recognise the influence of the labour movement, 
which found itself drawn into industrial relations and economic negotiations on a regular 
basis during the First World War. Furthermore, the rise to power of the SPD, the political 
wing of the labour movement, in the Weimar Republic at the end of the Great War, 
suggested that occupational health and safety issues would receive even greater attention 
in the immediate post-war period. 
A general improvement in working conditions was not forthcoming after 1918 however, 
and it was the spiralling accident rate which finally put health and safety issues on the 
agenda. 98 The rising accident levels were the price that was paid for economic success 
during the early years of Weimar, and were partly the result of a failure by the professional 
associations to realise effectively their responsibilities under the RVO. In response, an 
attempt was made to increase the role of the Statutory Labour Inspectorate. 
In 1925, the Ordinance on Occupational Illnesses (Berufskrankheitenverordnung) was 
introduced, and for the first time provided insurance for employees suffering from a 
recognised occupational illness. 99 In the same year, so-called commuting accidents 
(Wegeunfalle) were included in the list of those occurrences which the professional 
associations were responsible for preventing, 10' and a year later the first attempt was made 
to streamline the health and safety legislation, which thus far had been introduced in a 
98 There was a 43.5 per cent rise in occupational accidents between 1923 and 1924, and a further 32 
per cent rise in 1925 with 653 000 accidents recorded (Bauerdick 1994: 87). 
99 A list of around a dozen illnesses accompanied this legislation. To receive compensation, the 
employee had to be suffering from one of the illnesses listed. 
100 Commuting accidents were those which an employee suffered either on the way to, or back from, 
the workplace. 
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piecemeal fashion. The Labour Ministry produced a relevant bill in 1926, but a 
combination of political instability and the onset of the depression relegated the 
importance of this issue. '°' The economic crisis, high unemployment, divisions in the 
labour movement and the political instability were the undoing of the Weimar Republic 
and eventually paved the way for Adolf Hitler to assume the position of Chancellor of the 
Reich on January 30th 1933. 
It was during this period from the late nineteenth century to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 
that many of the present day health and safety structures appeared in Germany. The dual 
systems of regulation and inspection came into being as the state ceded competence to the 
professional associations without relinquishing its own authority in this respect (Bauerdick 
1994: 18). The appointment of safety officers in the mining industry set an important 
precedent, but the situation regarding safety in the mines was typical of the reactive way in 
which health and safety issues would continue to be addressed for much of the twentieth 
century. As IG Metall (1990b: 11) has indicated, "The well is covered after the child has 
fallen in. " 
Finally, the inclusion of the financial qualification in § 120a GewO, obliging the employers 
to implement only those measures which the company could reasonably afford, signalled 
the start of a conflict of interest between safety and profit, and the failure to unify the 
health and safety legislation in the 1920s can also be attributed to this wider conflict of 
interest, with the importance of health and safety issues relegated, as the economic 
situation worsened. 
101 The idea was eventually dropped in 1930 following one of the frequent dissolutions of the 
Reichstag at that time. 
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5.4 1933-1945: The Hitler Years 
With the exception of a restriction placed on the self-administration of the professional 
associations, the health and safety-related legislation initially suffered little at the hands of 
the National Socialists, who had disbanded the unions and the political parties within 
months of Hitler's rise to power. In fact, one or two advances were made, and between 
1933 and 1935 a series of health and safety-related ordinances were passed, the most 
important of which addressed home work (Heimarbeit) 102 and working time. 103 In 1934, 
an ordinance was passed providing for the appointment of accident trustees 
(Unfallvertrauensmänner). As with the safety officers in the mining industry at the start of 
the century, these individuals were required to participate in safety inspections, and were 
seen as an important link between the workforce and the employer in the individual 
companies (Diekershoff 1979: 2). 
Whilst these legislative provisions were initially regarded as a sign of progress, they were 
soon to be forgotten as Hitler sought to re-arm Germany as of 1935. Nevertheless, 
between 1935 and the outbreak of war just four years later, there were further legislative 
interventions. In 1936, accident insurance was extended to cover more cases of 
occupational illness, and in 1939, the issue of hazardous substances was addressed. 
In examining this period, one can identify similarities between the motives of Hitler and 
the Prussian state of the early nineteenth century, as both recognised the harmful effects of 
industrial activity on the physical well-being of the working population. The most likely 
explanation for these interventions in the more recent example however, is that these 
advances in the health and safety arena were nothing more than an attempt to achieve 
stability (Kaudelka 1995: 147), and to gain recognition for the National Socialist German 
Workers' Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei), its policies, and its 
leader. 
102 This ordinance was of relevance to those individuals who plied their trade from home. 
103 The Working Time Ordinance (Arbeitszeitordnung) regulated the length of the working day for 
employees of all ages for the first time. It remained in force until the 1990s 
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5.5 1945-1960: Occupational Accidents - The Price of Economic 
Recovery 
In contrast with the preceding time intervals, the period 1945-1960 was one of relative 
inactivity as far as occupational health and safety legislation was concerned. With much of 
the country having been raised to the ground, the need to improve working conditions 
within German industry was not the most pressing concern in the immediate post-war 
period. 
Having agreed on very little at their conferences in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, save for 
the need to de-militarise, de-nazify, and administratively decentralise the country, the 
Allies decided to divide Germany into zones of occupation. '°4 The currency reform of 
June 1948 paved the way for the introduction of the market economy in the three western 
zones, and by 1949 the Western Allies were looking to establish the necessary political 
bodies to facilitate the successful implementation of this economic system. German 
representatives began drawing up a constitutional document to regulate all aspects of 
society, and on May 23rd 1949, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) was introduced, signalling 
the birth of the FRG. With the proclamation of the constitution of the GDR in the Soviet 
zone of occupation just seven days later, the division of Germany was complete. 
In an attempt to prevent the rise of potentially strong governments, the framers of the 
Basic Law developed a strong constitutional document and a political system based on 
federal lines, with regional representation at national level made possible by dividing the 
country into a number of self-governing Federal States. The Basic Law also addressed the 
issue of occupational health and safety, albeit indirectly, stating in §1(1) that the dignity of 
man was inviolable, and that to respect and protect this was the duty of the state. In §2(2) 
there was reference to the bodily inviolability of every citizen, whilst §74.12 consigned 
104 Whilst there were initially just three zones, a fourth was created and placed under French 
supervision at the request of Britain and the United States. 
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health and safety matters to the area of concurrent legislation. '°5 These provisions served 
to complement the requirements of both the GewO and the RVO, which had since been 
re-introduced. In addition, the Statutory Labour Inspectorate and the professional 
associations had re-appeared. 
Other developments of direct significance came in 1951, when both the Federal Institute 
for Occupational Health and Safety (Bundesinstitut , 
dir Arbeitsschutz) was founded in 
Koblenz, and legislation was finally implemented to provide for an equal number of 
representatives of employers and employees on the management board (Vorstand) and in 
the representative assembly (Vertreterversammlung) of the self-administrating professional 
associations. 10' This provision for parity within the professional associations reflected the 
spirit of democracy and cooperation that was evident in the immediate post-war period. 
Of further significance was the passing of the WCA 1952. As far as occupational health 
and safety was concerned however, only §58 WCA 1952 was of direct relevance. In 
essence, it required the works councils to tackle the dangers prevailing at the workplace, 
and also required them to support both the statutory labour inspectors and the technical 
inspectors of the professional associations in their attempts to improve working 
conditions. 
Of equal importance had been the passing of the TVG in 1949, which provided the 
industrial unions with the opportunity to push for an improvement in occupational health 
and safety provisions at plant level in the form of collective agreements concluded with 
representatives of the employers. However, the industrial unions became entangled in the 
general desire to re-build industry and to re-float the economy, and their demands were 
therefore quantitative rather than qualitative in the embryonic years of the FRG. 107 
105 In the concurrent sphere, the Federal States can legislate whenever the Federal Government 
chooses not to. Given the need for uniformity in health and safety legislation, the Federal Government 
usually legislates. 
106 Initial attempts to realise these arrangements had failed towards the end of the Weimar Republic, 
and further moves in this direction had been thwarted by the Western Allies during the period of 
occupation. 
lo' There are currently no collective agreements in force in the metal-working industry to address 
the question of occupational health and safety directly. 
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When industrial production finally got underway towards the end of the 1940s, little 
consideration was given to the health and safety of the workforce. There was a need for a 
combined effort from all concerned to re-build the country as soon as possible, and the 
emphasis was therefore on high productivity in the early post-war period. Accident levels 
began to rise and approximately one million occupational and commuting accidents were 
registered in 1950 alone (HVBG 1994b: 14). This situation was compounded by other 
factors. 
For example, Germany, like many of the warring nations, had emerged from the Second 
World War with its workforce depleted. Once its labour market began to show signs of 
stagnation, Germany looked to several Mediterranean countries for available labour. 
Altmann (1992b: 362) has explained that these guest workers (Gastarbeiter) and the 
indigenous working population were more interested in quantitative rewards in the early 
post-war period and were therefore prepared to tolerate poor working conditions in return 
for extra pay. A study by Leichsenring (1972: 37) revealed that the language barrier was a 
cause of many occupational accidents involving these guest workers, who were found to 
be most susceptible to such occurrences during the early stages of their stay. 
One further contributory factor in relation to the rising accident rate concerned the 
machinery that was introduced by the `Marshall Plan for the Economic Recovery of 
Western Europe' as of 1947. Given the distinct shortage of trained and experienced 
operators, much of this equipment was as potentially dangerous at this point in time as 
that which had been introduced during the industrial revolution. It was being implemented 
without any prior thought having been given to the safety of the workforce. Whilst the 
operators attempted to adapt themselves to the machinery, what little health and safety 
legislation that had been passed to protect them, was being under-enforced due to a 
scarcity of qualified inspectors. 
By 1955, the absolute number of reportable occupational accidents - those resulting in at 
least three days work incapacity - was approaching the two million mark (HVBG 1994b: 
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14). 108 This figure represented a 43.4 per cent rise in the accident rate compared with 
1950. By 1960, there had been a further 31.4 per cent rise in absolute terms, with the 
accident rate having reached 140.6, compared with a figure of 123.5 just five years 
earlier. lo9 As had been the case during the Weimar Republic, the rising accident levels 
served as a catalyst for subsequent legislative activity. 
Figure 5.1: Reportable Occupational Accidents in the FRG 1950-1994 
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Despite the upheavals of the period 1933-1945, many of the occupational health and 
safety structures re-established themselves relatively quickly during the early post-war 
years. The duty of the individual employers to protect the health and safety of their 
employees was confirmed with the re-appearance of the GewO, and in 1949, the Basic 
108 Occupational accidents are defined in §548 RVO as those which an insured person suffers 
performing a task laid down in §§539,540 and §§543-545 RVO. The term `occupational accident' also 
includes commuting accidents. Furthermore, an employee who is injured in the process of making an 
initial cash withdrawal from a financial institution each month is deemed to have suffered an occupational 
accident. 
1°9 In 1960 there were 703 905 reportable occupational accidents in the metal-working industry 
alone. This represented an accident rate of 227.6. 
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Law outlined a protective role for the state. A further opportunity to streamline the 
increasing volume of health and safety-related legislation was missed however, and the 
fragmented rules and regulations which re-emerged after the war, continued to be 
supplemented by yet more provisions. Despite the presence of this legislation, all attempts 
to improve working conditions during this period were hampered by the desire, and indeed 
the need, to rebuild the country and its economy in the shortest time possible. As 
compliance with this legislation was monitored by an insufficient, under-qualified and 
fragmented system of inspection, the accident rate continued to rise (see Figure 5.1). 
5.6 1961-1995: Acknowledging and Addressing the Problem 
The 1960s were a watershed in the development of health and safety awareness in the 
FRG. It was during this decade that the post-war economic recovery slowed, that the 
industrial unions, employers and the state were regularly involved in tripartite 
negotiations, that the SPD finally came to power, and that a number of studies were 
published highlighting the financial implications of occupational accidents. 
The first attempt to address the spiralling accident rate involved the introduction of the 
Law Revising Accident Insurance (Unfallversicherungs-Neuregelungsgesetz) in April 
1963. Under this law, §719 was inserted into the RVO and provided for the appointment 
of safety representatives (Sicherheitsbeauftragte) in companies with upwards of 20 
employees (see Section 7.6). These safety representatives were similar to the accident 
trustees, who had appeared in 1934, and were charged with supporting the employer in all 
questions of accident prevention. 
To provide further assistance for the employers, many of whom were struggling to come 
to terms with the complexity of the new technologies and their implications for health and 
safety, the Machine Safety Law (Maschinenschutzgesetz) was introduced in 1968. The law 
required the manufacturers and importers of machinery and other equipment to ensure that 
their products complied with the accident-prevention regulations issued by the 
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professional associations, so as to ensure that those operating the machinery could not 
come to any harm. The law was renamed Equipment Safety Act (Geratesicherheitsgesetz) 
in 1980. 
The two most significant developments came within two years of each other. In January 
1972 an updated WCA came into being, and this was followed in December 1974 by the 
implementation of the Works Safety Law. 
As far as the WCA 1972 was concerned, §§80,81 and §§87-91 detailed the extent of the 
works council's involvement in the health and safety arena (see Section 7.4). Whilst all of 
these health and safety-related provisions were of extreme importance, it was §87 which 
represented the most significant progress. §87(1)7 afforded the works councils a right of 
co-determination on matters relating to the prevention of both occupational accidents and 
illness, although this right of co-determination was only applicable where primary 
legislation was not prescriptive, thus allowing for more specific regulation at plant level. 
With much of the primary legislation being very general in nature, "' this represents a 
considerable role for the employees' representative body. "' 
The Works Safety Law provided for the appointment of health and safety personnel of a 
technical and medical nature at plant level to assist the employers in implementing the 
health and safety legislation (see Section 7.5). There had been concern surrounding the 
ability of the employers to realise this task alone, and the appointment of expert personnel 
in an advisory capacity was therefore the obvious solution. Drawn up with larger 
companies in mind, the legislation was eventually required to be implemented in 
companies with upwards of 30 employees, but by the early 1990s, only 55 per cent of all 
industrial employees were covered by the requirements of the Works Safety Law (HVBG 
1994a: 46). 
110 The accident-prevention regulations in particular are very general in nature. 
III Given that the dangers vary so much between companies, the primary legislation tends not to be 
prescriptive. One can therefore argue that the issue of occupational health and safety is very decentralised. 
This reflects a wider trend towards decentralisation in the industrial relations arena, a process which 
Jacobi et al. (1992: 263) regard as being inevitable. 
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Opinions differ concerning the thinking behind this legislation. Some (Kittner 1994: 353; 
Bieneck and Ruckert 1993: 2) have suggested that it was introduced to provide expert 
assistance for the inspectors, who had always found it difficult to maintain regular contact 
with the companies. Others (BAU 1988: 61) maintain that the infrequency of the safety 
inspections made it impossible for the inspectors to familiarise themselves with the dangers 
prevailing in the companies. Bauerdick (1994: 109), meanwhile, claimed that it had 
become a necessity, given the inactivity of both the industrial unions and the employers' 
associations. 
Whatever the reasons for its introduction, the Works Safety Law served to institutionalise 
occupational health and safety at plant level, and although it has been criticised for giving 
employers the impression that the appointment of such experts relieves them of their 
duties in this area (Schulte and Riese 1987: 27), it was one of the reasons for the sustained 
improvement in the accident statistics in the 1970s (see Figure 5.1). 
The statistics show that since the record year in 1961, the occupational accident rate has 
been falling steadily, and German employees were apparently 40 per cent less likely to 
suffer an occupational accident in 1994 than they were in 1961 (Süddeutsche Metall- 
Berufsgenossenschaft 1994: 26). As well as the legislative programme of the previous 25 
years, other explanations for this encouraging trend include the advances made in medical 
care (Bridgford and Stirling 1994: 232). Changes in the economy have also been 
significant, as has the fact that the number of workers in the traditionally dangerous 
occupations, such as mining, has fallen. Safer technology has removed many dangers by 
reducing the frequency of direct contact with the tools of production, whilst sophisticated 
protective clothing serves to guard the workforce against those hazards that remain. In 
addition, the introduction of safety representatives, the involvement of the works council, 
and the implementation of a series of other legislative provisions, as described in this 
chapter, have introduced new actors at plant level to assist the employers in addressing the 
question of occupational health and safety. 
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Although the automation of industry has taken many workers out of the danger zone, with 
the machinery often being operated from a computer terminal at a safe distance, new 
problems such as stress and musculo-skeletal disorders have arisen. 112 These less 
traditional hazards were associated with the new technologies that were introduced during 
the periods of modernisation which followed the recessions of the early 1970s and 1980s. 
In an attempt to address these new hazards, the social democratic and liberal coalition 
government established the Humanisation of Working Life (Humanisierung der 
Arbeitswelt, HdA) initiative in 1974. According to Altmann (1992b: 363), the aims of the 
programme were as follows: 
" establishment of a scientific basis for a humane and productive design of work; 
" development of models for a humane design of technology and organisation; 
" dissemination of pertinent knowledge in the companies. 
The HdA initiative funded a number of research projects, but was eventually replaced by 
the AuT programme, which, in the words of Altmann (1992b: 364), is aimed at "mastering 
innovation in the production process. " It is claimed however, that little has changed as far 
as the content of AuT is concerned (Bieneck #55). 
One further problem was addressed in 1980 when the Chemical Law (Chemikaliengesetz) 
came onto the statute book. The post-war period had seen an increase in the use of 
chemical substances in industry, and the unforeseen dangers and side effects had resulted 
in a rise in the frequency of occupational disease. The legislation required the testing and 
registration of all new chemicals before they could be introduced into the workplace. 
In recent years there has been a renewed effort to streamline the health and safety 
regulations. It was hoped that this could be realised in the form of a Health and Safety 
Framework Law (Arbeitsschutzrahmengesetz, ASRG), which would also serve to 
implement the legislation emanating from the European Union (EU). 113 The ASRG was 
112 Such burdens find their way into the occupational illness statistics. Although they will not be 
considered in detail in this thesis, it is worth pointing out that the falling occupational accident statistics 
are therefore not as impressive as they may initially appear. 
113 See Appendix 6. 
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not intended to change fundamentally the dynamics of the system, but shortly before the 
parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1994, the ASRG was dropped from the Federal 
Government's legislative programme. "4 The Free Democrats (FDP) have been held 
responsible for its failure, and it has been suggested that they opposed the legislation on 
the grounds that it would prove too costly for the employers in small and medium-sized 
companies. "' Consequently, Germany has once again missed an excellent opportunity to 
streamline the health and safety legislation and is, in addition, at odds with Brussels, as the 
deadline for implementing EU health and safety legislation into national law, which the 
ASRG was intended to realise, has long since expired. 
In defence of this reluctance to implement the EU legislation, it has been suggested that 
much of what was required of Germany is already in place (Bieneck #55). Germany is not 
alone in stalling over the implementation of this legislation, but there can be no doubt that 
the cumbersome nature of the legislative process within a federal system has hampered 
German attempts to comply with Brussels. 
5.7 Summary 
Occupational health and safety legislation has been introduced in a piecemeal fashion in 
Germany since the early nineteenth century. Both the statutory and the autonomous 
provisions have been implemented on a regular basis in response to the changing nature of 
the workplace, but outdated and obsolete legislation has rarely been repealed. The result is 
a complex network of rules and regulations which many actors find extremely difficult to 
negotiate, 116 and which was described by Kittner (1993: 401) as: 
114 Following the failure of the ASRG, the Social Democrats have put forward the idea of a Health 
and Safety Law Book (Arbeitsschutzgesetzbuch) to unify the legislation in this area. 
115 These individuals are regarded as the supporters of the FDP (Meyer-Falcke #78). 
116 This legislative complexity was advantageous however, in the sense that it was partly responsible 
for the introduction of the Works Safety Law, and therefore the health and safety personnel, in the mid- 
1970s. The latter have assisted the employers and the works councils in their attempts to address health 
and safety. 
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... a mixture of regulations with no centrally binding theme from the early days of 
capitalism and the national socialist period, together with a series of individual 
laws, ordinances, and regulations issued by the Federal Government, the Federal 
States and the professional associations. (author's translation) 
However, it is this juridification which ensures that occupational health and safety is an 
ideal issue with which to examine the operation of plant-level industrial relations in 
Germany, and the role of the works council in particular. 
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CHAPTER SIX - HEALTH AND SAFETY STRUCTURES: 
THE MACRO-LEVEL ARRANGEMENTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Having traced the development of health and safety awareness in Germany, the aim of the 
next two chapters is to highlight the contribution made by the actors and agencies at both 
the macro and the micro levels to an improvement in working conditions. 117 Beginning 
with the macro level, this chapter is divided into four subsequent sections. 
The first, Section 6.2, examines the legislators, focusing in particular upon the state and 
the professional associations. The second concerns itself with the enforcers of this 
legislation and makes reference to official statistics in order to highlight a problem that has 
characterised these arrangements for some time. Section 6.4 identifies the institutions 
providing health and safety training for the plant-level actors, and the chapter concludes 
with an assessment of the efficacy of these arrangements for an improvement in working 
conditions. 
6.2 The Legislators 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the German health and safety arena is 
characterised by a dual system of regulation at the macro level. On the one hand, there are 
the statutory provisions issued by the Federal Government, on the other, the autonomous 
legislation in the form of the accident-prevention regulations of the professional 
associations. Whilst concentrating on the contribution made by both the state and the 
professional associations, this first section also refers to both the industrial unions and the 
117 For a diagrammatic overview of the German health and safety arena, see Appendix 7. 
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employers, or their associations, who, according to §1(1) of the TVG 1949, can conclude 
free and binding collective agreements to regulate working conditions. 
6.2.1 The State 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the German state has intervened in the 
industrial relations arena in order to protect the health and safety of its citizens. Having 
initially done so to address questions of working time and inspection arrangements in the 
early nineteenth century, subsequent statutory interventions were designed to alleviate the 
effects of industrialisation on the working population. The Basic Law of 1949 served to 
confirm the role which the state has in protecting the welfare of its citizens, assigning the 
issue of health and safety to the sphere of concurrent legislation. As of this date, and 
increasingly so since the mid-1960s, the Federal Government has exercised its right to 
legislate in this field, with responsibility for the drafting of these provisions falling to the 
Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung, BMA) in Bonn. 118 The BMA works closely with the umbrella 
organisations of both the 16 industrial unions and the employers - the German Trade 
Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbunct DGB) and the Federal Employers' 
Association (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA) respectively 
- with the individual labour ministries in the Federal States, who are charged with 
implementing the statutory legislation, and maintains regular contact with the Central 
Federation of Industrial Professional Associations (Hauptverband der gewerblichen 
Berufsgenossenschaften, HVBG) and a series of other bodies, including the Organisation 
of German Safety Engineers (Vereinigung der deutschen Sicherheitsingenieure, VDSI), 
with which the health and safety experts are registered. 
When new statutory legislation is required, it is normal practice for the BMA to produce 
an internal bill, which is initially discussed by a number of advisory committees comprising 
"$ The BMA addresses questions of a health and safety-related nature on behalf of the Federal 
Government. 
117 
representatives from the aforementioned organisations. From here, the bill passes to other 
ministries which may be affected by its implementation, and if it successfully negotiates 
this stage, it is then passed on to the Federal Cabinet, before being forwarded to the 
President of the Lower House of the German Parliament (Bundestag). The bill is then 
discussed by the parliamentary committees before receiving its first reading in the Lower 
House. From here, it passes to the Upper House of the German Parliament (Bundesrat), 
where the Federal States are represented, and if successful, returns to the Lower House 
for a second reading before coming onto the statute book. 
Much of the information which the BMA receives regarding health and safety emanates 
from the BAU, which, since 1972, has been based in Dortmund. The BAU is completely 
impartial in its activities and cooperates with both the professional associations and the 
Statutory Labour Inspectorates, 119 as well as being a constant source of technical advice 
for the BMA. Its most significant role however, involves raising public awareness for 
occupational health and safety, and to this end, the BAU constantly produces informative 
material, based on the results of its research, and regularly organises a variety of 
educational seminars. In November 1993, the BAU also opened an interactive exhibition 
centre in Dortmund, which is intended to teach visitors of all ages to recognise the dangers 
prevailing in the workplace. 
Whilst the BAU advises the BMA on matters of a technical nature, the Federal Institute 
for Occupational Medicine (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsmedizin, BAfAM) in Berlin provides 
the BMA with the very latest medical information. As with the BAU, the BAfAM runs a 
number of seminars and exhibitions designed both to raise public awareness and to 
improve the knowledge of those directly affected. 
119 § 139b GewO obliges each Federal State to establish a Statutory Labour Inspectorate. 
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6.2.2 The Professional Associations 
Founded in 1887 to administer the Accident Insurance Act of 1884, the professional 
associations have survived the upheavals of modern German history and are now one of 
the central institutions in the health and safety arena. Financed by their member 
companies, the professional associations have two main roles: compensation and 
rehabilitation on the one hand, accident prevention on the other. 120 
The majority of the 35 industrial professional associations 12' are organised on a branch 
specific basis, with all companies required to register with the professional association 
most closely associated with its end product (Schliephacke 1989c: 152). The arrangements 
for the metal-working companies are slightly different, in the sense that there are five such 
professional associations organised on a regional basis. Over 2.7 million companies were 
affiliated to one of the 35 industrial professional associations in 1994, with some 29 
million employees insured in the event of an accident, illness, invalidity or death (HVBG 
1995: 8). 
Each industrial professional association consists of a management board and a 
representative assembly, both of which are composed of equal numbers of employers' and 
employees' representatives. '22The size of these fora is determined by the size of the 
professional association, with the largest of the five metal-working professional 
associations, Maschinenbau- und Metall, having 16 members on the management board, 
120 §547 RVO details the employees' entitlements from the professional associations in the event of 
an occupational accident (see Appendix 8). 
121 There are 110 accident insurers in total. In addition to the 35 industrial professional associations, 
which are of interest in this thesis, there are 54 accident insurers in the public sector and 21 agricultural 
professional associations. 
122 The industrial professional associations have been described as an aspect of co-determination at 
the macro level (Schultze et al. 1991: 533): a reference to the way in which they are administered. Ever 
since their conception in the late nineteenth century, the professional associations have been run by 
representatives of capital and labour, but since the early 1950s there has been parity on both the 
representative assembly and on the management board of these organisations. Whilst the employers are 
normally represented by members of an employers' association, the majority of employee representatives 
are either works councillors or representatives of the industrial unions most closely associated with each 
particular professional association (Peter #45; Buchner #51). 
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and 60 on the representative assembly (Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft 
1994: 46-47). The representative assembly is the professional association's parliament 
(Hoffmann 1991: 23), and its members issue the accident-prevention regulations, 
determine danger tariffs, ' 2' re-elect the management board every six years. 
§708 RVO empowers the professional associations to issue accident-prevention 
regulations, which stipulate the measures to be taken by the employer, and the behaviour 
expected of the employees, to prevent occupational accidents. 124 These regulations also 
serve to qualify the framework provisions laid down in the Works Safety Law, and are 
formulated in expert committees which are normally composed of employers, union 
representatives, industrial experts and both technical and statutory inspectors (Peter #45). 
The BMA approves the accident-prevention regulations and must ensure that they do not 
duplicate any statutory provisions, and that they comply with the requirements of the 
European legislation. 125 
Much importance is attached to the accident-prevention regulations, as they are seen to 
reflect past experience in each particular branch of industry, whilst stipulating only 
minimum standards which can then be supplemented more specifically within the 
individual companies (Spinnarke 1994: 105). This flexibility is important as no two 
companies are exposed to the same dangers, and as Bacow (1980: 5) has indicated, "the 
challenge of regulation is to design a regulatory policy that responds effectively to the 
diverse conditions encountered among diverse employment situations. " The accident- 
prevention regulations meet this requirement, and are also advantageous in the sense that 
they are agreed upon by the social partners, and are more easily amended than the 
statutory laws and ordinances (ILO 1984: 22) which must negotiate the lengthy legislative 
process laid down in §§76-78 of the Basic Law (see Appendix 9). 
123 Danger tariffs are assigned to different departmental activities. For example, the danger tariff for 
administrative staff is much lower than that for a furnace worker in a steelworks. 
124 Of the DM 1024 million spent on accident prevention in 1994, almost DM 13 million was used 
to produce the accident-prevention regulations and associated informative material (HVBG 1995: 62). 
125 The BMA always consults the Federal States before approving these regulations. 
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Table 6.1: Expenditure of the Industrial Professional Associations 1950-94 
* Figures in DM 1000 
Source: HVBG, 1995. 
The activities of the professional associations are financed by the member companies who 
must pay an annual insurance premium. 126 §725 RVO allows the professional associations 
to vary these contributions, and the premiums are therefore calculated according to a 
system of danger tariffs, the size of the workforce, and/or the number and severity of 
accidents in the previous 12 months. Although the method of calculation varies between 
the professional associations, 127 each essentially operates an incentive scheme whereby 
their members, the individual companies, can obtain a rebate at the end of the financial 
year if their accident rate falls below the average for that specific professional association. 
The professional associations appear to set an acceptable level of occupational accidents, 
with those companies that exceed this level required to pay more. Table 6.1 details how 
the contributions have been spent since 1950. 
126 For every DM 100, - paid by the employers to their employees in 1993, only DM 1,44 went to the 
professional association, compared with a figure of DM 1,70 back in 1950 (HVBG 1994c: 36). The lower 
the premium, the safer the workplace. 
127 The Hütten- und Walzwerks-Professional Association operates a points system. 80 per cent of the 
premium is fixed, with the remaining 20 per cent dependent upon the severity of accidents. With each 
point costing DM 500, -, accidents resulting in 4-7 days absence are valued at 1 point, 8-14 days at 4 
points, 15-21 days at 8 points, with every additional day costing a further DM 500, -. A fatal accident 
incurs 180 points with a pensionable accident incurring 150 points (Frener #46). 
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Table 6.2: Accident Insurance Premiums as a Percentage of Turnover 1994 
There are conflicting opinions surrounding the efficacy of these arrangements as an 
incentive to the companies. The professional associations consider the premiums to be an 
effective steering mechanism (Buchner #51), whilst others point out that the sums of 
money involved are only significant for the smaller organisations (Zimolong #106). As 
Table 6.2 demonstrates, the annual premiums paid by the seven case-study companies in 
1994 represented an insignificant proportion of their annual turnover, and the information 
gleaned from the structured interviews revealed that the premiums were often paid by the 
personnel departments and were rarely discussed by the health and safety actors at plant 
level. 128 
128 Many individuals were actually unaware of the level of this premium. 
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6.2.3 The Social Partners 
With the introduction of the TVG in 1949, the German industrial unions and the individual 
employers, or their associations, were presented with the opportunity to conclude free and 
binding collective agreements to regulate working conditions. During the embryonic years 
of the FRG however, the social partners preferred to concentrate on more quantitative 
issues in the collective bargaining process, and it was not until the mid-1960s that there 
was a shift to more qualitative demands as the `economic miracle' slowed. Nevertheless, 
health and safety issues have been largely ignored in collective bargaining. IG Metall has 
yet to conclude such an agreement to address this topic directly, 129 preferring to leave the 
employers and works councils to regulate these questions in plant agreements. These 
agreements are considered to be more suitable than the generally applicable collective 
agreements given the diverse nature of the hazards in the individual companies (Bacow 
1980: 57). This reflects a wider trend in the devolution of collective bargaining to the 
micro level in Germany, and the increasing importance of plant-level co-determination. 130 
The closest IG Metall has come to regulating occupational health and safety has been in its 
attempts to reduce the length of the working week, which, as of October 1995, stands at 
35 hours. In truth, attempts to reduce the working week have been aimed at reducing 
unemployment rather than improving occupational health and safety. As has already been 
mentioned however, the shorter the time spent at the workplace, the less the degree of 
exposure to the prevalent risks, a relationship which many employees apparently fail to 
recognise (Schlummer #32). 
There are signs however, that IG Metall is planning to integrate health and safety issues 
into collective bargaining in the near future. In response to suggestions that the demands 
of their members are no longer centred on money alone (IG Metall 1993: 6), the union has 
drafted a document entitled "Bargaining Reform 2000" (Tarifreform 2000), which 
129 The industrial union, IG Bau Steine Erden, has addressed this issue in collective bargaining with 
its agreement entitled "Environment, Quality and Health and Safety" (author's translation). 
30 See also Jacobi et al. (1992). 
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portrays its vision of collective bargaining in the twenty-first century. If realised, this 
programme will represent a shift to more qualitative demands, including those of health 
and safety, in the bargaining process. 
The most significant contribution that the unions make to the health and safety arena is 
reserved for their role in the administration of the professional associations. It has been 
estimated that several hundred members of IG Metall sit on either the representative 
assembly or the management board of the five industrial professional associations in the 
metal-working industry (Dzudzek #92). IG Metall therefore exerts an enormous influence 
upon the formulation of the accident-prevention regulations, and this ability to formulate 
such regulations, together with representatives of the employers, may explain why the 
industrial unions have thus far chosen to ignore health and safety issues in collective 
bargaining. 
Figure 6.1: The Importance of Bargaining Issues 
Reduction in the 
Nbre Humane Working Working Week 
Conditions 3% 
7nß, 
More Money 
55% 
Few er Accidents 
15% 
Nbre Holiday 
7% 
Finally, the findings from the questionnaire survey carried out in the seven companies in 
the metal-working industry would seem to refute the aforementioned claims by IG Metall 
that money is no longer the issue of central importance for the majority of its members. 
Employees were asked to rank five potential bargaining issues in order of importance (see 
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Appendix 2, Question 25), and as Figure 6.1 demonstrates, 55 per cent considered more 
money to be of most importance, whilst just 15 per cent were most concerned with a 
reduction in the number of occupational accidents. 
6.3 The Enforcers 
It is at plant level that occupational accidents occur, and here that the health and safety 
rules and regulations are required to be implemented. To ensure that this does happen, a 
dual system of inspection serves to complement the dual system of regulation, with 
statutory labour inspectors employed by the Federal States ensuring compliance with the 
statutory legislation, and technical inspectors of the professional associations monitoring 
the implementation of the accident-prevention regulations. 
6.3.1 The Statutory Inspectors 
§139b GewO provides the legal basis for the activities of the Statutory Labour 
Inspectorates, which since the late nineteenth century, have been ensuring compliance with 
all statutory labour legislation. Organised presently by the governments in the Federal 
States, there are usually several Statutory Labour Inspectorates in any one Federal State. 
Each is responsible for a particular region, and the inspectors in each Statutory Labour 
Inspectorate are required to visit all companies within their region of responsibility, 
irrespective of the nature of the business. 
The Statutory Labour Inspectorates have various powers of persuasion at their disposal, 
and although they can ultimately refer a case to the public prosecutor for subsequent 
prosecution, the inspectors prefer to advise the employers about any deficiencies 
uncovered (Schlummer #32). This course of action enables the latter to remedy the 
situation voluntarily before resorting to an improvement notice, an administrative fine, the 
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shut-down of machinery, or prosecution. The inspectors attempt to convince the 
employers that healthy employees are cheaper employees (Schlummer #32). 131 
The Statutory Labour Inspectorates have also assumed responsibility for environmental 
issues in recent years, and it has been estimated that the inspectors have been devoting as 
little as 10 per cent of their time to matters of occupational health and safety (Bridgford 
and Stirling 1994: 237). Such a problem manifested itself in the early 1990s in NRW, 
where six of the seven case-study companies were located. 
Prior to 1994, the staff of the 22 Statutory Labour Inspectorates in NRW were working 
on behalf of both the Labour Minister and the Minister for the Environment. With 
environmental issues enjoying a higher public profile, the time the inspectors were able to 
devote to health and safety issues was greatly reduced (Bastong #91). It was therefore 
decided to establish a new administrative structure, with the personnel of the Statutory 
Labour Inspectorates divided equally between the aforementioned ministries. As far as 
health and safety issues were concerned, 12 Statutory Offices for Health and Safety 
(Staatliches Amt fair Arbeitsschutz, StAfA) were subsequently established, and as of 
January 1994, the StAfA inspectors have had sole responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with all statutory health and safety legislation. The new administration is leaner, and the 
Labour Minister now has absolute control over his inspectors, rather than having to share 
them with his environmental counterpart. With fewer inspectors however, it has been 
necessary to re-organise the inspection arrangements, and based on statistics compiled by 
the newly established Regional Institute for Occupational Health and Safety 
(Landesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz), the inspectors now work according to action 
programmes. The institute identifies specific problems from the accident statistics, which 
the StAfA then concentrates on reducing over a specified period of time. Early estimates 
suggest that the inspectors are spending 40 per cent of their time on such action 
programmes, giving them the opportunity to participate in accident investigations and to 
attend to their administrative duties (Meyer-Falcke #78). 
131 As Coye (1979: 179) has indicated, a healthy workforce has a beneficial long-term effect on 
productivity. 
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6.3.2 The Technical Inspectors 
Each of the 35 industrial professional associations employs a number of technical 
inspectors to enforce the implementation of the accident-prevention regulations in its 
member companies. Organised into a number of regional offices, the technical inspectors 
of any professional association are responsible for all member companies within their area 
of jurisdiction, and enjoy similar powers of enforcement to the statutory labour inspectors. 
Given these organisational arrangements, the technical inspectors are more specialised 
than their statutory counterparts, and as well as attempting to make regular visits to their 
member companies, the technical inspectors participate in the drafting of the accident- 
prevention regulations. 
Financed by the annual contributions from the member companies, the technical inspectors 
are, despite these powers of enforcement, a source of much needed information and advice 
for the plant-level actors (Peter #45; Frener #46; Leichsenring #77). 132 For example, they 
encourage the employers to inform them in advance of any planned changes to the 
workplace so that they can be advised on meeting the requirements of the relevant 
accident-prevention regulations (Buchner #51). 133 
The technical inspectors are not without their critics, and both the deficiency in personnel 
and the infrequency of company visits are major problems. It is openly admitted by the 
inspectors themselves that smaller companies are visited less frequently (Frener #46), 134 
yet some 61.5 per cent of the industrial workforce were employed in companies with 
132 Of the DM 1024 million spent on accident prevention in 1994, over 50 per cent, DM 574 million, 
went towards financing inspections and advisory visits to member companies (HVBG 1995: 62). 
133 This occurred at the case-study company Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH. Faced with the 
prospect of having to implement the latest requirements of the Hazardous Substances Ordinance 
(Gefahrstoffverordnung), the health and safety expert called on the technical inspector to assist him in 
realising this task. 
134 The health and safety expert at the case-study company Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH, which 
employs 370, stated that both the statutory labour inspectors and the technical inspectors of the relevant 
professional association visited the company more frequently during its time as a subsidiary of a large 
steel company (Interview #59). 
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fewer than 200 employees in 1994 (HVBG 1995: 11). There is no reason to conclude that 
smaller industrial companies are any safer. In fact, figures published by the HVBG (1995: 
13) indicated that, on average, companies with 20-199 employees had the highest accident 
rates in 1994 (56.1), 135 with those employing upwards of 1000 employees having the 
lowest average rate (31.7). 136 The figures presented in Table 6.3 indicate the size of the 
problem facing the technical inspectors. 
Table 6.3: Activities of the Technical Inspectorate 1994 
Source: HVBG, 1995. 
6.4 The Educators 
As the following chapter explains, the majority of actors at plant level address 
occupational health and safety issues on a part-time basis. Employers, works councillors, 
health and safety experts, safety representatives and the employees themselves all have 
health and safety responsibilities, and if they are to be successful in realising their 
respective obligations, it is essential that they are educated in the basic tenets of 
occupational health and safety. As this section demonstrates, the professional associations 
and the industrial unions are the major contributors in this regard. 
133 The average figure was an accident rate of 51.6 (HVBG 1995: 13). 
136 The inspectors justify their choice by suggesting that larger companies are more likely to 
introduce changes to either the workplace or the production process (Frener #46). 
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6.4.1 The Professional Associations 
A proportion of the contributions paid by the member companies to their professional 
associations goes towards financing health and safety training courses, which the 
professional associations are required to organise under §720 RVO. 137 This provision 
states that the professional associations should provide the necessary training for those 
individuals entrusted with ensuring the implementation of the health and safety rules and 
regulations at plant level. 13' The figures presented in Table 6.4 give some indication of the 
extent of this commitment to training. 
Criticism has been levelled at the professional associations for the lack of available places 
on their training courses (Interview #65). This, it is argued, is due largely to the need to 
educate health and safety personnel in companies located in the former GDR (Derringer 
#83). Nevertheless, the professional associations are second only to the schools in terms of 
the number of individuals they educate on an annual basis (Dertinger #83), and some of 
the larger professional associations in the metal-working industry offer as many as 150 
separate courses to the individuals in their member companies (Buchner #51). 
Table 6.4: Participants at Health and Safety Training Courses 1994 
Source: HVBG, 1995. 
137 Almost DM 146 million of the DM 1024 million spent on accident prevention in 1994 went 
towards covering the costs of training (HVBG 1995: 62). 
138 Whilst the employers must continue to pay their employees should they attend one of these 
courses, all subsistence costs incurred during such a visit are borne by the professional associations. 
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6.4.2 The Industrial Unions 
With one or two exceptions, the German industrial unions have chosen not to address 
health and safety issues in collective bargaining, but have attempted to increase their 
members' awareness and understanding of this issue in a number of other ways. For 
example, it is commonplace for union district offices (Verwaltungsstellen) to charge at 
least one union secretary with the task of advising its members on questions of a health 
and safety-related nature. IG Metall also encourages its district offices to organise health 
and safety discussion groups which bring together works councillors, health and safety 
personnel and other interested parties from the companies under its jurisdiction. One such 
discussion group in NRW regularly attracts over 150 visitors and meets at least once every 
month (Dzudzek #92). These meetings enable the union secretaries to inform the plant- 
level actors of particular dangers or developments, and also allow the participants to 
exchange their ideas and experiences of a health and safety-related nature. Finally, the 
industrial unions also run a variety of health and safety training courses at a number of 
their own training centres throughout the country. 
6.5 Summary 
The macro-level health and safety structures in the FRG are not easily explained. No single 
body is charged with formulating the legislation, no single agency is required to ensure its 
implementation, and no single organisation is entrusted with the training of the health and 
safety personnel. Instead, in terms of these three variables, the macro-level health and 
safety structures are characterised by their duality: 
" The legislation is formulated by the state and the professional associations; 
" The implementation of the legislation is overseen by the Statutory Labour Inspectorates 
and the technical inspectors of the professional associations; 
" The individuals with health and safety-related responsibilities are trained by the 
professional associations and the industrial unions. 
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There are those who have criticised the dual system of legislation, which has established 
itself over the past century, both for its complexity and the lack of co-ordination between 
the statutory and the autonomous bodies (Zwingmann #38). This, it is argued, has resulted 
in a duplication of legislation, despite the fact that both the BMA and the professional 
associations are given the opportunity to comment on all proposed legislation. On the 
other hand, there are those who draw attention to the benefits of self-regulation which 
characterises the formulation of the autonomous legislation. It is suggested that 
compliance with these provisions is more likely given the involvement of the social 
partners in their formulation (Bastong #91). 
Criticism has also been levelled at the enforcement arrangements within Germany, and 
whilst most European countries are faced with a quantitative deficiency within their health 
and safety inspectorates, the German dual system has the added problem of having had to 
come to terms with an increase in the number of companies requiring inspection following 
reunification. In addition, both the statutory and the technical inspectorates are much 
maligned for failing to co-ordinate their activities, the result of which has seen inspectors 
from both inspectorates appearing in companies within two or three days of one another in 
order to inspect the same work station (Buchner #51). An attempt was made to remedy 
this situation in 1977 with the introduction of the aforementioned General Ordinance for 
the Cooperation of the Professional Associations and the Statutory Labour Inspectorates. 
This legislation was designed to improve cooperation between the two inspectorates, and 
whilst a network of contacts has since been established between the individual inspectors, 
and such duplications are now mainly a thing of the past (Peter #45), cooperation at the 
higher echelons of the Statutory Labour Inspectorates and the professional associations is 
yet to materialise (Leichsenring #77). 
Finally, the health and safety-related educational arrangements have been condemned for 
their technical orientation, and whilst such instruction has helped to control the occurrence 
of workplace accidents, it has failed to contain the increasing prevalence of industrial 
131 
illness and psychological problems such as stress and 'mobbing' 139 (Dzudzek #92). 
Consequently, whilst not losing sight of the traditional dangers, the macro-level structures 
must adapt to the hazards of the modem-day workplace if the encouraging trends of 
recent decades are to continue. 140 
139 'Mobbing' is a generic term in German and is best translated by the word 'bullying'. It is 
employed to describe the process whereby individual employees are subjected to psychological abuse at the 
workplace. 
140 The education system has also been criticised as school pupils are encouraged to save water and 
not to litter, but are not instructed about the economic and physical consequences of unsafe behaviour at 
work. Consequently, many future employers enter full-time employment unaware of the overall costs of 
workplace accidents (Schlummer #32). 
132 
CHAPTER SEVEN - HEALTH AND SAFETY STRUCTURES: 
THE SITUATION AT PLANT LEVEL 
7.1 Introduction 
In advance of the empirical analysis, this chapter concerns itself with the roles and 
responsibilities of the micro-level actors, as laid down in the relevant legislative provisions. 
Taking each actor in turn, the aim is to identify the way in which these individuals can 
contribute to an improvement in working conditions, and the chapter concludes by 
evaluating the efficacy of these plant-level arrangements. 
7.2 Employers: Acceptance of Responsibility and the Tendency to 
Delegate 
It is the employers who, since the insertion of §120a into the GewO in 1891, have been 
held legally responsible for the health and safety of the labour they employ, and in 
recognition of this fact, are required to pay the entire annual accident-insurance 
contribution to the relevant professional association. Throughout history however, this 
legal responsibility has proved insufficient in encouraging employers to invest in improving 
the health and safety provisions at plant level. The introduction of the dual system of 
inspection, described in detail in the previous chapter, was intended to cajole the 
employers into addressing this issue, but the quantitative deficiencies within both the 
statutory and the technical inspectorates (see Table 6.3), coupled with the low level of 
fines that have occasionally been imposed, have, on the whole, proved to be an ineffective 
deterrent. Whilst empirical research continues to demonstrate the long-term benefits of a 
successful health and safety policy in terms of reduced costs and increased productivity 
(Kuhn and Schulz 1986), many employers are continually discouraged from making the 
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initial investment given the absence of an immediate return on their financial outlay 
(Schlummer #32; Leichsenring #77). 
The implementation of the Works Safety Law in 1974 was an attempt to remedy this 
situation. It served to introduce health and safety experts and medical personnel into the 
companies to assist the employers in tailoring the health and safety legislation to the 
specific needs of individual workplaces. The introduction of such specialists had become a 
necessity, as the employers were finding it increasingly difficult to address the problems 
associated with the changing nature of the production process and with the 
implementation of new technologies. However, these specialists were only to provide 
advice and support to the works councils and the employers, and despite one or two ideas 
to the contrary, did not relieve the latter of their responsibility for the health and safety of 
the labour which they employed. 
Further attempts to encourage the employers to address this issue included the 
introduction of the accident-prevention regulation UVV 1.0 in 1977. This regulation 
applies to all industrial companies and details the specific duties of each and every 
employer. They include the following: 
" According to §2(1), the employer is required to take all necessary measures, based on 
the accident-prevention regulations and the verified scientific and medical knowledge, 
to prevent occupational accidents; 
9 §4(1) requires the employer to provide personal protective equipment should technical 
measures prove insufficient in removing a potential source of danger. This includes 
protective equipment for the head, feet, eyes, face, and the respiratory system; 
9 Under §7(2), the employer is obliged to inform all employees about the potential 
hazards at their work station and the measures which are to be taken to avoid them. 
This instruction should take place before they begin work, and at regular intervals of 
not less than once every year thereafter; 
" §9(2) calls on the employer to allow the safety representatives sufficient time to realise 
their duties, as laid down in the RVO, and in particular, requires the employer to give 
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these individuals the opportunity to inspect their area of responsibility and to 
participate in any visits by the technical inspectors; 
" Most significantly, §12 permits the employers to delegate these duties further down 
the management chain (see Appendix 10). 
Much use is made of this last provision for a number of reasons. Firstly, within many of 
the larger German companies, there is no single source of authority. The many joint-stock 
companies for example, are run by a management board and a supervisory board, and as 
occurs at the case-study company Echo AG, it is necessary to inform individual 
management representatives in writing of their duties in the health and safety arena (see 
Sections 8.5 - 8.7). 
Secondly, many employers do not actually contribute to the day to day running of their 
companies, preferring to appoint representatives to positions of senior management. In 
such cases the employer is required to inform the appointed representatives of their duties, 
much in the same way as in the joint-stock companies. 
Thirdly, there are those employers who do assume responsibility for the day to day 
running of their companies. However, given their lack of contact with the employees, as 
with the case-study company, Beta GmbH, they charge a member of the management 
chain with ensuring compliance with the health and safety legislation (see Section 8.3). 
Finally, certain employers do not invoke §12 UVV 1.0, choosing instead to address this 
issue themselves. This was the situation in the smallest of the case-study companies, 
Foxtrot GmbH, although the employer in question was of the opinion that the appointment 
of a health and safety expert had effectively relieved him of his legal responsibilities in this 
respect (see Section 8.4). 
Despite the provisions of §12 UVV 1.0, the overall responsibility remains with the 
employer, and §130 of the Administrative Offences Act (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz) 
(see Appendix 11) reinforces this idea by requiring the employers to ensure that the 
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individuals to whom they assign these duties do in fact realise the requirements of the 
relevant legislation (IIA 1984: 72). 
It is the employers who ultimately decide how much time, effort, and money is devoted to 
improving the working conditions at plant level. The successful implementation of any 
health and safety legislation is therefore dependent upon the extent to which the employers 
are prepared to make health and safety an issue within their individual companies (Partikel 
1982: 75). A technical inspector indicated that if the benefits of good health and safety can 
be both explained and demonstrated to the employers in financial terms, their commitment 
is often assured (Buchner #51). 141 Unfortunately, "safety is a question of priorities - men 
or production" (Nichols and Armstrong 1973: 29), and as has been suggested, it is 
extremely difficult to convince employers of the need to invest in health and safety, as in 
financial terms there is no immediate or direct benefit for them in doing so (Schlummer 
#32; Sinclair 1972: 10). 
7.3 Line Management: 142 Key Actors at Plant Level 
Both foremen and supervisors make a significant contribution to the realisation of the 
employers' responsibilities in the health and safety arena. Certain employers choose to 
address these issues themselves, others prefer to assign them to subordinates, such as line 
managers, who come into contact more frequently with the employees, and who are 
therefore in a position to exert an influence upon behaviour. In all of the case-study 
companies for example, it was these line managers who were required to ensure 
compliance with the health and safety-related legislation in their areas of responsibility, 
and as Figure 7.1 demonstrates, the questionnaire survey revealed that line managers were 
141 Brody et al. (1990: 116) found that the employers who were aware of their total accident costs 
invested more in accident prevention. 
142 The term `line management' is adopted and refers to foremen (Meister) and supervisors 
(Vorarbeiter). 
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very often the source of health and safety information for new employees, therefore 
fulfilling the requirements of §7(2) UVV 1.0.14; 
Figure 7.1: Source of Health and Safety Information on Starting Work 
Health & Safety Expert 
1A% 
Works Council 
1% 
Safety Reps 
15% Colleagues 
2% 
Union Stewards 
3% 
Line Managers 
61% 
Much depends upon the example set by these individuals, as it is very difficult to convince 
the employees of the need to observe the health and safety legislation if either their 
supervisor or foreman is openly contravening the regulations. ' 44 Consequently, whilst the 
overall responsibility remains with the employer, both the proximity of the line managers 
to the dangers at the workplace, and their influence upon the behaviour of the employees, 
makes their commitment to the cause a necessity. 
143 64.5 per cent of respondents also stated that line managers inform them of new health and safety 
measures. 
144 Bach (1994: 132) suggested that line managers are judged on their ability to achieve productivity 
goals rather than on the safety record in their areas of responsibility. 
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7.4 The Works Council: The Employees' Representative? 
The WCA 1972 provides for the election of a works council in companies with five or 
more employees and affords these representative bodies rights of participation of varying 
degrees in managerial decision-making. The general duties of the works council are 
enshrined in §80 WCA 1972, and include a requirement of the employees' representative 
body to ensure that all the laws, ordinances, accident-prevention regulations, collective 
agreements and plant agreements are being observed in the workplace. Of central 
importance for this thesis however, is §87(1)7 WCA 1972 which grants the works council 
a right of co-determination in the health and safety arena. 143 An explanation of §87(1)7 
reveals that this right of co-determination comes into force whenever the statutory 
occupational health and safety legislation, issued by the Federal Government, or the 
autonomous accident-prevention regulations of the professional associations, are not 
prescriptive in nature, and therefore need to be tailored to the requirements of the 
individual companies (Fitting et al. 1987: 977). As the majority of these regulations are 
very general in nature, this right of co-determination is regularly applied. 
Of further significance are §§89-91 WCA 1972: 
" Should any deficiencies of a health and safety-related nature come to light, §88.1 
permits the works council and the employer to conclude plant agreements to alleviate 
the problems; 
" §89(1) requires the works council to pro-actively assist all health and safety agencies, 
including the professional associations, in their attempts to improve health and safety 
provisions at plant level; 
" §89(2) obliges the employer and the macro-level health and safety agencies to involve 
the works council in their visits and investigations and further requires the employer to 
keep the works council informed of the latest health and safety-related information; 
145 A survey conducted by Gill (1993: 118) amongst employers and employees in the early 1990s 
revealed that in 63 per cent of companies the works councils enjoyed full co-determination rights as far as 
health and safety issues were concerned. 
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" §89(4) ensures that the works council receives details of all inspections, investigations 
and discussions; 
" §89(5) calls on the employer to ensure that the works council receives and signs a 
copy of all accident reports; 
9 §90 requires the employer to inform the works council in advance about any planned 
changes to the workplace so that the potential effects of such alterations may be 
assessed; 
" §91 allows for the intervention of a plant-level arbitration committee if the works 
council and the employer fail to agree upon the removal of, the reduction of, or 
suitable compensation for, a burden which results from the changes referred to in 
§90.146 
Reference is also made to the works council in the Works Safety Law. 
" §9(1) obliges the health and safety personnel to cooperate with the works council in 
realising their duties; 
" §9(2) requires the health and safety personnel to advise and to keep the works council 
informed of the latest developments in the health and safety arena; 
" §9(3) involves the works council in the selection of health and safety personnel, as 
well as in decisions concerning the duties to be performed by these individuals; 147 
"§ 11 recommends that two works councillors attend the meetings of the industrial 
health and safety committee. 
Of equal importance are the arrangements for addressing this issue on the works council. 
§28(1) WCA 1972 permits those works councils with nine or more members to create 
special sub-committees to deal with specific issues. 148 This enables matters such as health 
146 This is a form of qualified co-determination and is particularly important as far as the 
introduction of new technology is concerned. 
147 Gevers (1985: 225) referred to a survey conducted by Denck (1975) which revealed that the 
works councils' rights of co-determination were realised most frequently in relation to §9(3) ASiG. 
149 The size of the works council is determined by the number of employees in any one company. §9 
WCA 1972 details the relationship between company size and the number of works councillors and states 
that works councils in companies with 301-600 employees shall comprise 9 members. 
139 
and safety to be addressed by a handful of works councillors at regular intervals, rather 
than on an occasional basis by the representative body as a whole. This arrangement also 
encourages a degree of specialisation within the works councils. This is necessary given 
the ever increasing complexity of these issues. However, this provision excludes the 
overwhelming majority of smaller companies in German industry whose works councils 
constitute fewer than nine members. '49 
These legislative provisions provide the works council with the opportunity to exert an 
enormous influence upon health and safety issues at plant level, but as the research 
initiatives reviewed in Chapter Four have demonstrated, these rights of participation are 
not always realised in practice. '5° 
In theory, a works council and an employer should negotiate under the auspices of the 
WCA 1972, with the works council enjoying a right of co-determination concerning the 
implementation of primary health and safety rules and regulations at plant level. Both the 
works council and the employer can call upon the expertise of health and safety personnel, 
and whilst industrial action is prohibited, arbitration is provided for in the event of a 
serious disagreement. In short, the negotiating partners must attempt to find a solution 
which will benefit both the employees and the company as a whole. 
Opinions do vary concerning the contribution made by the works councils to an 
improvement in health and safety at plant level. A StAfA inspector in NRW suggested that 
he and his colleagues rely upon the works councillors to contact them whenever problems 
arise at plant level, and that the inspectors often receive messages from these individuals 
informing them of violations against the statutory health and safety legislation (Schlummer 
#32). Inspectors from two of the five metal-working industrial professional associations 
also recognised the importance of the works council. One suggested that the works 
149 Whilst the threshold for the creation of such sub-committees is 300 employees, statistics 
produced by the HVBG (1995: 10) reveal that 99.4 per cent of all industrial companies and 98 per cent of 
all metal-working companies had fewer than 200 employees in 1994. As has already been mentioned, 61.5 
per cent of all industrial employees were employed in such companies in 1994 (HVBG 1995: 11). 
ISO The following chapter will demonstrate the contribution made by seven works councils to an 
improvement in health and safety. 
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councillors either point out dangers to him during inspections, or at least tell him in 
advance of where to look for these deficiencies (Frener #46). Another inspector also 
considered the works council to be a vital source of information during inspections, so 
much so that he would never contemplate carrying out an inspection in the absence of a 
works councillor (Buchner #51). 
The works councils have been criticised however, either for misinterpreting (Pr6ll #54), or 
worse, for failing to realise their rights of participation, as laid down in the WCA 1972 
(Zwingmann #38). This failing, it has been suggested, is due to a lack of knowledge within 
the works councils (Bastong #91), although in defence of this body there are those who 
argue that the works councillors have insufficient time at their disposal to address all the 
issues for which they are now responsible (Zwingmann #38). In order to realise its role as 
the employees' representative body, the works council must ensure that all its rights, 
including those relating to health and safety, are realised. In many cases, the employees' 
health and safety is put at risk as this topic is regarded as a marginal issue and is often 
addressed by new and inexperienced works councillors. This is typical of the way in which 
the issue of occupational health and safety is regarded by many employers, works 
councillors and employees, and unless the reluctant works councils attach greater 
importance to health and safety, many employees will fail to benefit from EU legislation, 
which will see more issues fall under §87(1)7 of the WCA 1972, therefore invoking the 
works council's right of co-determination. 'sl 
's' As the EU health and safety legislation issued under § 118a of the Framework Directive is not 
prescriptive, and details minimum standards only, the works council will enjoy a co-determination right in 
the same way as it does with the accident-prevention regulations (see Appendix 6). 
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7.5 Health and Safety Personnel: Expert Assistants at Plant Level 
Whilst both technical and medical safety experts had been present in many larger 
companies prior to 1974, the introduction of the Works Safety Law made their 
appointment compulsory in companies with, on average, upwards of 30 employees. 152 
Their introduction came as a direct response to the employers' inability to address 
occupational health and safety issues alone, and the original intention was that these 
individuals would provide the employers with technical and medical advice, would assist 
them with the implementation of the relevant legislation, and would ensure that the 
employers did not ignore the health and safety of their employees. 
The appointment of health and safety personnel is qualified by the accident-prevention 
regulations UVV 1.4 and UVV 1.5, which calculate the total number of hours of 
supervision required of these individuals over a twelve-month period. This is achieved by 
assigning danger tariffs to different activities at plant level. For example, each of the 89 
employees in the iron foundry at one of the case-study companies, Alpha Iron & 
Steelworks GmbH, are deemed to require 3.1 and 0.6 hours of supervision each year from 
a health and safety expert and a medical representative respectively. Thus: 
89 employees X 3.1 hours = 275.9 hours of supervision from the 
health and safety expert; 
89 employees X 0.6 hours = 53.4 hours of supervision from the 
medical representative. 
Based on these calculations, the employers can choose to comply with the requirements of 
the Works Safety Law in one of three ways. They can: 
152 Between 1963 and 1974, safety representatives had been the only internal source of advice for the 
employers as they attempted to address the question of occupational health and safety (Diekershoff 1979: 
1). 
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" charge a company employee with the duties of the health and safety expert or the 
medical representative; '53 
" hire these services from an external organisation; 
" appoint a freelance health and safety expert or medical representative (Paland and 
Schwedes 1991: 49). 154 
Table 7.1: Health and Safety Personnel at Plant Level 1994 
Source: HVBG, 1995. 
Based on these calculations, many German companies are not large enough to require the 
appointment of a full-time health and safety expert or medical representative, '55 and as 
Table 7.1 demonstrates, it is commonplace for the employers to choose either the second 
or third options when seeking to comply with the legislation. However, there is evidence 
to suggest that this is not the best solution. Hauß and Rosenbrock (1984: 283) identified a 
price war between the various independent services, with some employers inclined to 
choose the cheapest option, irrespective of the quality of the service provided. It has been 
estimated that such external services are on site in some cases for as little as two hours 
each year (Zwingmann 1992: 26), therefore contravening the requirements of the UVVs. 
153 §7 Works Safety Law permits only those employees who have been educated to either foremen, 
technician or engineer level to be considered for the position of health and safety expert. 
154 Should the employer choose the first option, the appointment of the individual employee requires 
the agreement of the works council. In the other two cases, the works council is unable to influence the 
employer's decision to the same extent. 
Iss On average, companies with upwards of 4740 employees require the appointment of full-time 
health and safety personnel (Kittner 1994: 367). 
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Whilst the Works Safety Law provides the employers and the works councils with the 
opportunity to define the exact duties of the health and safety personnel, the legislation 
recommends that these individuals perform a variety of tasks. For the health and safety 
experts, they include the following: 
" Advising all plant-level actors; 
" Checking all company equipment and technical facilities; 
" Overseeing the implementation of the health and safety legislation; 
" Ensuring that all employees behave safely; 
" Investigating accidents; 
" Training the safety representatives. 
Whilst the health and safety experts are a source of technical advice, the medical 
representatives assist the plant-level actors with questions concerning: 
" workplace design; 
" the introduction of new substances; 
" changes to the production process; 
" the selection of personal protective equipment; 
" physiological and psychological matters and ergonomics. 
They also: 
" organise the first-aid provisions at plant level; 
" medically examine the employees; 
" investigate the causes of occupational illness. 
Whilst the health and safety personnel are a vital source of advice and assistance, they 
enjoy no decision-making powers, so as not to give the employers the impression that the 
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appointment of such individuals relieves them of their overall responsibility in this area. As 
the case studies demonstrate however, this unintended scenario does prevail in the smaller 
companies (see Chapter Eight). 
One further problem surrounds the aforementioned requirement that the health and safety 
experts be educated to a certain level. Consequently, it is not uncommon to find both 
foremen and more senior managers assuming this position. The problem with such a 
scenario is a potential conflict of interest, as management representatives have more than 
just a passing interest in the financial performance of the company, thus reducing the 
likelihood of their insistence upon health and safety measures that could slow down 
production. 
Finally, having required that these regulations be implemented only in those companies 
with upwards of 30 employees, the Works Safety Law has, since its inception, been 
applicable to just over 50 per cent of the industrial workforce. Legislation emanating from 
the EU now requires that all employees receive such supervision, and the professional 
associations are currently in the process of re-drafting the accident-prevention regulations 
so that all companies will be required to provide both technical and medical supervision. 156 
Early indications are that a minimum of 10 hours supervision per company per year will be 
required (Interview #101). 
156 It is envisaged that smaller companies will initially struggle to meet these requirements. With 
this in mind, the professional associations have agreed to phase in the legislation over a five-year period. 
Companies employing 21-30 employees will have needed to comply by 31st March 1996. Those with 11- 
20 employees have until 31st March 1997 to fall into line, whilst companies with 1-10 employees face a 
deadline of 31st March 1999 (Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft 1995: 5). 
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7.6 Safety Representatives: The Contribution of Safety-Conscious 
Employees 
In plants with upwards of 20 employees, the RVO has, since 1963, provided for the 
appointment of safety representatives (Sicherheitsbeauftragte) at plant level to support 
management in all questions of accident prevention. '" Selected by the employers in 
cooperation with the works council, 1S8 the safety representatives perform their health and 
safety-related activities in tandem with their normal duties without any additional 
remuneration. They are a key link between the employees and company management. 
Despite their voluntary position, the safety representatives are potentially one of the most 
valuable assets that management has at its disposal, as they also experience the health and 
safety deficiencies on the shop-floor. 159 The safety representatives also have an enormous 
responsibility to their fellow employees as they enjoy a position of authority from which 
they can influence developments. 160 
Guidelines concerning the minimum number of safety representatives to be appointed in 
any one company are laid down in Appendix 1 to UVV 1.0 and are based on the perceived 
danger of the individual workplaces. §719(1) RVO recommends that safety 
representatives be appointed in all companies with upwards of 20 employees, and 
Appendix 1 to UVV 1.0 states that in foundries for example, there should be at least one 
safety representative for every 70 employees. As with all accident-prevention regulations 
however, the plant-level actors are permitted to conclude a subsequent agreement to 
regulate this figure more specifically to the needs of the individual workplaces. 
157 7.2 per cent of all companies registered with an industrial professional association, and 20.4 per 
cent of metal-working companies, had appointed safety representatives in 1994 (HVBG 1995: 71). 
158 Whilst §719(1) states that safety representatives are to be selected by the employer in cooperation 
with the works council, in practice, this selection appears to be made by the works council and the health 
and safety expert (see Chapter Eight). 
159 Administrative instructions which accompany §9(1) of the accident-prevention regulation UVV 
1.0 recommend that leading white-collar employees and line managers should not be selected as safety 
representatives in order to avoid a conflict of interest. 
160 The safety representatives can influence developments at plant level as they are permitted to 
attend the meetings of the statutory industrial health and safety committee. 
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Whilst the safety representatives assist the employer in ensuring compliance with the 
relevant occupational health and safety legislation at plant level, their main contribution is 
their ability to influence the behaviour of their fellow employees. By observing worker 
activity and by cooperating with both the health and safety experts and the medical 
personnel, the safety representatives are regarded as the actors most likely to bring about a 
change in the behaviour of the employees (Schliephacke 1988a; Petermann 1991). 
The duties of the safety officers also include the following: 
Supporting the employer in all questions of accident prevention; 
0 Ensuring both the provision and the utilisation of safety equipment. 
In those companies which fall below the threshold for the appointment of both health and 
safety experts and medical personnel, §719. (4) RVO provides for the creation of a safety 
committee (Sicherheitsausschuß). This forum enables all safety representatives to meet 
and discuss such issues on a regular basis. §719(4) RVO also requires the employer and 
the works council to meet with the safety representatives on a monthly basis to enable an 
exchange of information to take place. However, evidence both from the case studies and 
from other empirical research, suggests that these meetings rarely take place (Wattendorf 
1991: 12). 
The success of the safety representatives is largely dependent upon the support which they 
receive from the employer, but they can be very influential and extremely effective if 
allowed to pursue their activities during normal working hours, as recommended in §9(2) 
UVV 1.0. However, it has been suggested that the appointment of health and safety 
experts has made these safety representatives very much surplus to requirements 
(Petermann 1991). Nevertheless, these representatives have survived, and they go some 
way to fulfilling the requirements of the EU legislation for employee involvement in the 
health and safety arena (Buchner #51). 
147 
7.7 Industrial Health and Safety Committee: An Advisory Forum? 
§11 Works Safety Law provides the legal basis for the creation of an industrial health and 
safety committee (Arbeitsschutzausschuß). The law requires the employers in those 
companies which are obliged to appoint health and safety personnel to establish such a 
committee, which in turn serves to obviate the requirement under the RVO for the 
creation of the safety representatives' safety committee referred to in the previous section. 
The industrial health and safety committee was intended as an advisory forum which 
would meet every three months to discuss questions of a health and safety-related nature. 
Its composition is decided upon by the employer and the works council, but the Works 
Safety Law recommended that the following individuals be represented: 
The employer or an appointed representative; 
Two members from the works council; 
Medical representatives; 
Health and safety experts; 
Safety representatives (see Appendix 12). 
The industrial health and safety committee has been described as the "headquarters of 
plant-level health and safety" (BAU 1988: 63), and as the recommended composition 
indicates, this forum provides the opportunity for all the plant-level actors with 
responsibilities in this area to discuss this issue collectively and to exchange information at 
regular intervals. In many companies, this committee provides the only opportunity for an 
expression of the employees' interests, albeit indirectly, via the safety representatives and 
the works council, and to this end it is of vital importance that the latter should ensure that 
the committee does meet as frequently as the law requires. However, as the following 
chapter demonstrates, whilst it is during these meetings that many of the health and safety- 
related policy decisions are agreed upon, the appearance of what are considered to be 
more pressing issues on the company agenda often leads to a postponement of these 
gatherings. 
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7.8 Union Influence: Unionised Councils and Committed Stewards 
The previous chapter highlighted the macro-level contribution which the industrial unions 
make to the health and safety arena, with their administrative role in the professional 
associations of most significance. The purpose of this section is to draw attention to the 
health and safety-related role at plant level. 
According to the dual system of interest representation, the industrial unions are active at 
sectoral level, leaving the works councils to represent the employees' interests within the 
individual companies. However, as Chapter One explained, the unions re-established 
themselves at plant level at the end of the Second World War, and whilst the WCA 1952 
temporarily served to distance the industrial unions from the workplace, the creation of a 
network of union stewards proved to be a more than adequate response. Together with 
the works councils, which were eventually opened up to union influence with the 
introduction of the WCA 1972, these stewards have enabled the industrial unions to exert 
an influence upon occupational health and safety issues at plant level. 161 
The works councils have also enabled the industrial unions to gain a foothold in the 
workplace. As Table 1.1 demonstrated, works councils have become de facto, if not de 
jure, union bodies, and in 1994, IG Metall once again won over 80 per cent of all works 
council seats throughout Germany (IG Metall 1995d: 5). IG Metall is therefore able to 
exert an enormous influence upon the activities of these representative bodies, 162 and the 
right of co-determination enjoyed by the works councils in managerial decision-making in 
the health and safety arena, thus passes indirectly to the industrial union. Furthermore, 
works councillors rely upon IG Metall to keep them informed of the latest developments 
in the health and safety arena. 
161 The industrial unions do not have a representative role in the workplace and so cannot enforce 
the health and safety legislation. 
162 Since 1981, DGB unions have won 77 per cent of all works council seats, and in 95 per cent of 
cases, the chairperson of the works council has been affiliated to one of the 16 industrial unions (Kittner 
1994: 606). 
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Whilst the works councils provide the industrial unions with the greatest opportunity to 
influence the health and safety provisions at plant level, the union stewards have 
themselves come to play an increasingly significant role in this regard. Both previous 
empirical research (Diekershoff 1979: v), and the information gleaned from the case-study 
companies, suggests that there is a tendency for union stewards to be preferred for the 
position of safety representatives, as they are seen both to be trusted and to be respected 
by the majority of their fellow employees. 163 
7.9 Employees: The Forgotten Victims 
The aim of all occupational health and safety legislation is to protect the health and safety 
of the employees from dangers arising at the workplace, and whilst they are the subjects of 
this legislation, they too are required to contribute to reducing the frequency of 
occupational accidents and illness: 
9 §14 of the accident-prevention regulation UVV 1.0 requires the employees to support 
all health and safety-related measures, to observe the instructions of their employers, 
to wear the personal protective equipment, and to ignore any provisions or 
instructions which they consider to be unsafe; 
" §15 obliges the employees to use appliances only to complete tasks for which they are 
designed; 
9§ 16 requires them either to rectify or to report any deficiency which they uncover. 
The German health and safety legislation has been criticised for the absence of any form of 
direct employee involvement (Zwingmann 1992: 37; Rickert et al. 1994: 24), and the 
rights enjoyed by the German employees in the health and safety arena have been 
163 The selection of union stewards as safety representatives can prove beneficial, in the sense that 
collective agreements or plant agreements are often concluded to provide for a meeting of all union 
stewards within a company during normal working hours (Kühn 1982: 100). With all works councillors 
affiliated to IG Metall automatically union stewards, these meetings can provide a direct link between the 
safety representatives and the works council. 
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described as being "less developed than in many comparable countries" (Hauß and 
Rosenbrock 1984: 279). One of the major deficiencies has been that the employees were 
unable to refuse hazardous work until a complicated and little used procedure was 
introduced along with the Hazardous Substances Ordinance (Gefahrstoffverordnung) in 
1986 (Häckert et al. 1994: 24). 
In short, the health and safety-related legislation treats the employees as objects requiring 
protection (Häckert et at. 1994: 24), restricting their contribution to indirect 
representation via the works council and the safety representatives. In doing so, the first- 
hand knowledge of the employees - the individuals who are exposed to the dangers on a 
daily basis - is ignored, this despite empirical investigations which have identified a 
positive correlation between employee involvement and working conditions on the one 
hand, and industrial relations on the other. 164 
7.10 Summary 
Whilst the employers are charged with the overall responsibility for protecting the health 
and safety of the labour which they employ, the legislative provisions ensure that they are 
not alone in addressing this issue. The reluctance of the employers to invest in health and 
safety led to the introduction of inspectors in the nineteenth century, but their inability to 
cope with the increasing complexity of the subject matter, has since led to the appointment 
of expert personnel and to an expansion of the works council's ability to influence 
managerial decision-making in this respect. The result is a plant-level arrangement which 
combines the principles of co-determination with expert advice and assistance (Hauß and 
Rosenbrock 1984: 279), and as with the situation at the macro level, no single actor is 
required to address this issue alone. The employers have come to rely upon all levels of 
the management chain, as well as the health and safety personnel to assist them in this 
regard, and whilst the works councils have the opportunity to operate as an effective 
164 See also Lewis (1974); Swinton (1983); Fröhlich et al. (1989); Willsch (1993). 
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counterweight to the employers, the provision for safety representatives also ensures that 
the concerns of the employees can be brought to the fore. 
The plant-level arrangements have received mixed reviews. Some observers criticise the 
involvement of too many actors (Peter #45). Others regard this as being advantageous, 
given the knowledge that they all contribute (Meyer-Falcke #78; Zimolong #106). Critics 
have also denounced the over-reliance on expert personnel (Häckert et al. 1994: 27). On 
the whole however, the micro-level health and safety structures are held in high regard, 
but as the following chapter demonstrates, these legislative provisions are rarely realised in 
full. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - THE CASE STUDIES: AN INSIGHT INTO 
HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN SEVEN METAL- 
WORKING COMPANIES 
8.1 Introduction 
Taking each of the seven case-study companies in turn, this chapter utilises the findings 
from the questionnaire survey, and the information from both the structured interviews 
conducted with the micro-level actors and the observations made during numerous visits 
to the companies, to highlight the dynamics of plant-level industrial relations. It does so by 
examining the way in which occupational health and safety issues are addressed in practice 
in the German metal-working industry. 1's 
In order to facilitate a comparison between the prevalent structures, each case study is 
divided into five similar sections. In an attempt to familiarise the reader with the case- 
study companies, the first section provides an insight into both the development and the 
current performance of the individual companies. The second section serves to identify the 
actors and institutions involved in addressing the question of health and safety at plant 
level, whilst the third offers an explanatory and a diagrammatic summary of the 
communicative structures which exist to channel health and safety-related information 
around the companies. 166 There then follows an explanation of the way in which health and 
safety measures are developed, implemented and monitored at plant level, with the idea 
here being to identify who is involved in the development phase, what form the measures 
165 The overwhelming majority of all unionised employees in the seven case-study companies were 
affiliated to IG Metall, and it is this criterion that was adopted to classify the companies as belonging to 
the metal-working industry. Two of the seven companies, Echo AG - 'Branch A' and Echo AG - 'Branch 
B', were not registered with one of the five metal-working industrial professional associations, affiliated 
instead to the Berufsgenossenschaft der Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik. Three of the remaining five 
companies were members of the Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, whilst the other two 
were registered with the Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft. To reiterate, the names of the 
companies have been changed at the request of the individual employers. 
166 The information gathered from the questionnaire surveys forms the basis for this summary. 
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take, and how compliance with these measures is achieved. Finally, each case study 
concludes with a summary of the dynamics of occupational health and safety, and with 
reference to the empirical data collected, provides an explanation for the arrangements and 
the interrelationships uncovered in each case. The chapter concludes by comparing and 
contrasting the findings from the individual companies and highlights one or two 
generalisations which can be made. 
8.2 Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH 
8.2.1 Background Information 
Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH provides a vital source of employment for the town 
which has shared its name since industrial activity began in the late eighteenth century in 
what is now part of NRW. A medium-sized company167 with 370 employees and a 
turnover of DM 60 million in 1994, the iron and steelworks manufactures parts and 
appliances for the motor vehicle and machine building industries, exporting approximately 
35 per cent of its goods world-wide. 
The company assumed its present name in July 1988, bringing an end to a turbulent fifty- 
year relationship which it had endured with the steel producer ABC AG. During this time 
the iron and steelworks had been under the direct control of the latter, but 15 years of 
financial mis-management at ABC AG in the period 1972-1987 had serious consequences 
for the case-study company. ABC AG failed in its initial attempts to find a buyer for the 
iron and steelworks in 1987 and with the threat of closure looming, the works council and 
company management came together in February 1988 to persuade ABC AG to sanction 
the formation of a limited company, albeit as a subsidiary operation. Four months later, a 
167 The Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) has classified medium-sized companies 
as those employing 300-600 employees (Hofmann 1987: 43). 
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Dutch holding company moved in and bought the iron and steelworks, renaming it `Alpha 
Iron & Steelworks GmbH'. 168 
Figure 8.1: Company Structure - Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH 
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At the time of the survey, 54.3 per cent of the workforce were employed in the foundry 
(Gießerei), which was housed in what appeared, from the outside, to be a derelict 
building. The machinery in the foundry was more than 30 years old and in desperate need 
of modernisation, and whilst the layout of the work stations facilitated employee 
interaction, the foundry was dirty, badly lit, extremely noisy and offered very poor air 
quality. In contrast, the 89 employees in the engineering works (mechanischer Betrieb) 
enjoyed a cleaner and quieter working environment. Given the automation of large 
sections of the production process however, there was less employee interaction in the 
engineering works. The remaining 80 employees were divided between the administrative, 
service and repair, and quality control departments (see Figure 8.1). 
168 Industrial relations at Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH were not subject to the montan Co. 
Determination Law 1951. 
155 
As Figure 8.2 demonstrates, the company was, by 1994, showing signs of recovery from 
the recession which hit the steel industry in the early 1990s, with turnover having almost 
reached its 1991 level. In fact, the iron and steelworks had been forced to take on new 
employees in 1994 in order to meet the increasing demand for its products, but whilst both 
the foundry and the engineering works were operating at full capacity in early 1995, the 
company was experiencing acute financial difficulties as they were being forced to lower 
their prices in the face of stiff competition from eastern Europe. 
Figure 8.2: Recent Trends - Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH 
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The appointment of the new employees had coincided with a rise in the absolute number 
of reportable occupational accidents, and although the company had received a small 
rebate on its insurance premium in recent years, the figure of 221.6 reportable 
occupational accidents per 1000 employees in 1994 was considerably higher than the 
average for the Maschinenbau- und Metall professional association, to which the 
company was affiliated, which stood at 82.2 (BMA 1995: 57-61). 
The influx of new employees was followed by the appointment of a new works director by 
the Dutch holding company in October 1994. Under his predecessor, relations between the 
works council and all levels of the management chain had been poor, with a degree of 
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tension most evident between the works council and the manager of the engineering 
works. The incumbent works director also identified a lack of cooperation between the 
foundry and the engineering works, and indicated that the two plants regarded themselves 
as "little kingdoms" (Interview #48, author's translation). In response, he called for 
greater cooperation and stressed the need for a concerted effort to overcome the prevalent 
financial difficulties. 
Table 8.1: Company Profile 1994 - Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
The relationship between the works council and the works director was described as being 
"cooperative, good, and open" (Interview #48; Interview #57, author's translation), and as 
far as health and safety issues were concerned, the works council had never found it 
necessary to call in the inspectors. The works councillors had occasionally pointed out 
relevant paragraphs in the WCA 1972, but it had always been possible for the works 
council to reach agreement with management without recourse to the plant-level 
arbitration committee. The amicable working relationship between the chairman of the 
works council and the works director was influential in this respect. 
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8.2.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
A multitude of actors and agencies were involved in addressing health and safety issues at 
the iron and steelworks. In essence however, it fell to the works director, all subsequent 
levels of the management chain, the health and safety expert, a handful of works 
councillors, and the safety representatives, to ensure that the workplace remained safe, 
and the employees healthy. 
The works director, a Dutchman, adopted a hands-on approach as far as health and safety 
issues were concerned, and since his appointment in October 1994 he had been the 
catalyst for many of the changes which had taken place. For example, having attended just 
one meeting of the industrial health and safety committee, he decided that it was necessary 
to establish a second body, as in his opinion, this statutory committee had become little 
more than a "forum for arguments" (Interview #48, author's translation). This second 
body, the Environmental and Health and Safety Steering Committee (Umwelt- und 
Arbeitsschutz-Steuerungsgruppe, EHSSC), met on a monthly basis, and comprised the 
works director, the chairman of the works council, the health and safety expert, and the 
managers of the foundry, the engineering works and the service and repair department. 
The EHSSC had become the decision-making body at the iron and steelworks and it was 
here that all reportable occupational accidents were discussed, in an attempt to prevent 
their re-occurrence. The creation of the EHSSC had been well received by the plant-level 
actors and was praised for having speeded up the decision-making process (Interview 
#60). 169 
The works director had decided to retain the statutory industrial health and safety 
committee, despite the formation of the EHSSC, but had reduced the frequency of 
meetings of the former to just three per year. Attended by a representative of the works 
director, the medical representative, the health and safety expert, two works councillors, 
169 The EHSSC comprised just six members, whilst as many as a dozen individuals attended the 
meetings of the statutory industrial health and safety committee. It was therefore much easier to reach a 
compromise in the former. 
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the aforementioned plant managers and the safety representatives, the industrial health and 
safety committee had become a preliminary discussion group for the EHSSC. These 
meetings were of vital importance however, as they enabled the safety representatives to 
bring the opinions of the workforce to the attention of the other plant-level actors 
(Interview #58; Interview #60). 
One further measure which had been introduced by the works director was the creation of 
a small action group, whose task it was to reduce the accident rate in one particular 
department in the foundry. With, on average, four reportable accidents occurring in this 
department each month, the action group was charged with examining both the cause and 
the timing of these accidents, in the hope that an underlying trend for what was becoming 
an expensive problem could be identified. 
Whilst the works director retained overall responsibility for the health and safety of the 
workforce, he also required the plant managers to address these issues in their areas of 
responsibility. The plant managers were aware of their responsibilities in this regard and 
inspected their plants at regular intervals, often in the company of a safety representative. 
In turn, the plant managers required their foremen and supervisors to ensure compliance 
with the rules and regulations, and in both the foundry and the engineering works it was 
these line managers who were obliged to inform and advise the new employees about the 
specific dangers in each plant. 170 An' annual refresher course served to relay this 
information to the employees. 
There had been a works council at the iron and steelworks since 1946, and the prevalent 
representative body comprised nine members, one of whom, the chairman, was released 
from his normal duties. The works council met every Monday and it was usual for health 
and safety issues to be discussed in each meeting, with either the works council chairman 
170 Just 39 per cent of employees gave a positive response when questioned about the commitment of 
management to an improvement in the working environment. 
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reporting on the meetings of the EHSSC, 171 or the works council's health and safety 
specialists discussing the findings of their regular workplace inspections. 172 
These three specialists made up the health and safety sub-committee of the works council, 
which is provided for in §28 WCA 1972.13 Only one of the three had previously attended 
a health and safety training course, but they saw themselves as a vital link between the 
employees and the plant managers, advising the former when problems arose, and passing 
on information both to the latter and to the health and safety expert. '74 
The iron and steelworks employed one full-time health and safety expert and had 
secured the services of a medical representative from the regional Technical Supervisory 
Service (Technischer Überwachungsverein, TOP) who was on site for only three hours 
every fortnight. Any immediate medical attention, at all other times, was provided by the 
36 trained first-aiders amongst the employees. 
The health and safety expert had been with the company since 1962 and had assumed this 
position in 1993 following five years in charge of the engineering works. He described his 
activities as those of recording and analysing accidents, and this enabled him to compile a 
comprehensive annual accident report which was discussed in the industrial health and 
safety committee. Despite having experienced some difficulties with the works council 
during his time as plant manager, the health and safety expert claimed to enjoy a 
cooperative working relationship with the employees' representative body (Interview 
#49), a view shared by the chairman of the works council who explained that the 
171 The works council chairman, rather than one of the members of the health and safety sub- 
committee, represented the works council in the EHSSC. This decision was taken by the sub-committee 
members who felt that their chairman, being released from his normal duties, would have more time 
available to attend the meetings of this forum. 
172 61 per cent of employees indicated that their works council was very concerned with an 
improvement in the health and safety provisions. 
1 73 The works council had created five sub-committees, and the works councillors had the choice of 
which committees they wanted to attend. When asked however, the works councillors were unsure of 
which sub-committees they belonged to, suggesting that they met only infrequently. 
174 The works council had no fixed consultation periods, preferring to encourage the workers to 
come to the works council office as soon as problems arose. 
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employees appreciated his efforts to improve the provisions for their protection (Interview 
#57). 
The nine safety representatives at the iron and steelworks were selected by the plant 
managers, the latter having been advised by the health and safety expert not to choose line 
managers or union stewards for this post. The health and safety expert preferred the plant 
managers to select young employees with at least five years experience of the company. 
Their appointment was confirmed, with the agreement of the works council, in the 
industrial health and safety committee, and they were responsible for a particular section 
of the company rather than a pre-determined number of employees. 
Whilst the employees were required to observe the health and safety rules and regulations, 
they were given little opportunity to influence the development of these measures. ", The 
provision of a suggestion scheme enabled them to put their ideas directly to management 
(see Subsection 8.2.4), and whilst the health and safety expert revealed that he was 
contemplating the idea of introducing health and safety circles, to allow the employees to 
exert a greater influence, they remained reliant upon the works council, the safety 
representatives and the line managers to relay their concerns to management. 
Differing opinions emerged concerning the actor or body perceived to play the decisive 
role in addressing health and safety issues. The health and safety expert was mentioned, as 
it was he who worked closely with the works director, advising him on questions relating 
to labour law, as well as providing expert advice and assistance for all plant-level actors, 
as required by the Works Safety Law (Interview #48). Others, who suggested that the 
works council was a key actor in this respect, as its members were most likely to succeed 
in convincing the employees of the need to observe the health and safety measures, 
considered the works director to be of most significance, as he ultimately decided what 
money was available to invest in such issues (Interview #58). Whilst there was also a 
suggestion that the safety representatives were of central importance (Interview #61), the 
175 30.9 per cent of employees, the highest proportion in any of the seven case-study companies, 
indicated that they would be prepared to trade a reduction in their pay for an improvement in safety. 
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conclusion reached was that no single actor appeared able to address these questions 
alone. Either they lacked the necessary expertise, which was provided by the health and 
safety expert, the necessary local knowledge, which the employees communicated to a 
variety of actors (see Subsection 8.2.3), or they were restricted by their inability to take 
investment decisions, the privilege of either the plant managers or the works director. 
Consequently, the nuclei of health and safety-related activities at the iron and steelworks 
were the two committees, the industrial health and safety committee and the EHSSC, 
which served to discuss and develop these issues respectively. The composition of these 
committees (see Appendix 12) ensured that the necessary machinery was in place to 
overcome the aforementioned restrictions encountered by the individual actors. 
8.2.3 Communication 
The health and safety arena was dominated by the two committees, with the first, the 
statutory industrial health and safety committee, operating as a preliminary discussion 
group, and the second, the EHSSC, the decision-making body. The aim in this subsection 
is to identify how the employees were informed of the decisions reached by the latter, and 
how the former was made aware of the prevalent hazards to life and limb. The findings are 
presented diagrammatically in Figure 8.3, and refer to the responses given during the 
structured interviews and the information gleaned from the workforce questionnaires. 
There appeared to be three major sources of health and safety information for the 
employees at the iron and steelworks. On joining the company, the overwhelming 
majority, 81.7 per cent, received initial safety instruction from the line managers (see 
Appendix 13). These same individuals informed the largest group of employees, 69.1 per 
cent, of any new health and safety measures, 176 including those agreed upon by the 
EHSSC, with 38.2 per cent suggesting that such information was relayed to them via the 
176 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
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notice boards, and just over one in four respondents claiming to hear of these measures 
from the safety representatives (see Appendix 14). 
Whilst the information posted on the notice boards came directly from the EHSSC, there 
was less clarity surrounding the way in which either the line managers or the safety 
representatives were informed of these decisions, since neither group was directly 
represented in this forum. The evidence from the interviews however, suggested that both 
the safety representatives and the line managers were informed by the managers of the 
plant within which they were employed (Interview #60). 177 
Figure 8.3: Communicative Process - Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH 
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In order to ascertain how information from the employees reached the industrial health 
and safety committee, the questionnaires required the respondents to give details of whom 
they would approach with health and safety-related suggestions and problems. The 
respondents identified the line managers (31.8 per cent) as their main point of contact for 
their suggestions, but approached the safety representatives (27.6 per cent) and the works 
council (20.1 per cent) with their problems. Whilst both the safety representatives and the 
works council were able to feed the information into this forum directly, the line managers 
needed to inform their plant manager if the information at their disposal was to be aired in 
the industrial health and safety committee. 
8.2.4 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
Prior to the appointment of the works director in October 1994, health and safety 
measures were decided upon in the industrial health and safety committee. Having 
identified the inefficiencies of this forum however, the works director established the 
EHSSC. The industrial health and safety committee was therefore transformed into a 
discussion group, with ideas from here passing into the EHSSC. The latter also takes 
account of the deliberations of the other recently established discussion groups before 
drawing up any preventive measures. 
Whilst the Steering Committee decided upon the health and safety measures involving 
extreme expense, it was not uncommon for many problems to be addressed informally 
without involving this committee. The interviews revealed that, on many occasions, minor 
deficiencies were discussed by the works council and the plant managers before being 
corrected either by the latter or by the line managers and safety representatives (Interview 
#57). The employees themselves were given the opportunity to influence the development 
of health and safety measures via a general suggestion scheme which operated within the 
company. Although the scheme was criticised for its sluggishness (Interview #48), 39.7 
per cent of respondents claimed to have made use of it at some stage during their time at 
the iron and steelworks. A plant agreement served to regulate this scheme, and any 
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suggestions deemed to have contributed to an improvement were rewarded financially. A 
small committee comprising two management representatives and two works councillors 
decided upon the size of the reward, and the six suggestions implemented in 1994 had 
resulted in payments of between DM 70 and DM 520. 
Whilst Subsection 8.2.3 revealed how the employees were informed of the health and 
safety measures, the form that these measures assumed is considered here. There were no 
plant agreements to address specifically questions of a health and safety-related nature, 
with the only accord of any significance being that which regulated the operation of, and 
the rewards for improvements resulting from, the suggestion scheme. Instead, health and 
safety measures were either addressed informally by the works council and the plant 
managers, or democratically discussed and developed in the two health and safety 
committees. 
Having developed and implemented these measures, there was a need to ensure that they 
were upheld in the workplace. To ensure compliance in the different parts of the company, 
there were nine safety representatives and a full-time health and safety expert. In addition, 
the line managers were required to ensure that these measures were being observed, and 
according to more than 40 per cent of the respondents, the works council carried out 
regular inspections in the plants. Finally, the health and safety expert organised one major 
safety inspection each year, and the works director contributed by walking through the 
plant every day, stopping to advise any employees he found contravening these 
regulations. 
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8.2.5 Summary 
The evidence from both the interviews and the surveys revealed that the issue of 
occupational health and safety enjoyed a high profile17' at the iron and steelworks. 179 
However, all concerned were aware that a lack of finances made certain measures 
unaffordable, and the works council had therefore chosen not to insist upon the removal of 
those hazards which the company could not reasonably afford. This approach typified the 
way in which occupational health and safety issues were addressed at Alpha Iron & 
Steelworks GmbH. Finally, the preference for cooperation over confrontation ensured that 
it had not yet been necessary to call in external agencies to regulate questions of a health 
and safety-related nature, with all points of contention resolved internally by the 
aforementioned actors and agencies. 
8.3 Beta GmbH 
8.3.1 Background Information 
Founded in 1979, Beta GmbH specialised in the planning, construction and fitting of 
boilers for large-scale waste disposal systems at the time of the survey, and of its 276 
employees, the majority were employed in either the workshop or in administration at its 
premises in NRW. The remaining 25 employees, the construction workers, moved 
between building sites, assisting with the fitting of the boilers at their destination. 
The production of boilers, steam engines and water turbines had begun at this location in 
1864, and by the turn of the century the company had become a major force in the 
construction of power stations. Bought by the Beta family in 1934, the company 
178 The works director's involvement in the health and safety arena had served to raise the profile of 
such issues. The thesis also contends that both the dangerous nature of the work performed and the 
frequency of occupational accidents had been influential in this respect. 
179 56.7 per cent of employees agreed with this statement. 
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flourished both during and after the Second World War, playing a significant role in the 
development of oil refineries in Europe, the Middle East and South Africa. As demand fell 
in the 1970s however, the company's fortunes took a turn for the worse, and in 1979, 
Delta AG, a holding company, purchased 95 per cent of the boiler and machine-making 
operation, thus saving Beta from bankruptcy. Beta GmbH has since operated as an 
independent subsidiary of Delta AG, and the take-over revitalised the company, with 
turnover having risen from DM 19 million in 1979 to DM 90 million by 1994. 
There had not been a comparable improvement in the safety record of the company 
however, and although no official statistics were made available during the visit, the 
chairman of the works council revealed that there had been 35 reportable occupational 
accidents in 1994, continuing a recent negative trend (Interview #63). 180 
Table 8.2: Company Profile 1994 - Beta GmbH 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
A tour of the workshop, where the majority of the accidents had occurred, and where 48.6 
per cent of the workforce were employed, revealed that many employees were openly 
contravening the safety regulations by refusing to wear the protective clothing. The work 
itself was very labour intensive and physically demanding, this despite the recent 
introduction of new technology, which had been physically beneficial to the employees 
ISO A lack of investment was cited as the reason behind this rising accident rate (Interview #63). 
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who had previously been required to lift heavy loads by hand. Furthermore, with every 
available space, including the transport and pedestrian lanes, being utilised to store both 
raw materials and finished parts, the employees were required to negotiate these obstacles 
when moving about the workshop. Inevitably, accidents had resulted from employees 
stumbling or falling in the workshop (Interview #65). 
As for the power relations within the company, there was a suggestion that the 
relationship between the works council and management had improved in recent years, 
following a change in personnel ön the works council (Interview #42; Interview #66). 
However, the chairman of the employees' representative body explained that there had 
been disagreements concerning health and safety issues, with the workshop manager 
reluctant to remove deficiencies which had been identified during an internal safety 
inspection just one example. These differences of opinion had always been settled 
internally, but the chairman of the works council suggested that there could have been 
more conflict in this regard had the works council insisted upon the removal of the 
deficiencies that it had identified. Instead, the works council had chosen a less 
confrontational approach in order to safeguard what had become a cooperative working 
relationship. 
Figure 8.4: Company Structure - Beta GmbH 
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8.3.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
The works director, who held a5 per cent stake in the company, was legally responsible 
for the health and safety of the workforce, but was more concerned with questions of 
manpower planning and investment. He therefore claimed that health and safety was not 
his responsibility, and maintained that he had no idea how health and safety issues were 
addressed (Interview #67). Instead, the works director had chosen to invoke §12 UVV 
1.0 and required the workshop manager to deal with such issues on his behalf. 
Health and safety was just one of many issues dealt with by the workshop manager, who 
had been installed by the holding company, Delta AG, following the take-over in 1979. 
Whilst he attempted to maintain regular contact with the actors concerned, meeting 
informally with the relevant works councillors, the health and safety expert and the safety 
representatives, and attending the meetings of the industrial health and safety committee, 
the workshop manager relied upon the line managers for assistance in addressing these 
questions. The line managers were therefore required both to inform the employees about 
the prevalent dangers, and to ensure compliance with the health and safety rules and 
regulations in the workplace. 
The advice of the professional associations had been ignored at Beta GmbH, and one of 
the seven foremen had been appointed to the position of health and safety expert. 
Employed by the company since 1972, he became the health and safety expert just eight 
years later, and had since addressed this issue on a part-time basis. The health and safety 
expert indicated that, as a foreman, it had been tempting for him to put production issues 
before safety, but he insisted that his overriding concern had remained the health and 
safety of the employees (Interview 465). He therefore denied that his dual role was a 
disadvantage, arguing instead that given a further responsibility for training, he was able 
get his safety message across at an early stage. The health and safety expert described 
himself as an advisor and claimed to discuss health and safety with the workshop manager, 
the works councillors, the safety representatives and the employees on a daily basis, as 
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well as being required to inform new employees about the prevalent dangers, to remind 
the more experienced members of the workforce of the importance of wearing the 
protective clothing and to organise an annual safety seminar to reinforce the safety 
message. To complement the health and safety expert, a medical representative from a 
local medical centre spent three hours each week at Beta GmbH. At all other times, 14 
trained first-aiders were required to attend to minor problems. 
There were five safety representatives in the company, all of whom had been selected by 
the health and safety expert. Contrary to the recommendation issued in connection with 
§9(1) UVV 1.0, the latter had appointed one supervisor to the position of safety 
representative. The others, all employees, had been chosen on the strength that they 
displayed an interest in health and safety issues. The importance of the safety 
representatives manifested itself in the industrial health and safety committee where they 
were able to raise health and safety issues on behalf of the workforce. 
The industrial health and safety committee met on just two occasions each year and was 
attended by the workshop manager, the medical representative, the health and safety 
expert, two works councillors and four or five of the safety representatives. This 
committee oversaw all health and safety-related activities at Beta GmbH, and as well as 
facilitating an exchange of information, it was here that previous accidents and deficiencies 
were discussed, and responsibilities for the removal of the latter were assigned. 
The two works councillors who attended the meetings of the industrial health and safety 
committee, the chairman who was unofficially released from his normal duties and a works 
councillor in his first period of office, had taken it upon themselves to address this issue on 
behalf of the employees' representative body, as the works council at Beta GmbH, 
constituting only seven members, fell below the threshold for the creation of specialist 
sub-committees, as laid down in §28 WCA 1972. Of these two, only the chairman had 
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previously attended a health and safety training course, although it was evident that neither 
works councillor was particularly knowledgeable in this area. '8' 
The younger works councillor also represented the interests of the 25 construction 
workers on the health and safety sub-committee of the company works council'82 at Delta 
AG. 183 These meetings, which took place every four to six weeks, were mainly concerned 
with safety on the building sites, and it was commonplace for the works councillor from 
Beta GmbH to report back to the industrial health and safety committee on the content of 
these meetings. 
The workshop manager described the works council as an active and necessary partner in 
the health and safety arena. He suggested that the employees' representative body was a 
necessary counterweight in the whole process and claimed to encourage the works 
councillors to inform him of any deficiencies which had been brought to their attention 
(Interview #66). 
With only 40 per cent of the workforce unionised, there was no extensive network of 
union stewards at Beta GmbH. However, the chairman of the works council suggested 
that the employees did approach the union stewards with their health and safety-related 
problems (Interview #63), a claim not substantiated by the evidence from the 
questionnaire survey. 194 
As was the case at the iron and steelworks, the employees were given little opportunity to 
influence developments in the health and safety arena. With the suggestion scheme rarely 
used (see Subsection 8.3.4), and the health and safety expert unaware of the concept of 
181 Nevertheless, 61.1 per cent of employees were satisfied with the contribution made by the works 
council. 
182 §47 WCA 1972 provides for the formation of a company works council in organisations 
operating at a number of locations throughout Germany. 
183 The health and safety of the construction workers employed by Beta GmbH was addressed by a 
full-time health and safety expert at Delta AG. Beta GmbH therefore had an interest in these meetings. 
184 Only 5.6 per cent of respondents indicated that they would approach the union stewards with 
such problems. 
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health and safety circles, there appeared to be little hope for any form of direct employee 
involvement in the near future. 
Meanwhile, over half of the employees surveyed expressed concern about the pressure to 
increase production, and the chairman suggested that the conflict of interest between 
safety and production was particularly problematic. To emphasise this point, he cited the 
case of an employee who had been contravening safety regulations in the workshop. When 
challenged, the employee had suggested that not only were the safety regulations slowing 
him down, but that he was also under pressure from the workshop manager to work at a 
faster pace. The works council chairman had been unable to convince this employee of the 
need to observe the safety regulations, and less than a fortnight later, the latter was 
seriously injured and forced to retire when steel tubes, which he had failed to secure, 
rolled off a stand and crushed his legs. "' 
The health and safety expert was a central figure at Beta GmbH. In his capacity as a 
foreman he was able to insist upon the implementation of certain measures, something 
which the Works Safety Law prevented the health and safety experts from doing. 
However, he was unable to take any financial decisions, and it was therefore suggested 
that the workshop manager, the works council and the health and safety expert were at the 
centre of all such activities, with the health and safety expert advising the employees, the 
works council informing the workshop manager of problems that had been brought to its 
attention, and the three of them, together with others, working out solutions in the 
industrial health and safety committee (Interview #66). Despite the infrequency with which 
it was convened, the industrial health and safety committee was indeed the nucleus of 
health and safety activity at Beta GmbH. 
185 Only 11.1 per cent of employees indicated that they would trade less pay for better safety. 
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8.3.3 Communication 
The health and safety information relayed to new employees at Beta GmbH emanated 
from one of two main sources. Whilst just over half of the respondents, 53.3 per cent, 
suggested that this initial instruction was provided by line managers, a not insignificant 
proportion, 26.7 per cent, claimed to have been informed at the outset by the safety 
representatives (see Appendix 13). A similar picture emerged in relation to the source of 
information concerning new health and safety measures. 186 Whilst the line managers were 
mentioned by over half of the employees, more than one in four maintained that they were 
informed of these new measures by either the safety representatives, via the notice board, 
or during the infrequent works assemblies (see Appendix 14). 
Figure 8.5: Point of Contact with Problems and Suggestions - Beta GmbH 
197 
186 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
187 Questions 5 and 8 on the workforce questionnaire required the employees to indicate who they 
would approach with health and safety-related suggestions and problems respectively (see Appendix 2). 
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As the safety representatives attended the industrial health and safety committee, they 
could relay information directly to the employees. As was the case at Alpha Iron & 
Steelworks GmbH however, the line managers relied upon the workshop manager to keep 
them informed of the decisions made by this forum, although the workshop manager was 
facilitated in this process given the dual role performed by the health and safety expert. As 
for the information communicated in the bi-annual works assembly, the structured 
interviews suggested that, in this case, the works council provided the link to the decision- 
making body. 
Information from the workshop meanwhile, reached the industrial health and safety 
committee in much the same way as it filtered back to the employees. As Figure 8.5 
indicates, many employees approached either the line managers or the safety 
representatives with both their suggestions and problems, with the workshop manager and 
the works council also mentioned as a potential point of contact in both cases. 
Figure 8.6: Communicative Process - Beta GmbH 
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Finally, the communicative process was completed with the workshop manager, the works 
councillors and the safety representatives attending the meetings of the industrial health 
and safety committee. The remaining information, which was held by the line managers, 
was introduced into this forum by either the health and safety expert or the workshop 
manager himself (see Figure 8.6). 
8.3.4 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
There was a degree of informality about the way in which health and safety issues were 
addressed at Beta GmbH. This was typified by the absence of relevant plant agreements 
and the infrequency of the meetings of the industrial health and safety committee. Instead 
of the quarterly meetings recommended by the Works Safety Law, this forum was 
convened on just two occasions each year, and apparently had met just once in 1994. 
Nevertheless, this committee was undoubtedly the headquarters of health and safety 
activity at Beta GmbH, as it was here that many of the company specific regulations were 
formulated (see Appendix 12). Given the infrequency of these meetings however, it was 
not unusual for informal steps to be taken to address the many minor deficiencies which 
arose. 
There was much confusion at Beta GmbH surrounding the extent to which the employees 
were encouraged to influence the development of new health and safety measures, as the 
works council refuted claims made by the workshop manager and the works director that 
the employees were rewarded for successful suggestions. Only 13.9 per cent of 
respondents were of the opinion that they were actually involved in the development 
phase, with just 16.7 per cent having made such a suggestion in the past. '88 
Responsibility for ensuring compliance with the regulations lay with a number of 
individuals. The line managers and safety representatives were constantly in the workshop, 
as was the health and safety expert in his capacity as a foreman. The latter performed one 
188 There had been just three health and safety-related suggestions in 1994. 
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major inspection of the company each year, and occasionally carried out interim 
inspections together with the works council and the medical representative. Finally, the 
workshop manager claimed to tour the plant both first thing in the morning and last thing 
at night, stopping to berate workers ignoring the safety regulations. He also maintained 
that it had been necessary for him, on occasion, to send out written warnings to employees 
who continually contravened the safety regulations. 
8.3.5 Summary 
As was the case at the iron and steelworks, there was a clear preference at Beta GmbH for 
cooperation over confrontation in the health and safety arena, and the argument of the 
thesis is that this preference for cooperation has had a detrimental effect upon the accident 
rate at Beta GmbH. The works council recognised that more could have been done to 
improve the working conditions, but a desire to maintain an amicable working relationship 
with management had resulted in the former not only allowing the statutory industrial 
health and safety committee to be convened infrequently, but also enabling management to 
veto improvements of a health and safety-related nature on cost grounds. Finally, the 
apathy of the employees, as far as health and safety was concerned, presented the works 
council with little incentive to prioritise this issue. 
8.4 Foxtrot GmbH 
8.4.1 Background Information 
Founded in 1920, Foxtrot GmbH, the smallest of the case-study companies with just 89 
employees, manufactured and erected steel construction, specialising in steel framing, 
roofing and cladding. Just over 40 per cent of the workforce were employed at the 
company's premises in NRW, with the remainder, the construction workers, operating on 
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building sites at a variety of locations. With a turnover of DM 20 million in 1994, the 
financial position of the company was considered to be satisfactory (Interview #84). 
Figure 8.7: Company Structure - Foxtrot GmbH 
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Of particular interest for this study was the situation in the small workshop, which was 
divided into four sections, each headed by a foreman who was answerable to the 
workshop manager (see Figure 8.7). Details of the actors charged with ensuring 
compliance with the health and safety rules and regulations were displayed throughout the 
workshop, and although the transport lanes were used to store raw materials and finished 
products, the health and safety provisions were, on the whole, observed. 
In recognition of this fact, Foxtrot GmbH was regularly visited by trainee technical 
inspectors, as it was regarded as an exemplary company as far as the arrangements for 
addressing health and safety were concerned. With 11 reportable occupational accidents in 
1994, and an accident rate of 123.6 however, Foxtrot GmbH was far from being the safest 
of the seven case-study companies, this despite the recent introduction of new machinery, 
which whilst having reduced the number of employees in the workshop, 189 had made the 
work less physically demanding (see Table 8.3). 
1 89 Rather than having made these employees redundant, the company had transferred them to the 
building sites. 
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Table 8.3: Company Profile 1994 - Foxtrot GmbH 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
The chairman of the works council, who was simultaneously the health and safety expert, 
described his relationship with both the employer and the workshop manager as being 
cooperative. He had more contact with the latter however, and explained that he had 
always clarified health and safety matters with the workshop manager, as the employer 
was of the opinion that, having appointed a health and safety expert, he could disassociate 
himself from health and safety. '9° 
Health and safety issues were addressed almost single-handedly by the chairman of the 
works council/health and safety expert, and whilst there had never been any serious 
disagreements concerning health and safety measures, it had occasionally been necessary 
to convene a works assembly in order to demonstrate to either the employer or the 
workshop manager that the employees were interested in improving their working 
conditions. 
190 The chairman of the works council/health and safety expert described how his employer had told 
him that he was being paid to keep these issues off the works director's desk (Interview #84). 
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8.4.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
The health and safety arena at Foxtrot GmbH was dominated by one individual. He 
combined the functions of chairman of the works council and health and safety expert, an 
arrangement apparently not uncommon in small companies in Germany (Interview #101). 
Employed by Foxtrot GmbH since 1964, he assumed the position of health and safety 
expert following the implementation of the Works Safety Law in 1974, by which time he 
had already been elected onto the works council. As a member of the management board 
of the Maschinenbau- und Metall professional association, and the co-ordinator of a 
health and safety discussion group on behalf of IG Metall, the chairman of the works 
council/health and safety expert was able to put much of the information gleaned from 
these two bodies to good use at Foxtrot GmbH. Whilst he was more than qualified to 
address these issues alone, 191 the chairman of the works council/health and safety expert 
worked closely with the workshop manager and cooperated with the foremen and the 
safety representatives in pursuit of a safer working environment. 
Although the employer had chosen to disassociate himself from such issues, other levels 
of the management chain were actively involved. The workshop manager, who spent 
most of his time in the workshop, sought to rectify any deficiencies he identified, and the 
foremen were required to ensure compliance with the health and safety provisions in their 
areas of responsibility. 192 
The works council at Foxtrot GmbH comprised five members, none of whom was entitled 
to be released from normal duties. However, with the chairman of the works council 
simultaneously the health and safety expert, he was de facto, if not de jure, released: an 
arrangement which had been approved by his employer. Whilst the contribution made by 
the works council to an improvement in working conditions was dominated by its 
chairman, two other members were required to represent this body whenever a meeting of 
191 53.6 per cent of employees recognised the contribution made by the chairman of the works 
council/health and safety expert to an improvement in working conditions. 
192 Fewer than one in three respondents were satisfied with management in this regard. 
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the industrial health and safety committee was convened, 193 and given the absence of a 
body of union stewards, 194 all five works councillors concerned themselves with health and 
safety, such issues always being discussed at the monthly meetings of this representative 
body. 1 ' 
In addition to the two works councillors and the chairman of the works council/health and 
safety expert, the industrial health and safety committee was attended by the employer, a 
medical representative from an external medical service, and three of the eight safety 
representatives. 196 Given both the size of the company and the expertise of the chairman 
of the works council/health and safety expert, this forum was only convened to sanction 
major investments and to discuss serious accidents. 
The picture is completed by the employees, who as well as having the opportunity to 
make suggestions, and to put their ideas to either the safety representatives, the works 
council or the foremen, were consulted in advance of any planned changes to the 
production process. 
With one individual combining the advisory duties of a health and safety expert with the 
considerable rights enjoyed by the works council, the health and safety structures at 
Foxtrot GmbH were unlike those in any of the other companies under investigation. With 
only 36 employees on site, it was possible for the chairman of the works council/health 
and safety expert to maintain regular contact with all concerned, and with the workshop 
manager, the foremen, the supervisors, the safety representatives and the employees close 
at hand, health and safety problems were addressed quickly and almost always without the 
193 The chairman had requested this arrangement so that he could attend these meetings in his 
capacity as health and safety expert. 
194 The chairman of the works council/health and safety expert had concluded an agreement with IG 
Metall, enabling the company to forgo the election of union stewards on the grounds that the majority of 
the workforce were employed on construction sites and would therefore not have been able to guarantee 
their presence at a regular meeting (Interview #101). 
195 57.1 per cent of employees responded favourably when asked about the contribution made by the 
works council to an improvement in their working environment. 
196 None of these safety representatives, who were selected by the chairman of the works 
council/health and safety expert, held a position of responsibility, but the majority were simultaneously 
union stewards. 
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involvement of the works director. In essence, the chairman of the works council/health 
and safety expert was the dominant health and safety actor at Foxtrot GmbH. He had 
effectively relieved the works director of his responsibility in this area, and was seemingly 
content, and undoubtedly qualified, to address health and safety issues single-handedly. 
8.4.3 Communication 
Whilst a meeting of the industrial health and safety committee was occasionally required at 
Foxtrot GmbH, 197 it was normal practice, given the size of the company, for health and 
safety issues to be addressed exclusively by the chairman of the works council/health and 
safety expert. This section identifies how the employees were informed of his decisions, 
and how this individual was made aware of the problems in the workshop. 
As was the case at both the iron and steelworks and at Beta GmbH, line managers, in this 
case the foremen (47.1 per cent), were cited as the main source of health and safety 
information for new employees, with 29.4 per cent claiming to have received this initial 
instruction directly from the health and safety expert (see Appendix 13). 53.6 per cent of 
respondents indicated that they were informed of new health and safety measures by the 
foremen, but five other channels were also named. 198 The health and safety expert and the 
works council were mentioned as the source of this information by 39.3 per cent and 32.1 
per cent respectively. Other methods identified by at least one in four respondents were 
the posting of safety bulletins on the notice board in the workshop, announcements during 
the plant assembly, and the distribution of health and safety information brochures (see 
Appendix 14). 
1 97 Dotted lines on Figure 8.8 indicate the occasional role performed by this statutory body at Foxtrot 
GmbH. 
198 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
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Figure 8.8: Communicative Process - Foxtrot GmbH 
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As Figure 8.8 demonstrates, the flow of information from the workshop to the chairman 
of the works council/health and safety expert was less complicated. Over two thirds of 
respondents indicated that they approached either the health and safety expert or the 
works council with their problems, whilst slightly fewer, 60.7 per cent, contacted these 
same bodies with their suggestions. 
8.4.3 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
Meetings of the industrial health and safety committee were very infrequent at Foxtrot 
GmbH, and were deemed unnecessary, given the size of the company. Instead, health and 
safety measures were developed by the chairman of the works council/health and safety 
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expert, with the occasional cooperation of the workshop manager. In the majority of cases 
however, the chairman of the works council/health and safety expert addressed these 
issues alone. 
Despite the existence of a suggestion scheme, and the provision for financial rewards for 
such suggestions, only 3.6 per cent of employees indicated that they considered 
themselves to be involved in the development of health and safety measures. No 
suggestions were made during 1994, but 28.6 per cent of respondents had, at some stage, 
suggested an improvement to the prevalent arrangements. 
There were three health and safety-related plant agreements in force at Foxtrot GmbH. 
They regulated the provision of protective equipment, the number of safety 
representatives, 199 and the suggestion scheme. As was the case in the other companies 
however, the majority of health and safety measures were concerned with the immediate 
removal of deficiencies, therefore obviating the need to conclude long-term agreements. 
Compliance with the safety regulations was monitored by a variety of actors, and the 
workshop manager appeared to take an active interest in improving safety. He walked 
through the workshop at least twice each day, constantly advising workers of the need to 
wear the protective clothing (Interview #102). The chairman of the works council/health 
and safety expert did the same, and both the line managers and the safety representatives 
were required to ensure that the regulations were being observed. 
8.4.5 Summary 
At Foxtrot GmbH, questions of a health and safety-related nature were addressed in a 
conflict-free environment. The desire to avoid the involvement of third parties was 
influential in this regard, but the generally recognised expertise of one individual, the 
199 A plant agreement had been concluded to provide for more safety representatives than the 
number recommended for a company of this size in Appendix 1 of UW 1.0. 
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chairman of the works council/health and safety expert, also ensured that decisions were 
rarely questioned. However, the thesis contends that this concentration of responsibility 
for occupational health and safety issues on the shoulders of one individual is 
counterproductive, in the sense that it discourages discussion and debate. An accident rate 
of 123.6 in 1994 at Foxtrot GmbH would appear to confirm this contention. 200 
8.5 Echo AG 
8.5.1 Background Information 
Founded in Germany in the nineteenth century, Echo AG, a multi-national organisation in 
the electronics industry, with 382 000 employees worldwide, and turnover in excess of 
DM 85 billion in 1994, has always demonstrated a keen interest in the health and safety of 
its workforce. It appointed its first full-time doctor in 1888, established a company 
sickness fund (Betriebskrankenkasse) in 1908, introduced health and safety experts as 
early as 1929, and established a company medical service six years later. Furthermore, 
employees were financially rewarded for their suggestions as far back as 1910, and Echo 
AG was one of the first German companies to experiment with quality circles and other 
employee-involvement schemes in the late 1970s. In 1994, Echo AG employed 210 health 
and safety experts and 64 doctors on a full-time basis in Germany alone. 
Echo AG has divided its operations in Germany into a number of regions (Regionen), and 
both `Branch A' and `Branch B', where surveys were carried out, were located in the 
same region, despite being situated in different Federal States. There were a total of four 
`Branches' (Zweigsniederlassungen) in this region, with the headquarters located at 
`Branch A' in Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen). Given the size of the company, the 
hierarchical and organisational structures were extremely complicated. For example, as 
well as being regionally organised, the company's operations in Germany were further 
200 The average figure for the Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, the professional 
association to which Beta GmbH is affiliated, stood at 82.2 in 1994. 
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divided into 16 operational divisions, which included transportation technology, 
communications, and audio-visual systems. To complicate matters yet further, there were 
employees at both `Branch A' and `Branch B' working for a variety of these different 
divisions. 
It was company policy to bracket environmental, health and safety, and radiation issues 
together in one department (Referat Umweltschutz, Arbeitssicherheit, Strahlenschutz - 
UAS), and each region had its own UAS department, headed by a senior full-time health 
and safety expert. However, responsibility for these questions remained with the senior 
management representative in each 'Branch'. 
Figure 8.9: Echo AG - Regional Occupational Accident Rate 1986-94 
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In the region under investigation, which had consistently had an accident rate below the 
average figure for the Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik professional association, to which 
Echo AG was affiliated (see Figure 8.9), the UAS department comprised two full-time and 
four part-time health and safety experts, four full-time doctors, and a total of 49 safety 
representatives, as well as a handful of radiation charges. 201 The senior health and safety 
201 These individuals performed a similar function in relation to radiation as the safety 
representatives did in the health and safety arena. 
185 
expert co-ordinated the health and safety activities in the four branches in this region, and 
his duties included organising the meetings of the various health and safety committees, 
attending all investigations into serious accidents, and both recording and analysing the 
health and safety statistics for the region as a whole. 
An industrial health and safety committee operated in the region, but the company had 
developed its own arrangements to meet the recommendations laid down in the Works 
Safety Law. Every three months, the committee sat at one of the four locations and was 
attended by the two full-time health and safety experts from the UAS department. Also 
present were a management representative, the part-time health and safety expert, the 
doctor, safety representatives, and the chairman of the health and safety sub-committee of 
the works council, all of whom were employed at the `Branch' which was hosting the 
meeting. Consequently, whilst the industrial health and safety committee met on four 
occasions, the only individuals to attend all meetings were the two full-time health and 
safety experts from the regional UAS department. 
The senior full-time health and safety expert suggested that the industrial health and safety 
committee was little more than an informative body, as the majority of health and safety 
measures were formulated by senior managers and the company works council at head 
office. These measures took the form of plant agreements and were implemented 
throughout Germany. He explained that, as money was always available for health and 
safety, and as measures were constantly being introduced, it was very difficult to convince 
people of the need to attend the meetings of this committee. In other regions, he 
maintained that this committee no longer met, and in his opinion it was only of use in so 
far as it allowed the works councillors and the health and safety experts to remind the 
management representatives that they needed to keep this topic on the agenda (Interview 
#85). On the rare occasions that minor health and safety measures were agreed upon in 
this committee, they were implemented throughout the region. 202 
202 Neither the individual 'Branches' nor the regions were permitted to conclude any plant 
agreements concerning health and safety. Instead, the company works council had concluded a number of 
agreements with the management of Echo AG, all of which were applicable to the individual 'Branches' 
throughout Germany. 
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The senior full-time health and safety expert also organised an annual meeting which 
brought together the regional manager, the regional health and safety experts and the 
members of the health and safety sub-committees of the four works councils. One further 
gathering was arranged for all the safety representatives in the region, and enabled the 
senior full-time health and safety expert to discuss the accident statistics and to inform 
these representatives of any new developments in this area. Health and safety issues were 
also discussed by a joint committee at the higher echelons of Echo AG, and the works 
councils in the individual branches received regular information both from this body and 
from the health and safety sub-committee of the company works council which sat on a 
monthly basis. Finally, Echo AG ran a three-day health and safety seminar once every four 
years which was attended by all chairmen of the health and safety sub-committees of the 
individual works councils. 
8.6 Echo AG - `Branch A' 
8.6.1 Background Information 
Approximately 65 per cent of the total workforce employed in this region were based at 
`Branch A' in Lower Saxony, and of these, only 36 per cent were blue-collar workers, the 
majority of whom were employed on a number of construction sites throughout the 
region. However, the survey concentrated on the 290 employees in the workshop at 
`Branch A', whose activities varied from wiring elevator circuits to quality control and 
packing 203 
203 The term `workshop' does not provide an accurate indication of the activities performed. The 
workshop itself was divided into 12 departments, and where the circuits were wired for example, the work 
stations resembled laboratories, with the employees required to wear special clothing for reasons of both 
cleanliness and safety. 
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Table 8.4: 'Branch' Profile 1994 - Echo AG - 'Branch A' 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. In 1994, the 
employees in the workshop suffered just seven reportable occupational accidents. This 
represented an accident rate of 24.1 for the workshop alone. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
A tour of the workshop revealed that the working conditions in all departments were 
extremely humane, with the employees exposed to few, if any, physical dangers. The 
nature of the work and the high proportion of white-collar employees in the workforce as 
a whole were two factors which helped to explain the comparatively favourable safety 
record at `Branch A' (see Table 8.4). In addition, there was the provision of so-called 
rehabilitationary work stations (Schonarbeitsplätze) which effectively served to falsify the 
accident statistics. 204 
One further contributory factor, as far as the safety performance was concerned, was the 
availability of financial resources for health and safety activities. Unlike the actors in many 
of the other case-study companies, where necessary measures had been put on hold, the 
individuals charged with addressing this issue at `Branch E1' were never hampered 
financially in their attempts to improve the prevalent working conditions. In fact, with 
money readily available, there was little need for the management representative, who was 
204 In an attempt to reduce the accident insurance premium, Echo AG, like many other companies in 
Germany, encouraged injured employees to return to work within three days of an occupational accident, 
so as not to be required to register the accident with the professional association. The employees who 
agreed to return were given light duties at these rehabilitationary work stations until they had fully 
recovered. 
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also the workshop manger, to discuss such issues with either the health and safety 
personnel or the chairman of the health and safety sub-committee of the works council, all 
of whom were entrusted with addressing these issues together with the departmental 
managers (see Figure 8.10). 
Figure 8.10: Company Structure - Echo AG - 'Branch A' 
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Both the information gleaned from the structured interviews, and the visits made to 
`Branch A', revealed that the employees' representative body was very much a white- 
collar works council, a finding which is perhaps not too surprising given the composition 
of the workforce (see Table 8.4). This accounts for the extremely cooperative relationship 
between the works councillors concerned with health and safety and the departmental and 
line mangers, although of further interest in this respect was the existence of a company 
agreement, which prohibited an individual `Branch' from seeking the assistance of a plant- 
level arbitration committee in relation to any issue, without first involving the company 
works council. As far as health and safety issues were concerned however, neither the 
company works council nor the arbitration committee had ever been required to settle 
internal disputes. 
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8.6.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
All levels of the management chain were required by Echo AG to concern themselves with 
health and safety at `Branch A', but responsibility lay with the workshop manager, who 
was the senior management representative at this location. To reiterate, the workshop 
manager was rarely involved in the health and safety arena, and the chairman of the health 
and safety sub-committee of the works council indicated that his interaction with the 
workshop manager was limited to the annual meeting of the industrial health and safety 
committee at `Branch A' (Interview #87). In his stead, the 12 departmental managers 
were obliged to concern themselves with health and safety, and one of these managers had 
assumed the position of health and safety expert for `Branch A' on a part-time basis. As 
was the case elsewhere, the group leaders205 and the supervisors were required to keep 
the employees informed of the latest developments in the health and safety arena. 206 
It fell to the supervisors to identify potential safety representatives, and if their choice met 
with the approval of the works council, the appointment was confirmed by the workshop 
manager. The senior full-time health and safety expert insisted that none of the safety 
representatives had line management responsibilities, and he indicated that had any safety 
representatives assumed a position of responsibility, they would have been asked to 
relinquish the post of safety representative, in order to avoid a conflict of interest 
(Interview #85). 
The four safety representatives in the workshop were each responsible for at least one 
department and approximately 70 employees, and despite criticism from the chairman of 
the health and safety sub-committee of the works council for not making optimum use of 
the time that they were given to address these issues (Interview #87), the safety 
representatives appeared to be realising their role as an information link between the 
employees and management (see Subsection 8.6.3). 
205 The group leaders assumed similar responsibilities to the foremen in the other case-study 
companies. 
206 57.1 per cent of employees recognised the efforts of management in this regard. 
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The part-time health and safety expert was little more than an assistant for his two full- 
time counterparts from the UAS department, who together with a full-time doctor, were 
both located at `Branch A'. However, as the two full-time health and safety experts were 
regularly required to visit the three other `Branches' in this region, and were also obliged 
to travel to the construction sites, the role of the part-time health and safety expert took 
on greater significance. 207 
Whilst the occurrence of occupational accidents was regularly discussed during the 
monthly meetings of the works council at `Branch A', the representative body only 
addressed health and safety as a peripheral issue. Instead, the works council had created a 
network of seven sub-committees, one of which concerned itself with health and safety, 
thus enabling these issues to be discussed in greater detail by a small group of works 
councillors. In the 12 months prior to the survey however, this five-man committee had sat 
on just three occasions, and it transpired that its chairman, who lectured on health and 
safety for IG Metall, and who was also a reserve member of the representative assembly of 
the Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik professional association, preferred to address these 
issues alone. His contribution was widely praised by both the senior health and safety 
expert and the quality control departmental manager (Interview #85; Interview #86). The 
chairman of this sub-committee indicated that his main task was to keep the topic of health 
and safety uppermost in the minds of the employees (Interview #87), and his role as an 
instructor in the workshop's training department enabled him to get the safety message 
across at an early stage. 208 
With a union density of just 26 per cent, the works council had not attempted to establish 
an extensive network of union stewards, and whilst none of the 30 stewards were 
simultaneously safety representatives, they did concern themselves with health and safety. 
207 Only one in three employees were satisfied with the contribution made by the health and safety 
personnel. 
209 Over 70 per cent of employees suggested that the works council was very concerned with their 
health and safety. 
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Such issues were discussed at their monthly gatherings, with any key information then fed 
into the next meeting of the works council (Interview #87). 
The employees at Echo AG were given more opportunity than most to influence 
developments in the health and safety arena, and as Subsection 8.6.4 explains, regular 
safety competitions and an established suggestion scheme presented the workforce with an 
opportunity to put forward its ideas for an improved working environment. 
With the majority of health and safety measures that were implemented at `Branch A' 
emanating from discussions between the management of Echo AG and the company 
works council, it was difficult to identify a nucleus of health and safety activity in the 
individual `Branch'. The chairman of the health and safety sub-committee of the works 
council was a central figure, as was the senior full-time health and safety expert. However, 
it appeared that the industrial health and safety committee, which despite being convened 
only once at `Branch A' each year, was the forum which served to keep everyone 
informed of the latest developments, and which enabled the individual actors to develop 
and implement supplementary health and safety measures. 
8.6.3 Communication 
Whilst the majority of health and safety measures implemented at `Branch A' were 
formulated externally in company agreements, the industrial health and safety committee 
did, on occasion, develop regionally specific measures. These were communicated to the 
employees in a variety of ways, with the line managers (90.5 per cent), safety 
representatives (76.2 per cent), information brochures (61.9 per cent), health and safety 
experts (57.1 per cent) and the notice boards (47.6 per cent) the main vehicles (see 
Appendix 14). 209 The line managers, the main source of this new information, were also 
209 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
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the most frequently cited medium (71.4 per cent) concerning the initial safety instruction 
(see Appendix 13). 
The members of the industrial health and safety committee were the point of contact for 
60 per cent of respondents with health and safety-related problems, and for 55 per cent 
with suggestions of a health and safety-related nature. In each case the safety 
representatives were most commonly cited as providing the link to this committee (20 per 
cent and 30 per cent respectively), with the health and safety experts the next most 
popular response (20 per cent and 15 per cent respectively). 
Figure 8.11: Communicative Process - Echo AG -'Branch A'21° 
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210 The works council does not appear in Figure 8.11 as the empirical evidence indicated that it was 
not involved sufficiently in the flow of health and safety-related information within the company. 
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As with the other companies, the line managers performed a crucial role in channelling this 
information throughout the company, and whilst they were not represented in the 
industrial health and safety committee, they were in frequent contact with the part-time 
health and safety expert, who, to reiterate, was a member of the management chain. 
8.6.4 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
Reference has already been made to the fact that the majority of new health and safety 
measures were formulated centrally at Echo AG in the form of company agreements, with 
the actors in the individual `Branches' required to ensure that they were implemented and 
observed at the various locations. It was occasionally necessary for the regional industrial 
health and safety committee to develop solutions to minor problems in the individual 
`Branches' however, and it was commonplace for any measures which had been decided 
upon in this forum to be implemented throughout the region. Such problems were often 
brought to the attention of the members of the industrial health and safety committee by 
the employees, who were given every opportunity to contribute towards an improvement 
in their working environment. A suggestion scheme had been in place for many years, and 
although there had only been five health and safety-related suggestions made in 1994,61.9 
per cent of respondents, the highest proportion in all of the case-study companies, 
indicated that they had previously suggested an improvement relevant to the health and 
safety arena. All suggestions were forwarded to a department which dealt exclusively with 
these ideas, and any of relevance to the health and safety arena were evaluated by the 
senior full-time health and safety expert. The initiators of any suggestions which were 
implemented were rewarded financially. 
With money readily available, safety competitions had also been a regular feature 
throughout the region, each one designed to address specific problems in the individual 
`Branches'. At the time of the survey, the works council at `Branch A', and the regional 
UAS department, were discussing arrangements for a competition which aimed to reduce 
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the frequency of behaviour-related occupational accidents. This followed a successful 
competition which had served to reduce the number of traffic accidents on site. 
As far as the supervision of the health and safety measures was concerned, a system of 
monthly safety inspections complemented the activities of the health and safety expert, the 
safety representatives, the line managers and the works councillors, all of whom made 
regular tours of their areas of responsibility to reinforce the safety message. With the 
workshop divided into 12 departments, an inspection team comprising the senior full-time 
health and safety expert, the chairman of the health and safety sub-committee of the works 
council and the part-time health and safety expert selected one department each month. 
Together with the relevant departmental manager and safety representatives, their aim was 
to identify deficiencies and to check compliance with the health and safety rules and 
regulations. 
8.6.5 Summary 
With money readily available, and given Echo AG's commitment to the health and safety 
of its employees over a number of years, there was little scope for conflict between the 
works council and branch management in this regard. Whilst there had been disagreements 
of a health and safety-related nature, all had been resolved internally, and the cooperative 
relationship which had been established between the chairman of the health and safety sub- 
committee of the works council, the workshop manager and the senior full-time health and 
safety expert, had served to neutralise any differences. 
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8.7 Echo AG -'Branch B' 
8.7.1 Background Information 
Many of the 16 operational divisions of Echo AG were represented at `Branch B', which 
was located in NRW. Considerably smaller than `Branch A', with just 570 employees, 
`Branch B' was run by a three-man branch-management committee (see Figure 8.12), with 
the speaker of this committee reporting to the senior management 
representative/workshop manager at `Branch A'. Whilst 70 per cent of the workforce 
were in administration, the remainder were either construction workers, or were employed 
in the workshop where the questionnaires were distributed. 
Figure 8.12: Company Structure - Echo AG - `Branch B' 
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The 46 employees in the workshop were involved in wiring switch-gear circuits 
(Schaltanlagen) and repairing engines, and the nature of the work, which was neither 
physically demanding nor dangerous, was reflected in the safety record (see Table 8.5). 
There had been just two reportable occupational accidents in the workshop in 1993, but 
this translated into an accident rate of approximately 40. In 1994 however, no single 
accident was registered in the workshop at `Branch B'. 
Table 8.5: 'Branch' Profile 1994 - Echo AG - 'Branch B' 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
The structured interviews conducted at `Branch B' revealed that a cooperative 
relationship had been established between the works council and the members of the 
branch-management committee. Health and safety issues were also addressed in a very 
amicable way, and it was suggested that the presence of the same individuals on both sides 
over a number of years had helped to engender this cooperation (Interview #62; Interview 
#69). Whilst there had been disagreements of a health and safety-related nature, they had 
always been resolved internally, without recourse to either the company works council or 
a plant-level arbitration committee. Both the company's commitment to health and safety, 
and the availability of financial resources, had been important in this respect. 
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8.7.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
The speaker of the branch-management committee had assumed responsibility for the 
health and safety of all those employed at `Branch B' at the time of his appointment. A 
letter from a regional management representative had informed him of his duties, as laid 
down in the statutory and autonomous legislation, and required him to do all in his power 
to ensure a hazard-free working environment for the employees at `Branch B'. However, 
the speaker revealed that, in practice, he knew very little about the prevalent health and 
safety structures, and instead, health and safety issues were addressed by a different 
member of the branch-management committee. The individual in question had been 
employed at `Branch B' since 1953 and had assumed the position of part-time health and 
safety expert in 1989, just two years before joining the branch-management committee. 
The part-time health and safety expert worked closely with the regional UAS department 
and described his duties as preventing accidents and educating the workforce. To this end 
he carried out a tour of the workshop once every six months, attended the meetings of the 
industrial health and safety committee and made regular visits to the construction sites. He 
also appointed the safety representatives, acting upon recommendations made by the line 
mangers, who were instructed to select employees who enjoyed the respect and the trust 
of their colleagues. In his opinion, the safety representatives played a vital role in the 
annual meeting of the industrial health and safety committee at `Branch B', a forum which 
facilitated an exchange of information, with the safety representatives relaying ideas from 
the workforce to the branch mangers and vice-versa (Interview #69). The part-time health 
and safety expert also managed the engineering and construction workers' department, 
and given his role on the branch-management committee, he relied upon the workshop 
manager, line management, a part-time works doctor and two trained first-alders for 
assistance in addressing questions of a health and safety-related nature in the workshop. 
Comprising 11 members, the works council had created a health and safety sub- 
committee which met as and when the need arose. Health and safety issues were rarely 
discussed during the monthly meetings of the works council, and of the three members of 
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this sub-committee, none of whom was employed in the workshop, it was the chairman 
who was most committed. The interviews revealed widespread acknowledgement of the 
contribution made by this individual to an improvement in safety in the workshop. The 
speaker of the branch-management committee for example, explained how the chairman 
had ensured that health and safety issues remained on the agenda (Interview #62), whilst 
his colleague suggested that the chairman's involvement in health and safety over an 
extended period of time had fostered a cooperative and productive relationship with 
management (Interview #69). 
Finally, as at `Branch A', the employees were given the opportunity to contribute directly 
to an improvement in their working conditions, with safety competitions and the 
suggestions scheme both regular features at `Branch B'. In addition, the company sickness 
fund organised several health and safety-related training courses, all of which were 
regularly attended by a number of employees. 
Whilst there were those who suggested that the works council was at the centre of health 
and safety activity at `Branch B' (Interview #62), others maintained that the part-time 
health and safety expert was of most significance (Interview #69; Interview #70). The 
latter was able to introduce minor health and safety measures at `Branch B', but as was 
the case at `Branch A', it was the industrial health and safety committee which decided 
upon the majority of health and safety measures to supplement the company agreements, 
despite meeting only once at this location each year. 
8.7.3 Communication 
New employees at `Branch B' were informed of the dangers in the workshop by one of 
two sources. 71.4 per cent of respondents referred to the line managers, whilst the 
remaining 28.6 per cent suggested that the safety representatives were their initial 
instructors as far as health and safety was concerned (see Appendix 13). 
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Figure 8.13: Communicative Process - Echo AG - `Branch B'2" 
Industrial 
Health & Safety Health & Safety 
J 
Health & Safety 
Expert / Branch Committee Expert / Branch 
Manager Manager 
Line Safety Safety Line 
Managers LIeIIIManjrs 
Brochures 
Newsletter 
Employees 
Upward Communication 
__ 
Downward Communication 
As for the way in which new measures, emanating either from agreements concluded for 
the company as a whole, or from the regional industrial health and safety committee, were 
relayed to the employees in the workshop, the pattern which emerged was far simpler than 
that at `Branch A'. Here, the line managers were named by 72.7 per cent of employees, 
whilst just under two thirds of respondents relied upon information brochures (see 
Appendix 14). 212 In addition, over 30 per cent of respondents at both `Branch A' and 
`Branch B' revealed that the company newspaper was an important source of such 
information. 
Information from the employees, meanwhile, reached the industrial health and safety 
committee in one of two ways. As far as problems of a health and safety-related nature 
211 The works council does not appear in Figure 8.13 as the empirical evidence indicated that it was 
not involved sufficiently in the flow of health and safety-related information within the company. 
212 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
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were concerned, the line managers (40 per cent) and the safety representatives (40 per 
cent) were the main points of contact, with the former most likely to communicate this 
information to the branch manager/part-time health and safety expert. Suggestions from 
the employees followed a similar route, with 27.3 per cent of respondents approaching the 
line managers, and a similar proportion of employees contacting the safety representatives. 
8.7.4 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
There were many similarities between the two `Branches' of Echo AG in terms of the way 
in which health and safety measures were developed, implemented and monitored, and this 
was largely a result of the network of company agreements which had been concluded at 
the highest level of Echo AG. As was the case at `Branch A', the actors at `Branch B' 
were permitted to regulate only minor issues, as they sought to improve the prevalent 
working conditions. Regular safety competitions, which were designed to reduce the 
frequency of particular types of accidents, and a permanent suggestion scheme enabled the 
workforce to exert an influence, but there had only been six health and safety-related 
suggestions in 1994, and just 18.2 per cent of respondents had at some stage made use of 
this scheme. 
As far as ensuring compliance with the health and safety legislation was concerned, the 
size of the workshop obviated the need for sophisticated inspection arrangements, such as 
those at `Branch A'. With just 46 employees in the workshop, it had been decided that one 
safety inspection every six months was sufficient, and with no workshop-related 
occupational accidents registered either internally or with the professional association in 
1994, this decision would seem to have been justified. 
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8.7.5 Summary 
As was the case at `Branch A', the availability of finances had reduced the likelihood of 
conflict arising between the works council and branch management over health and safety 
issues. The exemplary safety record in the workshop during 1994 had also been beneficial 
in this regard, but there was evidence to suggest that the health and safety actors, and the 
sub-committee of the works council in particular, were becoming complacent. 
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Nevertheless, these issues enjoyed a high profile at `Branch B', and both the financial 
support and the long-standing relationship between key members of the works council and 
the branch-management committee ensured that health and safety issues were addressed 
cooperatively. 
8.8 Tango-Roger Steel AG 
8.8.1 Background Information 
Tango-Roger Steel AG, a joint-stock company with the two-tier structure (Streeck 1984a: 
41) of a management board, and a supervisory board, was founded in January 1993 
following the merger of Tango Steel AG and Roger Steel AG, both of which had been 
operational since the mid-nineteenth century. In its first year of production, Tango-Roger 
Steel AG, which had business interests in over 40 countries and employed some 78,000 
worldwide, had a turnover of over DM 10 billion in Germany alone. Eighteen months 
later, in an attempt to improve flexibility, the management board decided to divide the 
company into five separate operations, one of which retained the name `Tango-Roger 
Steel AG'. The survey was carried out at one of the sites belonging to the latter in NRW, 
Z" Only 18.2 per cent of the employees surveyed in the workshop indicated that members of their 
representative body made a regular tour of their workplace, and just 36.4 per cent declared that they 
considered the works council to be concerned about their health and safety. 
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where in March 1995, approximately 4000 were employed. 214 85 per cent of these 
employees worked in the two plants, the rolling mill (Kaltwalzwerk) and strip production 
(Breitbandstraße), where the questionnaires were distributed. 
The automation of large sections of the production process in the two plants had removed 
many of the traditional hazards to life and limb, but it was suggested that much greater 
concentration was now required by the employees (Interview #112). A tour of these plants 
however, revealed that the employees were still exposed to conditions of extreme heat and 
noise, with both the lighting and the air quality far from satisfactory. 
Table 8.6: Company Profile 1994 - Tango-Roger Steel AG 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
As Figure 8.14 demonstrates, Tango-Roger Steel AG, and both Tango Steel AG and 
Roger Steel AG before it, had a comparatively favourable safety performance in the 
German steel industry. However, following the aforementioned re-organisation in 1994, 
the management board expressed its intention to reduce the workforce at these premises 
to 1900, and in pursuit of this goal, all employees born in or before 1942 had been 
pensioned off, resulting in a shortfall of experienced labour and established safety 
214 Tango Steel AG had been a vital source of employment in the region since the closure of the coal 
mines, but had itself seen its workforce reduced from almost 17 000 in 1960 to just over 7000 in 1980, 
and to 4000 by the mid-1990s. 
203 
representatives. In addition, the closure of one site had resulted in a number of employees 
being transferred to the premises under investigation, and it was estimated that by early 
1995, as many as 40 per cent of the employees in both the rolling mill and in strip 
production were unfamiliar with the production process (Interview #112). The result was 
a rise in both fatal and non-fatal accidents in 1994 and early 1995, and in response, the 
Joint Committee for Health and Safety and the Environment (Ausschuß für Sicherheit und 
Umwelt, J('HSL) drew up an action programme in an attempt to reverse this trend (see 
Subsection 8.8.4). 
Figure 8.14: Accident Frequencies in the German Steel Industry 215 
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Source: Tango-Roger Steel AG. 
Tango-Roger Steel AG was under the influence of the Montan Co-Determination Law 
(Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of 1951, which, to reiterate, provided for parity on both 
the supervisory and management boards of joint-stock companies with over 2000 
2 15 The figures refer to the number of reportable occupational accidents per one million hours 
worked in six steel companies. As of 1993. Tango-Roger Steel AG replaced Tango Steel AG and Roger 
Steel AG. The companies Steel #1, Steel #2 and Steel #3 as well as the Hütten- und Walzwerks 
professional association, to which all are affiliated, provide a comparison. The figures are arrived at by 
multiplying the number of reportable occupational accidents in one year by one million and dividing the 
answer by the total number of hours worked in that year. 
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employees in the iron, coal and steel industries. Of most significance was the fact that the 
employees were represented on the management board by a labour director 
(Arbeitsdirektor), who had been nominated by IG Metall. It was within the labour 
director's area of responsibility, in his capacity as the personnel director on the 
management board, that health and safety issues were addressed (see Figure 8.15). 
Figure 8.15: Company Structure - Tango-Roger Steel AG 
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The relationship between the works council and the labour director was strained. The 
works council accused its representative on the management board of working against the 
interests of the employees, and suggested that, given an academic rather than a unionist 
background, the labour director had acquired a different understanding of co- 
determination (Interview #107). 216 In contrast, the works council cooperated closely with 
216 According to the Montan Co-determination Law, the labour directors are to be proposed by IG 
Metall, with suitable candidates being either union officers, works councillors or individuals employed in 
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both the staff in the labour director's area of responsibility and the plant managers, with 
whom it preferred to address health and safety issues. 
Finally, from a financial point of view, the company was showing signs of recovery from 
the recession in the steel industry in the early 1990s, which had seen Tango-Roger Steel 
AG make losses of over DM 1 million per day in 1993. The company was in the black in 
early 1995, and whilst the works council appreciated that money had not always been 
available to invest in improving working conditions during the recession, it was becoming 
concerned with the lack of availability of finances for such measures, despite the upturn in 
the company's fortunes (Interview #107). 
8.8.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
Whilst the labour director was responsible for ensuring compliance with the occupational 
health and safety legislation on behalf of the management board at Tango-Roger Steel AG, 
it was the personnel manager for strip production, who was employed in the labour 
director's area of responsibility, who addressed these issues on his behalf. The personnel 
manager oversaw the activities of both the works medical and works safety services, with 
whom he cooperated closely, and was also the chairman of the employers' representatives 
on six joint committees, including the JCHSE, and those concerned with the suggestion 
scheme and questions related to §90 WCA 1972. 
With the personnel managers for strip production and the rolling mill located at some 
distance from the individual plants, much was expected of the individual plant managers 
in relation to health and safety. They, in turn, required the section and line managers to 
concern themselves with these measures, and as the following section indicates, the line 
managers were actively involved in keeping the workforce informed of the latest 
the labour director's area of responsibility. It is worth pointing out that, as an equal member of the 
management board, the labour director is answerable to the shareholders, and once in office, must 
consider the financial situation of the company, as well as the interests of the employees. They are 
effectively caught between two stools and must be prepared to oppose the works councils if necessary 
(Interview # 109). 
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developments in this respect. According to the head of the works safety service, the 
foremen and the supervisors had an important role to play, as it was they who were 
responsible for both the initial plant-specific safety training, and the annual refresher 
course. In his opinion, the foremen and supervisors were of most importance during the 
night shift and at weekends when the health and safety experts were not on site (Interview 
# 104). 
The works council at Tango-Roger Steel AG comprised 27 members, and although §38 
WCA 1972 provided for just six of its members to concentrate on works council business 
on a full-time basis, all works councillors were de facto released from their normal duties. 
Given the size of the company, the works councillors had been split into smaller groups, 
and were located in a number of offices throughout the company, in order to facilitate 
contact between the workforce and their representative body. The works councillors were 
required to address all issues in their area of responsibility, and for this reason, the works 
council had tried to ensure that there was at least one member of each joint committee in 
every works council office. 
With an overall union density of 82 per cent, and around 98 per cent amongst the blue- 
collar employees, 21 the works council had been able to establish a network of 
approximately 250 union stewards, each responsible for 25-30 employees. These 
stewards had an important role to play in the health and safety arena as many were 
simultaneously safety representatives. It fell to the health and safety experts to select 
potential safety representatives, and the head of the works safety service indicated that he 
encouraged his team to choose employees who regularly expressed an interest in such 
issues and who were easily accessible for the rest of the workforce. 218 He explained that it 
was advisable to select an employee who constantly worked the same shift, and who thus 
came into contact with the entire workforce (Interview #104). The safety representatives 
took part in the monthly safety inspections and discussions (see Subsection 8.8.4), as well 
217 As the works council had to agree to all new appointments, it operated an unofficial closed-shop 
policy (Interview #82). 
218 The inaccessibility of crane drivers for example, made them unsuitable candidates for the post of 
safety representative. 
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as being represented in the JCHSE, but there was criticism of the fact that they were rarely 
given sufficient time to address health and safety issues (Interview #107). However, the 
practice of selecting union stewards as safety representatives, or of electing safety 
representatives to the body of union stewards, provided the former with the opportunity to 
discuss such issues at the quarterly meetings of the latter. 
Reference has already been made to the works safety service, which was under the 
supervision of the personnel manager for strip production, and which complemented the 
works medical service with its two full-time works doctors. The works safety service 
was headed by a full-time health and safety expert who was responsible for the activities of 
the fire brigade, company security and three other full-time health and safety experts. The 
works safety service was very much a neutral body, despite the fact that the health and 
safety experts were employed by the company. The head of the service described its 
activities as being of an advisory nature and indicated that it was often criticised by the 
workforce, which was unaware of the restrictions placed on the health and safety 
personnel by the Works Safety Law (Interview #104). 
The principle of co-determination was central to the organisation of all activities at Tango- 
Roger Steel AG, and there were a total of 17 joint committees which addressed a variety 
of issues. 219 They included working time, investment, data processing and ergonomics, 
suggestions, measures subject to §90 WCA 1972 and questions relating to health and 
safety and the environment. 220 
The latter were addressed by the JCHSE on a bi-monthly basis, and these meetings had 
replaced the statutory industrial health and safety committee. Management was 
represented on this committee by the personnel manager for strip production, the plant 
219 Although the size of these committees varied between 4 and 16 members, there was always parity 
between the representatives of management and the workforce. 
220 The existence of a joint committee on investments allowed both sides to discuss planned changes 
well in advance of their introduction. If an investment was agreed upon, the joint committee concerned 
with measures subject to §90 WCA would sit, in order to discuss the effects of this investment on the 
workforce. Given the interlinkages between these two committees and the JCHSE, the make-up of these 
fora was fairly similar. 
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managers and representatives of the works medical and works safety services, whilst six 
works councillors, a representative of the disabled employees and the speaker of the safety 
representatives made a case for the workforce. It was here that many health and safety 
measures were developed and responsibilities assigned, and when asked for their opinions 
on the efficacy of this committee, many of its members gave a positive response, 
describing it as an "informative, advisory, problem-solving, and decision-making body 
which enabled all concerned to discuss such issues collectively on a regular basis" 
(Interview #99, author's translation). Those members who were unimpressed with the 
JCHSE referred to both the time it had taken to implement certain measures decided upon 
in this forum, and to the increasing conflict between safety and profit, which had seen the 
cost of health and safety measures brought into the decision-making process with 
increasing frequency (Interview #100). 
Whilst all these actors and agencies were concerned with protecting the health and safety 
of the workforce, the contribution made by the employees themselves was restricted. A 
company suggestion scheme and an annual safety competition enabled them to exert a 
direct influence upon these issues, but as was the case in the other companies, any further 
involvement was of an indirect nature, with the works council, the safety representatives 
and the line managers providing the link to the JCHSE. 
Although 12 of the 16 members of this forum indicated that the management board had a 
decisive role to play as far as health and safety issues were concerned, it was clear that the 
health and safety arena was dominated by the JCHSE. Many financial decisions were taken 
by the management board, but it was in this committee that the development, the 
implementation and the supervision of such measures were addressed. 
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8.8.3 Communication 
Given the dominant role of the JCHSE, this subsection identifies the way in which 
information relating to the measures developed in this forum reached the workforce, and 
secondly, how the members of the JCHSE were made aware of the situation in the 
workplace. 
Figure 8.16: Communicative Process - Tango-Roter Steel AG 
Works 
Council 
Safety 
Reps 
Joint Committee 
for Health & 
Safety & the 
Environment 
Safety 
Reps 
Employees 
Union 
Stewards 
Plant 
Managers 
Upward Communication 
Downward Communication 
Line 
Managers 
As with the other companies, it was the line managers, who were not members of this 
committee, who were named most frequently by new employees (39.1 per cent) as the 
source of health and safety information (see Appendix 13). As far as new health and safety 
measures were concerned however, there were three main vehicles for relaying this 
information to the employees. Once again, the line managers, who were informed by the 
individual plant managers of the decisions of this committee, were most likely to transmit 
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this information (63.8 per cent). In addition, over 50 per cent of respondents suggested 
that safety representatives served to inform them of such measures, whilst 47.1 per cent 
cited the union stewards as the source of this information (see Appendix 14). 22' 
As for the flow of information from the employees to the JCHSE, responses from the 
questionnaire survey revealed that the safety representatives (32.1 per cent and 39.6 per 
cent) and the works council (23.9 per cent and 20.1 per cent) were the two most likely 
points of contact with suggestions and problems respectively. With both represented on 
the joint committee, one can assume that much of the information reached its required 
destination. 
8.8.4 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
The majority of company specific health and safety measures introduced into the individual 
plants at Tango-Roger Steel AG emanated from the JCHSE in the form of plant 
agreements. For example, in response to the rising accident rate in early 1995, the JCHSE 
had developed an action programme, which it hoped would reduce the frequency of 
occupational accidents. The recommendations were as follows: 
" Plant managers were to participate in, and were to take charge of, the monthly safety 
inspections and discussions, which had been carried out over a number of years; 
" Steps were to be taken to increase the amount of health and safety training given to 
the foremen and the supervisors; 
" The foremen were required to ensure that their area of responsibility was kept clean 
and tidy; 
" Following every meeting of the joint committee, the committee members would select 
one section of a plant for immediate inspection; 
221 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
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9 At least 3 per cent of the entire workforce in each plant were to visit a training course 
at the professional association each year; 
"A health and safety expert was to attend one of the daily meetings of the management 
chain in each plant every week; 
9 The plant managers were to ensure that the employees were wearing the protective 
clothing; 
" The management chain was required to set an example to the rest of the workforce by 
observing the safety regulations; 
" Vehicle speed checks were to be introduced on site. 
An established suggestion scheme was also operational, and a joint committee had been 
established to evaluate the financial rewards for those suggestions which were 
implemented. In the first four months of 1995,90 suggestions relating to a variety of 
topics were put forward. Of these, 24 were implemented, with one suggestion being 
rewarded with a payment of over DM 10 000. Furthermore, 7 of the 62 employees whose 
suggestions were rejected had received a small payment in recognition of their 
contribution. 'm 
In addition, health and safety measures were developed informally during the discussions 
which followed the monthly safety inspections. These inspections were carried out in one 
section of each plant by the section manager, the relevant foreman, a health and safety 
expert, the works councillors responsible for that section, the relevant safety 
representatives, and since the introduction of the action programme, the plant manager. 2M 
These inspections were always followed by the safety discussion, the purpose of which 
was to assign responsibility for the removal of deficiencies which had been identified. 224 
222 The deputy chairman of the works council was sceptical of such a scheme, arguing that, in the 
existing climate, the employees were in danger of rationalising themselves away with their suggestions 
(Interview #82). 
22' The timetable for the year was always agreed upon in advance, and the chairman of the 
employees' representatives on the JCHSE criticised this approach, suggesting that it had not been 
uncommon for the relevant section to be 'cleaned up' the day before the inspection (Interview #107). 
22' These arrangements served to supplement the statutory provisions, which included the 
appointment of both the safety representatives and the health and safety personnel. 
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8.8.5 Summary 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the observations made at Tango-Roger Steel 
AG is that health and safety issues were, on the whole, addressed cooperatively, with the 
JCHSE and the other joint committees of relevance to the health and safety arena 
providing fora for the discussion of such issues at length on a regular basis. Of all the 
companies visited however, there appeared to be a greater potential for conflict at Tango- 
Roger Steel AG. The chairman of the employees' representatives on the JCHSE revealed 
that the works council would often threaten management with media involvement, if 
health and safety issues were ignored (Interview #107). The works council had recognised 
however, that money had not always been available for such measures during the recession 
in the steel industry. With the company's fortunes having improved in recent times, the 
works council was becoming restless, given the continued lack of investment, but with job 
cuts on the horizon, it had more pressing issues on its agenda. Nevertheless, as far as 
health and safety issues were concerned, third-party involvement had not yet been 
necessary. 
It did appear that more could have been done to improve the working conditions within 
the individual plants, and less than half of the employees indicated that they were satisfied 
with the contribution made by management, the health and safety experts and their 
representative body in this regard. 225 However, the spiralling accident rate in early 1995, 
and a handful of fatal accidents in particular, had encouraged management to act, and the 
aforementioned action programme represented its initial response. 
W The structured interviews and the observations made at a meeting of the JCHSE revealed a 
tendency on the part of the works council to concentrate on environmental issues. 
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8.9 Gamma Transportation Technology GmbH 
8.9.1 Background Information 
Gamma Transportation Technology GmbH (GTT GmbH) was an independent subsidiary 
of Gamma GmbH, a joint undertaking of the forging operations of three established steel 
companies, one of which was Tango Steel AG. GTT GmbH employed 930 at its premises 
in NRW, which had previously belonged to Tango Steel AG. Many of the workforce had 
been employed by the latter, prior to the merger of these forging operations and the 
formation of Gamma GmbH in 1988. 
Gamma GmbH was initially divided into three separate divisions: 
" Energy and Forging Technology, which had a wide product range, including crank, 
turbine and generator shafts; 
" Contract Manufacturing, which concerned itself with the treatment and inspection of 
steel; 
9 Transportation Technology, which specialised in railway wheels and wheelsets. 
In January 1994, the third division, Transportation Technology, became an independent 
subsidiary of Gamma GmbH, which at the time of the survey, was operating as a holding 
company for a total of four wholly-owned subsidiaries. However, Gamma GmbH was 
facing bankruptcy. The future of GTT GmbH and the other three subsidiaries was 
therefore far from secure, and to compound this situation yet further, GTT GmbH was 
showing no sign of recovery from the recession in the steel industry, with cheaper-priced 
products from eastern Europe the main cause of this sustained downturn in the company's 
fortunes. 
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Table 8.7: Company Profile 1994 - GTT GmbH 
* Includes both accidents at work and those which occurred either on the way to, or back 
from, the workplace. 
** Refers to the number of reportable occupational accidents per 1000 employees. 
*** Based on the figure of DM 1004 for every working day lost in the metal-working industry. 
On a more positive note however, the financial predicament had served to reconcile 
previous differences between the works council and the managers of the three plants - 
wheel preparation (Räderfertigung), wheel design (Warmformgebung) and the repair 
workshop (Reparaturwerkstatt) - where the questionnaires were distributed (see Figure 
8.17), and although the relationship between the individual plant managers and the works 
council did vary, it was generally agreed that the threat of closure had brought these 
actors closer together. 
As far as health and safety was concerned, the financial problems had hampered all 
attempts to implement long-term measures, and the health and safety expert was obliged 
to seek the approval of the works director for almost all investments. Third-party 
involvement had never been necessary in the health and safety arena however, with 
cooperation rather than confrontation the norm (Interview #95; Interview #96; Interview 
#97). 
The working conditions in two of the three plants under investigation varied quite 
considerably. In the wheel-design plant, the automation of large sections of the production 
process ensured that the work itself was neither physically demanding nor dangerous, and 
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with the exception of one work station, where a single employee continued to have direct 
physical contact with white-hot material, the workforce found itself at a safe distance from 
such dangers. Certain processes had been automated in the wheel-preparation plant, 
meanwhile, but many employees were still required to lift heavy loads, whilst others 
checked the smoothness of the axles with their bare hands. 226 
Figure 8.17: Company Structure - GTT GmbH 
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226 Of the three plants, wheel preparation had the highest accident rate. 
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The disregard for the protective clothing, and hard hats in particular, was noticeable 
during a tour of the wheel-design and the wheel-preparation plants. In addition, both the 
pedestrian and the transport lanes had been sacrificed for storage space, and as at Beta 
GmbH, the accident statistics reflected this deficiency, with 16 of the 68 reportable 
occupational accidents in 1994 having resulted from employees either stumbling or falling 
in the plants. 
Table 8.8: Accident Frequency - GTT GmbH 
* Calculated using the formula: Accidents X1 million / Number of hours worked January - 
April. 
In its first year of existence, GTT GmbH had an occupational accident rate of 73.4. 
However, in the first four months of 1995 there were just 18 reportable occupational 
accidents, compared with figures of 20 for the same period in 1994 and 25 in 1993. 
Expressed in relation to the number of hours worked during these periods - the accident 
frequency - Table 8.8 indicates that there are signs of improvement in the safety 
performance at GTT GmbH. 
8.9.2 Prevalent Health and Safety Structures 
Prior to the break-up of Gamma GmbH in January 1994, the company had been under the 
influence of the Montan Co-Determination Law of 1951, and health and safety issues had 
been addressed by a labour director on the management board. At GTT GmbH however, 
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the works director (Geschäftsführer) was legally responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the health and safety legislation, but as was the case elsewhere, he had invoked § 12 
UVV 1.0 and required the plant managers to address this issue on his behalf. 
The interviews carried out with the plant managers revealed that each attached a different 
degree of importance to health and safety, with the manager of the wheel-design plant 
seemingly most concerned and most involved with the development, the implementation 
and the supervision of such measures. In contrast, the manager of the wheel-preparation 
plant made no secret of the fact that he had done little to improve working conditions in 
his area ' of responsibility (Interview #97), and during a meeting of the safety committee, 
which he was attending for the first time, the manager of the wheel-preparation plant was 
criticised by the works council for failing to carry out regular safety inspections in his 
plant. Whilst not as committed as his counterpart in the wheel-design plant, the manager 
of the third plant, the repair workshop, was aware of his duties in this respect. However, 
all three plant managers relied upon their section managers, and most importantly line 
management (see Subsection 8.9.4), to keep the employees informed of the latest 
developments in the health and safety arena. 
GTT GmbH employed one full-time health and safety expert, who was also responsible 
for co-ordinating the company suggestion scheme. Having joined Tango Steel AG in 
1971, he became a plant manager, initially at Tango Steel AG and then at Gamma GmbH, 
before assuming the position of health and safety expert at the latter in 1989. The health 
and safety department at GTT GmbH had originally consisted of two health and safety 
experts, one part-time works doctor, and one secretary. However, a wave of job cuts saw 
one of the health and safety experts and the secretary take early retirement. Consequently, 
with the works doctor, who was employed by Gamma GmbH, present in the company for 
just three hours each day, much was expected of the one remaining health and safety 
expert, who was finding it difficult, given the absence of a secretary to deal with the 
administrative tasks, to maintain regular contact with the situation in the three plants. As 
well as carrying out regular safety inspections (see Subsection 8.9.4) and chairing two 
health and safety committees, the health and safety expert was also responsible for 
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compiling an annual safety report, which amongst other things, highlighted the frequency, 
the nature, and the location of occupational accidents within the company, but did not go 
into detail about the cost of these accidents. Of most concern to the health and safety 
expert was that he was infrequently informed internally of the occurrence of occupational 
accidents in the three plants. It was suggested that some foremen were unaware that 
employees under their supervision had been involved in an accident, and on many 
occasions, the health and safety expert learned of such an occurrence via the professional 
association, which contacted him requesting an accident report (Interview #110). The 
professional association had, in the interim, received a report from the injured employee's 
doctor. 227 
The links with Tango Steel AG manifested themselves in many ways at GTT GmbH, but 
none more so than on the works council. All 15 members of this body were de facto 
released from their normal duties, with each works councillor responsible for a particular 
section of the company. 22$ Whilst all works councillors were required to concern 
themselves with all issues, six members of this representative body, all of whom had 
previously been safety representatives, specialised in health and safety and attended the 
meetings of the two health and safety committees. 
The works council had chosen not to create a health and safety sub-committee, preferring 
instead to address such issues either in its daily meetings, or with management in the 
health and safety committees (Interview #98). Whilst there was a suggestion that the 
works council did not do enough to protect the health and safety of the workforce, and 
did not exercise its rights to the full (Interview #96), others defended this body, indicating 
that the works council was an active partner in this field and that, given the financial 
situation, its members did not make unrealistic demands (Interview #95; Interview #105). 
22' Ways to improve communication were under discussion at the time of the survey. 
229 This idea of assigning works councillors to particular sections of the company had originated at 
Tango Steel AG and had also been retained by the works council at Tango-Roger Steel AG (see 
Subsection 8.8.2). 
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With the overwhelming majority of the workforce unionised, there was a well established 
network of approximately 80 union stewards at GTT GmbH, many of whom were also 
safety representatives. There were a total of 33 safety representatives, all of whom had 
been selected by the works council, with its choice approved by the plant managers, the 
health and safety expert and a member of the works management. As was the case 
elsewhere, the meetings of the union stewards, which took place on a fortnightly basis, 
provided the safety representatives with the opportunity to discuss health and safety 
collectively. In addition, the safety representatives attended an annual three-day seminar 
organised by the health and safety expert, during which they were informed of the latest 
developments in the health and safety arena. However, the reduction in the size of the 
workforce had apparently made it extremely difficult for the plant managers to release the 
safety representatives from their normal duties, and they were therefore struggling to 
address health and safety issues in their areas of responsibility (Interview #96). 
The speaker of the safety representatives attended the meetings of the industrial health and 
safety committee, which were scheduled to take place once every three months. Given the 
financial problems however, this forum had failed to meet on two occasions during 1994. 
The meetings, when they did take place, were chaired by the health and safety expert and 
were also attended by the production manager, the works doctor, the manager of the 
wheel-design plant, and the six works councillors referred to above. 
Given the links with Tango Steel AG, it had been decided to maintain an additional safety 
committee which had met prior to the merger in 1988. This safety committee sat on two 
occasions between every meeting of the statutory industrial health and safety committee, 
therefore resulting in a health and safety-related gathering every month. The composition 
of the additional safety committee was not too dissimilar to that of the statutory forum, 
the only difference being that the production manager was represented by the three plant 
managers. Both committees were described as "problem-solving bodies" (Interview #105, 
author's translation), but the industrial health and safety committee assumed greater 
importance, given the presence of the production manager. This ensured that decisions 
: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concerning the financial viability of health and safety measures could be taken 
immediately. 
At the time of the survey, health and safety issues were of little importance to the 
employees at GTT GmbH (see Table 8.10 in Subsection 8.10.1). On the whole, they, like 
their counterparts at the other case-study companies, were unable to exert much influence 
in this regard. For example, only 12.4 per cent of respondents considered that they were 
involved in the development of health and safety measures, and with safety competitions 
having been curtailed for financial reasons, only the suggestion scheme enabled the 
employees to participate in the health and safety arena. 
The opinions of the interviewees varied when they were asked to consider which actor or 
agency was at the centre of health and safety activity at GTT GmbH. Some referred to the 
health and safety expert (Interview #96; Interview #98), whilst others mentioned the safety 
representatives (Interview #97) and the works council (Interview #98). The health and 
safety expert explained that, had money been available, he would have been able to 
address these issues alone. As this was not the case, the two health and safety committees 
had assumed a central position at GTT GmbH. 
8.9.3 Communication 
The aim here is to identify how the health and safety-related information made its way to 
and from both the statutory industrial health and safety committee and the company 
specific safety forum, which have been identified as the nuclei of health and safety activity 
at GTT GmbH. 
As far as the new employees were concerned, they received their initial safety instruction 
from either the health and safety expert (38.2 per cent), who provided them with a general 
overview, or from the line managers (42.1 per cent), who instructed the employees about 
the particular dangers in the plant in which they were to be employed (see Appendix 13). 
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When new measures were agreed upon by these committees however, there were a variety 
of different ways in which the employees were informed. 69.1 per cent of respondents 
indicated that this information emanated from the safety representatives, whilst over 50 
per cent referred to the line managers. Union stewards, the health and safety expert, the 
notice boards and information brochures were the source of this information for over 40 
per cent of respondents (see Appendix 14). 229 
Figure 8.18: Communicative Process - GTT GmbH 
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The flow of information from the employees to the decision-making forum was less 
complicated, with the safety representatives and the works council the points of contact 
for a combined total of 59.4 per cent of respondents with health and safety-related 
problems. When they had suggestions for ways in which to improve the working 
229 Respondents were encouraged to give more than one response to the question relating to the 
source of information concerning new health and safety measures. 
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environment, the employees were most likely to approach the safety representatives (40.2 
per cent), with a further 27.2 per cent of respondents relaying their suggestions to either a 
works councillor or the health and safety expert, all of whom attended the meetings of the 
two committees. 
8.9.4 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
Although the development of health and safety measures was being hampered by the 
financial difficulties facing the company, the health and safety committees continued to sit 
on a monthly basis. It was here that any affordable measures were sanctioned, but those 
that were deemed to be too expensive, given the financial predicament, were minuted, the 
intention being to address them as soon as money became available. 
The only plant agreement in force at GTT GmbH served to regulate the suggestion 
scheme, which enabled the employees to participate in the development of such measures. 
This scheme was run by the health and safety expert, and although the initiator of a 
suggestion was entitled to 30 per cent of any saving made, there had been no specific 
health and safety suggestions in the 12 months prior to the survey. However, 40 per cent 
of respondents claimed to have made use of this scheme at some stage in the past, and the 
health and safety expert indicated that many of the 60 suggestions put forward in 1994 
were in some way related to the health and safety arena (Interview #105). 
One further legacy from Tango Steel AG was the provision for safety inspections and 
safety discussions, whereby every month the health and safety expert would target a 
section of each of the three plants for inspection. The inspection was carried out by the 
health and safety expert, together with the relevant plant manager, at least one works 
councillor, the safety representatives from that section of the plant, and occasionally, the 
relevant foreman. The plant manager was required to conduct the inspection and to make 
relevant notes, the latter providing the agenda for the subsequent safety discussion. It was 
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during such discussions that the identified deficiencies were discussed, and both 
responsibilities and deadlines for their removal assigned? ° 
8.9.5 Summary 
The interviews conducted with the plant-level actors revealed that all attempts to improve 
the health and safety performance of the company were, at the time of the survey, being 
hampered by the financial predicament facing the holding company. All those interviewed 
stated that there was little money available to implement the necessary health and safety 
measures, and as a result, deficiencies and dangers identified in the monthly inspections 
and discussions had only been minuted. Furthermore, the health and safety department had 
not been able to appoint assistants for the health and safety expert, and he was therefore 
unable to inspect the plants as often as he would have liked. 
It was also suggested that since the company was no longer subject to the Montan Co- 
Determination Law, health and safety issues had ceased to be raised at the highest level, a 
task performed previously by the Labour Director. In addition, the reduction in the 
workforce had made it impossible for the plant managers to allow the safety 
representatives to take time off to realise their duties, something which had happened in 
the past, and which the plant managers wished to see re-introduced. 
All concerned were aware of the financial situation, and this had helped to improve the 
interrelationships at plant level. The works council was appreciative of the company's 
inability to finance major investments, and management was aware of the need to keep the 
accident rate under control. Health and safety issues were therefore addressed very 
cooperatively, and related problems continued to be resolved internally. 
230 A total of 47 such inspections had been carried out in 1994 (Interview #56). 
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8.10 The Empirical Evidence Reviewed 
The intention in this final section is to utilise the findings from the seven case-study 
companies to highlight the generalisations that can be made about the way in which 
occupational health and safety issues are addressed at plant level in the German metal- 
working industry. This will be achieved using the same subsection headings as appeared in 
the case studies, and will provide the basis for the empirical and theoretical conclusions 
presented in the final chapter. 
8.10.1 Health and Safety Structures 
It would be misleading to suggest that more than one of the seven employers or most 
senior management representatives encountered was actively involved in addressing the 
issue of occupational health and safety on a regular basis. The individual in question, the 
works director at Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH, had been the catalyst for a number of 
health and safety-related initiatives in the works, which of the seven companies, had the 
highest accident rate in 1994. In only two of the remaining six companies did the employer 
or most senior management representative even attend the meetings of the prevalent health 
and safety committee, and it appeared that there was a clear preference amongst such 
individuals to invoke §12 UVV 1.0, therefore delegating responsibility for health and 
safety further down the management chain. 
The individuals to whom they assigned this responsibility were the members of middle 
management, who assumed the position of plant or workshop manager in the seven 
workplaces. These middle managers took an active interest in such issues in all seven case- 
study companies, and whilst they too chose to delegate this responsibility to line 
managers, they were found to be participating in health and safety-related tours and 
inspections, and attending the meetings of the various health and safety committees on a 
regular basis. 
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The line managers were therefore obliged to concern themselves with health and safety, 
often relieving the plant/workshop managers of their responsibilities in this respect. It was 
these individuals who were required to ensure compliance with the health and safety 
legislation, and as the following subsection demonstrates, they were also involved in 
channelling much of the health and safety-related information both to and from the 
decision-making body in the individual companies. They therefore provided a vital link in 
the chain of communication as they were often the only level of management with which 
the employees had regular contact, particularly in the larger companies. 
Nevertheless, the questionnaire surveys revealed that just 49 per cent of all respondents 
considered the various levels of the management chain to be concerned with their health 
and safety, and whilst all managers spoke of the importance of health and safety during 
interview, when asked to rank three issues -a reduction in labour costs, fewer accidents, 
an increase in productivity - in order of importance, the following pattern emerged: 
MOST IMPORTANT - AN INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVITY 
SECOND MOST IMPORTANT -A REDUCTION IN LABOUR COSTS 
THIRD MOST IMPORTANT - FEWER ACCIDENTS 
However, management was not alone in affording the issue of health and safety such a low 
priority. Table 8.9 provides the reader with an overview of the way in which the seven 
works councils addressed occupational health and safety, and whilst the WCA 1972 does 
influence these arrangements, by allowing the larger works councils to create special sub- 
committees (see Section 1.3), 231 the inference that can be made from the empirical 
investigations is that health and safety was only a peripheral issue on these bodies, 
irrespective of company size, and therefore the opportunities provided by the legislation. 
231 Only three of the five eligible works councils had chosen to create a health and safety sub- 
committee. 
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For example: 
" Only 5 of the 40 works councillors who addressed health and safety were actually 
released from their normal duties; 
" Over 40 per cent of these individuals were in only their first term of office on a works 
council; 
" The majority of the works councillors who addressed health and safety lacked the 
desire, the knowledge and the expertise to influence such issues pro-actively; 
" In only four of the seven companies were health and safety issues regularly discussed 
during the meetings of the works council; 
" Only 38.8 per cent of respondents indicated that health and safety issues were regularly 
discussed at works assemblies; 
" Just 46.1 per cent were of the opinion that their works council carried out a regular 
health and safety-related inspection of the company; 
" Fewer than one in three respondents (32.5 per cent) had discussed health and safety 
with the works council during its consultation period; 
" Only 47.1 per cent of all respondents were aware of who addressed health and safety 
on the seven works councils; 
"A mere 53.1 per cent of all respondents considered the works councils to be concerned 
with their health and safety; 
" The works council was not the most frequent point of contact for employees with 
health and safety-related suggestions or problems (see Appendices 15 and 16 
respectively). 
There was also evidence to suggest that the works councils were prepared to relegate the 
importance of health and safety whenever what were considered to be more pressing 
issues appeared on the company agenda. This they were able to do, as health and safety 
was not an issue of central importance to the employees. As Table 8.10 indicates, the 
respondents in six of the seven companies, when asked to rank five issues in order of 
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importance, considered an increase in wages to be the most important of the five issues, 
with a reduction of accidents at best in second, and overall, in third position. 2 
Table 8.9: Works Council Health and Safety Structures - All Companies 
Nevertheless, all seven works councils were recognised by the employers as making a vital 
contribution to an improvement in working conditions. They were repeatedly described as 
effective counterweights to management in the health and safety arena and were praised 
for not making unrealistic demands upon scarce resources. In essence, the works councils 
were regarded as pragmatic institutions. 
232 Furthermore, only one in three respondents indicated that the employees regularly discussed 
health and safety, and just 23 per cent suggested that they would have been prepared to trade a proportion 
of their pay packet for better working conditions. 
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Table 8.10: The Relative Importance of Health and Safety by Company 
As for the health and safety experts, they assumed a position of central importance in all 
seven companies. They cooperated closely with both management and the works council, 
despite being employed by the former, and often chaired the meetings of the health and 
safety committees. There was no evidence to suggest that these individuals were 
management-oriented, and all health and safety experts interviewed, including those who 
were members of the management chain, demonstrated a keen desire to alleviate the 
hazards and to improve the working conditions at plant level, irrespective of the cost 
involved. To this end, they advised all levels of the management chain, the works 
councillors and the employees about the finer points of the relevant legislation, they 
participated in the safety tours and discussions in the larger workplaces, and carried out 
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regular inspections in the workshops of the smaller case-study companies. 233 Finally, in 
four of the seven workplaces, at least one of the health and safety experts had combined 
their responsibilities with other functions, but fears of a conflict of interest, which had led 
the professional associations to advise against such duality, had not materialised in 
practice. 
The safety representatives were generally recognised as a key link between the 
workforce and the decision-making bodies, and their participation, in one form or another, 
on the various health and safety committees, ensured that a great deal of the information 
from the employees was fed directly into these discussions. It was noticeable however, 
that the monthly meetings between the safety representatives, management and the works 
council, as required under §719(4) RVO, did not take place in any of the companies under 
investigation, and there was evidence to suggest that as the importance of health and 
safety issues diminished, the safety representatives were increasingly restricted in their 
ability to realise their responsibilities, with the line or plant managers reluctant to release 
them from their normal duties at regular intervals. Finally, it was only at Beta GmbH that 
line managers, contrary to recommendations made by the professional associations, had 
been appointed to the position of safety representatives. 
It was also commonplace for union stewards to concern themselves with health and 
safety issues, and it transpired that many safety representatives were simultaneously 
operating as union stewards, particularly in the more densely-unionised workplaces. The 
regular meetings of the union stewards provided the safety representatives with an ideal 
opportunity to discuss such issues as a group, with the presence of all unionised works 
councillors at these meetings an added bonus. 234 The attendance of the latter also 
facilitated the flow of information between the works council and the safety 
representatives. 
233 One in four employees stated that they were dissatisfied with the contribution made by their 
health and safety expert. 
234 All works councillors affiliated to IG Metall automatically become union stewards. 
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In none of the seven case-study companies were the employees given the opportunity to 
exert a direct influence of any significance upon the health and safety arena, this despite 
the fact that they are the individuals who are exposed to, and are familiar with some, if not 
all, of the prevalent dangers. 235 Instead, their contribution was limited to making use of the 
suggestion schemes, or in the more affluent companies, taking part in regular safety 
competitions. 236 
Figure 8.19: Variations in Compliance With Health and Safety Legislation 
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Initiator A: Measures developed by magagement and the works council; 
Initiator B: Measures developed by management alone; 
Initiator C: Measures developed by plant-level actors with employee involvement; 
Initiator D: Measures developed by the macro-level actors; 
Initiator E: Measures developed by plant-level actors without employee involvement. 
235 As has been indicated however, the employees lack the knowledge and the expertise to recognise 
all of the hazards at plant level (Zwingmann #38). 
236 Peters (1991: 65) refers to a study by Dejoy (1986) which found that increased employee 
involvement in the health and safety arena served to raise the profile of health and safety amongst the 
workforce, and led the latter to believe that their employer attached great importance to such issues. 
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As Table 8.10 indicated however, health and safety issues were not of central importance 
for the employees, but the questionnaire survey revealed that increased employee 
involvement in the health and safety arena could have raised the profile of such issues 
amongst the workforce. As Figure 8.19 indicates, the employees were of the opinion that 
health and safety measures were most likely to be observed all of the time if they 
themselves were involved in their formulation (Initiator Q. This is the case, it has been 
argued, as they are prepared to observe what they consider both to make sense and to be 
of use at plant level (Pröll #54). 
Although § 11 Works Safety Law intended the industrial health and safety committee to 
operate as an advisory forum, the evidence gathered from the case-study companies 
suggests that this committee, and the variations upon it, have become the "headquarters" 
of plant-level health and safety (BAU 1988: 63), with major decisions taken during the 
meetings of these fora. As Appendix 12 demonstrates, the make-up of the committees did 
vary between the companies, as did the frequency with which this committee was 
convened. The five largest companies had taken it upon themselves to develop their own 
arrangements, whilst the statutory industrial health and safety committee sat in the two 
remaining companies only as and when it was absolutely necessary. 237 
Overall, the committees were well received, as they provided an opportunity for all 
concerned to discuss health and safety issues on a regular basis. Given the right of co- 
determination which the works councils enjoy on such issues, the committees also 
provided the ideal opportunity for these rights to be realised. Unfortunately however, none 
of the companies had decided to invite the employees to attend these meetings, this 
despite the fact that these individuals are exposed to the dangers prevailing in the 
workplace on a daily basis. 
237 Given the size of these two companies, it was often easier to regulate such issues informally. 
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8.10.2 Communication 
As Figure 8.20 demonstrates, health and safety-related information was communicated in 
a fairly symmetrical pattern around the companies (see Appendix 17). Both the line 
managers and the safety representatives established the link between the employees and 
the decision-making bodies, which in the majority of companies, were the industrial health 
and safety committees or the company specific variations upon this forum. 
Figure 8.20: Communicative Process - All Companies 
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The questionnaire survey revealed that, of those employees who claimed to have been 
informed of the prevalent dangers on joining their company, 54.2 per cent had received 
238 this information from a line manager, whilst 16.1 per cent referred to the health and 
238 81.7 per cent of line managers who completed a questionnaire indicated that they informed new 
employees about the dangers at plant level. 
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safety expert as the source of this information. 239 When asked how they were informed 
about new health and safety measures, a question to which they were able to give a 
multiple response, the largest group of respondents, 64.5 per cent, indicated that they 
received such information from the line managers. 46.5 per cent referred to the safety 
representatives, and over 25 per cent of employees claimed to hear of these new measures 
from either the union stewards, their colleagues, via the notice board or in safety 
brochures. Meanwhile, only one in five employees reported having received such 
information from their representative body. 
Figure 8.21: Frequency of Contact Between Line Managers and Other Actors 
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The works council was more involved with the flow of information from the shop floor to 
the decision-making bodies. For example, when asked who they would approach with 
their health and safety-related problems, 31 per cent of all respondents referred to the 
safety representatives, but 22.1 per cent mentioned their representative body. As far as 
suggestions emanating from the workforce were concerned however, the works council 
239 The findings from the structured interviews indicated that the health and safety experts were 
required to give the new employees a general introduction to health and safety at plant level. They were 
then passed on to the line managers who informed them of the specific dangers to which they would be 
exposed at their particular work station. 
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was only the third most frequent response (17.4 per cent), with employees preferring to 
seek out either the safety representatives (29.8 per cent) or a line manager (19.8 per cent). 
In all seven companies, these line managers were a vital link in the health and safety- 
related chain of communication, but in none of the workplaces were they invited to attend 
the meetings of the health and safety committees, thus raising doubts about the amount of 
information that was communicated between the workforce and these fora, and therefore 
about the efficacy of the communicative process. Whilst questionnaires distributed to the 
line managers in üve of the seven companies revealed that the majority of these individuals 
were in daily contact with senior management, their interaction with the other members of 
these committees was less impressive, thus raising doubts about the flow of information 
both to and from the workforce (see Figure 8.21). 
Table 8.11: Information Flowing Directly To The Nuclei - All Companies 
Finally, the figures presented in Table 8.11 demonstrate that, in each company, less than 
75% of the health and safety-related information from the employees was actually relayed 
directly to a member of one of the decision-making bodies. These findings clearly indicate 
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that more could have been done to improve the communicative process, so as to ensure 
that this information reached its required destination. 
8.10.3 Development, Implementation, Supervision 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the empirical investigations is that the majority 
of health and safety measures were developed at plant level during the meetings of the 
prevalent health and safety committees. This being the case, the employees were given 
little opportunity to exert a direct influence upon such developments as they were not 
invited to attend these gatherings. 240 They therefore relied upon the safety representatives 
and the works councillors to represent their interests in this forum. 
As the case studies have indicated, the extent to which the employees can exert an 
influence is normally limited to suggesting improvements to the prevalent arrangements 
via a suggestion scheme. However, in the more affluent companies, as was the case at 
Echo AG and at Tango-Roger Steel AG, safety competitions provided the employees with 
a further opportunity to involve themselves in the management of occupational health and 
safety. 241 
The majority of health and safety measures which were formulated in the committees were 
not implemented as plant agreements, as they were intended to regulate specific 
deficiencies immediately, rather than remain in force over an extended period of time. 
Those plant agreements which had been concluded were either designed to complement 
both the statutory and the autonomous regulations, or were intended to tailor this 
legislation to the specific dangers prevailing in the individual companies. 
240 The questionnaire survey highlighted the employees' inability to influence such matters, with just 
13.3 per cent of all respondents of the opinion that they were involved in the development of health and 
safety measures. However, some 59.1 per cent of employees claimed to have been encouraged to make 
suggestions, but only 35.3 per cent had done so at some stage, this despite the financial incentives on 
offer. 
241 Safety competitions which are designed to reduce accident levels, as at Echo AG - `Branches A 
and B', do have a disadvantage in that they encourage employees not to report minor occupational 
accidents internally, rather than serve to instil a safety culture at plant level. 
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Finally, compliance with the legislative provisions was ensured in a variety of ways. There 
was a positive correlation between the size of the company and the degree of formality of 
the inspection arrangements adopted. Regular departmental investigations and safety 
discussions were the norm in the three largest companies, whilst in the remaining 
workplaces, six-monthly investigations were commonplace, with senior managers, works 
councillors and the health and safety experts also walking through the plants and the 
workshops on a daily basis, stopping to advise those employees found to be contravening 
the health and safety rules and regulations. 242 In all seven companies, the line managers 
and the safety representatives were also required to provide close supervision of 
compliance with the health and safety legislation. 
8.10.4 The Case-Study Evidence: A Summary 
The findings from the empirical investigations conducted in the seven case-study 
companies can therefore be summarised as follows: 
" There existed, amongst senior managers, a tendency to delegate responsibility for 
health and safety further down the management chain; 
" Line managers assumed this responsibility on behalf of their superiors; 
" Health and safety was only a peripheral issue on the works councils; 
" The works councils were regarded as effective counterweights to management in the 
health and safety arena and did not make unrealistic demands upon scarce resources; 
" Health and safety experts assumed a position of central importance at plant level; 
"Safety representatives were a vital link in the chain of communication; 
"I The statutory industrial health and safety committee, and the variations upon it, were 
headquarters of health and safety activity at plant level; 
" 'Union stewards were actively involved in the health and safety arena; 
242 Only 46.1 per cent of all respondents were of the opinion that their works councillors made 
regular tours of the workplace. 
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" The issue of health and safety, and a reduction in occupational accidents in particular, 
was of limited importance to the employees; 
" The employees were given little opportunity to influence the management of 
occupational health and safety; 
" There was a clear preference for cooperation rather than confrontation amongst the 
plant-level actors as far as occupational health and safety issues were concerned; 
" The plant-level actors interpreted the relevant legislative provisions to suit the 
conditions prevailing in the workplace. 
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CHAPTER NINE - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: 
COOPERATION AND MEDIATION 
9.1 Empirical Conclusions 
The evidence from the empirical investigations in the seven case-study companies revealed 
that the issue of occupational health and safety was addressed very cooperatively at plant 
level. The aim here is firstly both to summarise and to account for the evidence which 
supports this conclusion. There then follows an evaluation of the influence of a number of 
variables on the efficacy of the health and safety structures. This section then closes with 
an assessment of the significance of the empirical findings for an understanding of the 
broader picture at plant level. 
9.1.1 Evidence and Explanations 
There is ample evidence from the case-study companies to support the claim that there is a 
clear preference for cooperation over confrontation in relation to the issue of occupational 
health and safety. For example: 
" None of the seven works councils had ever found it necessary to call in third parties to 
settle internal disputes; 
" The technical inspectors of the professional associations had only been requested to 
make an extraordinary visit in order to assist with the implementation of new 
legislation; 
" Threats of media involvement in the most densely-unionised workplace, which were 
designed to publicise violations of health and safety legislation, had not been realised; 
"A plant-level arbitration committee had not been formed in any of the workplaces under 
investigation; 
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" Points of contention between the employers and the workforce were handled by the 
works council through an `internal arbitration system'. 243 
As for why cooperation rather than confrontation was the norm, a number of explanations 
can be offered. 
Firstly, no single actor or body was either permitted, or possessed the knowledge to 
address such issues alone. On the one hand, §87(1)7 WCA 1972 obliged the employer to 
seek the approval of the works council before taking any major decisions. On the other, 
the complexity of health and safety issues ensured that neither the employer nor the works 
council was able to act without the expert advice and assistance of the other plant-level 
actors. Those who possessed the necessary knowledge, the health and safety personnel 
and the safety representatives, were unable to take investment decisions, whilst those who 
could, the employers and the works councillors, were often underqualified to do so. 
Consequently, such issues were addressed in the health and safety committees - identified 
in the previous chapter as the nuclei of health and safety activity at plant level. 
Secondly, this right of co-determination in managerial decision-making, which the WCA 
1972 grants the works councils in relation to occupational health and safety issues, is also 
influential in creating this preference for cooperation at plant level. The employer is, as a 
result of this provision, unable to act in the health and safety arena without first gaining 
the approval of the works council. Furthermore, the provision in the Works Safety Law 
for an industrial health and safety committee ensures that representatives of the works 
council and the employer not only discuss such issues at regular intervals, but also, as the 
case-study evidence suggests, both address the deficiencies and conclude agreements 
during these meetings. 
243 As far as this `internal arbitration system' was concerned, health and safety-related problems 
were discussed, in the first instance, with line managers. The failure of such discussions to reconcile the 
prevalent differences resulted in attempts by the works council to negotiate a solution with middle 
management, and in the unlikely event of either of these arrangements failing to bridge the gap, the works 
council turned to senior management in one final attempt to reach agreement and thus avoid third-party 
intervention. 
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Thirdly, as occupational accidents were only infrequent occurrences in the case-study 
companies, 244 the employers and the works councils were under little internal pressure to 
raise the profile of health and safety at plant level. Disagreements concerning inactivity in 
this area were almost non-existent, and it was only when either an acceptable level of 
occupational accidents was exceeded, as at Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH, or serious 
and fatal accidents occurred, as was the case at Tango-Roger Steel AG, that the 
workforce, the works councillors and the employers recognised the need to address the 
deficiencies. In essence, both the works councils and the employers were prepared to talk 
around this issue until such a time as action became necessary. 
Fourthly, the contention of this thesis is that other legislative provisions serve to foster this 
cooperative approach. For example, the `absolute peace obligation' enshrined in §74(2) 
WCA 1972 is instrumental in creating a cooperative framework at plant level. Its 
prohibition of the instigation of industrial action by the micro-level actors defines the limits 
of acceptable behaviour in the workplace and thus encourages the representatives of the 
employer and the works council to identify common ground. 
§2(1) WCA 1972, which to reiterate, requires the works council to work with the 
employer for the good of both the company and the employees, is also valid in this regard. 
It obliges the works council to refrain from adopting a stance which could benefit the 
employees, whilst at the same time endangering the survival of the company within which 
it operates. Instead, the works council must seek to strike a balance between representing 
workforce and company interests. 
The way in which these provisions influenced plant-level reality, and the health and safety 
arena in particular, is highlighted in Figure 9.1, which simulates the decision-making 
process in relation to the problem of poor air quality in two of the case-study companies. 
two of the three solutions were reached by the industrial health and safety committee at 
Beta GmbH, whilst the third was the result of deliberations in the two health and safety- 
244 During 1994 there were just 6 reportable occupational accidents at Echo AG -'Branch B', 11 at 
Foxtrot GmbH, 25 at Echo AG - `Branch A' and 35 at Beta GmbH. 
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related fora at GTT GmbH. The factors affecting the decisions taken by the members of 
these bodies included the cost of the preventive measures, and closely related to this, the 
availability of finances given the performance of the two companies. 
Figure 9.1: The Decision-Making Process and its Consequences 
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The `red path' traces the consequences of a short-term solution which was reached at Beta 
GmbH in 1993. With the company experiencing some financial difficulties at this time, 
there was a recognition from within that the company could not afford to install the air- 
conditioning system necessary to remove the problem. Instead, the employer suggested 
the provision of breathing apparatus for the affected employees. The works council agreed 
and negotiated a compensatory payment for these individuals, which, if Table 8.10 and the 
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employees comparative disinterest in a reduction of accidents is any indication, was well 
received. The protective clothing controlled the problem without removing the source of 
danger. 245 
The `blue path' represents the course of action that was taken by Beta GmbH just 12 
months later, at a time when the company's fortunes had improved, and the air- 
conditioning system had become affordable. Once installed, the system removed the 
problem of poor air quality in the affected section of the workshop. 246 
Finally, the `green path' highlights the situation at GTT GmbH at the time of the survey. 
With the holding company facing closure, the company could not afford to introduce such 
measures, and problems were simply minuted. Their removal was delayed until finances 
became available. The deficiencies, and therefore the dangers, remained. 247 
These three examples highlight the significance of §2(1) WCA 1972, and to a limited 
extent, §74(2) WCA 1972 in creating this cooperative approach, as the works councils 
were obliged to consider both the wishes of the employees and the capabilities of the 
company when formulating their demands. In all three cases the solutions reached were 
therefore of benefit to both the employees and the company as a whole. 
In addition, the preference for a cooperative approach to health and safety at plant level 
can also be explained by: 
245 This solution was beneficial to both the employees and the company in the short term. The 
former received a compensatory payment, whilst the latter was saved from having to make an investment 
which, at the time, it could not afford. 
246 This second solution was beneficial to both the employees and the company in the long term. The 
latter benefited from the undisturbed production run, whilst the implementation of the air-conditioning 
system served to maintain the health and safety, and therefore the long-term earning capacity, of the 
former. 
247 This too was a solution which benefited both the employees and the company as jobs would have 
been sacrificed to finance the implementation of the system had the works council insisted upon this 
measure which the company could otherwise not afford. 
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" the fact that there is little reason for the works councils to confront the employers on 
such issues, given the low level of importance attached to health and safety by the 
employees; 
" the general acceptance of the need to implement and to observe the requirements of 
both the statutory legislation and the autonomous accident-prevention regulations; 
" the dislike of third-party intervention in plant-level industrial relations; 
" the employers' desire to avoid incurring the costs of arbitration; 
" the fact that the relationship between the employer and the works council is an on- 
going association. 
9.1.2 The Efficacy of the Health and Safety Structures 
In his widely acclaimed survey of the performance of 63 works councils, Kotthoff (1981) 
reached the conclusion that variables such as union density, company size and 
management attitudes exerted a significant influence upon the ability of these bodies to 
function as effective representatives of the workforce. The aim here is to assess the extent 
to which similar variables influenced the efficacy of the health and safety structures in the 
seven companies under investigation. 
The size of the companies was found to be significant in the sense that it determined the 
structures which they were either permitted or obliged to create by the_statutory_and. the 
autonomous legislative provisions. For example, the smaller companies, Foxtrot GmbH 
and Beta GmbH, were not required to appoint a full-time health and safety expert under 
the Works Safety Law, and only the works councils in the larger companies were able to 
create a sub-committee, as laid down in §28 WCA 1972, to address health and safety- 
related questions. A positive correlation between company size and both the frequency 
with which the various health and safety committees were convened, and the degree of 
formality with which such issues were addressed, was also identified. The internal 
inspection arrangements were a prime example of the latter. 
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As far as union density was concerned meanwhile, it was apparent in the highly-unionised 
workplaces, Tango-Roger Steel AG and GTT GmbH, that the union stewards played a 
more significant role in the health and safety arena than in the less densely-unionised 
companies, where bodies of union stewards were not so well established. Unlike Kotthoff 
(1981) however, no significant relationship was identified between the performance of the 
works councils and the degree to which these bodies were unionised. 
The importance of the involvement of the chairman of the works council in the 
regulation of health and safety issues should not be overstated, although the direct 
involvement of these individuals in the health and safety arena at Alpha Iron & Steelworks 
GmbH, Beta GmbH, and at Foxtrot GmbH in particular, did result in this topic enjoying a 
higher profile on these bodies. To suggest that their involvement had a positive effect on 
the efficacy of the health and safety structures however, would, as the accident statistics 
demonstrate, be very misleading. 
Finally, the empirical findings suggest that the two key variables in this respect were those 
of management attitudes and the availability of financial resources, with the latter 
perhaps the more significant given that health and safety is a cost factor. It was noticeable, 
therefore, that the three workplaces with the lowest accident rates were in the best 
financial position, whilst one of the two companies operating under the threat of closure, 
Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH, had the highest accident rate. 
Whilst the ability to invest in accident prevention is helpful, this in itself it is no guarantee 
of success. This thesis contends that without the commitment of management, attempts to 
improve the safety of the workplace remain futile. Only in those workplaces where 
management is committed to addressing such issues, and is prepared to devote scarce 
resources to improving the working environment, can real progress be made. 
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9.1.3 Summary 
Having observed the way in which health and safety issues were addressed in the seven 
case-study companies, what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of plant-level 
industrial relations in general? 
Firstly, to describe the works council as a representative of workforce interests at plant 
level is a little misleading. The argument of the thesis is that this body functions as a 
mediator between the employer and the employees at plant level, rather than as a 
representative of the latter at the expense of the former. Two main findings serve to 
substantiate this claim. 
On the one hand, there was the preference for cooperation over confrontation in the 
workplace. For example, both health and safety-related and general points of contention 
were solved via an `internal arbitration system' (see Subsection 9.1.1), with the works 
councils seeking to strike a balance between workforce demands and the capability of the 
company within which they were operational. In essence, these bodies served to moderate 
the demands of the workforce. On the other hand, the works councillors performed the 
role of intermediaries in the flow of general information to the employers from the 
workforce and vice-versa. They made regular use of both their legally prescribed and 
informal meetings with the employers to make the latter aware of the burning issues in the 
workplace which had been brought to their attention. Similarly, they either used the notice 
boards and the works assemblies, or relied upon the union stewards to relay to their 
electorate the information that they had received from the employers. The works councils 
therefore performed a vital role in the transfer of information between the two extremes, 
and thus ensured that misunderstandings rarely arose. 
Secondly, it was also clear that the works councils choose to prioritise issues at plant 
level, with the degree of importance attached to individual issues often reflected in the 
seniority of the works councillors charged with addressing the various topics. With 
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quantitative issues being addressed with increasing regularity by works councils at plant 
level in Germany, it was noticeable in the larger case-study companies that the relevant 
sub-committees were populated by the more experienced works councillors, with newly 
elected members serving their time on the less contentious fora. Table 8.10 demonstrated 
the comparative importance of health and safety issues to the workforce. 
Finally, the empirical findings and the general observations from the case-study companies 
lead the author to conclude that the plant-level actors prefer to adopt a flexible approach 
to the legislative provisions which are designed to regulate their relationship. With one or 
two exceptions, notably §2(1) WCA 1972, with its call for cooperation, and §74(2), 
stipulating an `absolute peace obligation', the employers and the works councillors 
demonstrated a clear preference to be creative with these regulations. 248 As Weltz (1976: 
80) indicated, the plant-level actors appear to develop their own rules in order to manage 
their interaction. 
9.2 Theoretical Conclusions 
The review of the established theoretical approaches to industrial relations presented in 
Chapter Two concluded that a corporatist, or more accurately, a micro-corporatist frame 
of reference offered the best explanation of the particular nature of plant-level industrial 
relations in Germany. The aim here, in this penultimate section, is to assess the 
significance both of this chosen explanatory framework and of the other theoretical 
approaches, elucidated in Chapter Two, in light of the findings from the seven case-study 
companies. 
On its own, the micro-corporatist frame of reference is unable to explain the pattern of 
industrial relations identified in the case-study companies. Whilst there is no disputing the 
fact that the state `holds the ring' in the industrial relations arena, and that there was a 
248 The red, blue and green paths presented in Figure 9.1 are demonstrative of the actors' preference 
to be creative with the legislative provisions. 
247 
clear preference for cooperation in the seven workplaces, it was evident that the labour 
legislation was not always observed in full. Furthermore, Schmitter's (1979: 13) 
suggestion that the bodies of interest representation enjoy a "representational monopoly 
within their respective categories" was not a true reflection of plant-level reality. For 
example, visits to the works council offices in the three most densely-unionised 
workplaces - Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH, Tango-Roger Steel GmbH and GTT 
GmbH - revealed that these bodies were essentially workplace unions. They openly 
advertised their links with IG Metall, distributing union literature to the employees and 
regularly discussing union business during the meetings of the works council. However, 
with the statutory legislation, in the form of WCA 1972, defining the limits of acceptable 
behaviour in the workplace, by prohibiting industrial action and insisting upon cooperation 
for the good of both the employees and the company, the applicability of the corporatist, 
or more accurately, the micro-corporatist frame of reference must not be dismissed. 
Aspects of the unitary approach, such as the illegitimacy of a union presence and the 
existence of a single focus of authority at plant level, were rejected earlier in the thesis, 
and there was little evidence from the case-study companies to support this frame of 
reference. The absence of industrial conflict and the rarity of disagreements did lend 
credence to this approach however, and the team analogy was not too inaccurate given the 
aforementioned preference for cooperation over conflict in the workplace. Nevertheless, 
the presence of a works council in all seven companies invalidated the central idea of there 
being a single "source of authority" and one "focus of loyalty" (Fox 1966: 3) in this team, 
and as Halbach et al. (1989: 354) stated, "the appeal for cooperation in §2(1) WCA 1972 
must not and cannot remove the natural divergence of interests existing between the 
employer and the works council as representatives of the employees" (author's 
translation). 
Certain aspects of the pluralist approach were also applicable. For example, the industrial 
unions were found to be heavily involved at plant level, albeit indirectly, via the works 
councils and the union stewards. Secondly, the aforementioned `internal arbitration 
system' (see Subsection 9.1.1) was demonstrative of the plant-level actors' ability to 
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reconcile their differences without third-party intervention. The on-going association 
between the employers and the works councils further supports the pluralist frame of 
reference, as does the suggestion that there is a balance of power in the workplace, 
although the employer ultimately retained the upper hand. However, with industrial 
conflict prohibited, disputes and disagreements an infrequent occurrence, and collective 
bargaining absent from plant-level industrial relations, the applicability of the pluralist 
frame of reference remains restricted. 
The case studies failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the Marxist approach. 
The occasional disagreements at plant level were found not to be the result of class-based 
differences, and were certainly not irreconcilable. The thesis therefore confirms its 
contention that the Marxist frame of reference is more applicable for an explanation of 
nineteenth century industrial relations than it is of the situation at plant level in the late 
twentieth century. 
The social action theorists' suggestion that behaviour can be explained by individual 
responses to particular situations was rejected in Chapter Two given the high degree of 
juridification of plant-level industrial relations in Germany, and in particular, the influence 
of the WCA 1972 upon the situation in the workplace. The case-study evidence revealed 
however, that these legislative provisions are not always adhered to, and instead, that the 
plant-level actors manage their own relationship, albeit within the confines set by the 
legislative provisions. In essence, they do respond in their own way to the particular 
situations with which they are faced. For example, the works councils at Beta GmbH, 
Foxtrot GmbH, Echo AG - `Branches A and B' and GTT GmbH chose not to insist upon 
a meeting of the statutory industrial health and safety committee once every three months 
(see Appendix 12). At GTT GmbH, it was commonplace for this forum not to be 
convened when more pressing issues appeared on the company agenda. Finally, as Figure 
9.1 demonstrated, the works councils at Beta GmbH and GTT GmbH have allowed the 
employer either to control or to minute a safety deficiency in periods of economic 
hardship, rather than insist upon its removal. 
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The conclusion reached in Chapter Two was that whilst no single frame of reference was 
capable of adequately explaining the particular nature of plant-level industrial relations in 
Germany, the micro-corporatist frame of reference was of most relevance. The evidence 
from the case-study companies has not disproved the first statement, but as far as the 
second is concerned, the thesis contends that an explanatory framework derived from the 
social action and the micro-corporatist frames of reference offer the most accurate 
portrayal of plant-level reality. 
Whilst the informal nature of plant-level industrial relations is demonstrative of the social 
action approach, the preference for cooperation over confrontation, that was identified in 
the case-study companies, typifies the corporatist frame of reference. The significance of, 
and the adherence to, the WCA 1972, with its requirement for plant-level cooperation in 
pursuit of a common good, lends further credence to the corporatist approach. 
To further test the validity of the corporatist frame of reference, it is worth considering, in 
light of the empirical findings, whether the industrial companies reflect the three 
corporatist traits discussed by Crouch and Dore (1990: 22-24, see Section 2.7). 
Firstly, given that the works councils are actively involved in addressing questions of a 
health and safety-related nature, the thesis contends that the industrial organisation does 
make use of "representatives of the interests whose behaviour is involved" (Crouch and 
Dore 1990: 22). Secondly, given that certain employees are disciplined internally for 
contravening the health and safety legislation (see Subsection 8.3.4), the conclusion which 
can be drawn is that the industrial organisation has the "power to constrain and sanction" 
(Crouch and Dore 1980: 23). Finally, the empirical evidence does indicate that there is a 
"notion of orientation to a public interest" (Crouch and Dore 1980: 24). For example, the 
works councils choose not to insist upon the implementation of preventive measures 
which the companies can not reasonably afford (see Figure 9.1), and the employers are 
prepared to address identified deficiencies when finances became available (see Figure 
9.1). 
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The picture that emerges is one of the industrial organisation being analogous to a `padded 
cell'. The statutory legislation, and the `absolute peace obligation' enshrined in the WCA 
1972 in particular, define the boundaries of the cell, ensuring that the employer and the 
works council cannot do one another any lasting harm. With the prohibition of conflict 
assured, the plant-level actors then manage their relationship in response to external 
influences within the confines set by the statutory provisions. 
9.3 Limitations and Future Research Areas 
The major weakness of the empirical research is that it was only possible to identify the 
way in which health and safety issues were addressed in seven companies. The findings 
presented in the previous chapter would have been more representative had a greater 
number of workplaces been visited, but there were constraints both on money and on the 
time which was available to carry out the field work. Furthermore, the sensitive nature of 
this topic ensured that it was only possible to gain access to `responsible' companies, with 
attempts to distribute the questionnaires and to conduct the interviews in those 
workplaces with poor health and safety records thwarted. 
Whilst one can be reasonably pleased with the response to the questionnaire survey, there 
was disappointment surrounding the way in which the questionnaires were distributed in 
some of the case-study companies. It was requested that they be distributed to all blue- 
collar employees: those members of the workforce most likely to be exposed to the 
dangers at plant level. However, there was a tendency for either the senior managers or 
the works councillors to prefer to select the respondents individually, and it was often 
necessary to explain to these individuals that the findings of the questionnaire survey 
would be of most interest to their company if the sample was representative of the 
workforce as a whole. Assurances were given that the questionnaires were distributed to 
most, if not all, blue-collar employees in four of the seven companies, but in the remaining 
three, they were distributed only to the workforce in specific plants, or to the employees in 
small workshops. 
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The author also accepts that the findings from the questionnaire survey are little more than 
a series of subjective responses to specific questions, and if the survey were to be 
repeated, the length of the workforce questionnaires would be reduced, and would be 
supplemented by a number of structured interviews. Ideally, more time would also have 
been spent in each company, in order to observe the individual actors at work. However, 
one was conscious, given the fact that health and safety issues were not of central 
importance to the plant-level actors, of outstaying one's welcome. 
One could argue that health and safety is not the best issue with which to examine the 
dynamics of plant-level industrial relations in German industry, given that both the 
positive-sum nature24. and the complexity of health and safety ensure that cooperation 
rather than confrontation is the norm in relation to this issue at plant level. Whilst an 
examination of the way in which a more contentious issue was being addressed in the 
workplace may have proved more enlightening, 250 it is the author's contention that the low 
propensity of industrial conflict in German industry since 1949 justifies both the choice of 
the issue and the concentration on cooperative plant-level industrial relations. 
In examining the way in which occupational health and safety issues were addressed in the 
German metal-working industry, this thesis has identified a clear preference for 
cooperation over confrontation at plant level, with third-party involvement in company 
affairs the exception rather than the rule. Before any generally applicable conclusions can 
be drawn about this preference for cooperation over confrontation at the micro level in 
German industry however, the author contends that further research is necessary into the 
way in which more quantitative issues are addressed at plant level. 
249 Health and safety has been shown to be a positive-sum issue in the sense that both the employees 
and the company benefit in the short term if little is done to improve working conditions. Similarly, both 
experience a long-term benefit whenever this issue is addressed (see Figure 9.1). 
2°A review of labour-court decisions in NRW revealed that few disputes of direct relevance to 
health and safety have reached this stage. However, it was suggested that thousands of decisions, such as 
those concerned with questions of working time, do have implications for the health and safety arena 
(Seile #81). 
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The study has also highlighted the large volume of legislation which exists to regulate the 
health and safety arena. Further consideration needs to be given to the extent to which the 
plant-level actors have come to rely upon this legislation, and just how effective it actually 
is. For example, Foxtrot GmbH was regarded as an exemplary company for trainee 
inspectors to visit, given the fact that the legislative provisions were in place. 
Nevertheless, this same company had an accident rate well above the average for the 
professional association to which it was affiliated. 
The thesis has also made reference to the impending alterations to the accident-prevention 
regulations, which concern themselves with the appointment of health and safety personnel 
in the smaller companies. Further investigation would be useful at a later date, in order to 
assess the contribution being made by such amendments to an improvement in the working 
conditions being enjoyed by the large number of employees in these smaller workplaces. 
Similarly, reference has been made to the legislation emanating from the EU, with the 
extension of the rights of co-determination enjoyed by the works councils in the health and 
safety arena of most significance. In time, further study will be required of the extent to 
which the works councils are making use of these rights, and whether the new legislation 
is actually contributing to an improvement in the health and safety of the working 
population. 
Finally, in an article published just five years after German reunification, Mense-Petermann 
(1996: 65) wrote of "... a revival of enterprise oriented models of industrial relations from 
the past in the East. " In essence, she was referring to the decentralisation 
(Verbetrieblichung) of industrial relations to the plant level in Germany, and therefore to a 
role of greater significance for the works councils. It is the author's contention therefore, 
that further research will be necessary into the way in which such developments are 
affecting the German model of industrial relations as a whole. For example, will the works 
councils assume the role of responsible co-managers, or will they utilise these greater 
powers to adopt a more conflictual approach at plant level? As Kotthoff (1994) 
demonstrated in the late 1980s, a follow-up study can be very enlightening, and a return to 
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the seven case-study companies in a decade or so from now would serve to answer all 
these questions, and no doubt many more besides. 
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Appendix 1: Qualitative Interviews 
Interview Date Interviewee 
#1 Monday 18th January 1993 Mr C. Bowater, British Alcan 
Aluminium. 
#2 Wednesday 7th July 1993 
#3 Tuesday 13th July 1993 
#4 Wednesday 14th July 1993 
#5 Thursday 15th July 1993 
Prof. D. Sadowski, IAAEG Trier. 
Ford Köln: plant visit and presentation. 
Frau A. Glowatzki, Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz, Dortmund. 
Prof. Dr. W. Müller-Jentsch, Ruhr- 
Universität Bochum. 
#6 Monday 11th April 1994 Herr M. Deiß, ISF München. 
#7 Monday 11th April 1994 IG Metall Arbeitskreis für 
Arbeitssicherheit, München. 
#8 Tuesday 12th April 1994 Herr F. Oppenauer, IG Metall, München. 
#9 Monday 1 8th April 1994 Herr T. Staffeldt, IGES Berlin. 
#10 Tuesday 19th April 1994 Herr H. Salani, Works Councillor, EKO 
Stahl, Eisenhüttenstadt. 
#11 Wednesday 20th April 1994 Herr E. Göbel, BRAG Berlin. 
#12 Friday 22nd April 1994 Frau Schwarz, Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsmedizin, Berlin. 
#13 Monday 25th April 1994 Herr Krauß, Bayer, Leverkusen. 
#14 Tuesday 25th April 1994 Frau A. Kähler, Kirchlicher Dienst in der 
Arbeitswelt (IDA), Hamburg. 
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#15 Thursday 27th April 1994 Herr H. Vriedt / Frau C. Ferber, Info 
Arbeit und Gesundheit, Hamburg. 
#16 Thursday 27th April 1994 Herr A. Oppolzer, Hochschule für 
. Wirtschaft und Politik, Hamburg. 
#17 Friday 28th April 1994 Works Councillor, Zulu AG. 
#18 Monday 8th May 1994 Mr I. Donald, Dept. of Psychology, 
University of Surrey. 
#19 Wed. 19th October 1994 Ms P. Kenny, Robens Institute, 
Guildford. 
#20 Monday 9th January 1995 Herr D. Herrmann / Frau A. Kibler, 
KDA, Hamburg. 
#21 Monday 9th January 1995 Herr B. Janßen, IG Metall 
Verwaltungsstelle, Hamburg. 
#22 Tuesday 10th January 1995 Herr U. Fitzner, IG Metall Bezirksleitung, 
Hannover. 
#23 Tuesday 10th January 1995 Herr C. Glunz, IG Metall Bezirksleitung, 
Dortmund. 
#24 Wed. 11th January 1995 Herr Jörg / Herr Bohn, Mercedes-Benz, 
Mannheim. 
#25 Wed. 11th January 1995 Herr Paszehr, IG Metall Bezirksleitung, 
Stuttgart. 
#26 Thursday 12th January 1995 Herr Fuchs, IG Metall Vorstand, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
#27 Friday 12th January 1995 Works Councillor, Zulu AG. 
#28 Monday 13th February 1995 Mr D. Hunt, Shop Steward, Body Plant, 
Ford Dagenham. 
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#29 Monday 13th February 1995 Mr G. Foulkes, Plant Convenor, Body 
Plant, Ford Dagenham. 
#30 Wednesday 8th March 1995 
#31 Friday 10th March 1995 
#32 Tuesday 14th March 1995 
Frau E. Zwink, Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz, Dortmund. 
Herr K. Kuhn, Gruppenleiter 
Gesundheitsschutz und 
Arbeitsbedingungen - Statistik, 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, 
Dortmund. 
Herr Schlummer, Staatliches Amt für 
Arbeitsschutz, Dortmund. 
#33 Wed. 15th March 1995 Frau M. Wienemann, 
Weiterbildungszentrum, Ruhr- 
Universität Bochum. 
#34 Thursday 16th March 1995 Works Councillor, Echo AG -'Branch A'. 
#35 Thursday 16th March 1995 Full-Time Health and Safety Expert, Echo 
AG - `Branch A'. 
#36 Friday 17th March 1995 Labour Director, Delta AG. 
#37 Friday 17th March 1995 Health and Safety Expert, Delta AG. 
#38 Friday 17th March 1995 Herr B. Zwingmann, Referatsleiter für 
Arbeitsschutz, Arbeitsumwelt, 
Arbeitsmedizin und Unfallversicherung 
beim DGB Vorstand, Düsseldorf. 
#39 Monday 20th March 1995 Herr P. Camin, Betriebsrat, Reynolds 
Aluminium, Hamburg. 
#40 Monday 20th March 1995 Herr S. Poier, Plant Manager, Reynolds 
Aluminium, Hamburg. 
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#41 Wed. 22nd March 1995 Personnel Manager, Zulu AG.. 
#42 Thursday 23rd March 1995 Works Council Chairperson, Beta GmbH. 
#43 Thursday 23rd March 1995 Plant Manager, Beta GmbH. 
#44 Thursday 23rd March 1995 Works Councillor, Echo AG - `Branch B'. 
#45 Monday 27th March 1995 Herr Peter, Bezirksleiter der TABs, 
Hütten- und Walzwerks- 
Berufsgenossenschaft, Essen. 
#46 Monday 27th March 1995 Herr Frener, Technischer Aufsichtsdienst, 
Hütten- und Walzwerks- 
Berufsgenossenschaft, Essen. 
#47 Tuesday 28th March 1995 Works Council Chairperson, Alpha Iron 
and Steelworks GmbH. 
#48 Tuesday 28th March 1995 Works Director, Alpha Iron & Steelworks 
GmbH. 
#49 Tuesday 28th March 1995 Health and Safety Expert, Alpha Iron and 
Steelworks GmbH. 
#50 Wed. 29th March 1995 Personnel Manager, Tango-Roger Steel 
AG. 
#51 Wed. 5th April 1995 Herr Buchner, TAB, Maschinenbau- und 
Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, Düsseldorf. 
#52 Thursday 6th April 1995 Herr W. Ullenboom, RWTÜV 
Anlagetechnik GmbH, Essen. 
#53 Thursday 6th April 1995 Herr Sochert, Bundesverband der 
Betriebskrankenkassen, Essen. 
#54 Thursday 6th April 1995 Herr U. Prö11, Sozialforschungsstelle, 
Dortmund. 
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Interview Date 
#55 Friday 7th April 1995 
#56 Wed. 12th April 1995 
#57 Thursday 20th April 1995 
458 Thursday 20th April 1995 
#59 Friday 21st April 1995 
#60 Friday 21st April 1995 
#61 Friday 21st April 1995 
#62 Monday 24th April 1995 
#63 Monday 24th April 1995 
#64 Monday 24th April 1995 
#65 Monday 24th April 1995 
#66 Monday 24th April 1995 
#67 Monday 24th April 1995 
#68 Monday 24th April 1995 
#69 Tuesday 25th April 1995 
#70 Tuesday 25th April 1995 
Interviewee 
Herr H-J. Bieneck, Bundesministerium 
für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Bonn. 
Health and Safety Expert, Gamma 
Transportation Technology GmbH. 
Works Council Chairman, Alpha Iron & 
Steelworks GmbH. 
Health and Safety Representatives of the 
Works Council, Alpha Iron & Steelworks 
GmbH. 
Health and Safety Expert, Alpha Iron & 
Steelworks GmbH. 
Plant Manager - Engineering Works, 
Alpha Iron & Steelworks GmbH. 
Plant Manager - Foundry, Alpha Iron & 
Steelworks GmbH. 
Speaker - Branch-Management 
Committee, Echo AG - `Branch B'. 
Works Council Chairman, Beta GmbH. 
Works Councillor, Beta GmbH. 
Health and Safety Expert, Beta GmbH. 
Workshop Manager, Beta GmbH. 
Works Director, Beta GmbH. 
Personnel Manager, Beta GmbH. 
Branch Manager / Health and Safety 
Expert, Echo AG - 'Branch B'. 
Works Councillor, Echo AG - 'Branch B'. 
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#71 Tuesday 25th April 1995 Workshop Manager, Echo AG - 'Branch 
B'. 
#72 Wednesday 26th April 1995 Health and Safety Expert, Adam Opel 
AG, Bochum. 
#73 Thursday 27th April 1995 Construction Site Visit, Delta AG. 
Discussions with Site Managers and 
StAfA Inspector. 
#74 Thursday 27th April 1995 Herr H-J. Sperling, Ruhr-Universität 
Bochum. 
#75 Thursday 27th April 1995 Prof. Dr. W. Müller-Jentsch, Ruhr- 
Universität Bochum. 
#76 Friday 28th April 1995 Herr K. Kreizberg, BDA, Köln. 
#77 Friday 28th April 1995 Herr C. Leichsenring, 
Berufsgenossenschaft der Feinmechanik 
und Elektrotechnik, Köln. 
#78 Tuesday 2nd May 1995 Herr Dr. A. Meyer-Falcke, Referatsleiter 
Gesundheitsschutz am Arbeitsplatz, 
Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und 
Soziales des Landes NRW, Düsseldorf. 
#79 Tuesday 2nd May 1995 Herr Lemanski, Landesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz NRW, Düsseldorf. 
#80 Tuesday 2nd May 1995 Herr Eberle, Referat 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Landesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz NRW, Düsseldorf. 
#81 Tuesday 2nd May 1995 Herr Selle, Landesarbeitsgericht 
Düsseldorf. 
261 
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#82 Wednesday 3rd May 1995 
#83 Wednesday 3rd May 1995 
#84 Wednesday 3rd May 1995 
#85 Friday 5th May 1995 
#86 Friday 5th May 1995 
#87 Friday 5th May 1995 
#88 Monday 8th May 1995 
#89 
#90 
#91 
#92 
#93 
#94 
#95 
Monday 8th May 1995 
Monday 8th May 1995 
Tuesday 9th May 1995 
Tuesday 9th May 1995 
Interviewee 
Deputy Chairman of the Works Council, 
Tango-Roger Steel AG. 
Herr Dertinger, Hauptverband der 
gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften, 
Sankt Augustin. 
Works Council Chairman / Health and 
Safety Expert, Foxtrot GmbH. 
Full-Time Health and Safety Expert, Echo 
AG - `Branch A'. 
Quality Control Manager, Echo AG - 
'Branch A'. 
Works Councillor, Echo AG -'Branch A'. 
Health and Safety Expert, Delta AG. 
Health and Safety Sub-Committee 
Member of the Company Works Council, 
Delta AG. 
Labour Director, Delta AG. 
Herr Bastong, Verband der Metall- und 
Elektro-Industrie NRW e. V., Düsseldorf. 
Herr J. Dzudzek, IG Metall, 
Bezirksleitung Duisburg. 
Wednesday 10th May 1995 Deputy Chairman of the Works Council, 
Tango-Roger Steel AG. 
Wednesday 10th May 1995 Works Director, Gamma GmbH. 
Wednesday 10th May 1995 Plant Manager, Wheel Design, Gamma 
Transportation Technology GmbH. 
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#96 Wednesday 10th May 1995 Plant Manager, Repair Workshop, 
Gamma Transportation Technology 
GmbH. 
#97 Wednesday 10th May 1995 Plant Manager, Wheel Preparation, 
Gamma Transportation Technology 
GmbH. 
#98 Wednesday 10th May 1995 Works Councillor, Gamma 
Transportation Technology GmbH. 
#99 Friday 12th May 1995 Employers' Representatives, Joint 
Committee for Health and Safety and the 
Environment, Tango-Roger Steel AG. 
#100 Friday 12th May 1995 Workers' Representatives, Joint 
Committee for Health and Safety and the 
Environment, Tango-Roger Steel AG. 
#101 Friday 12th May 1995 Works Council Chairman / Health and 
Safety Expert, Foxtrot GmbH. 
#102 Friday 12th May 1995 Workshop Manager, Foxtrot GmbH. 
#103 Monday 15th May 1995 Herr K. Kuhn, Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz, Dortmund. 
#104 Monday 15th May 1995 Senior Health and Safety Expert, Works 
Safety Department, Tango-Roger Steel 
AG. 
#105 Tuesday 16th May 1995 Health and Safety Expert, Gamma 
Transportation Technology GmbH. 
#106 Tuesday 16th May 1995 Herr Zimolong, Ruhr-Universität 
Bochum. 
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#107 Wednesday 17th May 1995 Works Councillor, Tango-Roger Steel 
AG. 
#108 Wednesday 17th May 1995 Meeting of the Safety Committee, 
Gamma Transportation Technology 
GmbH. 
#109 Wednesday 17th May 1995 Works Director, Gamma GmbH. 
#110 Wednesday 17th May 1995 Health and Safety Expert, Gamma 
Transportation Technology GmbH. 
#111 Wednesday 17th May 1995 Colloquium, Ruhr-Universität Bochum. 
#112 Thursday 18th May 1995 Personnel Manager, Strip Production, 
Tango-Roger Steel AG. 
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Appendix 2: Workforce Questionnaire 
1. Hier sind einige Aussagen über den Arbeitsschutz im Betrieb. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
stimme ich stimme weiß stimme ich stimme 
absolut ich kaum nicht eingeschränkt ich voll 
nicht zu zu zu zu 
A) Ich achte immer auf die 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsschutzvorschriften. 
B) Die Vorgesetzten achten immer 1 2 3 4 5 
auf die Arbeitsschutzvorschriften. 
C) Ich würde 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 
vorschlagen, die meine Sicherheit 
verbessern aber gleichzeitig meine 
Arbeitsleistung reduzieren würden. 
D) Der Arbeitsschutz hat einen 1 2 3 4 5 
hohen Stellenwert innerhalb des 
Betriebes. 
E) Die Betriebsleitung kümmert 1 2 3 4 5 
sich sehr viel um die Sicherheit 
der Arbeitnehmer. 
F) Unter der Belegschaft werden 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsschutzfragen ständig 
diskutiert. 
G) Die Gewerkschaft berät die 1 2 3 4 5 
Belegschaft immer in 
Arbeitsschutzfragen. 
H) Die Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 1 2 3 4 5 
erschweren meine Arbeit. 
1) Die Mehrheit der Arbeitsunfälle 1 2 3 4 5 
sind verhaltensbedingt. 
J) Ich bin mit der Arbeit der 1 2 3 4 5 
Sicherheitsfachkräfte zufrieden. 
2. Wurden Sie bei Arbeitsantritt über die konkreten Gefahren an Ihrem 
Arbeitsplatz informiert? 
Ja Qi Nein Q2 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Wenn ja, wer hat Sie darüber informiert? (Bitte nur ein Kreuz) 
WER: 
die Vorgesetzten Q1 der Betriebsrat Qs 
die Vertrauensleute Q2 ein Sicherheitsbeauftragter Q6 
eine Sicherheitsfachkraft Q3 ein Betriebsarzt Q7 
die Berufsgenossenschaft Q4 
Andere (wenn ja, wer) ................................................................................ 
Q 
Werden Sie ermutigt Verbesserungen im Bereich Arbeitsschutz 
vorzuschlagen? 
Ja Q1 Nein Q2 
An wen würden Sie mit Arbeitsschutzvorschlägen herantreten? 
(Bitte nur ein Kreuz) 
den Betriebsrat Qi 
die vorgesetzten Q2 
die Vertrauensleute Q3 
die Betriebsleitung Qa 
den Betriebsarzt Qs 
den Sicherheitsbeauftragten Q6 
die Sicherheitsfachkraft Q7 
die Gewerkschaft Qa 
weiß nicht Q9 
Andere (wenn ja, an wen) ................................................................... 
Q 
Haben Sie persönlich Verbesserungen im Bereich Arbeitsschutz schon 
vorgeschlagen? 
Ja Qi Nein Q2 
Haben Sie die Möglichkeit die folgenden Entscheidungen des 
Arbeitgebers zu beeinflussen? 
Ja Nein 
Die Auswahl der Körperschutzmittel Q1Q2 
Die Formulierung neuer Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen Q1 Q2 
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8. 
9. 
10. 
An wen würden Sie mit Arbeitsschutzproblemen herantreten? 
(Bitte nur ein Kreuz) 
den Betriebsrat Qi 
die Vorgesetzten Q2 
die Vertrauensleute Q3 
die Betriebsleitung Qa 
den Betriebsarzt Q5 
Andere (wenn ja, an wen) 
den Sicherheitsbeauftragten 
die Sicherheitsfachkraft 
die Gewerkschaft 
weiß nicht 
................................................................... 13 
Q6 
Q7 
Q9 
Q9 
Nehmen Sie an der Entwicklung, der Durchführung und der Kontrolle 
der Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen im Betrieb teil? 
Ja Nein 
Entwicklung Q1Q2 
Durchführung Qi Q2 
Kontrolle QiQi 
Wie werden Sie informiert, wenn neue Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 
eingeführt werden? 
DURCH. - Ja Nein DURCH Ja Nein 
die Vorgesetzten Q1 Q2 die Sicherheitsbeauftragten Qi Qz 
den Betriebsrat Qi Q2 die Sicherheitsfachkräfte Qi Qz 
die Gewerkschaft Q1 Q2 die Berufsgenossenschaft Q1 Qz 
die Betriebsärzte Qi Q2 die Betriebsversammlung Q1 Q2 
die Vertrauensleute Q1 Qs die betriebliche Zeitung Q1 Q2 
das schwarze Brett 
Qi Q2 Aufklärungsbroschüren Qi Qi 
Kollegen Q1 Qz 
Andere (wenn ja, durch wen) ......... .......................................... 
Q 
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11. Wie reagiert die Belegschaft auf verschiedene 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
werden werden weiß werden werden nie 
immer gelegentlich nicht selten beachtet 
beachtet beachtet beachtet 
A) Maßnahmen, die durch die 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsleitung und den 
Betriebsrat entwickelt werden. 
B) Maßnahmen, die durch die 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsleitung entwickelt 
werden. 
C) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
interne Stellen mit direkter 
Beteiligung der Belegschaft 
entwickelt werden. 
D) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
externe Stellen entwickelt 
werden. 
E) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
interne Stellen ohne direkte 
Beteiligung der Belegschaft 
entwickelt werden. 
12. Hier sind einige Fragen über die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Stellen. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
Wie oft haben Sie Kontakt zu: 
täglich wöchentlich alle 
vierzehn 
Tage 
monatlich seltener 
A) der Betriebsleitung. 1 2 3 4 5 
B) den Sicherheitsfachkräften. 1 2 3 4 5 
C) den Betriebsärzten. 1 2 3 4 5 
D) den technischen 
Aufsichtsbeamten. 
1 2 3 4 5 
E) den Vertrauensleuten 1 2 3 4 5 
F) den Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten. 1 2 3 4 5 
G) den Sicherheitsbeauftragten. 1 2 3 4 5 
H) dem Betriebsrat. 1 2 3 4 5 
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13. 
14. 
15. 
Welche der folgenden Zwischenfälle würden Sie melden? 
Ja 
Schnittverletzung ohne Erstversorgung Qi 
defekte Geräte Qi 
beschädigte Sicherheitskleidung Q1 
Unfall ohne Personenschaden 
Q1 
Nein 
J2 
02 
02 
02 
Haben Sie persönlich einen der folgenden Arbeitsunfälle erlitten? 
Nein 
Unfall mit bis zu 3 Tagen Krankmeldung 
QiQ2 
Unfall mit mehr als 3 Tagen Krankmeldung 
QiQ2 
Wegeunfall Qi Q2 
Wenn ja, haben diese Unfälle Ihr Verhalten am Arbeitsplatz 
beeinflußt? 
Ja Nein 
Unfall mit bis zu 3 Tagen Krankmeldung 
QiQ2 
Unfall mit mehr als 3 Tagen Krankmeldung 
Q1Q2 
Wegeunfall Qi Q2 
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16. Hier sind einige Aussagen über den Betriebsrat. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
stimme ich stimme weiß stimme ich stimme 
absolut ich kaum nicht eingeschränkt ich voll 
nicht zu zu zu zu 
A) Der Betriebsrat kümmert 1 2 3 4 5 
sich sehr viel um die 
Sicherheit der Arbeitnehmer. 
B) Betriebsbegehungen durch 1 2 3 4 5 
den Betriebsrat finden sehr oft 
statt. 
C) Arbeitsschutzfragen werden 1 2 3 4 5 
bei den 
Betriebsversammlungen immer 
diskutiert. 
D) Der Betriebsrat hat einen 1 2 3 4 5 
großen Einfluß auf die 
Entwicklung von 
Arbeitsschutzvorschriften im 
Betrieb. 
E) Im Falle einer 1 2 3 4 
Nichtwiederwahl des jetzigen 
Betriebsrates würde der 
Arbeitsschutz im Betrieb 
leiden. 
F) Die Rolle des Betriebsrates 1 2 3 4 5 
als Vertretungsorgan der 
Belegschaft würde ich als sehr 
positiv beurteilen. 
G) Der Betriebsrat würde die 1 2 3 4 5 
Nichtbeachtung von 
Arbeitsschutzvorschriften 
dulden, um Verbesserungen 
für die Arbeitnehmer in 
anderen Bereichen zu 
bekommen. 
17. Wie unterrichtet der Betriebsrat die Belegschaft von seinen Tätigkeiten 
im Bereich Arbeitsschutz? 
DURCH: Ja Nein DURCH La 
die Vertrauensleute Q1 Qz die betriebliche Zeitung Q1 
die Kollegen Qi Qz die Betriebsversammlung Qi 
das schwarze Brett 
Q1 Q2 weiß nicht Q1 
Andere (wenn ja, durch wen) ................................................................. 
Nein 
of 
a2 
02 
a 
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18. Wissen Sie wer im Betriebsrat für den Arbeitsschutz verantwortlich 
ist? 
Ja Qi Nein Qs 
19. Suchen Sie den Betriebsrat innerhalb der Sprechstunden auf? 
Nein Qi Manchmal Qs Ja, immer Q3 
20. Haben Sie in diesem Zusammenhang jemals Arbeitsschutzfragen 
besprochen? 
Ja Qi Nein Q2 
21. Mit wem arbeitet der Betriebsrat hinsichtlich des Arbeitsschutzes AM 
MEISTEN zusammen? 
(Bitte nur ein Kreuz) 
MIT: 
dem Vorstand Q1 den Sicherheitsfachkräften Q7 
den Vorgesetzten Q2 den Sicherheitsbeauftragten Qs 
den Arbeitnehmern Q3 der Gewerkschaft Q9 
den Vertrauensleuten Q4 der Berufsgenossenschaft Q 10 
den technischen Aufsichtsbeamten Qs den Betriebsärzten Qii 
den Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten Q6 weiß nicht 
Q 12 
Anderen (wenn ja, mit wem) ................................................................. 
Q 
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22. Wie würden Sie das Verhältnis zwischen dem Betriebsrat und den 
folgenden Körperschaften beschreiben? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
sehr 
kooperativ 
kooperativ weiß 
nicht 
unkooperativ sehr 
unkooperativ 
A) der Betriebsleitung 1 2 3 4 5 
B) den Arbeitnehmern 1 2 3 4 5 
C) den Sicherheitsfachkräften 1 2 3 4 5 
D) den Vorgesetzten 1 2 3 4 5 
E) den Betriebsärzten 1 2 3 4 5 
F) den Vertauensleuten 1 2 3 4 5 
G) der Gewerkschaft 1 2 3 4 5 
23. Hier sind einige Aussagen über Ihren Arbeitsplatz. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
stimme ich stimme weiß stimme ich stimme 
absolut ich nicht eingeschränkt Ich voll 
nicht zu kaum zu zu za 
A) Mein Arbeitsplatz ist für die 1 2 3 4 5 
Zukunft sicher. 
B) Ich würde meine Arbeit als 1 2 3 4 5 
monoton beschreiben. 
C) Das Arbeitsklima ist sehr gut. 1 2 3 4 5 
D) Wir werden ständig 1 2 3 4 5 
gezwungen, unsere 
Arbeitsleistun zu erhöhen. 
E) Ich bin mit meiner Arbeit sehr 1 2 3 4 5 
zufrieden. 
F) Unter humaneren 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsbedingungen könnte ich 
produktiver arbeiten. 
24. Wie würde Ihrer Ansicht nach die Betriebsleitung die folgenden Punkte 
einordnen? 
Bitte bilden Sie eine Rangfolge zwischen 1 (am wichtigsten) und 3 (am 
unwichtigsten) 
Eine Reduzierung der Lohnkosten .......... 
Eine Steigerung der Produktivität .......... 
Eine Reduzierung der Arbeitsunfälle .......... 
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25. Wie würden Sie die folgenden Punkte einordnen? 
Bitte bilden Sie eine Rangfolge zwischen 1 (am wichtigsten) und 5 (am 
unwichtigsten) 
Mehr Urlaub .......... 
Eine Reduzierung der Arbeitsunfälle .......... 
Mehr Geld .......... 
Eine Humanisierung der Arbeitsbedingungen .......... 
Eine Reduzierung der Arbeitswoche .......... 
26. Wären Sie bereit, einen geringeren Lohn in Kauf zu nehmen, wenn 
dadurch eine höhere Sicherheit am Arbeitsplatz gewährleistet werden 
könnte? 
Ja Q1 Nein Qs 
27. Geschlecht? 
Männlich Q1 Weiblich Q2 
28. Alter? 
Unter 18 Qi 36-45 Q4 
18-25 Q2 46-55 Q5 
26-35 Q3 56-65 Q6 
29. Seit wann sind Sie in diesem Werk beschäftigt? 
0-5 Jahre Qi 16-20 Jahre Q4 
6-10 Jahre Q2 21-25 Jahre Qs 
11-15 Jahre Q3 Mehr als 25 Jahre 
Q6 
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30. Sind Sie gewerkschaftlich organisiert? 
Ja, bei der IG Metall Qi Ja, bei einer anderen Gewerkschaft Q4 
Ja, bei der DAG Q2 Nein Qs 
Ja, bei dem CGB Q3 
31. Welchen Beruf üben Sie aus? 
................................................................................................................ 
32. Sind Sie gleichzeitig Sicherheitsbeauftragte/Sicherheitsbeauftragter? 
Ja Q1 Nein Qi 
33. Nach welcher Lohnform werden Sie bezahlt? 
Akkordlohn Qi 
Stundenlohn Qz 
Monatslohn Q3 
Monatsgehalt Qa 
Andere Entlohnungsform (Wenn ja, welcher Art) 
................................................................................ a 
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Appendix 3: Works Council Questionnaire 
1. Geschlecht? 
Männlich Qi Weiblich Q2 
2. Alter? 
18-25 Qi 46-55 Q4 
26-35 Q2 56-65 Qs 
36-45 Q3 
3. Seit wann sind Sie in diesem Werk beschäftigt? 
0-5 Jahre Q1 16-20 Jahre Qa 
6-10 Jahre Qz 21-25 Jahre Qs 
11-15 Jahre Q3 Mehr als 25 Jahre Q6 
4. Seit wann sind Sie Be triebsratsmitglied? 
0-4 Jahre Q1 13 -16 Jahre 
Q4 
S-8 Jahre Q2 17-20 Jahre Q5 
9 -12 Jahre 
Q3 Mehr als 20 Jahre Q6 
5. Sind Sie freigestellt? 
Ja Qi Nein Qi 
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6. Sind Sie gewerkschaftlich organisiert? 
Ja, bei der IG Metall Qt Ja, bei einer anderen Gewerkschaft Q4 
Ja, bei der DAG Q2 Nein Q5 
Ja, bei dem CGB Q3 
7. Haben Sie eine gewerkschaftliche Funktion? 
Ja Q1 Nein Q2 
8. Wenn ja, welche? 
0 ............. 0 
9. Sind Sie Arbeitsschutzbeauftragte/Arbeitsschutzbeauftragter des 
Betriebsrates? 
Ja Qi Nein Q2 
10. Wieviel Zeit verbringen Sie persönlich mit Arbeitsschutzfragen? 
0 -25% 
Q, 51-75% Q3 
26-50% Q2 Mehr als 75% 
Q4 
11. Wieviel Zeit verbringt der Betriebsrat als Gremium mit 
Arbeitsschutzfragen? 
0- 25% Q 51- 75% Q3 
26-50% Q2 Mehr als 75% 
Qa 
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12. Hier sind einige Aussagen über den Betriebsrat und den Arbeitsschutz 
im Betrieb. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
stimme ich stimme ich weiß stimme ich stimme 
absolut nicht kaum zu nicht eingeschränkt Ich voll 
zu zu zu 
A) Bei den 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsversammlungen 
werden 
Arbeitsschutzfragen 
immer diskutiert. 
B) Bei den Vier-Augen 1 2 3 4 5 
Gesprächen mit der 
Betriebsleitung werden 
Arbeitsschutzfragen 
immer diskutiert. 
C) Der Betriebsrat schlägt 1 2 3 4 5 
der Betriebsleitung 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 
regelmäßig vor. 
D) Bei der Entwicklung 1 2 3 4 5 
von 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 
werden die Kosten immer 
chtigt. 
E) Der Betriebsrat würde 1 2 3 4 5 
die Nichtbeachtung von 
Arbeitsschutzvorschriften 
dulden, um 
Verbesserungen für die 
Arbeitnehmer in anderen 
Bereichen zu bekommen. 
F) Im Betrieb werden die 1 2 3 4 5 
Rechte des Betriebsrates 
realisiert, genauso wie sie 
im BetrVG und im ASiG 
nieder eschrieben sind. 
G) Bei den 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsbegehungen und 
Unfalluntersuchungen 
nimmt der Betriebsrat 
immer teil. 
Fortsetzung ................... 
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stimme ich stimme ich weiß stimme ich stimme 
absolut nicht kaum zu nicht eingeschränkt ich voll 
zu zu zu 
H) Bei den Gesprächen 1 2 3 4 5 
zwischen der 
Betriebsleitung und den 
Sicherheitsbeauftragten 
nimmt der Betriebsrat 
immer teil. 
1) Der Betriebsrat wird 1 2 3 4 5 
von der Betriebsleitung 
umfassend und rechtzeitig 
informiert. 
J) Im Falle einer 1 2 3 4 5 
Nichtwiederwahl des 
jetzigen Betriebsrates 
würde der Arbeitsschutz 
im Betrieb leiden. 
13. Wird der Betriebsrat bei der Auswahl der folgenden Personen beteiligt? 
Ja ein 
der Sicherheitsbeauftragten Qi Qz 
der SicherheitsJachkrlifte QiQ2 
der Betriebsärzte QiQ2 
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14. Wie würden Sie das Verhältnis zwischen dem Betriebsrat und den 
folgenden Körperschaften beschreiben? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
Zwischen dem 
Betriebsrat und ........ 
sehr 
kooperativ 
kooperativ weiß 
nicht 
unkooperativ sehr 
unkooperati 
v 
A) der Betriebsleitung 1 2 3 4 5 
B) den Arbeitnehmern 1 2 3 4 5 
C) den 
Sicherheitsfachkräften 
1 2 3 4 5 
D) den Vorgesetzten 1 2 3 4 5 
E) den Betriebsärzten 1 2 3 4 5 
F) den Vertauensleuten 1 2 3 4 5 
G) der Gewerkschaft 1 2 3 4 
H) den 
Sicherheitsbeauftragten 
1 2 3 4 5 
I) der Berufsgenossenschaft 1 2 3 4 5 
J) den 
Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten 
1 2 3 4 5 
K) dem Arbeitsdirektor im 
Aufsichtsrat. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Hier sind einige Fragen über die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Stellen. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
Wie oft haben Sie Kontakt zu: 
täglich wöchentlich alle 
vierzehn 
Tage 
monatlich seltener 
A) den Arbeitnehmern. 1 2 3 4 5 
B) der Gewerkschaft. 1 2 3 4 5 
C) der Betriebsleitung. 1 2 3 4 5 
D) den Sicherheitsfachkräften. 1 2 3 4 5 
E) den Betriebsärzten. 1 2 3 4 5 
F) den technischen 
Aufsichtsbeamten. 
1 2 3 4 5 
G) der Berufsgenossenschaft. 1 2 3 4 5 
H) den Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten. 1 2 3 4 5 
I) den Sicherheitsbeauftragten. 1 2 3 4 5 
J) den Vertrauensleuten. 1 
L2 
3 4 5 
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16. Hier sind einige Aussagen über den Arbeitsschutz im Betrieb. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
stimme ich stimme weiß stimme ich stimme Ich 
absolut ich kaum nicht eingeschränkt voll zu 
nicht zu zu zu 
A) Arbeitsschutz ist eine 1 2 3 4 5 
Voraussetzung des 
Unternehmenserfolges. 
B) Eine effektive 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsschutzpolitik ist der 
Belegschaft zuträglich. 
C) Akkordlohn ist dem 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsschutz abträglich. 
D) Die Betriebsleitung steht 1 2 3 4 5 
unter ungenügendem Druck, 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 
durchzuführen. 
E) Die Betriebsleitung 1 2 3 4 5 
kümmert sich sehr viel um die 
Sicherheit der Arbeitnehmer 
F) Das Arbeitsklima ist sehr 1 2 3 4 5 
t. 
G) Die Mehrheit der 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsunfälle sind 
verhaltensbedingt. 
H) Der Arbeitsschutzausschuß 1 2 3 4 5 
ist sehr effizient. 
1) Die Einführung von 1 2 3 4 5 
Gesundheitszirkeln ist dem 
Arbeitsschutz zuträ lich. 
17. Nimmt der Betriebsrat an der Entwicklung, der Durchführung und der 
Kontrolle der Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen im Betrieb teil? 
Ja ein 
Entwicklung Qi Qx 
Durchführung Q1 Q2 
Kontrolle Q1Q2 
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18. Was halten Sie von den Rechten des Betriebsrates hinsichtlich des 
Arbeitsschutzes? 
Könnten erweitert werden 
Qi 
Bin zufrieden 
Q2 
Weiß nicht 
Q3 
19. Wie reagiert die Belegschaft auf verschiedene 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
werden werden weiß werden werden nie 
immer gelegentlich nicht selten beachtet 
beachtet beachtet beachtet 
A) Maßnahmen, die durch die 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsleitung und den 
Betriebsrat entwickelt werden. 
B) Maßnahmen, die durch die 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsleitung entwickelt 
werden. 
C) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
interne Stellen mit direkter 
Beteiligung der Belegschaft 
entwickelt werden. 
D) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
externe Stellen entwickelt 
werden. 
E) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
interne Stellen ohne direkte 
Beteiligung der Belegschaft 
entwickelt werden. 
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Appendix 4: Line Management Questionnaire 
1. Alter? 
Unter 18 Q1 36-45 Qa 
18-25 Q2 46-55 Qs 
26-35 Q3 56-65 Q6 
2. Geschlecht? 
Männlich Q1 Weiblich Q2 
3. Seit wann sind Sie in diesem Werk beschäftigt? 
0-S Jahre Q1 16-20 Jahre Qa 
6-10 Jahre Q2 21-25 Jahre Qs 
11-15 Jahre Q3 Mehr als 25 Q6 
4. Sind Sie gewerkschaftlich organisiert? 
Ja, bei der IG Metall Q1 Ja, bei einer anderen Gewerkschaft Qa 
Ja, bei der DAG Q2 Nein Qs 
Ja, bei dem CGB Qs 
5. Nach welcher Lohnform werden Sie bezahlt? 
Akkordlohn Qi 
Stundenlohn Q2 
Monatslohn Q3 
Monatsgehalt Qa 
Andere Entlohnungsform (Wenn ja, welcher Art) 
................................................................................ 
Q 
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6. Hier sind einige Aussagen über den Arbeitsschutz im Betrieb. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
stimme ich stimme weiß stimme ich stimme 
absolut ich kaum nicht eingeschränkt ich voll 
nicht zu zu zu zu 
A) Ich achte immer auf die 1 2 3 4 5 
Arbeitsschutzvorschriften. 
B) Die Beschäftigten achten 1 2 3 4 5 
immer auf die 
Arbeitsschutzvorschriften. 
C) Ich informiere die 1 2 3 4 5 
Beschäftigten bei Arbeitsantritt 
über die Gefahren am Arbeitsplatz. 
D) Die Betriebsleitung kümmert 1 2 3 4 5 
sich sehr viel um die Sicherheit 
der Arbeitnehmer. 
E) Der Betriebsrat kümmert sich 1 2 3 4 5 
sehr viel um die Sicherheit der 
Arbeitnehmer. 
V) Im Falle einer Nichtwiederwahl 1 2 3 4 5 
des jetzigen Betriebsrates würde 
der Arbeitsschutz im Betrieb 
leiden. 
G) Das Arbeitsklima ist sehr gut. 1 2 3 4 5 
H) Die Arbeitnehmer werden 1 2 3 4 5 
ständig gezwungen, ihre 
Arbeitsleistung zu erhöhen. 
1) Die Mehrheit der Arbeitsunfälle 1 2 3 4 5 
sind verhaltensbedin 
J) Der Arbeitsschutz hat einen 1 2 3 4 5 
hohen Stellenwert innerhalb des 
Betriebes. 
K) Das Arbeitsschutzsystem im 1 2 3 4 5 
Betrieb könnte verbessert werden. 
7. Haben Sie persönlich Verbesserungen im Bereich Arbeitsschutz schon 
vorgeschlagen? 
Ja Qi Nein Q2 
8. Wie werden Sie informiert, wenn neue Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen 
eingeführt werden? 
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9. Wissen Sie wer im Betriebsrat für den Arbeitsschutz verantwortlich 
ist? 
Ja Qi Nein Q2 
10. Mit wem arbeitet der Betriebsrat hinsichtlich des Arbeitsschutzes AM 
MEISTEN zusammen? 
(Bitte nur ein Kreuz) 
MIT. - 
dem Vorstand Q1 den Sicherheitsfachkräften Q7 
den Vorgesetzten Q2 den Sicherheitsbeauftragten Q8 
den Arbeitnehmern Q3 der- Gewerkschaft Q9 
den Vertrauensleuten Q4 der Berufsgenossenschaft Q 10 
den technischen Aufsichtsbeamten Qs den Betriebsärzten Qii 
den Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten Q6 weiß nicht Q 12 
Anderen (wenn ja, mit wem) ................................................................. 
Q 
11. Hier sind einige Fragen über die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Stellen. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
Wie oft haben Sie Kontakt zu: 
täglich wöchentlich alle 
vierzehn 
Tage 
monatlich seltener 
A) der Betriebsleitung. 1 2 3 4 5 
B) den Sicherheitsfachkräften. 1 2 3 4 5 
C) den Betriebsärzten. 1 2 3 4 5 
D) den technischen 
Aufsichtsbeamten. 
1 2 3 4 5 
E) den Vertrauensleuten 1 2 3 4 5 
F) den Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten. 1 2 3 4 5 
G) den Sicherheitsbeauftragten. 1 2 3 4 5 
H) dem Betriebsrat. 1 2 3 4 5 
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12. Wie reagiert die Belegschaft auf verschiedene 
Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die Ihrer Meinung am besten entspricht. 
werden werden weiß werden werden nie 
immer gelegentlich nicht selten beachtet 
beachtet beachtet beachtet 
A) Maßnahmen, die durch die 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsleitung und den 
Betriebsrat entwickelt werden. 
B) Maßnahmen, die durch die 1 2 3 4 5 
Betriebsleitung entwickelt 
werden. 
C) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
interne Stellen mit direkter 
Beteiligung der Belegschaft 
entwickelt werden. 
D) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
externe Stellen entwickelt 
werden. 
E) Maßnahmen, die durch 1 2 3 4 5 
interne Stellen ohne direkte 
Beteiligung der Belegschaft 
entwickelt werden. 
13. Wie würde Ihrer Ansicht nach die Belegschaft die folgenden Punkte 
einordnen? 
Bitte bilden Sie eine Rangfolge zwischen 1 (am wichtigsten) und 5 (am 
unwichtigsten) 
Mehr Urlaub .......... Eine Reduzierung der Arbeitsunfälle .......... Mehr Geld .......... Eine Humanisierung der Arbeitsbedingungen .......... Eine Reduzierung der Arbeitswoche .......... 
14. Wie würde Ihrer Ansicht nach die Betriebsleitung die folgenden Punkte 
einordnen? 
Bitte bilden Sie eine Rangfolge zwischen 1 (am wichtigsten) und 3 (am 
unwichtigsten) 
Eine Reduzierung der Lohnkosten .......... Eine Steigerung der Produktivität .......... Eine Reduzierung der Arbeitsunfälle .......... 
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Appendix 5: The Health and Safety Measures Hamper My Work! 
Agree totally 
4% Totally disagree 
Agree slightly 
29% 
26% 
Don't know Slightly disagree 
12% 29% 
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Appendix 6: Single European Act: Selected Articles 
§100 
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue 
directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of 
the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common 
market. 
§100a 
1. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in this 
Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives 
set out in Article 7a. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 189b and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free 
movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed 
persons. 
3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, 
safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a 
high level of protection. 
4. If after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council acting by a 
qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions 
on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of the 
environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these 
provisions. The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having 
verified that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States. By way of derogation from the 
procedure laid down in Articles 169 and 170, the Commission or any other 
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it 
considers that another Member State is making improper use of the powers 
provided for in this Article. 
5. The harmonization measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a 
safeguard clause authorizing the Member States to take, for one or more of the 
non-economic reasons referred to in Article 36, provisional measures subject to a 
Community control procedure. 
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§118a 
1. Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, 
especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, 
and shall set as their objective the harmonization of conditions in this area, while 
maintaining the improvements made. 
2. In order to help achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph, the Council, 
acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189c and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt by means of directives, 
minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions 
and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States. Such directives shall 
avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would 
hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. 
3. The provisions adopted pursuant to this Article shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent measures for the protection 
of working conditions compatible with this Treaty. 
§118b 
The Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and labour 
at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations 
based on agreement. 
Source: Cowgill, A., 1992. 
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Appendix 7: The German Health and Safety Arena - An Overview 
MACRO-LEVEL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY SYSTEM 
legislators 
- State 
(§74.12 GG) 
Federation / 
Fed. States 
- Laws and 
Ordinances 
Professional 
Associations 
- Accident 
Prevention 
Regulations 
enforcers 
State 
MICRO-LEVEL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY SYSTEM 
responsibility 
lies 
with 
Employers / 
Senior Managers 
providing 
advice and 
support 
Health and Safety 
Expert / Works 
Doctors 
Statutory Labour 
Inspectorates 
Professional 
Associations makers 
required to 
- Technical 
Inspectorate 
Private ~ Private 
Organisations Organisations 
- Technical advisory Rules 
role 
` 
Professional 
Associations 
Micro-Level Health and Safety 
Macro-Level Health and Safety 
Source: Schliephacke, J., and Hundt, A., 1993 
Works Council All Employees 
J coordinating J supporting 
role role 
Industrial Health Safety Reps 
and Safety Committee 
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Appendix 8: 4547 Reich Insurance Code 
Nach Eintritt des Arbeitsunfalls gewährt der Träger der Unfallversicherung nach Maßgabe 
der folgenden Vorschriften an Leistungen insbesondere 
Heilbehandlung, 
Übergangsgeld, 
besondere Unterstützung, 
Wiederherstellung oder Erneuerung von Körperersatzstücken, 
Berufshilfe, 
Verletzenrente, 
Sterbegeld, 
Rente an Hinterbliebene. 
Source: Kittner, M., 1994. 
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Appendix 9: 4476-78 Basic Law 
Artikel 76 
[Gesetzesvorlagen] 
(1) Gesetzesvorlagen werden beim Bundestage durch die Bundesregierung, aus der 
Mitte des Bundestages oder durch den Bundesrat eingebracht. 
(2) Vorlagen der Bundesregierung sind zunächst dem Bundesrate zuzuleiten. Der 
Bundesrat ist berechtigt, innnerhalb von sechs Wochen zu diesen Vorlagen 
Stellung zu nehmen. Die Bundesregierung kann eine Vorlage, die sie bei der 
Zuleitung an den Bundesrat ausnahmsweise als besonders eilbedürftig bezeichnet 
hat, nach drei Wochen dem Bundestage zuleiten, auch wenn die Stellungnahme des 
Bundesrates noch nicht bei ihr eingegangen ist; sie hat die Stellungnahme des 
Bundesrates unverzüglich nach Eingang dem Bundestage nachzureichen. 
(3) Vorlagen des Bundesrates sind dem Bundestage durch die Bundesregierung 
innerhalb von drei Monaten zuzuleiten. Sie hat hierbei ihre Auffassung darzulegen. 
Artikel 77 
[Gesetzgebungsverfahren] 
(1) Die Bundesgesetze werden vom Bundestage beschlossen. Sie sind nach ihrer 
Annahme durch den Präsidenten des Bundestages unverzüglich dem Bundesrate 
zuzuleiten. 
(2) Der Bundesrat kann binnen drei Wochen nach Eingang des Gesetzesbeschlusses 
verlangen, daß ein aus Mitgliedern des Bundestages und des Bundesrates für die 
gemeinsame Beratung von Vorlagen gebildeter Ausschuß einberufen wird. Die 
Zusammensetzung und das Verfahren dieses Ausschusses regelt eine 
Geschäftsordnung, die vom Bundestag beschlossen wird und der Zustimmung des 
Bundesrates bedarf Die in diesen Ausschuß entsandten Mitglieder des Bundesrates 
sind nicht an Weisungen gebunden. Ist zu einem Gesetze die Zustimmung des 
Bundesrates erforderlich, so können auch der Bundestag und die Bundesregierung 
die Einberufung verlangen. Schlägt der Ausschuß eine Änderung des 
Gesetzesbeschlusses vor, so hat der Bundestag erneut Beschluß zu fassen. 
(3) Soweit zu einem Gesetze die Zustimmung des Bundesrates nicht erforderlich ist, 
kann der Bundesrat, wenn das Verfahren nach Absatz 2 beendigt ist, gegen ein 
vom Bundestage beschlossenes Gesetz binnen zwei Wochen Einspruch einlegen. 
Die Einspruchsfrist beginnt im Falle des Absatzes 2 letzter Satz mit dem Eingange 
des vom Bundestage erneut gefaßten Beschlußes, in allen anderen Fällen mit dem 
Eingange der Mitteilung des Vorsitzenden des in Absatz 2 vorgesehenen 
Ausschusses, daß das Verfahren vor dem Ausschusses abgeschlossen ist. 
(4) Wird der Einspruch mit der Mehrheit der Stimmen des Bundesrates beschlossen, 
so kann er durch Beschluß der Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Bundestages 
zurückgewiesen werden. Hat der Bundesrat den Einspruch mit einer Mehrheit von 
mindestens zwei Dritteln seiner Stimmen beschlossen, so bedarf die 
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Zurückweisung durch den Bundestag einer Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln, mindestens 
der Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Bundestages. 
Artikel 78 
[Zustandekommen der Bundesgesetze] 
Ein vom Bundestage beschlossenes Gesetz kommt zustande, wenn der Bundesrat 
zustimmt, den Antrag gemäß Artikel 77 Abs. 2 nicht stellt, innerhalb der Frist des Artikels 
77 Abs. 3 keinen Einspruch einlegt oder ihn zurücknimmt oder wenn der Einspruch vom 
Bundestage überstimmt wird. 
Source: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1993. 
292 
Appendix 10: Accident-Prevention Reiulation 1.0: Selected Articles 
I. Allgemeine Vorschriften und Pflichten des Unternehmers 
Allgemeine Anforderungen 
§2 
(1) Der Unternehmer hat zur Verhütung von Arbeitsunfällen Einrichtungen, 
Anordnungen und Maßnahmen zu treffen, die den Bestimmungen dieser 
Unfallverhütungsvorschrift und den für ihn sonst geltenden 
Unfallverhütungsvorschriften und im übrigen den allgemein anerkannten 
sicherheitstechnischen und arbeitsmedizinischen Regeln entsprechen. Soweit in 
anderen Rechtsvorschriften, insbesondere in Arbeitsschutzvorschriften, 
Anforderungen gestellt werden, bleiben diese Vorschriften unberührt. 
(2) Technische Erzeugnisse, die nicht den Unfallverhütungsvorschriften entsprechen, 
dürfen verwendet werden, soweit sie in ihrer Beschaffenheit die gleiche Sicherheit 
auf andere Weise gewährleisten. 
(3) Tritt bei einer Einrichtung ein Mangel auf, durch den für die Versicherten sonst 
nicht abzuwendende Gefahren entstehen, ist die Einrichtung stillzulegen. 
Ausnahmen 
§3 
(1) Die Berufsgenossenschaft kann im Einzelfall auf schriftlichen Antrag des 
Unternehmers Ausnahmen von Unfallverhütungsvorschriften zulassen, wenn 
1. der Unternehmer eine andere, ebenso wirksame Maßnahme trifft oder 
2. die Durchführung der Vorschrift im Einzelfall zu einer unverhältnismäßigen Härte 
führen würde und die Abweichung mit dem Schutz der Versicherten vereinbar ist. 
Dem Antrag ist eine Stellungnahme der Betriebsvertretung beizufügen. 
(2) Von den in §2 Abs. 1 bezeichneten allgemein anerkannten Regeln darf nur 
abgewichen werden, soweit die gleiche Sicherheit auf andere Weise gewährleistet 
ist. 
Persönliche Schutzausrüstungen 
§4 
(1) Ist es durch betriebstechnische Maßnahmen nicht ausgeschlossen, daß die 
Versicherten Unfall- oder Gesundheitsgefahren ausgesetzt sind, so hat der 
Unternehmer geeignete persönliche Schutzausrüstungen zur Verfügung zu stellen 
und diese in ordnungsgemäßigen Zustand zu halten. 
(2) Der Unternehmer hat insbesondere zur Verfügung zu stellen: 
1. Kopfschutz, wenn mit Kopfverletzungen durch Anstoßen, durch pendelnde, 
herabfallende, umfallende oder wegfliegende Gegenstände oder durch lose 
hängende Haare zu rechnen ist. 
2. Fußschutz, wenn mit Fußverletzungen durch Stoßen, Einklemmen, umfallende, 
herabfallende oder abrollende Gegenstände, durch Hineintreten in spitze und 
scharfe Gegenstände oder durch heiße Stoffe, heiße oder ätzende Flüssigkeiten zu 
rechnen ist. 
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3. Augen- oder Gesichtsschutz, wenn mit Augen- oder Gesichtsverletzungen durch 
wegfliegende Teile, Verspritzen von Flüssigkeiten oder durch gefährliche 
Strahlung zu rechnen ist. 
4. Atemschutz, wenn Versicherte gesundheitsschädlichen, insbesondere giftigen, 
ätzenden oder reizenden Gasen, Dämpfen, Nebeln oder Stäuben ausgesetzt sein 
können oder wenn Sauerstoffmangel auftreten kann. 
5. Körperschutz, wenn mit oder in der Nähe von Stoffen gearbeitet wird, die zu 
Hautverletzungen führen oder durch die Haut in den menschlichen Körper 
eindringen können, sowie bei Gefahr von Verbrennungen, Verätzungen, 
Verbrühungen, Unterkühlungen, elektrischen Durchströmung, Stich- oder 
Schnittverletzungen. 
(3) Die Vorschriften über die ärztlichen Vorsorgeuntersuchungen sind unabhängig 
davon anzuwenden, ob persönliche Schutzausrüstung benutzt werden. 
Auslegung von Unfallverhütungsvorschriften, Unterweisung der Versicherten 
§7 
(1) Der Unternehmer hat die für sein Unternehmen geltenden 
Unfallverhütungsvorschriften an geeigneter Stelle auszulegen. Den mit der 
Durchführung der Unfallverhütung betrauten Personen sind die Arbeitsschutz- und 
Unfallverhütungsvorschriften auszuhändigen, soweit sie ihren Arbeitsbereich 
betreffen. 
(2) Der Unternehmer hat die Versicherten über die bei ihren Tätigkeiten auftretenden 
Gefahren sowie über die Maßnahmen zu ihrer Abwendung vor der Beschäftigung 
und danach in angemessenen Zeitabständen, mindestens jedoch einmal jährlich, zu 
unterweisen. 
Förderung der Mitwirkung der Versicherten an der Unfallverhütung 
§g 
Der Unternehmer hat die Mitwirkung der Versicherten an der Verhütung von 
Arbeitsunfällen zu fördern. Er hat den mit der Durchführung der Unfallverhütung 
betrauten Personen die Teilnahme an Ausbildungsveranstaltungen aus dem Gebiet der 
Unfallverhütung unter Berücksichtigung der betrieblichen Belange zu ermöglichen. 
Sicherheitsbeauftragte 
§9 
(1) Die Zahl der nach §719 RVO zu bestellenden Sicherheitsbeauftragten ergibt sich 
aus der Anlage 1 zu dieser Unfallverhütungsvorschrift. 
(2) Der Unternehmer hat den Sicherheitsbeauftragten Gelegenheit zu geben, ihre 
Aufgaben zu erfüllen, insbesondere in ihrem Bereich an den Betriebsbesichtigungen 
und Unfalluntersuchungen der Technischen Aufsichtsbeamten teilzunehmen. Den 
Sicherheitsbeauftragten sind auf Verlangen die Ergebnisse der 
Betriebsbesichtigungen und Unfalluntersuchungen zur Kenntnis zu geben. 
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Besichtigung des Unternehmers durch Technische Aufsichtsbeamte, Erlaß 
einer Anordnung 
§10 
(1) Der Unternehmer hat dem Technischen Aufsichtsbeamten die Besichtigung seines 
Unternehmens zu ermöglichen und ihn auf sein Verlangen dabei zu begleiten oder 
durch einen geeigneten Vertreter begleiten zu lassen. 
(2) Erläßt die Berufsgenossenschaft eine Anordnung und setzt sie hierbei eine Frist, 
innerhalb der die verlangten Maßnahmen zu treffen sind, so hat der Unternehmer 
nach Ablauf der Frist unverzüglich mitzuteilen, ob er die verlangten Maßnahmen 
getroffen hat. 
Auskunftspflicht 
§11 
Der Unternehmer hat der Berufsgenossenschaft die im Zusammenhang mit der Verhütung 
von Arbeitsunfällen stehenden Angaben zu machen und Auskünfte zu erteilen. 
Pflichtenübertragung 
§12 
Hat der Unternehmer ihm hinsichtlich der Unfallverhütung obliegende Pflichten 
übertragen, so hat er dies unverzüglich schriftlich zu bestätigen. Die Bestätigung ist von 
dem Verpflichteten zu unterzeichnen; in ihr sind der Verantwortungsbereich und die 
Befugnisse zu beschreiben. Eine Ausfertigung der schriftlichen Bestätigung ist dem 
Verpflichteten auszuhändigen. 
Aufsichtspersonen 
§13 
Der Unternehmer hat die Verantwortungsbereiche der von ihm zu bestellenden 
Aufsichtspersonen abzugrenzen und dafür zu sorgen, daß diese ihren Pflichten auf dem 
Gebiet der Unfallverhütung nachkommen und sich untereinander abstimmen. 
II. Pflichten der Versicherten 
Befolgung von Weisungen des Unternehmers, Benutzung persönlicher 
Schutzausrüstungen 
§14 
Die Versicherten haben alle der Arbeitssicherheit dienenden Maßnahmen zu unterstützen. 
Sie sind verpflichtet, Weisungen des Unternehmers zum Zwecke der Unfallverhütung zu 
befolgen, es sei denn, es handelt sich um Weisungen, die offensichtlich unbegründet sind. 
Sie haben die zur Verfügung gestellten persönlichen Schutzausrüstungen zu benutzen. Die 
Versicherten dürfen sicherheitswidrige Weisungen nicht befolgen. 
Bestimmungsgemäße Verwendung von Einrichtungen 
§15 
Die Versicherten dürfen Einrichtungen nur zu dem Zweck verwenden, der vom 
Unternehmer bestimmt oder üblich ist. 
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Beseitigung von Mängeln 
§16 
(1) Stellt ein Versicherter fest, daß eine Einrichtung sicherheitstechnisch nicht 
einwandfrei ist, so hat er diesen Mangel unverzüglich zu beseitigen. Gehört dies 
nicht zu seiner Arbeitsaufgabe oder verfügt er nicht über Sachkunde, so hat er den 
Mangel dem Vorgesetzten unverzüglich zu melden. 
(2) Absatz 1 gilt entsprechend, wenn der Versicherte feststellt, daß 
1. Arbeitsstoffe sicherheitstechnisch nicht einwandfrei verpackt, gekennzeichnet oder 
beschaffen sind oder 
2. das Arbeitsverfahren oder der Arbeitsablauf sicherheitstechnisch nicht einwandfrei 
gestaltet bzw. geregelt sind. 
Unbefugte Benutzung von Einrichtungen 
§17 
Versicherte dürfen Einrichtungen und Arbeitsstoffe nicht unbefugt benutzen. 
Einrichtungen dürfen sie nicht unbefugt betreten. 
Source: Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1995. 
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Appendix 11: 4130 Administrative Offences Act 
(1) Wer als Inhaber eines Betriebes oder Unternehmens vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig die 
Aufsichtsmaßnahmen unterläßt, die erforderlichen sind, um in dem Betrieb oder 
Unternehmen Zuwiderhandlungen gegen Pflichten zu verhindern, die den Inhaber 
als solchen treffen und deren Verletzung mit Strafe oder Geldbuße bedroht ist, 
handelt ordnungswidrig, wenn eine solche Zuwiderhandlung begangen wird, die 
durch gehörige Aufsicht hätte verhindert werden können. Zu den erforderlichen 
Aufsichtsmaßnahmen gehören auch die Bestellung, sorgfältige Auswahl und 
Überwachung von Aufsichtspersonen. 
Source: Leichsenring, C., and Petermann, 0., 1993. 

M 
b d 
d 
I 
hn 
w 
b 
b 
v a 
a L 
'ý 
I 
w 
.9 
Q 
b 
'v d a 'ý 
b 
O 
E 
ED 
i1 
CIO 
6 
ü 
u 
d 
w 
DA 
QÖ 
-x 
; äff°a}ýr 
4 
"C '. ý 'r co W7_ TEE ý0 
ac ýsý 
3a 'ý 
0 
x ; ''%'yz zl.. 
b 
ýr 
As 
ad .0 
. 
i7 t: `°< V 
`'o q'aý "o : ýý 'rig ý-; ' NI rn ýr ° 
W-tr-rý. M . """ýr. . F"MFirKF ".. ý.. ý -iiKWYiiY- 
va , ýo 
h " :' t0 .:: V1 M N ,r 
6 
0 
u be 
w a w 
v a 
ao 
.0 
a 0 
V, 
w 
C. 
ýs ä 
u_ 
4 
. Iý 
w 
O 
w 
Q 
O 
a 
d a 0 
3 
L 
a 
w 
B 
E. 
4 49 
303 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Arbeitssicherheitsorganisation: Überprüfung der Durchführung des 
Arbeitssicherheitsgesetzes in qualitativer Hinsicht. In: MAGS, 1988. Jahresbericht 
der Gewerbeaufsicht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen- Teil Arbeitsschutz. 
Düsseldorf. Das Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. Pp. 89-92. 
Association of Optometrists, 1991. Your Eyes and VDU's. London: Eye Care 
Information Bureau. 
BAfAM, 1995. Vom Arbeitsschutz zur betrieblichen Gesundheitsförderung - 
Produktionsfaktor Gesundheit. Informationen der Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsmedizin, 3(1), 3-4. 
BAU, 1980. Untersuchung des Arbeitsschutzsystems in der BRD: Zusammenfassung 
des Forschungsberichtes 232. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz. 
BAU, 1988. Making Work More Human. Dortmund: Federal Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health. 
BAU, 1993. Working Programme of the Federal Institute for Occupational Health 
and Safety for the Years 1992-1994. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz. 
BKK, 1995. Gesundheitsförderung im Betrieb, 3. Auflage. Essen: Bundesverband der 
Betriebskrankenkassen. 
BMA, 1991. Statistisches Taschenbuch 1991 - Arbeits- und Sozialstatistik. Bonn: Der 
Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
BMA, 1992. Arbeitssicherheit 192: Unfallverhütungsbericht. Bonn: 
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
BMA, 1993. Arbeitssicherheit 193: Unfallverhütungsbericht. Bonn: 
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
BMA, 1994. Arbeitssicherheit 194: Unfallverhütungsbericht Arbeit. Bonn: 
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
BMA, 1995. Arbeitssicherheit 195: Unfallverhütungsbericht Arbeit. Bonn: 
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
304 
Commission of the European Communities, 1992. Training in Safety and Health at 
Work. Luxembourg: The Commission. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1993. Opinions of Europeans Following the 
European Year of Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work. Luxembourg: 
The Commission. 
Daimler Benz, 1978. Arbeitsordnung. Daimler Benz AG. 
Department of Employment, 1986. Building Businesses ........ Not Barriers. Cmnd 9794. 
London: HMSO. 
Deutsche Sozialgeschichte Band 1- 1815-1870,1976. München: Verlag C. H Beck. 
Deutsche Sozialgeschichte Band 2- 1870-1914,1974. München: Verlag C. H Beck. 
DGB, 1992. Beschluß des Bundesvorstandes des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes. 
Forderungen des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes zur Reform des 
Arbeitsschutz- und Berufskrankheitenrechts. Düsseldorf. DGB. 
Dictionary of German History 1806-1945,1978. London: Fest. 
EG-Harmonisierung darf das deutsche Modell nicht untergraben. Handelsblatt, 
06/04/1987. Düsseldorf. 
Einheitliches Recht bleibt auf der Tagesordnung, 1992. Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 
(1), 4-7. 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living And Working Conditions, 1992. 
First European Survey on the Working Environment 1991-1992. Dublin: The 
Foundation. 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1994. 
Monitoring the Working Environment - Report of the Second European 
Conference. Dublin: The Foundation. 
German Bundestag, 1984.2nd (updated) edition. Questions on German History: ideas, 
forces, decisions from 1800 to the present. Bonn: German Bundestag. 
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1993. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag. 
Handbuch der Großunternehmen 1995 - Band 1,1994.42. Aufgabe. Darmstadt: 
Verlag Hoppenstedt GmbH. 
Hazards, 1992. European Works Hazards Conference Resource Book. 
Nottinghamshire: Russell Press. 
305 
Health and Safety Commission, 1992. The Health and Safety System in Great Britain. 
London: HMSO. 
Health and Safety Executive, 1982. HSC Report 1981/82. London: HMSO. 
Health and Safety Executive, 1990a. A Guide to the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974. London: HMSO. 
Health and Safety Executive, 1990b. Workplace Health and Safety in Europe - The 
Study of Regulatory Arrangements in France, West Germany, Italy and Spain. 
Basingstoke: HMSO. 
Health and Safety Executive, 1993 a. HSC Annual Report 1992/93. London: HMSO. 
Health and Safety Executive, 1993b. The Costs of Accidents at Work. London: HMSO. 
Financial Times, November 1995. Health in the Workplace: A Financial Times Guide. 
London: Financial Times. 
Hibbs, J., 1994. EC Works Council Plan 'may be an own goal'. Daily Telegraph, 
07/09/1994. 
Home Office, Lifting the Burden. Cmnd 9571. London: HMSO. 
Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1994. Verwaltungs- und 
Unfallverhütungsbericht 1993. Die Berufsgenossenschaft. 
Hütten- und Walzwerks-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1994. Verwaltungs- und 
Unfallverhütungsbericht 1993. Düsseldorf: Die Berufsgenossenschaft. 
HVBG, 1989. Die Berufsgenossenschaften. Sankt Augustin: Hauptverband der 
gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. 
HVBG, 1993. BG-Statistiken für, die Praxis. Sankt Augustin: Hauptverband der 
gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. 
HVBG, 1994a. BGZ Jahresbericht 1993. Sankt Augustin: Hauptverband der 
gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. 
HVBG, 1994b. BG Statistics 1993 - Figures and Long-Term Trends. Sankt Augustin: 
Hauptverband der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. 
HVBG, 1994c. Arbeitssicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz: System und Statistik. Sankt 
Augustin: Hauptverband der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. 
306 
HVBG, 1995. BG Statistics 1994 - Figures and Long-Term Trends. Sankt Augustin: 
Hauptverband der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften. 
IDE Research Group, 1981. European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
IG Metall, 1983. Arbeitsschutz als Betriebsratsaufgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Union 
Druckerei. 
IG Metall, 1985. Mitwirkung, Mitbestimmung und Zusammenarbeit des 
Betriebsrates beim Arbeitsschutz. Arbeitsheft 024, Abteilung 
Bildungswesen/Bildungspolitik. 
IG Metall, 1986. Kampf um soziale Gerechtigkeit, Mitbestimmung, Demokratie und 
Frieden: Die Geschichte der Industriegewerkschaft Metall seit 1945 - Ein Bericht 
in Wort und Bild. Köln: Bund-Verlag. 
IG Metall, 1990a. Arbeitsschutz 1. Abteilung Sozialpolitik, Referat Arbeitsschutz. 
IG Metall, 1990b. Humane Working Conditions - Basic Principles of IG Metall. 
Frankfurt am Main: Safety at Work Publications, IG Metall, No. 26. 
IG Metall, 1992a. Geschäftsbericht 1989-1991. Frankfurt am Main: Union Druckerei. 
IG Metall, 1992b. Satzung der IG Metall. Frankfurt am Main: Union Druckerei. 
IG Metall, 1993. Tarifreform 2000. Frankfurt am Main: Union Druckerei. 
IG Metall, 1995a. Betriebsräte erfahren nichts. direkt, (2), 4. 
IG Metall, 1995b. Arbeitgeber muß neue Literatur bezahlen. direkt, (4), 7. 
IG Metall, 1995c. Betriebsrat hat Mitbestimmungsrecht. direkt, (7), 7. 
IG Metall, 1995d. Betriebsratswahlen `94 - Erfolg für die IG Metall. metall, 47(1), 5. 
ILO, 1984. Report of the Tripartite Mission on the Effectiveness of Labour 
Inspection in the Federal Republic of Germany. Geneva: ILO. 
ILO, 1990. Safety and Health at Work. ILO-CIS Bulletin, 4(1). 
ILO, 1992a. Safety and Health at Work. ILO-CIS Bulletin, 6(1). 
ILO, 1992b. Safety and Health at Work. ILO-CIS Bulletin, 6(6). 
ILO, 1992c. Year of Labour Statistics 1992. ' Geneva: ILO. 
307 
ILO, 1993a. Sources and Methods: Labour Statistics. Companion to the Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics. Volume 7- Strikes and Lockouts. Geneva: ILO. 
ILO, 1993b. Year of Labour Statistics 1993. Geneva: ILO. 
ILO, 1994. Safety and Health at Work. ILO-CIS Bulletin, 8(6). 
ILO, 1995. Year of Labour Statistics 1995. Geneva: ILO. 
Kirchlicher Dienst in der Arbeitswelt, 1993. Information Handout. Hamburg: KdA. 
Labour Research Department, 1984. Safety Representatives in Action. London: LRD. 
Leichsenring, C., 1988. Die Berufsgenossenschaften brauchen den Naturwissenschaftler 
als Gutachter, Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 06/07/1988, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Leichsenring, C., 1990. Arbeitssicherheit ist Managerpflicht. Die Welt, 29/12/1990, 
Hamburg. 
MAGS, 1994. Fachkonzept der Arbeitsschutzverwaltung des Landes Nordrhein- 
Westfalen. Stand 28. Februar 1994. Düsseldorf. Das Ministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1992. Unfallverhütungsvorschrift 1.0 
Allgemeine Vorschriften (VBG 1) vom 1. April 1977 in der Fassung vom 1. Juli 
1991. 
Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1994. Verwaltungsbericht 1993. 
Düsseldorf. 
Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1995. Neufassungen der 
Unfallverhütungsvorschriften "Fachkräfte für Arbeitssicherheit" (VBG 122) und 
"Betriebsärzte" (VBG 123). Einlage zum Heft 2/95 "sicher arbeiten". 
Niedersächsisches Sozialministerium / Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium, 1994. 
Gewerbeaufsicht Jahresbericht 1993/92/91. Hannover. 
Petermann, 0., 1991. Wachsende Konkurrenz für den Sicherheitsbeauftragten nach der 
Reichsversicherungsordnung. Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 10/09/1991, Frankfurt am 
Main: FAZ. 
Programm "Arbeit und Technik", 1989. Sicherheitsingenieur, 20(5), 60-61. 
Rainer, J., 1985. Wie verhütet man mit Erfolg Unfälle im Betrieb? Die Welt, 05/12/1985, 
Hamburg. 
308 
Robens, 1972. Safety and Health at Work - Report of the Committee. London: 
HMSO. 
Schliephacke, J., 1988a. Der Meister trägt die Verantwortung vor Ort. Blick durch die 
Wirtschaft, 13/06/1988, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Schliephacke, J., 1988b. Der Sicherheitsbeauftragte überzeugt durch Persönlichkeit. Blick 
durch die Wirtschaft, 20/06/1988, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Schliephacke, J., 1988c. Der Sicherheitsingenieur - Berater mit umfassenden Aufgaben. 
Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 01/06/1988, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Schneider, A., 1992. Wer im Betrieb für die Arbeitssicherheit zuständig ist. Blick durch 
die Wirtschaft, 31/07/1992, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Shrimsley, R., 1994. Scargill Gives the Thrill-Seekers a `White-Knuckle Ride'. Daily 
Telegraph, 07/09/1994. 
Siller, E., 1988a. Der Chef muß klar sagen, daß er Arbeitssicherheit will. Blick durch die 
Wirtschaft, 01/07/1988, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Siller, E., 1988b. Die Arbeitssicherheit hängt von guter Organisation und Führung ab. 
Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 19/04/1988, Frankfurt am Main: FAZ. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993. Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 - Für das Ausland. 
Wiesbaden: Metzler-Poeschel. 
Süddeutsche Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, 1994. Schwerpunktaktion `94. In: SMBG 
Mitteilungsblatt, (4), 26-33. 
Taylor, R., 1995. Healthy, wealthy .... and wise. 
In: Financial Times, November 1995. 
Health in the Workplace: A Financial Times Guide. London: Financial Times. Pp. 
3-4. 
Tinnappel, F., 1988. Der Arbeitsschutz wird viel zu selten überprüft. Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 04/11/1988, Frankfurt am Main. 
TUC, 1988. Hazards at Work. London: TUC. 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971. Industrial Social Welfare. New 
York: UN. 
Weniger meldepflichtige Arbeitsunfälle, 1995. Sicherheitsbeauftragter, 30(3), 14-15. 
Wood, L., 1995. Safety on the Agenda. In: Financial Times, November 1995. Health in 
the Workplace: A Financial Times Guide. London: Financial Times. Pp. 6-7. 
309 
Ziller, P., 1995. FDP will Arbeitnehmer zur Kasse bitten. Frankfurter Rundschau, 
03/05/1995, Nr. 102,4. 
Secondary Sources 
Abmayr, H. G., 1995. Überstunden: Übles Spiel. Metall, 47(2), 16-18. 
Adams, R. I., ed., 1991. Comparative Industrial Relations. London: Harper Collins. 
Adamy, W., and Steffen, J., 1985. Handbuch der Arbeitsbeziehungen. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Addison, J. T., et al., 1995. German Industrial Relations: An Elusive Exemplar. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 2(1), 25-45. 
Altmann, N., and Düll, K., 1987. Rationalisierung und neue Verhandlungsprobleme im 
Betrieb. WSI-Mitteilungen, 40(5), 261-269. 
Altmann, N., 1992a. Rationalization Strategies and Representation of Workers Interests. 
In: Altmann, N., et at., eds., 1992. Technology and Work in German Industry. 
London: Routledge. Pp. 385-399. 
Altmann, N., 1992b. Unions' Policies Towards New Technologies in the 1980s - An 
Example from the Metal Industry. In: Altmann, N., et at., eds., 1992. Technology and 
Work in German Industry. London: Routledge. Pp. 361-384. 
Angermaier, M., et al., 1991. Arbeit und Gesundheit in der gewerkschaftlichen Politik. 
WSI-Mitteilungen, 44(9), 522-532. 
Arndt, F., 1993.20. Kongreß für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin in Düsseldorf - In der 
Pfeife rauchen. Der Gewerkschafter, 41(12), 16-17. 
Arnold, A., and Satzer, R., 1986a. Belegschaftsbefragungen zu Arbeitsbedingungen 
und Gesundheit - Arbeitspapier 05. Düsseldorf: Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut des DGB. 
Arnold, A., and Satzer, R., 1986b. Kaputt und auch noch selber Schuld - 
Gesundheitsschutz am Arbeitsplatz. Hamburg: Reinbek. 
Bach, S., 1994. The Working Environment. In: Sisson, K., ed., 1994. Personnel 
Management: A Comprehensive Guide to Theory and Practice in Britain. 2nd 
edition. Blackwell: Oxford. Pp. 117-149. 
Bacow, L. S., 1980. Bargaining for Job Safety and Health. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
310 
Bailey, S., et al., eds., 1994. Economic Incentives to Improve the Working 
Environment - Summary and Conclusions of an International Study. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community. 
Bain, G. S., and Clegg, H. A., 1974. A Strategy for Industrial Relations Research in Great 
Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(1), 91-113. 
Baldwin, W., and Daintith, T., eds., 1992. Harmonization and Hazard: Regulating 
Workplace Health and Safety in the European Community. London: Graham and 
Trotman. 
Ballerstedt, E., et al., 1979. Soziologischer Almanach. Frankfurt am Main: Campus 
Verlag. 
Baliweiser, W., and Berger, K-H., Hrsg., 1985. Information und Wirtschaftlichkeit. 
Wiesbaden: Gabler. 
Barrass, R., 1994. Scientists Must Write. A Guide to Better Writing for Scientists, 
Engineers and Students. 8th edition. London: Chapman & Hall. 
Barrett, B., and Howells, R., 1993. Health and Safety Law. London: Pitman. 
Barrett, B., et al., eds., 1982. Industrial Relations and the Wider Society. London: 
Collier Macmillan / Middlesex: Oxford University Press. 
Bartholomai, G., et al., 1977. Sozialpolitik nach 1945 - Geschichte und Analysen. 
Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 
Batstone, E., 1988. The Reform of Workplace Industrial Relations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Bauerdick, J., 1994. Arbeitsschutz zwischen staatlicher und verbandlicher 
Regulierung. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
Bean, R., 1994. Comparative Industrial Relations, 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 
Beaumont, P. B., 1990. Change in Industrial Relations. London: Routledge. 
Beaumont, P. B., et al., 1982. The Determinants of Effective Joint Health and Safety 
Committees. University of Glasgow: Centre for Research in Industrial Democracy 
and Participation. 
Behr, M., and Pohlmann, M., 1991. Die Rolle der Betriebsräte im Innovationsprozeß. 
WSI-Mitteilungen, 44(4), 250-258. 
Berghahn, V., 1987. Modern Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
311 
Berghahn, V., and Karsten, D., 1987. Industrial Relations in West Germany. Oxford: 
Berg. 
Bergmann, J., 1979. Beiträge zur Soziologie der Gewerkschaften. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Bergmann, J., et at, 1976. Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Frankfurt am Main: Aspekte Verlag. 
Bieneck, H-J., 1994.20 Jahre Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz. Die Berufsgenossenschaft, 
1994(12), 736-741. 
Bieneck, H-J., and Ruckert, A., 1993. Health and Safety for Workers - Current 
Developments in the Federal Republic of Germany. Bonn: Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs. 
Bierwith, W., 1995. Unfalltod ist wahrscheinlicher als ein Treffer im Lotto. Metall, 47(2), 
19. 
Binder, G., 1974. Grundwissen Grundgesetz. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. 
Birk, P., 1983. Sozialer Rückschritt durch technischen Fortschritt. Der Gewerkschafter, 
31(8), 2-3. 
Birke, M., et at., 1985. Beschäftigungspolitische Handlungsspielräume von 
Betriebsräten: Fallstudien zur Umsetzung tarifvertraglicher und betrieblicher 
Regelungen im Industriebetrieb. Frankfurt am Main/ New York: Campus Verlag. 
Bispinck, R, 1993. Daten und Fakten zum bundesdeutschen Tarifsystem. WSI 
Mitteilungen, 46(8), 529-531. 
Blain, A. N. J., and Genhard, J., 1970. Industrial Relations Theory -A Critical Review. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 8(3), 389-407. 
Blüm, N., 1994. Dauerhafter Fortschritt im Arbeitsschutz ist ein Gebot der Humanität und 
wirtschaftlichen Vernunft. sicher ist sicher, 45(9), 403. 
Blume, 0., 1964. Normen und Wirklichkeit einer Betriebsverfassung. Tübingen: 
Mohr. 
Bobzien, M. H., 1994. Gesundheitsschutz - Arbeitsschutz als Führungsaufgabe. sicher ist 
sicher, 45(12), 618-626. 
Bognanno, M., and Kleiner, M., eds., 1992. Labour Market Institutions and the 
Future Role of Unions. Oxford: Blackwell. 
312 
Böhle, F., 1985. Betriebliche Informationspolitik und Interessenvertretung. Soziale Welt, 
aoocvi(2), 242-260. 
Böhle, F., and Kaplonek, H.,. 1980. Interessenvertretung am Arbeitsplatz und 
Reformen im Gesundheitsschutz. Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus Verlag. 
Braul, H., 1995. Das Arbeitsschutzsystem in Großbritannien - Ein Erfahrungsbericht. WSI 
Mitteilungen, 48(2), 139-143. 
Braun, S., et al., 1992. Belegschaften und Unternehmer. Frankfurt am Main/New York: 
Campus. 
Brewster, C., 1989. Employee Relations. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Bridgford, J., and Stirling, J., 1994. Employee Relations in Europe. Oxford: Blackwell 
Business. 
Briefs, U., 1989. Co-Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Appraisal of 
Secular Experience. In: Szell, G., et al., 1989. The State, Trade Unions and Self- 
Management: Issues of Competence and Control. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. 
Brody, B., et al., 1990. Le coüt des accidents du travail. Relations Industrielles, 45(1), 
94-117. 
Brötz, R., et al., 1982. Betriebsräte und Humanisierung der Arbeitsbedingungen in Klein- 
und Mittelbetrieben. WSI Mitteilungen, 3 5(5), 296-305. 
Buchholz, D., 1994a. Deutsche Rechtsvorschriften - Aufbau des Arbeitsschutzrechtes. In: 
Kühn, D., Hrsg., 1994. Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz bei der Arbeit, 
Gelsenkirchen: Damm-Verlag KG. Pp. 102-103. 
Buchholz, D., 1994b. Die Entscheidungsübersicht. In: Kühn, D., Hrsg., 1994. Sicherheit 
und Gesundheitsschutz bei der Arbeit, Gelsenkirchen: Damm-Verlag KG. Pp. 68- 
71. 
Bulmer, S. J., 1986. The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-Making 
in West Germany. New York/London: Garland. 
Büntgen, M., et at., 1980a. Arbeitsschutzsystem - Untersuchung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 2. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz: Forschungsbericht Nr. 232. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Büntgen, M., et al., 1980b. Arbeitsschutzsystem - Untersuchung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 3. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz: Forschungsbericht Nr. 232. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
313 
Bürger, M., 1992. Betriebsalltag zwischen Kooperations- und Konfliktfähigkeit. Die 
Mitbestimmung, 3 8(2), 3 8-41. 
Burton, J. W., 1969. Conflict and Communication. The Use of Controlled 
Communication in International Politics. London: Macmillan. 
Butera, E., et al., eds., 1990. Technological Development and the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions. London: Kogan Page. 
Campbell, S., 1986. Labour Inspection in the European Communities. London: 
HMSO. 
Chasse, J. D., and LeSourd, D. A., 1985. The 'New Economics' and Industrial Health: A 
Reply. International Journal of Health Services, 15(1), 141-144. 
Chelius, JR., 1985. The New Economics of Industrial Health: An Explanation. 
International Journal of Health Services, 15(1), 135-140. 
Childs, D., and Johnson, J., 1981. West Germany - Politics and Society. London: 
Croom Helm. 
Chissick, S. S., and Derricott, R., eds., 1981. Occupational Health and Safety 
Management. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Clausen, U., and Huber, W., 1987. Wenn Arbeit das Leben kostet. Bochum: SWi 
Verlag. 
Clegg, H., 1976. Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A theory based on 
comparisons of six countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Clutterbuck, RC., 1980. The State of Industrial Ill Health in the United Kingdom. 
International Journal of Health Services, 10(1), 149-160. 
Codrington, C., and Henley, J. S., 1981. The Industrial Relations of Injury and Death: 
Safety Representatives in the Construction Industry. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 19(3), 297-315. 
Cowgill, A., 1992. The Maastricht Treaty in Perspective - Consolidated Treaty on 
European Union. Stroud: British Management Data Foundation. 
Coye, M., 1979. Crisis Control in the Workplace. A Review of Three Major Works in 
Occupational Health. International Journal of Health Services, 9(1), 169-183. 
Creighton, B., and Gunningham, N., 1985. The Industrial Relations of Occupational 
Health and Safety. Sydney: Croom Helm. 
314 
Cressey, P., et al., 1985. Just Managing: Authority and Democracy in Industry. 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Cressey, P., and Williams, R., 1990. Participation in Change: New Technology and the 
Role of Employee Involvement. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions. 
Cronin, J. B., 1971. Cause and Effect? Investigations into Aspects of Industrial Accidents 
in the United Kingdom. International Labour Review, 103(2), 99-115. 
Crouch, C., 1977. Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis. London: 
Heinemann 
Crouch, C., 1979. The Politics of Industrial Relations. Glasgow: Fontana. 
Crouch, C., 1982. Trade Unions: the Logic of Collective Action. Glasgow: Fontana. 
Crouch, C., 1993. Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Crouch, C., 1994. Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Crouch, C., and Dore, R., 1990. Whatever Happened to Corporatism. In: Crouch, C., and 
Dore, R., 1990. Corporatism and Accountability: Organized Interests in British 
Public Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. 1-43. 
Cullingford, E. C. M., 1976. Trade Unions in West Germany. London: Wilton House. 
Czock, H., et al. Hrsg., 1994. Gesundheitszirkel in der betrieblichen 
Gesundheitsfdrderung - Man lebt nur einmal. Berlin: BILAG. 
Czock, H., et at, Hrsg., 1993. Gesundheitsförderung in der Arbeitswelt, 
Dokumentation des Fachseminars "Arbeit und Gesundheit in der Bildungsarbeit". 
Berlin: BILAG. 
Dabscheck, B., 1989. Australian Industrial Relations in the 1980s. Melbourne: OUP. 
Dahrendorf, R., 1965. Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland. München: R Piper 
& Co. Verlag. 
Dahrendorf, R, 1968. Society and Democracy in Germany. London: Weidenfeld- 
Nicholson. 
Dalton, A. J. P., 1992. Lessons from the UK: Fightback on Workplace Hazards 1979-1992. 
International Journal of Health Services, 22(3), 489-495. 
315 
Darlington, R., 1994. The Dynamics of Workplace Unionism: Shop Steward 
Organisation in Three Merseyside Plants. London: Mansell. 
Däubler, W., 1991. Ratgeber Arbeitsrecht. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
Däubler, W., et al., 1992. BetrVG - Betriebsverfassungsgesetz: Kommentar für die 
Praxis, 3. Auflage. Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Davies, N., and Teasdale, P., 1994. The Costs to the British Economy of Work 
Accidents and Work-Related Dl Health. London: Health and Safety Executive. 
Davis, K. P., 1979. Health and Safety. Wokingham: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company. 
Dawson, S., et al., 1988. Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
de Gier, E., 1991. Implementation of EC Directives on Working Conditions and 
Product Safety: Possibilities and Limitations. Amsterdam: Hugo Sinzheimer 
Institute. 
Deppe, H-U., 1981. Work, Disease, and Occupational Medicine in the FRG. 
International Journal of Health Services, 11(2). 
Deppe, R., et al., 1980. Arbeitsschutzsystem - Untersuchung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Band 1. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz: 
Forschungsbericht Nr. 232. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Deutsch, S., 1981. Extending Workplace Democracy: Struggles to Come in Job Safety 
and Health. Labour Studies Journal, 6(1), 124-132. 
Dewis, M., 1992. Tolley's Health and Safety at Work Handbook 1993. Croydon: 
Tolley. 
Diekershoff, K-H., 1979. Sicherheitsbeauftragte im Betrieb. Funktionalität und 
Wirksamkeit. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz: Forschungsbericht 
Nr. 202. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Diekershoff, K-H., 1983. Nicht für Kleinbetriebe? Bundesarbeitsblatt, 1983(3), 33-36. 
Doeringer, P., 1981. Industrial Relations in International Perspective. London: 
Macmillan Press. 
Doll, W., 1993. Bericht der Bundesregierung - Unfallhäufigkeit blieb. sicher ist sicher, 
44(2), 88-92. 
Drake, C. D., and Wright, F. B., 1983. Law of Health and Safety at Work - The New 
Approach. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
316 
Dufty, N. F., and Fells, R. E., 1989. Dynamics of Industrial Relations in Australia. 
Sydney: Prentice Hall. 
Dunlop, J. T., 1958. Industrial Relations Systems. Carbondale: Union Press. 
Dwyer, T., 1991. Life and Death at Work. New York: Plenum Press. 
Dybowski-Johannson, G., 1980. Die Interessenvertretung durch den Betriebsrat. 
Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus Verlag. 
Eberle, E., 1994. Gedankenaustausch im MAGS: Enge Beteiligung der Betriebsräte 
vonnöten. In: MAGS, 1994. Jahresbericht 1993 der Gewerbeaufsicht des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen - Arbeitsschutz. Düsseldorf: Das Ministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
Eberlie, R. F., 1990. The New Health and Safety Legislation of the European Community. 
Industrial Law Journal, 19,81-97. 
Ebsworth, D. R., 1980. Industrial Relations in the West German and British 
Chemical Industries. Ph. D. thesis, University of Surrey. 
Edwards, P., 1995. The Employment Relationship. In: Edwards, P., ed., 1995. Industrial 
Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 3-26. 
Edwards, P., 1986. Conflict at Work: A Materialist Analysis of Workplace Relations. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Egger, H., 1992. Die Rechte der Arbeitnehmer und des Betriebsrats auf dem Gebiet des 
Arbeitsschutzes. Betriebs-Berater, 47(1), Heft 9,629-636. 
Eisenbach, B., et al., 1995. Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektive der "Betrieblichen 
Gesundheitsförderung". Erfahrungsberichte der IG Metall, der IG BSE, der 
Gewerkschaft HBV und der Gewerkschaft ÖTV. WSI Mitteilungen, 48(2), 99-111. 
Eldridge, J. E. T., 1971. Sociology and Industrial Life. London: Michael Joseph. 
Endres, E., and Wehner, T., 1993. Es gibt keine Stunde Null bei der Einführung der 
Gruppenarbeit. Das Beispiel Automobilindustrie. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 
44(10), 631-644. 
Endruweit, G., et al., Hrsg., 1985. Handbuch der Arbeitsbeziehungen. Berlin/New 
York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Engel, P. O. E., 1986. Vom Qualitätszirkel zur Arbeitsgruppe für Arbeitssicherheit. Die 
Berufsgenossenschaft, 1986(5), 260-261. 
317 
Erd, R., 1978. Verrechtlichung industrieller Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main/New York: 
Campus Verlag. 
Ermischer, I., and Preusche, E., 1992. Betriebsräte zwischen Mitbestimmung und 
Abwicklungs-"Komanagement". Chemnitz: Institut für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialforschung Chemnitz e. V. 
Esland, G., et al., eds., 1975. People and Work. Edinburgh: Holmes McDougall. 
Evans, R. J., 1978. Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Farnham, D., and Pimlott, J., 1995. Understanding Industrial Relations, 5th edition. 
London: Cassell. 
Ferner, A., 1994. The State As Employer. In: Hyman, R., and Ferner. A., eds., 1994. New 
Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 52-79. 
Fife-Schaw, C., 1995. Questionnaire Design. In: Breakwell, G., et al.., eds., 1995. 
Research Methods in Psychology. London: SAGE. 
Fitting, K., et al., 1987. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz - Handkommentar. 15. Auflage. 
München: Verlag Franz Vahlen. 
Flanders, A., 1968. Trade Unions. London: Hutchinson University Library. 
Föhr, H., 1978. Arbeitsrecht für Arbeitnehmer. Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Forrester, I., 1975. The German Civil Code. Amsterdam/Oxford: North-Holland 
Publishing Company. 
Foster, J., 1993.2nd edition. Starting SPSS/PC+ and SPSS for Windows: A 
Beginner's Guide to Data Analysis. Wilmslow: Sigma Press. 
Fox, A., 1966. Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations: An Assessment of the 
Contribution Which Industrial Sociology Can Make Towards Understanding 
and Resolving Some of the Problems Now Being Considered by the Royal 
Commission. London: HMSO. 
Fox., A., 1973. Industrial Relations: a Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology. In: Child, J., 
1973. Man and Organization: The Search for Explanation and Social Relevance. 
London: Allen & Unwin. Pp. 185-233. 
Freeman, R., and Medoff, J., 1984. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books Inc. 
Freigang, M., 1993. Gesundheitsschutz im Betrieb - Handbuch für Betriebsräte. 
Köln: Bund Verlag. 
318 
Fricke, W., et al., Hrsg., 1982. Beteiligen, Mitgestalten, Mitbestimmen. Arbeitnehmer 
verändern ihre Arbeitsbedingungen. Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Fricke, W., and Schuchardt, W., Hrsg., 1985. Innovatorische Qualifikationen- eine 
Chance gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitspolitik. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 
Friczewski, F., 1992. Macht Arbeit krank? Die Mitbestimmung, 3 8(7), 40-42. 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1979. Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitssicherheit in beiden 
deutschen Staaten. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 
Fröhlich, D., et al., 1989. New Information Technology and Participation in Europe: 
The Potential for Social Dialogue. Dublin: European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Fromm, C., et al., 1995. Reform des Arbeitsschutzes. Veränderte Handlungsbedingungen 
für die betriebliche Interessenvertretung. WSI Mitteilungen, 48(2), 122-129. 
Fulbrook, M., 1991. The Fontana History of Germany 1918-1990. The Divided 
Nation. London: Fontana Press. 
Fulbrook, M., 1994. Updated edition. A Concise History of Germany. Cambridge: 
University Press: 
Fulcher, J., 1991. Labour Movements, Employers and the State. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Funke, H., et al., 1974. Industriearbeit und Gesundheitsverschleiß. Köln: Europäische 
Verlagsanstalt. 
Fürstenberg, F., 1958. Der Betriebsrat - Strukturanalyse einer Grenzinstitution. Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, (10), 418-429. 
Fürstenberg, F., 1993. Industrial Relations in Germany. In: Bamber, G., and Lansbury, R., 
eds., 1993.2nd edition. International and Comparative Industrial Relations. New 
York: Routledge. Pp. 175-196. 
Ganz, B., and Landerer, C., 1991. Arbeitsumweltschutz als neue Beratungs- und 
Qualifizierungsaufgabe für DGB-Technologieberatungsstellen. WSI-Mitteilungen, 
44(9), 572-576. 
Gaßmann, P., 1984. Rationalisierung in der Metallwirtschaft - eine Bestandsaufnahme. Die 
Mitbestimmung, 30(1), 7-10. 
319 
Gevers, J. K. M., 1985. Worker Control Over Occupational Health Services: The 
Development of Legal Rights in the EEC. International Journal of Health Services, 
15(2), 217-229. 
Giesert, M., and Höfle, M., 1991. Gewerkschaftliche Bildungsarbeit im Bereich Arbeit 
und Gesundheit. WSI-Mitteilungen, 44(9), 565-572. 
Gill, C., 1993. Participation in Health and Safety within the European Community. 
Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Gill, F. S., and Ashton, I., 1982. Monitoring for Health Hazards at Work. Frome: 
Butler & Tanner Ltd. 
Glendon, A. I., and McKenna, E. F., 1995. Human Safety and Risk Management. 
London: Chapman & Hall. 
Glendon, A. J., et al., 1986. Occupational Accidents and Diseases. Dublin: European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Gnade, A., 1983. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz. Kommentar zum Praxis. Bonn: Bund 
Verlag. 
Gold, M., and Hall, M., 1990. Legal Regulation and the Practice of Employee 
Participation in the European Community. Dublin: European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Gold, M., ed., 1993. The Social Dimension. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Goldman, L., 1992. That Was The Year That Was. Occupational Health, 44(12), 381- 
382. 
Goldman, L., 1993. The Unbearable Burden of Reasonableness. Occupational Health, 
45(4), 137-138. 
Gospel, H., and Palmer, G., 1993. British Industrial Relations. London: Routledge. 
Gould, J., and Kolb, W. L., eds., 1964. A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. London: 
Tavistock. 
Graf, H., 1983. Der reibungslose Umgang mit dem Betriebsrat. Landsberg: Verlag 
Moderne Industrie. 
Grandjean, E., 1980. Fitting the Task to the Man. London: Taylor & Francis. 
Grebing, H., 1969. The History of the German Labour Movement. Munich: 0. Wolff. 
320 
Green, E. M. M., 1985. A Study of the Structure and Function of Trade Unions Based 
on Historical, Comparative Analysis of Organisations in Britain and the German 
Federal Republic Within the Experience of the 1970's. M. Phil thesis, University of 
Surrey. 
Green, G. D., 1991. Industrial Relations. London: Pitman. 
Grunberg, L., 1983. The Effects of The Social Relations of Production on Productivity 
and Workers Safety: An Ignored Set of Relationships. International Journal of 
Health Services, 13(4). 
Grunberg, L., et al., 1984. Productivity and Safety in Worker Cooperatives and 
Conventional Firms. International Journal of Health Services, 14(3), 413-432. 
Günther, H., 1993. Neuordnung des Arbeitsschutzes. Arbeit und Arbeitsrecht, 48(4), 
97-99. 
Hachtmann, R, 1989. Industriearbeit im Dritten Reich. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht. 
Häckert, W., et al., 1994. Arbeits(Umwelt)schutz: Innovation durch Europa. 
Umsetzungsbarrieren und Weiterbildung. Graue Reihe, Band 76. Düsseldorf. Hans 
Böckler Stiftung. 
Hagenkötter, M., et al., 1979. Auf dem Wege zu einer Theorie des Arbeitsschutzes. 
Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Sonderschrift Nr. 6. Bremerhaven: 
Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Halbach, G., et al., 1989. Übersicht über das Recht der Arbeit. 3. Auflage. Bonn: 
Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. 
Halbach, G., et al., 1991. Labour Law in Germany - An Overview, 4th revised and 
extended edition, translated by Haarkamp, A., et al.. Bonn: Federal Ministry for 
Labour and Social Affairs. 
Hale, A. R., and Hale, M., 1972. A Review of the Industrial Accident Research 
Literature. London: HMSO. 
Hall, M., et al., 1992. The European Works Council: Setting the Research Agenda. 
Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations, 41. 
Hall, M., 1994. Industrial Relations and the Social Dimension of European Integration: 
Before and After Maastricht. In: Hyman, R., and ý Ferner. A., eds., 1994. New 
Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 281-311. 
Hancock, M. D., et at., 1991. Managing Modern Capitalism. Wesport: Greenwood 
Press. 
321 
Harrington, 7. M., 1991. The Health of the Nation: Responses. British Medical Journal, 
303,908-910. 
Hams, R., 1987. Power and Powerlessness in Industry. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
Hartmann, F., 1972. Geschichte der Gewerkschaftsbewegung nach 1945 in 
Niedersachsen. Hannover: Sponnholtz. 
Hauß, F., 1982. Thematisierung von Belastungen im betrieblichen Arbeitsschutz. In: 
Hauß, F., Hrsg., 1982. Arbeitsmedizin und präventive Gesundheitspolitik. 
Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. Pp. 81-96. 
Hauß, F., 1991. New Initiatives for Health in the Workplace in Germany. Berlin: 
IGES-Papier Nr. 91-49. 
Hauß, F., et al., 1980a. Betriebliche Arbeitsschutz als Gesundheitspolitische Strategie 
- Ergebnisse und Schlußfolgerungen aus einer empirischen Untersuchung. Berlin: 
IIVG Papers. 
Hauß, F., et al., 1980b. Gesundheitspolitik im Betrieb: Ergebnisse einer empirischen 
Untersuchung zur Praxis des Arbeitsschutzes. WSI Mitteilungen, 33(10), 570-581. 
Hauß, F., and Rosenbrock, R. D., 1984. Occupational Health and Safety in the Federal 
Republic of Germany: A Case Study of Co-determination and Health Politics. 
International Journal of Health Services, 14(2), 279-287. 
Heinrich, H. W., 1959. Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach. 4th 
edition. New York/Toronto/London: McGraw Hill. 
Helfert, M., 1975. Ziele und Durchsetzung der Humanisierung der Arbeit. 
Zusammenfassung gewerkschaftlicher Forderungen. WSI Mitteilungen, 28(5), 245- 
256. 
Henninger, C., 1989. Leitbild Arbeitssicherheit. In: Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 
1989. Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: 
Werbezentrum Wilsch. Pp. 13-16. 
Herber, R., 1990. Arbeitsschutz: Arbeitsteilung zwischen Staat und Selbstverwaltung. 
Arbeit und Sozialpolitik, 10,356-357. 
Heywood, J., 1985. Economics of Health and Safety. Employment Gazette, 93(1), 21- 
27. 
Hibbett, A., 1991. Employee Involvement: A Recent Survey. Employment Gazette, 
99(12), 659-664. 
322 
Hickey, S. H. F., 1985. Workers in Imperial Germany. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hildebrandt, E., 1992. Industrial Relations and the Environment in the EC. Dublin: 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Hildebrandt, E., Hrsg., 1991. Betriebliche Sozialverfassung unter Veränderungsdruck. 
Berlin: WZB. 
Hill, S., 1991. Why Quality Circles Failed But Total Quality Management Might Succeed. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29(4), 541-568. 
Rinne, K., 1992. Das deutsche Modell erhalten und ausbauen. Gewerkschaftliche 
Umschau, (1), 8-10. 
Hirsch-Weber, W., 1959. Gewerkschaften in der Politik. Von der 
Massenstreikdebatte zum Kampf um das Mitbestimmungsrecht. Köln/Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Hirszowicz, M., 1981. Industrial Sociology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hoffmann, B., 1991. Arbeitsschutz und Unfallstatistik. Meckenheim: Schriftenreihe des 
HVBG. 
Hoffmann, W., 1995. Die Leistungen der IG Metall. Standpunkt - Das Themenheft der 
IG Metall, 1(2), 11-14. 
Hofmann, 0., 1987. Die Interessenvertretung in Klein- und Mittelbetrieben. Die 
Mitbestimmung, 33(1+2), 43-46. 
Holborn, L., et al., 1970. German Constitutional Documents Since 1871. London: Pall 
Mall Press. 
Hormann-Reckeweg, B., 1992. Hände und Arme von Säuren zerfressen. 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, (1), 34-35. 
Howard, G., 1992. Implementing the Framework Directive. Occupational Health, 
44(11), 326-327. 
Howard, G., 1994. Whistleblowers: New Legal Protections. Occupational Health, 46(3), 
95-96. 
Howells, R., and Barrett, B., 1975. The Health and Safety at Work Act -A Guide for 
Managers. London: IPM. 
Hoyos, C. G., and Wenninger, G., 1994. Arbeitssicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz in 
Organisationen. Göttingen/Stuttgart: Verlag für Angewandte Psychologie. 
323 
Hueck, G., et al., 1994. Nachschlagewerk des Bundesarbeitsgerichts - 
Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis. München: Verlag C. H. Beck. 
Hugh-Jones, E. M., 1958. Human Relations and Modern Management. Amsterdam: 
North Holland Publishing Company. 
Hyman, R., 1975. Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: Macmillan 
Press. 
Hyman, R., 1989. The Political Economy of Industrial Relations. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press. 
Hyman, R., 1994a. Theory and Industrial Relations. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 32(2), 165-180. 
Hyman, R., 1994b. Economic Restructuring, Market Liberalism and the Future of 
National Industrial Relations Systems. In: Hyman, R, and Ferner. A., eds., 1994. New 
Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 1-14. 
Hyman, R., and Ferner, A., eds., 1994. New Frontiers in European Industrial 
Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Jackson, M., 1991. An Introduction to Industrial Relations. London: Routledge. 
Jacobi, 0., et at., Hrsg., 1980. Moderne Zeiten - alte Rezepte. Kritisches 
Gewerkschaftsjahrbuch 1980/81. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag. 
Jacobi, 0., et al., 1992. Germany: Co-determining the Future? In: Ferner, A., and Hyman, 
R., eds., 1992. Industrial Relations in the New Europe. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 
218-269. 
Jaeger, R., 1992. Euro-Normen und die nationalen Standards. Gewerkschaftliche 
Umschau, (1), 11-13. 
Johannson, K., 1977. Der Betriebsrat. Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Jones-Lee, M. W., ed., 1982. The Value of Life and Safety. Proceedings of a 
Conference held by the `Geneva Association'. Amsterdam/New York/Oxford: 
North Holland Publishing Company. 
Kasparek, B., 1986. Der Einfluß von Arbeitsschutzstrukturen auf die 
Arbeitssicherheit. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, 
Forschungsbericht 471. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Kaudelka, K., 1995. Das deutsche Arbeitsschutzsystem: Die Entwicklung von 1839 bis 
zur Europäischen Union 1995. sicher ist sicher, 46(3), 147-148. 
324 
Kaupinnen, T., and Köykkä, V., eds., 1994. Workplace Europe: New Forms of 
Bargaining and Participation. Helsinki: Finnish Labour Relations Association, 
Number 3. 
Kauppinen, T., 1994. Corporatistic Choices and Transformation of Industrial 
Relations in Finland. Opening Address to the Fourth IIR. A European Congress, 
Helsinki. 
Keller, B., 1993. Einführung in die Arbeitspolitik: Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
Arbeitsmarkt in sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive. 3. Auflage. München/Wien: 
R. Oldenbourg Verlag. 
Kern, H., and Schumann, M., 1985. Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung, 2. Auflage. München: 
Verlag C. H. Beck. 
Kerr, W., 1950. Accident Proneness of Factory Departments. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 34,167-170. 
Kessler, S., and Bayliss, F., 1992. Contemporary British Industrial Relations. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
King, R. W., and Magid, J., 1979. Industrial Hazard and Safety Handbook. London: 
Butterworth & Co. Ltd. 
Kinnersly, P., 1973. The Hazards of Work. London: Pluto Press. 
Kittner, M., 1975. Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer über die Arbeitsorganisation und 
über die Ausgestaltung und Umgebung des Arbeitsplatzes. WSI Mitteilungen, 28(5), 
256-269. 
Kittner, M., 1993. Gewerkschaftsjahrbuch 1993,18. Auflage. Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Kittner, M., 1994. Arbeits- und Sozialordnung, 19. Auflage. Köln: Bund-Verlag. 
Kliesch, G., et al., 1978. Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz - Kommentar. Wolfenbüttel: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag. 
Kluge, M., et al., 1981. Betriebsräte in der industriellen Provinz. Frankfurt am 
Main/New York: Campus Verlag. 
Kneissel, J., 1984. Arbeitssicherheit Heute. Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Koch, K., 1978. Trade Union Workshop Representatives in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Report Prepared for the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of 
Industrial Society. 
325 
Koch, K., 1989. West Germany Today. London: Routledge. 
Kocka, J., 1990. Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen. Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz. 
Kogan, H., 1992. A Year of Heightened Awareness for OH, Occupational Health, 44(3), 
75-76. 
König, C. D., et al., 1989. Qualitätszirkel im Dienste der Arbeitssicherheit. Die 
Berufsgenossenschaft, 1989(3), 112-115. 
Konstanty, R., 1981. Thesen für ein Arbeitsschutzgesetz. WSI Mitteilungen, 34(2), 105- 
112. 
Konstanty, R, 1990. Gesundheitsschutz in der Arbeitsumwelt - Bilanz und Perspektiven. 
Soziale Sicherheit, 39(5), 148-151. 
Konstanty, R., and Zwingmann, B., 1991. Aussicht auf höhere Sicherheitsstandards in der 
Arbeitsumwelt. Die Mitbestimmung, 37(4). 
Konstanty, R., and Zwingmann, B., 1992. Die Reformchancen zielstrebig nutzen. 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, (1), 25-27. 
Konstanty, R., and Zwingmann, B., 1995. Perspektiven der Arbeitsschutzreform nach dem 
Scheitern des Arbeitsschutzrahmengesetzes. WSI Mitteilungen, 48(2), 61-76. 
Koopmann, K., 1981. Vertrauensleute. Arbeitervertretung im Betrieb. Hamburg: 
VSA-Verlag. 
Kopp, I., 1992. Förderung neuer Formen der Zusammenarbeit bei der betrieblichen 
Sicherheitsarbeit - eine wichtige Aufgabenstellung im Rahmen des AuT Programms. 
In: Ritter, A., and Zink, K. J., Hrsg., 1992. Gruppenorientierte Ansätze zur 
Förderung der Arbeitssicherheit. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag. Pp. 35-37. 
Kotthoff, H., 1981. Betriebsräte und betriebliche Herrschaft. Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus Verlag. 
Kotthoff, H., 1985. Betriebliche Interessenvertretung durch Mitbestimmung des 
Betriebsrats. In: Endruweit, G., et al., Hrsg., 1985. Handbuch der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Pp. 65-87. 
Kotthoff, H., 1994. Betriebsräte und Bürgerstatus. Wandel und Kontinuität 
betrieblicher Mitbestimmung. München und Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag. 
Kotthoff, H., and Reindl, J., 1990. Die soziale Welt kleiner Betriebe. Göttingen: Verlag 
Otto Schwarz & Co. 
326 
Krause, N., 1989. Wie gefährlich ist Bildschirmarbeit wirklich? In: Siller, E., and 
Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 1989. Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum 
Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: Werbezentrum Wilsch. Pp. 82-85. 
Kreikebaum, H., and Herbert, K-J., 1990. Arbeitsgestaltung und Betriebsverfassung. 
Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt. 
Kreißig, V. and Schreiber, E., 1990. Gewerkschaften und Räte der Werktätigen nach 
der Wende in der DDR - eine politikwissenschaftliche Studie. Chemnitz: Institut 
für Wirtschafts- und Sozialforschung Chemnitz e. V. 
Kreißig, V., et al., 1990. Zur Entwicklung von Betriebsräten im Raum Chemnitz - 
Zeitraum Dezember 1989-August 1990. Chemnitz: Institut für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialforschung Chemnitz e. V. 
Kroger, W., and Meis, S., 1991. Probleme und Möglichkeiten der Ef iizienzkontrolle 
betrieblicher Arbeitsschutzaktivitäten. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitsschutz, Forschungsbericht 640. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Krüger, W., et al., 1993. Indikatoren zur gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effizienzmessung 
des Arbeitsschutzes. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, 
Forschungsbericht 686. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Kühn, D., Hrsg., 1994. Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz bei der Arbeit. 
Gelsenkirchen: Damm-Verlag KG. 
Kühn, H., 1982. Betriebliche Arbeitsschutzpolitik und Interessenvertretungen der 
Beschäftigten. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag,. 
Kuhn, J., 1995. Gesundheitsförderung mit einer Krankenkasse. sicher ist sicher, 46(1), 
12-14. 
Kuhn, K., 1987. Arbeitsschutzdaten. Bundesarbeitsblatt, (5), 31-35. 
Kuhn, K., 1989. Arbeitsbedingungen und neue Techniken. Sicherheitsingenieur, 20(1), 
20-23. 
Kuhn, K., and Schulz, H-J., 1986. Dynamische Anwendung von Indikatoren zur 
empirischen Beschreibung von Arbeitsbedingungen im Bereich der Sicherheit 
und des Arbeitsschutzes . im Unternehmen. Ansätze einer Arbeitsschutzberichterstattung. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, 
Forschungsbericht 465. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Lampert, H., 1980. Sozialpolitik. Berlin: Springer Verlag. ' 
Lampert, H., 1988. Die Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung der BRD. München and Wien: 
327 
Lane, C., 1989. Management and Labour in Europe. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Lane, C., 1994. Industrial Order and the Transformation of Industrial Relations: Britain, 
Germany and France Compared. In: Hyman, R., and Ferner. A., eds., 1994. New 
Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. 167-195. 
Lasko, R., 1974. A Comment on 'Analysis of an Index of Industrial Morale'. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(1), 114-116. 
Laufer, A., 1987. Construction Accident Cost and Management Safety Motivation. 
Journal of Occupational Accidents, 8(4), 295-315. 
Lehmbruch, G., 1979. Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New 
Corporatism. In: Schmitter, P., and Lehmbruch, G., eds., 1979. Trends Towards 
Corporatist Intermediation. London: SAGE. Pp. 53-61. 
Leichsenring, C., 1972. Die Unfälle der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Schriftenreihe des Hauptverbandes der gewerblichen 
Berufsgenossenschaften e. V. Tübingen: Druckerei Tübinger Chronik. 
Leichsenring, C., 1989. In der Schadenverhütung liegt das Erfolgsrezept der 
Sicherheitsstrategie. In: Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 1989. 
Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: 
Werbezentrum Wilsch. Pp. 34-38. 
Leichsenring, C., 1991. Der Beitrag des Betriebsrates zur Arbeitssicherheit, 2. 
Auflage. Hürth: Greven & Bechtold GmbH. 
Leichsenring, C., and Labitzke, G., 1985. In sicherer Arbeit unterweisen - ein 
Leitfaden für die betriebliche Praxis, 3. Auflage. Köln: Greven. 
Leichsenring, C., and Labitzke, G., 1992. Unterweisen in der Arbeitssicherheit - ein 
Leitfaden für die betriebliche Praxis, 5. Auflage. Köln: Berufsgenossenschaft der 
Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik. 
Leichsenring, C., and Petermann, 0., 1993. Die Pflichten des Unternehmers in der 
Arbeitssicherheit. Hürth: Greven & Bechtold GmbH. 
Lewis, D., 1974. An Industrial Relations Approach. Industrial Law Journal, (3), 96- 
104. 
Lewis, R., ed., 1986. Labour Law in Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Lißner, L., 1995. Arbeitsbedingte Gesundheitsrisiken. Auf dem Weg in eine ungewisse 
Zukunft. WSI Mitteilungen, 48(2), 77-88. 
328 
Lobrum, B., 1987. Optimierung von Arbeitssicherheit und Arbeitsgestaltung unter 
Beteiligung der Betroffenen. Humane Produktion - Humane Arbeitsplätze, 9(5), 
44-46. 
Lohrum, B., 1992. Verbesserung der Arbeitssicherheit und Arbeitsgestaltung unter 
Beteiligung der Betroffenen. In: Ritter, A., and Zink, K. J., Hrsg., 1992. 
Gruppenorientierte Ansätze zur Förderung der Arbeitssicherheit. Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag. Pp. 99-114. 
Lohrum, B., 1994. Betriebliche Erfahrungen zur Gesundheitsförderung. sicher ist sicher, 
45(10), 510-514. 
Lorenz, E., 1995. Promoting Workplace Participation: Lessons from Germany and France. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 2(1), 46-63. 
Lowrance, W., 1976. Of Acceptable Risk. Los Altos: William Kaufmann Inc. 
Luhmann, N., 1975. Soziologische Aufklärung 2: Aufsätze zur Theorie der 
Gesellschaft. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Lütge, F., 1966. Deutsche Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
Maclnnes, J., 1987. Thatcherism at Work. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Mallier, A. T., 1987. Employment Regulation in the Federal Republic of Germany. A 
Report Prepared for the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial 
Society. 
Marchington, M., and Parker, P., 1990. Changing Patterns of Employee Relations. 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Marginson, P., et al., 1988. Beyond the Workplace. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Markmann, H., 1995.50 Jahre Arbeitsbeziehungen in Deutschland: eine 
Erfolgsgeschichte? Industrielle Beziehungen, 2(1), 82-100. 
Markovits, A., 1986. The Politics of West German Trade Unions. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Marschner, A., 1993. Die Berufskrankheit. Arbeit und Arbeitsrecht, 48(9). 
Marsden, D., 1995. The German Model: introduction. Industrielle Beziehungen, 2(1), 5- 
7. 
Marsh, A., 1979. Concise Encyclopaedia of Industrial Relations. Westmead: Gower 
Press. 
329 
Marsh, D., 1992. The New Politics of British Trade Unionism - Union Power and the 
Thatcher Legacy. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Marx, K., 1961. Capital - Volume 1. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 
Maschmann, F., 1995. Die Zukunft des Arbeitsschutzrechtes. Betriebs-Berater, 50(3), 
146-153. 
Matthöfer, H., 1977. Humanisierung der Arbeit und Produktivität in der 
Industriegesellschaft. Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. 
Mattik, U., and Meyer, G., 1992. Neue Herausforderungen in der betrieblichen Praxis. 
Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, (1), 16-18. 
Mattik, U., and Meyer, P-H., 1995. Betriebliche Strategien zum Arbeits- und 
Gesundheitsschutz. Handlungsansätze und Perspektiven. WSI Mitteilungen, 48(2), 
111-121. 
Mayer, P., 1994. Umwelt und Arbeitssicherheit. Zentralblatt für Arbeitsmedizin, 
Arbeitsschutz und Ergonomie, 44(1), 2-4. 
McAfee, RB., and Winn, A. R., 1989. The Use of Incentives / Feedback to Enhance 
Work Place Safety: A Critique of the Literature. Journal of Safety Research, 20(1), 
7-19. 
Menge, R., 1995. Die Betreuung von Klein- und Mittelbetrieben. sicher ist sicher, 46(1), 
18. 
Mense-Petermann, U., 1996. Die Verbetrieblichung der industriellen Beziehungen in Ost- 
deutschland als Herausforderung für das duale System. Industrielle Beziehungen, 
3(1), 65-79. 
Mertens, A., 1978. Der Arbeitsschutz und seine Entwicklung. Dortmund: 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung. 
Mertens, A., 1980. Der Arbeitsschutz auf dem. Prufstand. Schriftenreihe der 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Tagungsbericht 25. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag 
NW. 
Meyer-Falcke, A., and Postler, K., 1993. Arbeitsschutz in Klein- und Mittelbetrieben - die 
zahlen: "Wir wollen, daß Sie gesund von der Arbeit nach Hause kommen". In: MAGS, 
1993. Jahresbericht 1992 der Gewerbeaufsicht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
- Arbeitsschutz. Düsseldorf: Das Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Pp. 3 8-41. 
Meyeringh, U., 1993a. Aufgaben der Berufsgenossenschaften. Drei Schwerpunkte für die 
neuen Selbstverwalter. Soziale Sicherheit, 42(7), 196-198. 
330 
Meyeringh, U., 1993b. Kooperation gefordert. Zum Verhältnis von 
Berufsgenossenschaften und Gewerbeaufsicht. Soziale Sicherheit, 42(11), 326-327. 
Miller, D., 1978. Trade Union Workplace Representatives in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. An Analysis of the Postwar Vertrauensleute Policy of the German Metal 
Workers Union (1952-1977). British Journal of Industrial Relations, 16(3), 335- 
354. 
Milles, D., and Reuhl, B., 1985. Chronologische Orientierung. In: Milles, D., and Müller, 
R., Hrsg., 1985. Berufsarbeit und Krankheit. Frankfurt am Main/New York: 
Campus Verlag. Pp. 341-373. 
Millward, N., 1994. The New Industrial Relations. London: Policy Studies Institute. 
Millward, N., et al., 1992a. Workplace Industrial Relations in Transition - The 
ED/ESRC/PSI/ACAS Surveys. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Millward, N., et al., 1992b. First Findings From the 1990 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey. London: Employment Department. 
Moll, R., 1994. Gruppenarbeit und Projektmanagement - Neue Herausforderungen für die 
betriebliche Interessenvertretung. WSI Mitteilungen, 47(8), 523-527. 
Monat, J., and Sarfati, H., eds., 1986. Workers' Participation: A Voice in Decisions 
1981-1985. Geneva: International Labour Office. 
Moore, R.,. 1991. The Price of Safety: The Market, Workers, Rights and the Law. 
London: Institute of Employment Rights. 
Morgan, P., and Davies, N., 1981. Costs of Occupational Accidents and Diseases in Great 
Britain. Employment Gazette, 89(11), 477-485. 
Muakami, T., 1993. Lean Production und Arbeitsbeziehungen bei Opel Eisenach. 
Unpublished Report. 
Mückenberger, U., 1975. Betriebsverfassung und basisorientierte Betriebsratspolitik. In: 
Duhm, R., and Wiese, H., Hrsg., 1975. Krise und Gegenwehr. Berlin: Rotbuch. 
Pp. 128-159. 
Müller, C., 1994. Die aktive Rolle der Mitarbeiter im Gesundheitszirkel. sicher ist sicher, 
45(10), 520-523. 
Müller-Jentsch, W., 1986. Soziologie der industriellen Beziehungen. Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus Verlag. 
0 
331 
Müller-Jentsch, W., 1994. Industrielle Demokratie - Von der repräsentativen 
Mitbestimmung zur direkten Partizipation. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 45(6), 
362-368. 
Müller-Jentsch, W., 1995. Auf dem Prufstand: Das deutsche Modell der industriellen 
Beziehungen. Industrielle Beziehungen, 2(1), 11-24. 
Müller-Jentsch, W., 1996. Theorien Industrieller Beziehungen. Industrielle Beziehungen, 
3(1), 36-64. 
Naphtali, F., 1977. Wirtschaftsdemokratie: Ihr Wesen, Weg und Ziel. 4. Auflage. 
Köln/Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. 
Neal, A. C., 1987. Co-Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Empirical 
Perspective from the United Kingdom. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
25(2), 227-245. 
Neal, A. C., and Wright, F. B., eds., 1992. The European Communities Health and 
Safety Legislation. London: Chapman & Hall. 
Nichols, T., and Armstrong, P., 1973. Safety or Profit? Bristol: Falling Wall Press. 
Nicholson, A., and Ridd, J., 1987. Health, Safety and Ergonomics. London: 
Butterworths. 
Niedenhoff, H-U., 1979. Mitbestimmung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Köln: 
Deutscher Instituts-Verlag GmbH. 
Niedenhoff, H-U., 1994. Die Kosten der Anwendung des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes. 
Köln: Bund Verlag. 
Nipperdey, H., 1993. Nipperday I, Arbeitsrecht. Testsammlung. München: Verlag 
C. H. Beck. 
Oates, A., and Gregory, D., eds., 1993. Industrial Relations and the Environment - 
Ten Countries Under the Microscope - Volume 1. Dublin:. European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Oborne, D. J., 1985. Ergonomics at Work. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Oi, W. Y., 1974. On the Economics of Industrial Safety. Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 3(4), 669-699. 
Olsen, D., 1993. Worker Participation in the Management of Health and Safety in 
Britain and Germany. Ph. D. thesis, University of Warwick. 
332 
Olson, M., 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge, Mass. /London: Harvard University Press. 
Oppolzer, A., 1994. Rückbau oder Ausbau des Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutzes? Zum 
Vergleich der Gesetzentwürfe von Bundesregierung und SPD-Fraktion für ein neues 
Arbeitszeitgesetz. Arbeit und Recht, XLII(2), 41-49. 
Osswald, R., 1986. Lebendige Arbeitswelt. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. 
Ott, E., 1987. Interessenvertretung der Arbeitnehmer in Klein- und Mittelbetrieben bei der 
Einführung neuer Technologien - Bedingungen und Möglichkeiten. Die 
Mitbestimmung, 33(1+2), 52-54. 
Paland, N., and Schwedes, R, 1991. Occupational Safety and Health in Germany. An 
Overview, 4th revised and extended edition. Bonn: Federal Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs. 
Paoli, P., 1992. First European Survey on the Work Environment 1991-1992. Dublin: 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Parmeggiani, L., 1982. State of the Art: Recent Legislation on Workers' Health and 
Safety. International Labour Review, 121(3), 271-285. 
Parsons, T., and Smelser, N., 1966. Economy and Society. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Partikel, H., 1982. Die Rolle des Betriebsrates im Arbeitsschutz. Soziale Sicherheit, 
31(3), 75-80. 
Partikel, H., 1983. Aufgaben des Betriebsrates für den Arbeitsschutz. Arbeitsheft 027 
IG Metall, Abteilung Bildungswesen/Bildungspolitik. 
Partikel, H., 1987. Betriebsvereinbarungen und Rechte der Arbeitnehmervertreter. sicher 
ist sicher, 38(11), 619-620. 
Partikel, H., and Rhein, G., 1985. Mitwirkung, Mitbestimmung und Zusammenarbeit 
des Betriebsrates beim Arbeitsschutz. IG Metall, Arbeitsheft 024, Abteilung 
Bildungswesen/Bildungspolitik. 
Peltzer, M., 1972. The German Labour Management Relations Act. London: 
Macdonald & Evans. 
Pencavel, J. H., 1974. Analysis of an Index of Industrial Morale. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 12(1), 48-55. 
Peretzki-Leid, U., 1991. Aufgaben der Bundesländer im Gesundheitsschutz. in -der 
Arbeitsumwelt. WSI Mitteilungen, 44(9), 540-543. 
333 
Peter, G., et at., 1986. Der Arbeitsschutzbeauftragte - Interessenvertretung und 
Arbeitspolitik im Steinkohlenbergbau. Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag. 
Peter, G., et al., 1992. Betriebliche Präsenz und Alltagsbedeutung des Arbeitsschutzes 
verblasen. Die Mitbestimmung, 38(1), 37-39. 
Peter, G., and Pröll, U., 1990. Präventiver Arbeitsschutz als betriebliche Normalität. 
Elemente eines Konzeptes sozialwissenschaftlicher Analyse und arbeitspolitischer 
Gestaltung des Arbeitsschutzes. In: Pröll, U., and Peter, G., Hrsg., 1990. Prävention 
als betriebliches Alltagshandeln. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, 
Tagungsbericht 54. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. Pp. 11-22. 
Peters, R. H., 1991. Strategies for Encouraging Self-Protective Employee Behaviour. 
Journal of Safety Research, 22(2), 53-70. 
Pheasant, S., 1991. Ergonomics, Work and Health. London: Macmillan. 
Pies, W., 1992. Effiziente Unfallverhütung durch basisnahe Sicherheitsarbeit unter 
Einbeziehung der Mitarbeiter. In: Ritter, A., and Zink, K. J., Hrsg., 1992. 
Gruppenorientierte Ansätze zur Förderung der Arbeitssicherheit. Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag. Pp. 91-98. 
Poole, J., 1994, The Prevention of Industrial Accidents. Occupational Health, 46(6), 
208-211. 
Popitz, H., et al., 1972. Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters. Tübingen: Mohr. 
Powell, P. I., et al., 1971.2000 Accidents -A Shop Floor Study of Their Causes. 
London: National Institute of Industrial Psychology. 
Pröll, U., 1990. "Ich weiß ja, daß die von einem anderen Stern kommen!, Bemerkungen 
zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen Fachkräften für Arbeitssicherheit und Betriebsärzten. 
In: Pröll, U., and Peter, G., Hrsg., 1990. Prävention als betriebliches 
Alltagshandeln. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Tagungsbericht 
54. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. Pp. 95-110. 
Pröll, U., 1991a. Arbeitsschutz und Neue Technologien: Handlungsstrukturen und 
Modernisierungsbedarf im institutionalisierten - Arbeitsschutz. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Pröll, U., 1991b. Arbeitsschutzreform und betriebliche Praxis der Arbeitssicherheit. Die 
Berufsgenossenschaft, 1991(4), 204-208. 
Pröll, U., and Peter, G., Hrsg., 1990.. Prävention als betriebliches Alltagshandeln. 
Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Tagungsbericht 54. Bremerhaven: 
Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
334 
Pröll, U., and Sczesny, C., 1991. Fachkräfte für Arbeitssicherheit in der betrieblichen 
Zusammenarbeit - Ergebnisse einer schriftlichen Befragung von 
Sicherheitsfachkräften im VDSI. Dortmund: Sozialforschungsstelle. 
Pröll, U., and Thon, W., 1986. Die Institution des Arbeitsschutzes und die Gestaltung von 
Arbeit und Technik. Die Mitbestimmung, 32(11), 582-584. 
Promberger, M., 1991. Strukturen und Prozesse in der betrieblichen 
Interessenvertretung - Eine Fallstudie. Erlangen: IPRAS. 
Pulte, P., 1995. Die arbeitsrechtlichen Aushang- und Bekanntmachungspflichten im 
Betrieb. Betriebs-Berater, 1995(5), 250-257. 
Rainnie, A., 1989. Industrial Relations in Small Firms: Small Isn't Beautiful. London: 
Routledge. 
Rehtanz, H., 1981. Schwerpunkte der Arbeitsschutzforschung für die achtziger Jahre. 
Sozialistische Arbeitswissenschaft, 25(1), 1-8. 
Rehtanz, H., and Wienhold, L., 1988. Arbeitsschutz im Betrieb - Planung, 
Durchführung, Kontrolle. Berlin: VdW. 
Ritter, A., 1992. Workshop "Partizipative Sicherheitsarbeit und betriebliche 
Interessenvertretung". In: Ritter, A., and Zink, K. J., Hrsg., 1992. Gruppenorientierte 
Ansätze zur Förderung der Arbeitssicherheit. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag. 
Pp. 157-160. 
Roberts, B. C., ed., 1985. Industrial Relations in Europe. London: Croom Helm. 
Roberts, I. L., 1973. The Works Constitution Acts and Industrial Relations in West 
Germany, Implications for the UK. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 11(3), 
338-367. 
Röbke, R., et al., 1973. Verhaltensvariabilität des Menschen als Unfallursache. 
Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Forschungsbericht 111. 
Wilhelmshaven: Hug & Co. 
Rosenbaum, W., 1982. Die Wirkungen des Arbeitsrechts auf die Beziehungen zwischen 
Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern im Betrieb. Leviathan, 1982(3), 392-423. 
Rosenbrock, R., 1993. Sozialversicherung und Prävention in ' der Arbeitswelt - Zehn 
Thesen zum betrieblichen Gesundheitsschutz. Soziale Sicherheit, 42(2), 38-43. 
Rosner, L., 1995. Betriebsblindheit. Die Berufsgenossenschaft, 1995(4), 188-190. 
335 
Rottmann, M., 1989. Zur Mitbestimmung des Betriebsrates beim Umgang mit 
Gefahrstoffen. Betriebs-Berater, 44(16), 1115-1120. 
Sadler, S., and Thomas, M., 1994. Workplace Health: Surveying Employers Attitudes. 
Occupational Health, 46(8), 272-274. 
Sagarra, E., 1977. A Social History of Germany. London: Methuen. 
Salamon, M., 1992. Industrial Relations - Theory and Practice. New York: Prentice 
Hall. 
Sass, R. 1986. The Workers' Right to Know, Participate and Refuse Hazardous Work: A 
Manifesto Right. Journal of Business Ethics, (5), 129-136. 
Sass, R. 1986. Workplace Health and Safety: Report from Canada. International 
Journal of Health Services, 16(4), 565-582. 
Sass, R., and Crook, G., 1981. Accident Proneness: Science or Non-Science? 
International Journal of Health Services, 11(2), 175-189. 
Schardt, L. P., 1979. Belegschaft und betriebliche Interessenvertretung - Ergebnisse einer 
Fallstudie. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 30(3), 159-172. 
Schaub, G., 1980. Arbeitsrechtsbuch. 4. Auflage. München: C. H. Beck. 
Schieke, H., and Braunsteffer, H., 1992. Kurzinformation über Arbeitsunfälle, 
Wegeunfälle, Berufskrankheiten. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag. 
Schienstock, G., 1982. Industrielle Arbeitsbeziehungen: Eine vergleichende Analyse 
theoretischer Konzepte in der "industrial relations" Forschung. Opladen: Leske 
Verlag & Budrich GmbH. 
Schliephacke, J., 1989a. Betriebsbeauftragte im Unternehmen - Der Sicherheitsingenieur 
als Koordinator. Sicherheitsingenieur, 20(7), 12-16. 
Schliephacke, J., 1989b. Am wenigsten lohnen sich Betriebsunfälle - Die Höhe der 
Beitragskosten zeigt den Sicherheitsgewinn. In: Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 
1989. Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum Unternehmenserfolg. , 
Aschaffenburg: 
Werbezentrum Wilsch. Pp. 25-28. 
Schliephacke, J., 1989c. Die Berufsgenossenschaften - Aufgaben, Leistungen und Erfolge. 
In: Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 1989. Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum 
Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: Werbezentrum Welsch. Pp. 143-173. 
Schliephacke, J., 1995. Ist der "EU-Baustellenkoordinator" Garant für mehr 
Arbeitssicherheit? Sicherheitsingenieur, 26(3), 20-25. 
336 
Schliephacke, J., and Hundt, A., 1992 
Berufsgenossenschaft, 10. überarbeitete 
Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik. 
. Aufgaben und Leistungen der 
und ergänzte Auflage. Köln: BG der 
Schliephacke, J., and Hundt, A., 1993 
Berufsgenossenschaft, 11. überarbeitete 
Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik. 
. Aufgaben und Leistungen der 
und ergänzte Auflage. Köln: BG der 
Schmidt, R., and Trinczek, R., 1991. Duales System: Tarifliche und betriebliche 
Interessenvertretung. In: Müller-Jentsch, W., Hg., 1991. Konfliktpartnerschaft: 
Akteure und Institutionen der industriellen Beziehungen. München und Mering: 
Rainer Hampp Verlag. 
Schmitter, P., 1979. Still the Century of Corporatism? In: Schmitter, P., and Lehmbruch, 
G., eds., 1979. Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation. London: SAGE. Pp. 7- 
52. 
Schneider, H., 1984. Welche betrieblichen Kosten entstehen pro Unfalltag. 
Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Forschungsbericht 246. 
Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. 
Schöler, U., 1991. Gesundheitsschutz in der Arbeitsumwelt. Gelingt nach 99 Jahren der 
große Wurf? Soziale Sicherheit, 40(4), 97-102. 
Schommer, H-D., 1987. Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz - Durchführung im Betrieb. 
Bundesarbeitsblatt, 1987,2, Heft 7-8,24-26. 
Schottelius, D., and Küpper-Djindjic, C., 1993. Die Interdependenz zwischen 
Gesundheits-, Umwelt-, Arbeitsschutz und Anlagensicherheit aus der Sicht der 
betrieblichen Praxis. Betriebs-Berater, 48(7), 445-450. 
Schregle, J., 1978. Co-Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: a comparative 
view. International Labour Review, 117(1), 81-98. 
Schulstra, K. M., and Smit, E. J., 1994. Changing Forms of Interest Representation in 
the Netherlands. Paper Presented to the Fourth IIRA European Congress, Helsinki. 
Schulte, A., and Bieneck, H-J., 1987. Prävention verstärken. Bundesarbeitsblatt, 
1987(3), 15-20. 
Schulte, A., and Bieneck, H-J., 1990. Europa gibt Anstöße für deutschen Arbeitsschutz. 
In: Pröll, U., and Peter, G., . Hrsg., 1990. ' Prävention als betriebliches 
Alltagshandeln. Schriftenreihe der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Tagungsbericht 
54. Bremerhaven: Wirtschaftsverlag NW. Pp. 177-188. 
Schulte, A., and Riese, U., 1987, Verbesserung im Betrieb. Bundesarbeitsblatt, 1987(5), 
27-30. 
337 
Schultze, W., et al., 1991. Neue Aufgaben der Berufsgenossenschaften. WSI- 
Mitteilungen, 44(9), 533-540. 
Schulz, G. G., 1987a. Aufgaben und Stellung von Fachkräften fair Arbeitssicherheit. 
Ergebnisse einer VDSI-Umfrage - 1986. Mitteilungen des Vereins Deutscher 
Sicherheitsingenieure e. V. sicher ist sicher, 38(10), 571-574. 
Schulz, G. G., 1987b. Aufgaben und Stellung von Fachkräften für Arbeitssicherheit. 
Ergebnisse einer VDSI-Umfrage - 1986. Fortsetzung aus 10/1987, s. 571. sicher ist 
sicher, 38(11), 669-670. 
Seeger, 0., 1980. Sicherheitsfachkräfte im betrieblichen Einsatz. Köln: 
Arbeitgeberverband der Metallindustrie Köln. 
Seeger, O. W., 1988. Arbeitssicherheit und Umweltschutz aus betrieblicher Sicht. 
Sicherheitsingenieur, 19(6), 32-42. 
Senne, H., 1995. Gemeinsame Ausschüße nach §28 Abs. 3 BetrVG. Ergebnisse und 
Folgerungen einer empirischen Bestandsaufnahme. Betriebs-Berater, 1995(6), 305- 
308. 
Sereno, K. K., and Mortensen, C. D., 1970. Foundations of Communication Theory. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
Shadwell, A., 1909. Industrial Efficiency. London: Longmans. 
Shalev, M., 1980. Industrial Relations Theory and the Comparative Study of Industrial 
Relations and Industrial Conflict. British Journal of Industrial Relations; 18(l), 26- 
43. 
Silier, E., 1981. Verantwortung für Arbeitssicherheit, 8. Auflage. Köln: BG der 
Feinmechanik und Elektrotechnik. 
Siller, E., 1989a. Arbeitssicherheit braucht das Engagement des Firmenchefs: Sieben Tips 
für den Betriebsinhaber. In: Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 1989. 
Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: 
Werbezentrum Wilsch. Pp. 29-33. 
, 
Siller, E., 1989b. In der Arbeitssicherheit ' muß oft Bilanz gezogen werden: 
Führungsdefizite der Meister werfen Risiken auf. In: Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., 
Hrsg. 1989. Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: 
Werbezentrum Wilsch. Pp. 70-74. 
Siller, E., and Schliephacke, J., Hrsg. 1989. ', Arbeitssicherheit: Schlüssel zum 
Unternehmenserfolg. Aschaffenburg: Werbezentrum Wilsch. 
338 
Simitis, S., 1984. Zur Verrechtlichung der Arbeitsbeziehungen. In: Kübler, F., Hrsg., 
1984. Verrechtlichung von Wirtschaft, Arbeit und sozialer Solidarität. Baden- 
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Pp. 73-165. 
Simonds, R. H., and Shafai-Sahrai, Y., 1977. Factors Apparently Affecting Injury 
Frequency in Eleven Matched Pairs of Company. Journal of Safety Research, 9(3), 
120-127. 
Sinclair, T. C., 1972. A Cost-Effectiveness Approach to Industrial Safety. Research Paper 
for the Committee on Safety and Health at Work. London: HMSO. 
Sisson, K., 1993. In Search of Human Resource Management. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 31(2), 201-210. 
Sisson, K., ed., 1994. Personnel Management. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Slesina, W., and Broelanann, M., 1992. Gesundheitszirkel zur Versärkung des 
Gesundheitsschutzes im Betrieb. Arbeit, 1(2), 166-186. 
Slichter, S. H., and Healy, J. J., and Livernash, E. R., 1960. The Impact of Collective 
Bargaining on Management. Washington D. C: The Brookings Institution. 
Smith, M. J., et al., 1978. Characteristics of Successful Safety Programs. Journal of 
Safety Research, 10(1), 5-15. 
Sperling, H-J., 1994. Innovative Arbeitsorganisation und intelligentes 
Partizipationsmanagement. Marburg: Schüren Presseverlag GmbH. 
Spinnarke, J., 1994. Soziale Sicherheit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 7. 
überarbeitete Auflage. Heidelberg: Hüthig. 
Stahlhacke, 1994. LAGE: Entscheidungen der Landesarbeitsgerichte - 10. Ordner. 
Neuwied: Verlag H. Luchterhand. 
Steele, G. R., 1974. Industrial Accidents: An' Economic Interpretation. Applied 
Economics, (6), 143-155. 
Stiewitt, I., 1994. Weg vom "Reparatur - Arbeitsschutz". sicher ist sicher, 45(9), 406. 
Stranks, J., 1994a. Human Factors and Safety. London: Pitman., - 
Stranks, J., 1994b. Management Systems for Safety. London: Pitman. 
Streeck, W., 1981. Qualitative Demands and the Neo-Corporatist Manageability of 
Industrial Relations. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 19(1), 149-169. 
339 
Streeck, W., 1984a. Industrial Relations in West Germany: A Case Study of the Car 
Industry, London: Heinemann. 
Streeck, W., 1984b. Industrial Relations, Trade Unions and Works Councils in the 
German Car Industry. London: PSI Research Paper. 
Streeck, W., 1984c. Co-determination: the fourth decade. In: Wilpert, B., and Sorge, A., 
eds., 1984. International Perspectives on Organisational Democracy - Volume H. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Streeck, W., 1988. Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis in West 
Germany. In: Goldthorpe, J. H., ed., 1988. Order and Conflict in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. 291-314. 
Streeck, W., 1992. Social Institutions and Economic Performance. London: SAGE 
Publications. 
Swinton, K. E., 1983. Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Legislation: The 
Role of the Internal Responsibility System. In: Swan, K. P., and Swinton, K. E., eds., 
1983. Studies in Labour Law. Butterworths: Toronto. Pp. 146-175. 
Teague, P., Grahl, J., 1992. Industrial Relations and European Integration. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart. 
Tegtmeier, W., 1991. Veränderungen in Europa. Bundesarbeitsblatt, 1991(12), 5-9. 
Terry, M., 1994. Workplace Unionism: Structures and Objectives. In: Hyman, R., and 
Ferner. A., eds., 1994. New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: 
Blackwell. Pp. 223-249. 
Teuteberg, H-J., 1961. Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung in Deutschland. 
Mohr, Tübingen. 
Thiehoff, R., 1994. Gesundheitsförderung,, als .. 
Wirtschaftsfaktor.. Die 
Betriebskrankenkasse, (2), 84-86. 
Thierbach, D., and Blömer, . T., 1990.. 
Vom Deutschen Metallarbeiterverband zur 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall. Bramsche: Rasch Druckerei und Verlag. 
Thomas, P., 1991. Safety in Smaller Manufacturing' Establishments. Employment 
Gazette, 99(1), 20-25. 
Thon-Jacobi, W., 1989. Arbeitsschutzalltag - Eine, empirische Studie zu 
Handlungsstrukturen im Betrieb. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. 
Tillsley, C., 1994. Employee Involvement: Employees' Views. Employment Gazette, 
103(6). 
340 
Tolliday, S., and Zeitlin, J., ed., 1991. The Power to Manage - Employers and 
Industrial Relations in Comparative-Historical Perspective. London: Routledge. 
Trautwein-Kalms, G., and Gerlach, G., 1980. Gewerkschaften und Humanisierung der 
Arbeit. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 
Trinczek, R., 1989. Betriebliche Mitbestimmung als soziale Interaktion: Ein Beitrag zur 
Analyse innerbetrieblicher industrieller Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 
18(8), 444-456. 
Vadney, T. E., 1990. The World Since 1945. London: Penguin. 
von Beyme, K., 1985. Staat. In: Endruweit, G., et al., Hrsg., 1985. Handbuch der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Pp. 109-117. 
Walker, K. F., 1977. Towards Useful Theorising About Industrial Relations. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 15(3), 307-316. 
Walters, D. R., 1990. Worker Participation in Health and Safety: A European 
Comparison. London: Institute of Employment Rights. 
Walters, D. R., and Freeman, R. J., 1992. Employee Representation in Health and 
Safety at the Workplace. Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities. 
Walters, D. R., and Gourlay, S., 1990. Statutory Employee Involvement in Health and 
Safety at the Workplace: A Report of the Implementation Effectiveness of The 
Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977. London: HSE. 
Wank, R., 1992. In: Baldwin, R., and Daintith, T., eds., 1992. Harmonization and 
Hazard: Regulating Workplace Health and Safety in the European Community. 
London: Graham & Trotman. 
Wank, R., and Börgmann, u., 1992. Deutsches und europäisches Arbeitsschutzrecht. 
München: C. H. Beck. 
Wassermann, W., 1988. Arbeit, Gesundheit und neue Technik in Klein- und 
Mittelbetrieben. Struktur- und Handlungsprobleme der betrieblichen 
Interessenvertretung. Werkstattbericht 34. Düsseldorf: Ministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes NRW. 
Wattendorf, F., 1990. "Experten" und "Laien" im betrieblichen Arbeits- und 
Gesundheitsschutz. Verschiedene Sprachen - gleiche Probleme? In: Pröll, U., and 
Peter, G., Hrsg., 1990. Prävention als betriebliches Alltagshandeln. Schriftenreihe 
der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, Tagungsbericht 54. Bremerhaven: 
Wirtschaftsverlag NW. Pp. 125-133. 
341 
Wattendorf, F., 1991. Sicherheitsbeauftragte im Betrieb. Sicherheitsbeauftragter, 26(1), 
12-15. 
Weimer, B., 1995. Der Unfalljahresbericht. Sicherheitsingenieur, 26(3), 26-28. 
Weinert, R., 1985. Betriebsräte und Technischer Wandel. Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang. 
Weiss, M., 1992. European Employment and Industrial Relations Glossary: 
Germany. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
Weitbrecht, H., and Berger, G., 1985. Zur Geschichte der Arbeitsbeziehungen: 
Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz. In: Endruweit, G., et al., Hrsg., 1985. Handbuch 
der Arbeitsbeziehungen. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Pp. 483-5 10. 
Weitz, F., 1976. Introduction to New Technologies, Employment Policies and 
Industrial Relations. Munich: Anglo German Foundation for the Study of Industrial 
Society. 
Whomsley, D., et al. 1992. The EC and Health and Safety at Work. Luxembourg: 
Commission of the European Communities. 
Williams, K., 1984. Conflicts and Conflict Resolution at Plant Level in Britain and 
West Germany -A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison. Ph. D thesis, 
University of Surrey. 
Williams, K., 1988. Industrial Relations and the German Model. Aldershot: Avebury. 
Willsch, W., 1993. Betriebliche Gesundheitsförderung. sicher ist sicher, 44(2), 97-101. 
Windahl, S., et al., 1992. Using Communication Theory. London: SAGE Publications. 
Windhoff-Heritier, A., et al., 1990. Verwaltungen im Widerstreit von 
Klientelinteressen - Arbeitsschutz im Internationalen Vergleich. Wiesbaden: 
Deutscher Universitäts Verlag GmbH. 
Wlotzke, 0., and Lorenz, M., 1990. Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsschutzrecht im deutsch- 
deutschen Einigungsprozeß. Betriebs-Berater, Beilage 35 zu Heft 28/1990.1990 
Beilagen, 1-13. 
Wynne, R., 1993. Betriebliche Gesundheitsmaßnahmen - die nächsten Schritte, 
Grundsatzdokument. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions. 
Ziegenfuß, B., 1994. Sicherheitstechnische Betreuung von Kleinbetrieben. sicher ist 
sicher, 45(10), 518-519. 
342 
Zink, K. J., Partizipative Sicherheitsarbeit - ein Baustein integrierter 
Arbeitssicherheitskonzepte. In: Ritter, A., and Zink, K. J., eds., 1992. 
Gruppenorientierte Ansätze zur Förderung der Arbeitssicherheit, Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag. Pp. 3-16. 
Zwingmann, B., 1989. Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutz durch Tarifvertrag - Neue Ansätze 
in der Druckindustrie. WSI Mitteilungen, 42(12), 710-720. 
Zwingmann, B., 1992. Reformimpulse der Europäischen Gemeinschaften für den 
deutschen Arbeitsschutz - Kernelemente einer Grundsatzreform aus 
gewerkschaftlicher Sicht. In: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1992. Veränderung des 
Arbeitsschutzrechtes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Tagung der 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung am 12. und 13. Mai in Leipzig, 1992. Düsseldorf. Satz und 
Druck GmbH. Pp. 25-49. 
Zwingmann, B., 1995. Arbeitsschutz und Wirtschaftlichkeit - Argumente pro und 
contra aus gewerkschaftlicher Sicht. Unpublished. 
1 sfs 
, 
VI! R$rr OF SWREYLIB lARI 
